on the continent. I shall say nothing of Canada, or Halifax, or the
Penobscot, from whence we are expecting news, and which, for the moment,
are not of essential importance. Rhode Island is in our possession; you
can enter it in full security; letters, signals, and pilots will await
you there, agreeably to my instructions. Your magazines, your sick, and
all your unnecessary baggage, can go up the Providence by water; I shall
soon send to Rhode Island more particular information on this point.
The enemy have, at the present moment, seven thousand men of their best
troops employed at the siege of Charlestown; they have also some ships
of the line without the harbour; one vessel of fifty guns, two frigates
of forty-four, and several smaller vessels. According to news from
New York, Charlestown still held out on the 3rd of this month. On the
Islands of New York, Long Island, and Staten Island, the forces of the
enemy consisted of eight thousand regular troops, a few militia, upon
which they place no dependence, and a small number of royalists, very
contemptible in all respects. They have only one ship of seventy-four
guns, and some frigates. The American army is in three divisions; one
guards the fort of West Point and keeps open the North River; another
is in South Carolina; and the third, which is the largest, is in the
Jerseys, under the immediate command of General Washington. This last
division, not very numerous at present, will be increased in a few days;
and for that reason, I shall defer till another letter giving you a more
exact account of its situation.
Your voyage is known at New York. Advices were immediately sent on to
Charlestown, recalling either the troops, or at least the ships of war.
They are erecting fortifications on the Island, and preparing vessels
loaded with stones to obstruct the passage; in a word, if it be true
that the present divided state of the English forces seems to insure
their destruction, and to promise us the conquest of New York, it is
equally true that, at the moment of your arrival, if by good fortune
things remain in their present state, we shall have no time to lose in
taking advantage of those favourable circumstances.
At the same time that I here execute the orders of my general, and
communicate to you the sentiments of my friend, permit me to assure you
of the strong desire of our army to do whatever may please you, and how
much we shall all endeavour to merit the friendship and the esteem of
troops, whose assistance at the present moment is so essential to us.
You will find amongst us a great deal of good will, a great deal of
sincerity, and above all, a great desire to be agreeable to you.
I send a duplicate of this letter to the Chevalier de Ternay, and I
shall send the same to Point Judith and Seaconnet; so that in case you
should make land at Rhode Island, you may at once sail for Sandy Hook.
The next letter which I shall have the honour to write to you, will be
dated at headquarters. The confidence of General Washington, which M.
de Galvan has deserved, and the means which he has of fulfilling his
instructions, all assure me that you will be satisfied with our choice.
I have the honour to be, &c.
Footnote:
1. The instructions given to M. de Lafayette by the minister of foreign
affairs, (5th March, 1780), were, that, to prevent any mistake or delay,
he was to place, both on Rhode Island and on Cape Henry (the mouth of
the Chesapeake), a French officer, to await the arrival of the French
squadron, which was to land at one of those two points, and to give it
all the information it might require on its arrival. This letter was
consequently given to M. de Galvan, and he repaired to Cape Henry, but
vainly expected those frigates: they landed at Rhode Island, they left
Brest the 2nd of May, under the orders of the Chevalier de Ternay, and
appeared before Newport the 10th of July. This letter was delivered
afterwards to M. de Rochambeau, as well as several others, which want of
space and interest do not allow us to insert.
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
(ORIGINAL.)
Camp at Preakness, July 4th, 1780.
You know, my dear general, that I am very anxious to see the army well
clothed for this campaign; the importance of such a measure is on every
account obvious, and from the knowledge I have of the auxiliary troops
that are coming, I can so well demonstrate its necessity that I shall
for the present but attend to the means of executing it.
In the space of six months (we know from experience) the coats of our
soldiers begin to be worn out, so that there is no great inconvenience
in giving some new clothes to the draftsmen, and after they shall be
discharged, the number of the remaining soldiers will not much exceed
six or seven thousand men; as those very men will have been completely
clothed by the middle of July, I think I make full allowance for them by
keeping in store the seven thousand unmade suits that have been shipped
by Mr. Ross.
