“Concerning those whom God is slow to punish.” This subject is
discussed between Plutarch and several of his relatives, Plutarch
being the principal speaker. Epicurus had just left the company
uttering invectives against the justice of the Deity in the
government of the world, 140. It is admitted that the delay of
divine justice gives rise to perplexing thoughts, 141. Some of the
objections are,—(1) Such delay seems to proceed from indifference
on the part of the Deity to the desert of crime; (2) Punishment
long delayed fails to restrain the commission of crime, as a
speedy retribution would do; (3) It is often entirely useless as
a reparation to those who have suffered from injustice; (4) It
emboldens the transgressor, 141; (5) It diminishes in many minds the
belief of Divine Providence; (6) Punishment long delayed fails of any
good effect on the offender himself, 143. To what good purpose, then,
do the millstones of the gods grind, when they grind so slowly? 143.
To these objections it is answered as follows: It becomes us to enter
on such inquiries with great caution and self-distrust, because our
knowledge of God and of his ways is extremely narrow and imperfect,
144. We are very incompetent judges of what it is fit for God to do,
144. God only knows _when_, and _in what manner_, and _how much_ to
punish, 144. Those who are ignorant of music or of military affairs
are not competent judges of those matters, 144. No one who is not
properly trained can wisely administer human law, 145. The remissness
of which complaint is made is true only in part, and is only
apparent. So far as it is real, it may be vindicated by the following
considerations: (1) The Deity, by being slow to punish, teaches us to
moderate our anger, and never to punish in a passion, 146; He would
lead us to imitate his own gentleness and forbearance, 147; (2) The
wicked, in consequence of delay, have opportunity to repent, and are
therefore spared from a desire of their reformation, 148; The summary
justice, to which the passions of men incite them, excludes all
regard to this object, and degenerates into the mere gratification
of malice and revenge, 148; The wisdom of the divine policy, so
different from this, is fully justified by the results, since history
records many instances where men who, in early life, were profligate,
have afterwards reformed and become useful to society, 149, 150; (3)
The wicked are often permitted to live and prosper, that Providence
may by them execute its justice on others, of which instances are
given, 151, 152; (4) The wicked are sometimes spared that a noble
and virtuous posterity, proceeding from them, may bless the world,
152; (5) Punishment is sometimes deferred for a time that the hand
of Providence may be more conspicuous in inflicting it, 153. But the
objection against an overruling Providence, founded on the prosperity
of the wicked, assumes too much; the delay is apparent, rather than
real, 154. Retribution follows hard on the steps of crime, in the
shame, remorse, and inward suffering of the offender, 154. Many look
with envy on wicked men who seem to enjoy high prosperity, while
those men are soon to become involved in the deepest misery, 154.
Wicked men suffer not a late but a long punishment; they suffer
all the time, 155. What we call delay, is not such to the Deity;
distinctions of time with him have no place, 155. It is not the last
moment of punishment which contains all the punishment, 155. God
has the offender all the while in his power, and does not suffer
him to rest, 156. Instances are given of remorse suffered by the
guilty, 156, 157. Were death the extinction of our being, it might
still be maintained that the Deity is not remiss in punishing crime,
157. The wicked find, even here, that no real good comes from their
wickedness, 158. Self-condemnation, a dread of censure, a fear of
death, embitter their lives, 159. One of the company now leads the
conversation to a kindred subject, the question how the conduct of
Providence can be justified in punishing children for the misconduct
of their parents, of which several instances are quoted, 160, 161.
To this it is replied: (1) Children often derive advantage from the
virtue and piety of their fathers; it is not therefore strange that
they should suffer for their wickedness, 163, 164. (2) The law of
cause and effect comes in here, as in other cases, though we may
not fully explain it; children often inherit the diseases of their
parents; the plague of Athens took its rise in far distant Ethiopia,
165. (3) The constitution of society binds one generation to another,
and thus renders this retribution just, as well as inevitable; every
family, as well as every state, has a separate existence, a personal
identity of its own, and it is one and the same through successive
ages; hence the social crime of one age may properly work out its
legitimate results in another, 166-168. (4) In all cases, God deals
with men according to their deserts; if children are virtuous, they
are not harmed for what their ancestors have done, 169. But, says one
of the company, some of your remarks imply the immortality of the
soul, 168, 169. Plutarch answers, yes; and we have good reason for
assuming that point; if we were like the leaves which fall from the
trees in autumn, or like the hot-house plant which has no enduring
root; if we were brought into existence to endure only for a day,
it would be unworthy of the Deity to lavish so much care upon us,
169. The immortality of the soul, and an overruling Providence, are
confirmed to us by the same argument, 170. If the soul survives the
body, we may conclude that its future state will be one of reward
or punishment, because life is a struggle and a probation, 170.
Punishments that reach posterity often restrain the inclinations
of wicked persons, 171. Children born of diseased parents need to
be guarded against the hereditary disease, 172. And children of
wicked parents will be themselves wicked, unless careful and timely
restraints be placed upon them, 173, 174. God sees the inbred
corruption if we do not, and often does not wait till the actual
outbreak before animadverting upon it, 174, 175. Dormant villany may
be more dangerous than open iniquity, and so may need chastisement,
175. The innocent are never punished for the guilty; but if a man
tread in his father’s steps, he must succeed to his punishment, 175,
176. The argument is enforced by the story of a man who lived a
dishonest and wicked life; who appeared to die; visited the world of
spirits; saw the rewards and punishments there experienced; came back
to life, and was greatly reformed in consequence, 177-188.