If more are wanted in the course of next summer, I engage to go over to
France and bring back ten thousand complete suits properly conveyed.
Excluding wagoners, servants, and all such people who do not want to be
uniformly clothed, we may calculate the continental army to consist of
fourteen thousand men in the field. There may be found in the army
four thousand coats and waistcoats which are not absolutely bad, four
thousand stocks or cravats, and one thousand pretty good hats.
We may get from the stores fifteen thousand overalls, ten thousand pairs
of shoes, three thousand round hats, and some few shirts.
There are also six or seven hundred coats of every colour, to which
may be added about three or four hundred of the same kind, and some
indifferent hats found in the army, &c.
A small quantity of buff and red cloth to be bought for the facings of
the Pennsylvanian and Jersey lines.
The four thousand good hats in the stores or in the army to be cut
round, or cocked in the form of caps, but to be in an uniform manner.
All the articles now in the possession of the clothier-general, to be
immediately ordered to North River, and, if necessary, wagons should be
pressed for their speedy transportation.
I will write a letter to the Chevalier de Ternay, wherein I will desire
him to send to the most convenient place the clothing which has been put
under his convoy.
We shall then have ten thousand new coats and waistcoats, and four
thousand old ones, the whole of an uniform ground, ten thousand new
hats and stocks, and four thousand old ones, five and twenty thousand
overalls, more than twenty thousand shirts, and thirty thousand pairs of
shoes.
Each soldier enlisted for the war, let them even be ten thousand,
shall have, if you choose, a new complete suit, one hat, one stock, two
shirts, two pairs of overalls, and two pairs of shoes.
Each draftsman, if he has not the same, will at least receive a decent
uniform coat, one stock, one hat, one pair of overalls, and two pairs of
shoes; he will not certainly come out but well provided with shirts.
By the above mentioned arrangement, there remain about a thousand coats
of every colour, a thousand hats, which are not absolutely bad, and two
thousand pairs of shoes; these I propose to give to such men as will not
appear under arms in the field, and, if necessary, some hunting-shirts
may be added to the said clothing.
The dragoons are generally better clothed than the infantry, and we
might very easily complete their coats or stable-jackets, as each
different regiment could adopt a different colour.
As soon as the French clothing comes, I wish the whole army to be
clothed at once, in observing to give the round hats to some particular
brigades, for the sake of uniformity, and to turn up the facings
according to the plan agreed.
There will be then no excuse for the officers who, out of neglect,
should suffer their men to lose a single article, and the most strict
orders may be given for that purpose.
The French arms that are coming might be put in the hands of soldiers
enlisted for the war.
I wish that there was a distinction of one woollen epaulette for the
corporal, and two for the serjeant.
As to the feathers, (become a distinction of ranks,) I wish such as have
been pointed out might be forbidden to other officers, and for the light
division I shall beg the leave of wearing a black and red feather, which
I have imported for the purpose.
These ideas, my dear general, are not given to you as a great stroke of
genius, but I heartily wish something of the kind may be thought proper.
TO MM. LE COMTE DE ROCHAMBEAU, AND LE CHEVALIER DE TERNAY.~[1]
Camp, before Dobb's Ferry, Aug. 9, 1780.
Gentlemen,--I arrived two days ago at head quarters, and in consequence
of the mission I was charged with, my first care was to render an
account of our conversations; but the most minute details of them are so
important, and the fate of America, and the glory of France, depend so
completely upon the result of our combinations here, that, in order to
feel more certain of having perfectly understood your meaning, I will
submit to you a summary of our conversations, and entreat you to write
me word immediately whether I have rightly understood your meaning.
Before quitting Rhode Island, gentlemen, I should have taken this
precaution, if General Washington's march against New York had not
obliged me to join my division, at the very moment when, from our
further arrangements, you most required some information.
1st. I have described to you the actual situation of America, the
exhausted state in which I found her, and the momentary efforts she
had made, which could only have been produced by the hope of being
delivered, by one decisive blow, from the tyranny of the English.
I told you those efforts were so enormous, when we consider the state of
our finances, and the failure of all our resources, that I do not expect
to see them renewed during another campaign. I added that on the 1st of
November we should no longer have any militia, that the 1st of January
one half of our continental army would be disbanded, and I took the
liberty of saying, in my own name, that I thought it necessary, as a
political measure, to enter into action this campaign; and this I had
ascertained also to be the case, by sounding, on my journey, the wishes
of the people.
2nd. I confirmed what I have already had the honour of writing to you
respecting the continental troops, and the militia whom we are to have
with us. I told you that by counting the enemies in New York at fourteen
thousand men, of which ten thousand are regulars, and four thousand very
bad militia, I thought their numbers were somewhat exaggerated, and that
it was necessary to begin by deducting the sailors employed by Admiral
Arbuthnot. As to the fortifications, I said that the American troops
would take charge of New York, and that the fort of Brooklyn (upon which
you might operate in concert with a division of our troops) is merely an
earthen work of four bastions, with a ditch and a shed, containing from
a thousand to fifteen hundred men, and having in front another smaller
work, which cannot contain more than a hundred men. I added that nothing
could prevent a regular approach upon Brooklyn, and that that post is
the key of New York.
3rd. I explained to you General Washington's plan, and told you that
the moment you began your march, he would repair to Morrisania, where, I
again repeat, he would establish batteries that would close the passage
of Hell's Gate, and secure the one from the continent to Long Island, so
as to have nothing to fear from the enemy's ships. Whilst awaiting your
arrival, gentlemen, our army would entrench itself at Morrisania, or,
if possible, on the Island of New York, and would place itself in
a situation to detach a corps of troops, as soon as you shall have
approached us, either by coming by land to Westchester, and passing
afterwards under favour of our batteries, or by repairing by sea to
Wistown, or any other bay in that neighbourhood. General Washington
would furnish a sufficient corps of Americans, and fifteen large cannon,
to co-operate with your troops, and he believes that with these forces,
and united with artillery, the point of Brooklyn might soon be taken,
and consequently the town of New York.
4th. I represented to you that Long Island was a rich country, which,
even alter the destruction effected by the English, still possesses
some resources; that we might feel certain of being joined there by the
militia of the island; and, in short, that with the assistance of our
Morrisanian under-batteries, and still more with a battery on the Island
of New York, we should assure the communication between Long Island and
the continent. From these various circumstances, my own private opinion
would decidedly be to commence our action, if the fleet could be placed
in security, before we possessed any superiority of naval force.
5th. I strongly insisted upon the necessity of taking possession, as
soon as possible, of the New York harbour. I requested M. de Ternay
to examine that point with the pilots I gave him, and by the immense
advantages of that measure I hoped that, either with the aid of land
forces on the side of Sandy Hook, or merely by the superiority of his
own naval force, he would be enabled to accomplish the object we had
feared his attempting when we expected him with Admiral Graves.
6th. When proposing to you to send your magazines to Providence, I told
you that Rhode Island was completely useless to the Americans, but very
important for the succours arriving from France, in case, however, no
army should be necessary to preserve it; that if the English were to
commit the fault of taking it, a superior fleet, aided by forces from
the continent, would always have the power of retaking it.
7th. I ended by having the honour of telling you, gentlemen, that in
order to operate upon New York it would be necessary not to commence
later than the first days of September; and, after this explanation,
I said that General Washington, feeling the most perfect confidence
in you, was very desirous of having your opinion upon the subject, and
would only undertake what might appear to you most advantageous.
This, gentlemen, is what I had the honour of saying to you, and this is
what you did me the honour to reply to:--
1st. That the succour sent to the United States was anything rather than
trifling; that the second division was to set out a short time after
you, and, that it might justly be expected every instant; that it would
consist at least of two thousand five hundred, and, in all probability,
of a still greater number of troops; that it was to be sent by three
ships, but that, according to all appearances, a larger number of
vessels would be granted; that the only reason which could prevent its
arriving before the 1st of September, would be the impossibility of a
junction between the French and Spanish fleets, and that, in the latter
case, it would arrive, at farthest, by the end of autumn, and would then
be a great deal stronger; that M. de Guichen has been apprised of
our projects, and has received the order to facilitate them; that,
consequently, the Chevalier de Ternay has written to him for the five
promised vessels; and that, from all these circumstances, you hoped to
be able to act before the end of the campaign, but did not doubt, at
least, having the power of furnishing us with very superior forces for
this winter, and for the next campaign.
2nd. The project of attacking Brooklyn was extremely agreeable to you,
and appeared to you the most proper measure for the reduction of New
York; but you think that we ought to have upon that Island a force at
least equal to that which the enemy may offer us, and you added that by
leaving a counterfeit at New York, they may fall on the corps of Long
Island, with nearly their whole army, which contingency, you will
perceive, had been already provided for by Washington's arrangements.
3rd. You appeared to me doubtful whether it would be possible to stop
the enemy at the passage of Morrisania, but on this point I can give you
no decisive information. The idea of repairing by land to Westchester
appeared less agreeable to you than that of going by sea into a bay of
Long Island. As to the landing, the Count de Rochambeau looks upon it as
a very long operation, and, from his own experience on the subject, he
believes that it would require nearly three weeks to land an army, with
all its accoutrements, for a campaign and siege. You desired to have
every possible information concerning Brooklyn, in order to be able to
make calculations accordingly for the artillery and engineer service.
You appeared to me to consider a naval superiority as necessary, even
at the commencement of the campaign; but it is true that this idea may
partly proceed from your doubts relating to the communication concerning
Morrisania.
5th. The Chevalier de Ternay conceives it would be difficult to take
possession of New York harbour, and hopes to accomplish the same object
by the situation in which he has placed his cruisers. He does not think
that his seventy-fours can enter, but from the difference of opinion
which I ventured to express, as to the importance at least of occupying
the harbour, he told me he would again attend to this project. As to his
manner of protecting the disembarkation, it would be to cruise in the
Sound, and his frigates, and one or two vessels, would enter into the
bay at the place where the troops should land.
6th. Rhode Island appears to you a very important point to preserve; but
if M. de Ternay should have the superiority, you think, as we do, that
it would be unnecessary to leave a garrison there during the attack
of New York. The Count de Rochambeau desired me to assure General
Washington that, in every case, upon receiving an order, he would
instantly repair to that spot which the commander-in-chief should
appoint. I told him, also, that the French generals wished that it were
possible to have an interview with him.
At the termination of our conversation, we decided upon the following
measures, of which I consequently gave an account to General Washington.
1st. You have written to France to urge the speedy arrival and
augmentation of the promised succours. You have already asked for the
five vessels of M. de Guichen, and I have also taken charge of another
letter, which repeats the same request, and which will pass through the
hands of the Chevalier de la Luzerne.
2d. As soon as you receive news of the arrival either of the second
division or of the ships from the West Indies, you will immediately
despatch a messenger to General Washington; and, whilst our army is
marching towards Westchester, and your own making preparation for
embarkation, M. de Ternay will endeavour to effect his junction.
3d. If the French fleet should be equal to that of the enemy, it will
immediately enter into a contest for superiority; if it should be
superior, it will take the French troops instantly on board, and carry
them towards the bay intended for their landing.
4th. A spot shall be chosen from whence the ships may protect the
operation, and which will also afford to the troops first landed a
position well sheltered by the fire from the ships, and behind which
the remainder of the troops may join them; or by advancing with all the
landed troops, the right and left wings may be so placed as to cover the
last of the disembarkation. The spot selected shall be situated in
such a manner that the corps of the American army intended for this
particular expedition, may arrive and land at the very moment of the
landing of the Count de Rochambeau, and that their general may be able
to co-operate instantly with the French general.
5th. According to the number of French troops in a state to operate,
General Washington will either conduct himself, or send to Long Island,
a sufficient number of troops to obtain a force nearly equal to that of
the enemy, and he will also have a corps of troops of nearly the same
strength as the one opposed to him, either at Westchester or in the
Island of New York.
6th. The Chevalier de Ternay will examine, attentively, the possibility
of forcing the passage of Sandy Hook, and if it be deemed practicable,
will attain that important end.
7th. As soon as the arms, clothes, and ammunition, belonging to the
United States, shall arrive, the Chevalier de Ternay will have the
goodness, without giving them time to enter the harbour, to send them
with a convoy of frigates, or, if the batteries be not yet erected, by
a ship of the line, to that point in the Sound which General Washington
may judge proper to select.
8th. The French fleet will take charge of the boats we shall require,
which will be delivered up to them at Providence; they will also land
us all the powder that they can do without themselves; this does not
amount, at present, to more than thirty thousand pounds.
9th. I shall send to the French generals all the correct information
I may obtain respecting the passage of the Sound by Hell Gate; I shall
communicate to them, likewise, all the details relating to Brooklyn, and
they will send us the calculations which have been made in consequence
by the artillery and engineers,--from thence we shall decide what must
be sent with the American Long Island corps for these two companies.
Some doubts are entertained by the French generals concerning the
two points of this last article; I shall send them from home some
information respecting that subject, of which I had before the honour of
speaking to them.
10th. The invalids, magazines, &c., shall be sent to Providence, and the
batteries of that river are to be placed by us in proper order. It is
clearly specified that the instant the expected naval superiority of
force arrives, the French are not to lose a single day in commencing
their co-operative measures.
Such is, gentlemen, the abridgment of the account rendered to General
Washington; and it will serve as the basis for his preparations, as
well as a rule for the future elucidations you may receive. From the
confidence with which he has honoured me, I was obliged to settle
finally all that it was possible for me to arrange with you,--the fate
of America, in short, appears to be dependent upon your activity or
repose during the remainder of this summer. I attach the greatest
importance to all your ideas being clearly rendered, and I entreat you
to lose no time in writing a few words to say whether I have understood
your meaning.
A short time after my departure, gentlemen, you must have learnt that
General Clinton, fearing for New York; had been obliged, by a sudden
movement of our army, to enclose himself in that island. The army is at
present near Dobb's Ferry, ten miles above King's Bridge, on the right
side of the North River, and our advance guard is nearly three miles
before it.
If General Clinton, with a force and position equal to our own, should
judge proper to fight, we shall give him a favourable opportunity of
doing so, and he may take advantage of that kind of challenge to make
the most impartial trial of the English and Hessian against the American
troops.
I shall wait here, most impatiently, gentlemen, your answer to this
letter. I shall have the honour of communicating to you the various
advices General Washington may find it expedient to send you. The first
intelligence of the arrival of the ships is very necessary to our peace
of mind, and from an intimate knowledge of our situation, I assure you,
gentlemen, in my own private name and person, that it is important to
act during this campaign, that all the troops you may hope to obtain
from France next year, as well as all the projects of which you may
flatter yourselves, will never repair the fatal consequences of our
present inactivity. Without resources in America, all foreign succours
would prove of no avail; and although, in every case, you may rely
wholly upon us, I think it important to take advantage of the moment
when you may find here a co-operation, without which you will not be
able to achieve anything for the American cause.
I have the honour to be, &c.
P.S. Such, gentlemen, is the long official letter which I have the
honour of writing to you, but I cannot send it without thanking you for
the kindness you expressed for me at Rhode Island, and presenting you
the assurance of my sincere and respectful attachment.
Footnote: