It will have blood; they say blood win have blood:

Transcribed from the 1904 Edward Arnold edition by David Price, email

ccx074@pglaf.org

STYLE

* * * * *

BY

WALTER RALEIGH

AUTHOR OF ‘THE ENGLISH NOVEL,’

AND ‘ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, A CRITICAL ESSAY’

* * * * *

_FIFTH IMPRESSION_

* * * * *

LONDON

EDWARD ARNOLD

Publisher to the India Office

1904

* * * * *

JOANNI SAMPSON

BIBLIOTHECARIO OPTIMO

VIRO OMNI SAPIENTIA ÆGYPTIORUM

ERUDITO

LABORUM ET ITINERUM SUORUM

SOCIO

HUNC LIBELLUM

D · D · D

AUCTOR

TABLE OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS

CONTAINED IN THIS ESSAY

PAGE

The Triumph of Letters 1

The Problem of Style 3

The Instrument and the Audience, with a Digression on the 4

Actor

The Sense-Elements 8

The Functions of Sense 10

Picture 11

Melody 14

Meaning, Exampled in Negation 17

The Weapons of Thought 21

The Analogy from Architecture 23

The Analogy Rectified. The Law of Change 24

The Good Slang 27

The Bad Slang 29

Archaism 32

Romantic and Classic 36

The Palsy of Definition 39

Distinction 43

Assimilation 45

Synonyms 46

Variety of Expression 49

Variety Justified 50

Metaphor and Abstraction: Poetry and Science 55

The Doctrine of the _Mot Propre_ 61

The Instrument 65

The Audience 65

The Relation of the Author to his Audience 71

The Poet and his Audience 71

Public Caterers 77

The Cautelous Man 78

Sentimentalism and Jocularity 81

The Tripe-Seller 83

The Wag 85

Social and Rhetorical Corruptions 87

Sincerity 88

Insincerity 93

Austerity 94

The Figurative Style 98

Decoration 100

Allusiveness 102

Simplicity and Strength 104

The Paradox of Letters 107

Drama 108

Implicit Drama 111

Words Again 115

Quotation 116

Appropriation 119

The World of Words 123

The Teaching of Style 124

The Conclusion 127

STYLE

STYLE, the Latin name for an iron pen, has come to designate the art that

handles, with ever fresh vitality and wary alacrity, the fluid elements

of speech. By a figure, obvious enough, which yet might serve for an

epitome of literary method, the most rigid and simplest of instruments

has lent its name to the subtlest and most flexible of arts. Thence the

application of the word has been extended to arts other than literature,

to the whole range of the activities of man. The fact that we use the

word “style” in speaking of architecture and sculpture, painting and

music, dancing, play-acting, and cricket, that we can apply it to the

careful achievements of the housebreaker and the poisoner, and to the

spontaneous animal movements of the limbs of man or beast, is the noblest

of unconscious tributes to the faculty of letters. The pen, scratching

on wax or paper, has become the symbol of all that is expressive, all

that is intimate, in human nature; not only arms and arts, but man

himself, has yielded to it. His living voice, with its undulations and

inflexions, assisted by the mobile play of feature and an infinite

variety of bodily gesture, is driven to borrow dignity from the same

metaphor; the orator and the actor are fain to be judged by style. “It

is most true,” says the author of _The Anatomy of Melancholy_, “_stylus

virum arguit_, our style bewrays us.” Other gestures shift and change

and flit, this is the ultimate and enduring revelation of personality.

The actor and the orator are condemned to work evanescent effects on

transitory material; the dust that they write on is blown about their

graves. The sculptor and the architect deal in less perishable ware, but

the stuff is recalcitrant and stubborn, and will not take the impress of

all states of the soul. Morals, philosophy, and æsthetic, mood and

conviction, creed and whim, habit, passion, and demonstration—what art

but the art of literature admits the entrance of all these, and guards

them from the suddenness of mortality? What other art gives scope to

natures and dispositions so diverse, and to tastes so contrarious?

Euclid and Shelley, Edmund Spenser and Herbert Spencer, King David and

David Hume, are all followers of the art of letters.

In the effort to explain the principles of an art so bewildering in its

variety, writers on style have gladly availed themselves of analogy from

the other arts, and have spoken, for the most part, not without a

parable. It is a pleasant trick they put upon their pupils, whom they

gladden with the delusion of a golden age, and perfection to be sought

backwards, in arts less complex. The teacher of writing, past master in

the juggling craft of language, explains that he is only carrying into

letters the principles of counterpoint, or that it is all a matter of

colour and perspective, or that structure and ornament are the beginning

and end of his intent. Professor of eloquence and of thieving, his

winged shoes remark him as he skips from metaphor to metaphor, not daring

to trust himself to the partial and frail support of any single figure.

He lures the astonished novice through as many trades as were ever housed

in the central hall of the world’s fair. From his distracting account of

the business it would appear that he is now building a monument, anon he

is painting a picture (with brushes dipped in a gallipot made of an

earthquake); again he strikes a keynote, weaves a pattern, draws a wire,

drives a nail, treads a measure, sounds a trumpet, or hits a target; or

skirmishes around his subject; or lays it bare with a dissecting knife;

or embalms a thought; or crucifies an enemy. What is he really doing all

the time?

* * * * *

Besides the artist two things are to be considered in every art,—the

instrument and the audience; or, to deal in less figured phrase, the

medium and the public. From both of these the artist, if he would find

freedom for the exercise of all his powers, must sit decently aloof. It

is the misfortune of the actor, the singer, and the dancer, that their

bodies are their sole instruments. On to the stage of their activities

they carry the heart that nourishes them and the lungs wherewith they

breathe, so that the soul, to escape degradation, must seek a more remote

and difficult privacy. That immemorial right of the soul to make the

body its home, a welcome escape from publicity and a refuge for

sincerity, must be largely foregone by the actor, who has scant liberty

to decorate and administer for his private behoof an apartment that is

also a place of business. His ownership is limited by the necessities of

his trade; when the customers are gone, he eats and sleeps in the

bar-parlour. Nor is the instrument of his performances a thing of his

choice; the poorest skill of the violinist may exercise itself upon a

Stradivarius, but the actor is reduced to fiddle for the term of his

natural life upon the face and fingers that he got from his mother. The

serene detachment that may be achieved by disciples of greater arts can

hardly be his, applause touches his personal pride too nearly, the

mocking echoes of derision infest the solitude of his retired

imagination. In none of the world’s great polities has the practice of

this art been found consistent with noble rank or honourable estate.

Christianity might be expected to spare some sympathy for a calling that

offers prizes to abandonment and self-immolation, but her eye is fixed on

a more distant mark than the pleasure of the populace, and, as in

gladiatorial Rome of old, her best efforts have been used to stop the

games. Society, on the other hand, preoccupied with the art of life, has

no warmer gift than patronage for those whose skill and energy exhaust

themselves on the mimicry of life. The reward of social consideration is

refused, it is true, to all artists, or accepted by them at their

immediate peril. By a natural adjustment, in countries where the artist

has sought and attained a certain modest social elevation, the issue has

been changed, and the architect or painter, when his health is proposed,

finds himself, sorely against the grain, returning thanks for the

employer of labour, the genial host, the faithful husband, the tender

father, and other pillars of society. The risk of too great familiarity

with an audience which insists on honouring the artist irrelevantly, at

the expense of the art, must be run by all; a more clinging evil besets

the actor, in that he can at no time wholly escape from his phantasmal

second self. On this creature of his art he has lavished the last doit

of human capacity for expression; with what bearing shall he face the

exacting realities of life? Devotion to his profession has beggared him

of his personality; ague, old age and poverty, love and death, find in

him an entertainer who plies them with a feeble repetition of the

triumphs formerly prepared for a larger and less imperious audience. The

very journalist—though he, too, when his profession takes him by the

throat, may expound himself to his wife in phrases stolen from his own

leaders—is a miracle of detachment in comparison; he has not put his

laughter to sale. It is well for the soul’s health of the artist that a

definite boundary should separate his garden from his farm, so that when

he escapes from the conventions that rule his work he may be free to

recreate himself. But where shall the weary player keep holiday? Is not

all the world a stage?

Whatever the chosen instrument of an art may be, its appeal to those

whose attention it bespeaks must be made through the senses. Music,

which works with the vibrations of a material substance, makes this

appeal through the ear; painting through the eye; it is of a piece with

the complexity of the literary art that it employs both channels,—as it

might seem to a careless apprehension, indifferently.

For the writer’s pianoforte is the dictionary, words are the material in

which he works, and words may either strike the ear or be gathered by the

eye from the printed page. The alternative will be called delusive, for,

in European literature at least, there is no word-symbol that does not

imply a spoken sound, and no excellence without euphony. But the other

way is possible, the gulf between mind and mind may be bridged by

something which has a right to the name of literature although it exacts

no aid from the ear. The picture-writing of the Indians, the hieroglyphs

of Egypt, may be cited as examples of literary meaning conveyed with no

implicit help from the spoken word. Such an art, were it capable of high

development, would forsake the kinship of melody, and depend for its

sensual elements of delight on the laws of decorative pattern. In a land

of deaf-mutes it might come to a measure of perfection. But where human

intercourse is chiefly by speech, its connexion with the interests and

passions of daily life would perforce be of the feeblest, it would tend

more and more to cast off the fetters of meaning that it might do freer

service to the jealous god of visible beauty. The overpowering rivalry

of speech would rob it of all its symbolic intent and leave its bare

picture. Literature has favoured rather the way of the ear and has given

itself zealously to the tuneful ordering of sounds. Let it be repeated,

therefore, that for the traffic of letters the senses are but the

door-keepers of the mind; none of them commands an only way of

access,—the deaf can read by sight, the blind by touch. It is not amid

the bustle of the live senses, but in an under-world of dead impressions

that Poetry works her will, raising that in power which was sown in

weakness, quickening a spiritual body from the ashes of the natural body.

The mind of man is peopled, like some silent city, with a sleeping

company of reminiscences, associations, impressions, attitudes, emotions,

to be awakened into fierce activity at the touch of words. By one way or

another, with a fanfaronnade of the marching trumpets, or stealthily, by

noiseless passages and dark posterns, the troop of suggesters enters the

citadel, to do its work within. The procession of beautiful sounds that

is a poem passes in through the main gate, and forthwith the by-ways

resound to the hurry of ghostly feet, until the small company of

adventurers is well-nigh lost and overwhelmed in that throng of insurgent

spirits.

To attempt to reduce the art of literature to its component

sense-elements is therefore vain. Memory, “the warder of the brain,” is

a fickle trustee, whimsically lavish to strangers, giving up to the

appeal of a spoken word or unspoken symbol, an odour or a touch, all that

has been garnered by the sensitive capacities of man. It is the part of

the writer to play upon memory, confusing what belongs to one sense with

what belongs to another, extorting images of colour at a word, raising

ideas of harmony without breaking the stillness of the air. He can lead

on the dance of words till their sinuous movements call forth, as if by

mesmerism, the likeness of some adamantine rigidity, time is converted

into space, and music begets sculpture. To see for the sake of seeing,

to hear for the sake of hearing, are subsidiary exercises of his complex

metaphysical art, to be counted among its rudiments. Picture and music

can furnish but the faint beginnings of a philosophy of letters.

Necessary though they be to a writer, they are transmuted in his service

to new forms, and made to further purposes not their own.

The power of vision—hardly can a writer, least of all if he be a poet,

forego that part of his equipment. In dealing with the impalpable, dim

subjects that lie beyond the border-land of exact knowledge, the poetic

instinct seeks always to bring them into clear definition and bright

concrete imagery, so that it might seem for the moment as if painting

also could deal with them. Every abstract conception, as it passes into

the light of the creative imagination, acquires structure and firmness

and colour, as flowers do in the light of the sun. Life and Death, Love

and Youth, Hope and Time, become persons in poetry, not that they may

wear the tawdry habiliments of the studio, but because persons are the

objects of the most familiar sympathy and the most intimate knowledge.

How long, O Death? And shall thy feet depart

Still a young child’s with mine, or wilt thou stand

Full grown the helpful daughter of my heart,

What time with thee indeed I reach the strand

Of the pale wave which knows thee what thou art,

And drink it in the hollow of thy hand?

And as a keen eye for the imagery attendant on a word is essential to all

writing, whether prose or poetry, that attempts the heart, so languor of

the visual faculty can work disaster even in the calm periods of

philosophic expatiation. “It cannot be doubted,” says one whose daily

meditations enrich _The People’s Post-Bag_, “that Fear is, to a great

extent, the mother of Cruelty.” Alas, by the introduction of that brief

proviso, conceived in a spirit of admirably cautious self-defence, the

writer has unwittingly given himself to the horns of a dilemma whose

ferocity nothing can mitigate. These tempered and conditional truths are

not in nature, which decrees, with uncompromising dogmatism, that either

a woman is one’s mother, or she is not. The writer probably meant merely

that “fear is one of the causes of cruelty,” and had he used a colourless

abstract word the platitude might pass unchallenged. But a vague desire

for the emphasis and glamour of literature having brought in the word

“mother,” has yet failed to set the sluggish imagination to work, and a

word so glowing with picture and vivid with sentiment is damped and

dulled by the thumb-mark of besotted usage to mean no more than “cause”

or “occasion.” Only for the poet, perhaps, are words live winged things,

flashing with colour and laden with scent; yet one poor spark of

imagination might save them from this sad descent to sterility and

darkness.

Of no less import is the power of melody which chooses, rejects, and

orders words for the satisfaction that a cunningly varied return of sound

can give to the ear. Some critics have amused themselves with the hope

that here, in the laws and practices regulating the audible cadence of

words, may be found the first principles of style, the form which

fashions the matter, the apprenticeship to beauty which alone can make an

art of truth. And it may be admitted that verse, owning, as it does, a

professed and canonical allegiance to music, sometimes carries its

devotion so far that thought swoons into melody, and the thing said seems

a discovery made by the way in the search for tuneful expression.

What thing unto mine ear

Wouldst thou convey,—what secret thing,

O wandering water ever whispering?

Surely thy speech shall be of her,

Thou water, O thou whispering wanderer,

What message dost thou bring?

In this stanza an exquisitely modulated tune is played upon the syllables

that make up the word “wandering,” even as, in the poem from which it is

taken, there is every echo of the noise of waters laughing in sunny

brooks, or moaning in dumb hidden caverns. Yet even here it would be

vain to seek for reason why each particular sound of every line should be

itself and no other. For melody holds no absolute dominion over either

verse or prose; its laws, never to be disregarded, prohibit rather than

prescribe. Beyond the simple ordinances that determine the place of the

rhyme in verse, and the average number of syllables, or rhythmical beats,

that occur in the line, where shall laws be found to regulate the

sequence of consonants and vowels from syllable to syllable? Those few

artificial restrictions, which verse invents for itself, once agreed on,

a necessary and perilous license makes up the rest of the code.

Literature can never conform to the dictates of pure euphony, while

grammar, which has been shaped not in the interests of prosody, but for

the service of thought, bars the way with its clumsy inalterable

polysyllables and the monotonous sing-song of its inflexions. On the

other hand, among a hundred ways of saying a thing, there are more than

ninety that a care for euphony may reasonably forbid. All who have

consciously practised the art of writing know what endless and painful

vigilance is needed for the avoidance of the unfit or untuneful phrase,

how the meaning must be tossed from expression to expression, mutilated

and deceived, ere it can find rest in words. The stupid accidental

recurrence of a single broad vowel; the cumbrous repetition of a

particle; the emphatic phrase for which no emphatic place can be found

without disorganising the structure of the period; the pert intrusion on

a solemn thought of a flight of short syllables, twittering like a flock

of sparrows; or that vicious trick of sentences whereby each, unmindful

of its position and duties, tends to imitate the deformities of its

predecessor;—these are a select few of the difficulties that the nature

of language and of man conspire to put upon the writer. He is well

served by his mind and ear if he can win past all such traps and

ambuscades, robbed of only a little of his treasure, indemnified by the

careless generosity of his spoilers, and still singing.

Besides their chime in the ear, and the images that they put before the

mind’s eye, words have, for their last and greatest possession, a

meaning. They carry messages and suggestions that, in the effect

wrought, elude all the senses equally. For the sake of this, their prime

office, the rest is many times forgotten or scorned, the tune is

disordered and havoc played with the lineaments of the picture, because

without these the word can still do its business. The refutation of

those critics who, in their analysis of the power of literature, make

much of music and picture, is contained in the most moving passages that

have found utterance from man. Consider the intensity of a saying like

that of St. Paul:—“For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor

angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to

come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to

separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.”

Do these verses draw their power from a skilful arrangement of vowel and

consonant? But they are quoted from a translation, and can be translated

otherwise, well or ill or indifferently, without losing more than a

little of their virtue. Do they impress the eye by opening before it a

prospect of vast extent, peopled by vague shapes? On the contrary, the

visual embodiment of the ideas suggested kills the sense of the passage,

by lowering the cope of the starry heavens to the measure of a

poplar-tree. Death and life, height and depth, are conceived by the

apostle, and creation thrown in like a trinket, only that they may lend

emphasis to the denial that is the soul of his purpose. Other arts can

affirm, or seem to affirm, with all due wealth of circumstance and

detail; they can heighten their affirmation by the modesty of reserve,

the surprises of a studied brevity, and the erasure of all impertinence;

literature alone can deny, and honour the denial with the last resources

of a power that has the universe for its treasury. It is this negative

capability of words, their privative force, whereby they can impress the

minds with a sense of “vacuity, darkness, solitude, and silence,” that

Burke celebrates in the fine treatise of his younger days. In such a

phrase as “the angel of the Lord” language mocks the positive rivalry of

the pictorial art, which can offer only the poor pretence of an

equivalent in a young man painted with wings. But the difference between

the two arts is even better marked in the matter of negative suggestion;

it is instanced by Burke from the noble passage where Virgil describes

the descent of Æneas and the Sibyl to the shades of the nether world.

Here are amassed all “the images of a tremendous dignity” that the poet

could forge from the sublime of denial. The two most famous lines are a

procession of negatives:—

_Ibant obscuri sola sub nocte per umbram_,

_Perque domos Ditis vacuas et inania regna_.

Through hollow kingdoms, emptied of the day,

And dim, deserted courts where Dis bears sway,

Night-foundered, and uncertain of the path,

Darkling they took their solitary way.

Here is the secret of some of the cardinal effects of literature; strong

epithets like “lonely,” “supreme,” “invisible,” “eternal,” “inexorable,”

with the substantives that belong to them, borrow their force from the

vastness of what they deny. And not these alone, but many other words,

less indebted to logic for the magnificence of reach that it can lend,

bring before the mind no picture, but a dim emotional framework. Such

words as “ominous,” “fantastic,” “attenuated,” “bewildered,”

“justification,” are atmospheric rather than pictorial; they infect the

soul with the passion-laden air that rises from humanity. It is

precisely in his dealings with words like these, “heated originally by

the breath of others,” that a poet’s fine sense and knowledge most avail

him. The company a word has kept, its history, faculties, and

predilections, endear or discommend it to his instinct. How hardly will

poetry consent to employ such words as “congratulation” or

“philanthropist,”—words of good origin, but tainted by long immersion in

fraudulent rejoicings and pallid, comfortable, theoretic loves. How

eagerly will the poetic imagination seize on a word like “control,” which

gives scope by its very vagueness, and is fettered by no partiality of

association. All words, the weak and the strong, the definite and the

vague, have their offices to perform in language, but the loftiest

purposes of poetry are seldom served by those explicit hard words which,

like tiresome explanatory persons, say all that they mean. Only in the

focus and centre of man’s knowledge is there place for the hammer-blows

of affirmation, the rest is a flickering world of hints and half-lights,

echoes and suggestions, to be come at in the dusk or not at all.

The combination of these powers in words, of song and image and meaning,

has given us the supreme passages of our romantic poetry. In

Shakespeare’s work, especially, the union of vivid definite presentment

with immense reach of metaphysical suggestion seems to intertwine the

roots of the universe with the particular fact; tempting the mind to

explore that other side of the idea presented to it, the side turned away

from it, and held by something behind.

It will have blood; they say blood win have blood:

Stones have been known to move and trees to speak;

Augurs and understood relations have

By maggot-pies and choughs and rooks brought forth

The secret’st man of blood.

This meeting of concrete and abstract, of sense and thought, keeps the

eye travelling along the utmost skyline of speculation, where the heavens

are interfused with the earth. In short, the third and greatest virtue

of words is no other than the virtue that belongs to the weapons of

thought,—a deep, wide, questioning thought that discovers analogies and

pierces behind things to a half-perceived unity of law and essence. In

the employ of keen insight, high feeling, and deep thinking, language

comes by its own; the prettinesses that may be imposed on a passive

material are as nothing to the splendour and grace that transfigure even

the meanest instrument when it is wielded by the energy of thinking

purpose. The contempt that is cast, by the vulgar phrase, on “mere

words” bears witness to the rarity of this serious consummation. Yet by

words the world was shaped out of chaos, by words the Christian religion

was established among mankind. Are these terrific engines fit

play-things for the idle humours of a sick child?

And now it begins to be apparent that no adequate description of the art

of language can be drawn from the technical terminology of the other

arts, which, like proud debtors, would gladly pledge their substance to

repay an obligation that they cannot disclaim. Let one more attempt to

supply literature with a parallel be quoted from the works of a writer on

style, whose high merit it is that he never loses sight, either in theory

or in practice, of the fundamental conditions proper to the craft of

letters. Robert Louis Stevenson, pondering words long and lovingly, was

impressed by their crabbed individuality, and sought to elucidate the

laws of their arrangement by a reference to the principles of

architecture. “The sister arts,” he says, “enjoy the use of a plastic

and ductile material, like the modeller’s clay; literature alone is

condemned to work in mosaic with finite and quite rigid words. You have

seen those blocks, dear to the nursery: this one a pillar, that a

pediment, a third a window or a vase. It is with blocks of just such

arbitrary size and figure that the literary architect is condemned to

design the palace of his art. Nor is this all; for since these blocks or

words are the acknowledged currency of our daily affairs, there are here

possible none of those suppressions by which other arts obtain relief,

continuity, and vigour: no hieroglyphic touch, no smoothed impasto, no

inscrutable shadow, as in painting; no blank wall, as in architecture;

but every word, phrase, sentence, and paragraph must move in a logical

progression, and convey a definite conventional import.”

It is an acute comparison, happily indicative of the morose angularity

that words offer to whoso handles them, admirably insistent on the chief

of the incommodities imposed upon the writer, the necessity, at all times

and at all costs, to mean something. The boon of the recurring

monotonous expanse, that an apprentice may fill, the breathing-space of

restful mechanical repetition, are denied to the writer, who must needs

shoulder the hod himself, and lay on the mortar, in ever varying

patterns, with his own trowel. This is indeed the ordeal of the master,

the canker-worm of the penny-a-liner, who, poor fellow, means nothing,

and spends his life in the vain effort to get words to do the same. But

if in this respect architecture and literature are confessed to differ,

there remains the likeness that Mr. Stevenson detects in the building

materials of the two arts, those blocks of “arbitrary size and figure;

finite and quite rigid.” There is truth enough in the comparison to make

it illuminative, but he would be a rash dialectician who should attempt

to draw from it, by way of inference, a philosophy of letters. Words are

piled on words, and bricks on bricks, but of the two you are invited to

think words the more intractable. Truly, it was a man of letters who

said it, avenging himself on his profession for the never-ending toil it

imposed, by miscalling it, with grim pleasantry, the architecture of the

nursery. Finite and quite rigid words are not, in any sense that holds

good of bricks. They move and change, they wax and wane, they wither and

burgeon; from age to age, from place to place, from mouth to mouth, they

are never at a stay. They take on colour, intensity, and vivacity from

the infection of neighbourhood; the same word is of several shapes and

diverse imports in one and the same sentence; they depend on the building

that they compose for the very chemistry of the stuff that composes them.

The same epithet is used in the phrases “a fine day” and “fine irony,” in

“fair trade” and “a fair goddess.” Were different symbols to be invented

for these sundry meanings the art of literature would perish. For words

carry with them all the meanings they have worn, and the writer shall be

judged by those that he selects for prominence in the train of his

thought. A slight technical implication, a faint tinge of archaism, in

the common turn of speech that you employ, and in a moment you have

shaken off the mob that scours the rutted highway, and are addressing a

select audience of ticket-holders with closed doors. A single natural

phrase of peasant speech, a direct physical sense given to a word that

genteel parlance authorises readily enough in its metaphorical sense, and

at a touch you have blown the roof off the drawing-room of the villa, and

have set its obscure inhabitants wriggling in the unaccustomed sun. In

choosing a sense for your words you choose also an audience for them.

To one word, then, there are many meanings, according as it falls in the

sentence, according as its successive ties and associations are broken or

renewed. And here, seeing that the stupidest of all possible meanings is

very commonly the slang meaning, it will be well to treat briefly of

slang. For slang, in the looser acceptation of the term, is of two

kinds, differing, and indeed diametrically opposite, in origin and worth.

Sometimes it is the technical diction that has perforce been coined to

name the operations, incidents, and habits of some way of life that

society despises or deliberately elects to disregard. This sort of

slang, which often invents names for what would otherwise go nameless, is

vivid, accurate, and necessary, an addition of wealth to the world’s

dictionaries and of compass to the world’s range of thought. Society,

mistily conscious of the sympathy that lightens in any habitual name,

seems to have become aware, by one of those wonderful processes of chary

instinct which serve the great, vulnerable, timid organism in lieu of a

brain, that to accept of the pickpocket his names for the mysteries of

his trade is to accept also a new moral stand-point and outlook on the

question of property. For this reason, and by no special masonic

precautions of his own, the pickpocket is allowed to keep the admirable

devices of his nomenclature for the familiar uses of himself and his

mates, until a Villon arrives to prove that this language, too, was

awaiting the advent of its bully and master. In the meantime, what

directness and modest sufficiency of utterance distinguishes the dock

compared with the fumbling prolixity of the old gentleman on the bench!

It is the trite story,—romanticism forced to plead at the bar of

classicism fallen into its dotage, Keats judged by _Blackwood_,

Wordsworth exciting the pained astonishment of Miss Anna Seward. Accuser

and accused alike recognise that a question of diction is part of the

issue between them; hence the picturesque confession of the culprit, made

in proud humility, that he “clicked a red ’un” must needs be interpreted,

to save the good faith of the court, into the vaguer and more general

speech of the classic convention. Those who dislike to have their

watches stolen find that the poorest language of common life will serve

their simple turn, without the rich technical additions of a vocabulary

that has grown around an art. They can abide no rendering of the fact

that does not harp incessantly on the disapproval of watch-owners. They

carry their point of morals at the cost of foregoing all glitter and

finish in the matter of expression.

This sort of slang, therefore, technical in origin, the natural

efflorescence of highly cultivated agilities of brain, and hand, and eye,

is worthy of all commendation. But there is another kind that goes under

the name of slang, the offspring rather of mental sloth, and current

chiefly among those idle, jocular classes to whom all art is a bugbear

and a puzzle. There is a public for every one; the pottle-headed lout

who in a moment of exuberance strikes on a new sordid metaphor for any

incident in the beaten round of drunkenness, lubricity, and debt, can set

his fancy rolling through the music-halls, and thence into the street,

secure of applause and a numerous sodden discipleship. Of the same lazy

stamp, albeit more amiable in effect, are the thought-saying contrivances

whereby one word is retained to do the work of many. For the language of

social intercourse ease is the first requisite; the average talker, who

would be hard put to it if he were called on to describe or to define,

must constantly be furnished with the materials of emphasis, wherewith to

drive home his likes and dislikes. Why should he alienate himself from

the sympathy of his fellows by affecting a singularity in the expression

of his emotions? What he craves is not accuracy, but immediacy of

expression, lest the tide of talk should flow past him, leaving him

engaged in a belated analysis. Thus the word of the day is on all lips,

and what was “vastly fine” last century is “awfully jolly” now; the

meaning is the same, the expression equally inappropriate. Oaths have

their brief periods of ascendency, and philology can boast its

fashion-plates. The tyrant Fashion, who wields for whip the fear of

solitude, is shepherd to the flock of common talkers, as they run hither

and thither pursuing, not self-expression, the prize of letters, but

unanimity and self-obliteration, the marks of good breeding. Like those

famous modern poets who are censured by the author of _Paradise Lost_,

the talkers of slang are “carried away by custom, to express many things

otherwise, and for the most part worse than else they would have exprest

them.” The poverty of their vocabulary makes appeal to the brotherly

sympathy of a partial and like-minded auditor, who can fill out their

paltry conventional sketches from his own experience of the same events.

Within the limits of a single school, or workshop, or social circle,

slang may serve; just as, between friends, silence may do the work of

talk. There are few families, or groups of familiars, that have not some

small coinage of this token-money, issued and accepted by affection,

passing current only within those narrow and privileged boundaries. This

wealth is of no avail to the travelling mind, save as a memorial of home,

nor is its material such “as, buried once, men want dug up again.” A few

happy words and phrases, promoted, for some accidental fitness, to the

wider world of letters, are all that reach posterity; the rest pass into

oblivion with the other perishables of the age.

A profusion of words used in an ephemeral slang sense is evidence, then,

that the writer addresses himself merely to the uneducated and

thoughtless of his own day; the revival of bygone meanings, on the other

hand, and an archaic turn given to language is the mark rather of authors

who are ambitious of a hearing from more than one age. The accretions of

time bring round a word many reputable meanings, of which the oldest is

like to be the deepest in grain. It is a counsel of perfection—some will

say, of vainglorious pedantry—but that shaft flies furthest which is

drawn to the head, and he who desires to be understood in the

twenty-fourth century will not be careless of the meanings that his words

inherit from the fourteenth. To know them is of service, if only for the

piquancy of avoiding them. But many times they cannot wisely be avoided,

and the auspices under which a word began its career when first it was

imported from the French or Latin overshadow it and haunt it to the end.

Popular modern usage will often rob common words, like “nice,” “quaint,”

or “silly,” of all flavour of their origin, as if it were of no moment to

remember that these three words, at the outset of their history, bore the

older senses of “ignorant,” “noted,” and “blessed.” It may be granted

that any attempt to return to these older senses, regardless of later

implications, is stark pedantry; but a delicate writer will play shyly

with the primitive significance in passing, approaching it and circling

it, taking it as a point of reference or departure. The early faith of

Christianity, its beautiful cult of childhood, and its appeal to

unlearned simplicity, have left their mark on the meaning of “silly”; the

history of the word is contained in that cry of St. Augustine, _Indocti

surgunt et rapiunt coelum_, or in the fervent sentence of the author of

the _Imitation_, _Oportet fieri stultum_. And if there is a later

silliness, altogether unblest, the skilful artificer of words, while

accepting this last extension, will show himself conscious of his

paradox. So also he will shun the grossness that employs the epithet

“quaint” to put upon subtlety and the devices of a studied workmanship an

imputation of eccentricity; or, if he falls in with the populace in this

regard, he will be careful to justify his innuendo. The slipshod use of

“nice” to connote any sort of pleasurable emotion he will take care, in

his writings at least, utterly to abhor. From the daintiness of elegance

to the arrogant disgust of folly the word carries meanings numerous and

diverse enough; it must not be cruelly burdened with all the laudatory

occasions of an undiscriminating egotism.

It would be easy to cite a hundred other words like these, saved only by

their nobler uses in literature from ultimate defacement. The higher

standard imposed upon the written word tends to raise and purify speech

also, and since talkers owe the same debt to writers of prose that these,

for their part, owe to poets, it is the poets who must be accounted chief

protectors, in the last resort, of our common inheritance. Every page of

the works of that great exemplar of diction, Milton, is crowded with

examples of felicitous and exquisite meaning given to the infallible

word. Sometimes he accepts the secondary and more usual meaning of a

word only to enrich it by the interweaving of the primary and

etymological meaning. Thus the seraph Abdiel, in the passage that

narrates his offer of combat to Satan, is said to “explore” his own

undaunted heart, and there is no sense of “explore” that does not

heighten the description and help the thought. Thus again, when the poet

describes those

Eremites and friars,

White, Black, and Gray, with all their trumpery,

who inhabit, or are doomed to inhabit, the Paradise of Fools, he seems to

invite the curious reader to recall the derivation of “trumpery,” and so

supplement the idea of worthlessness with that other idea, equally

grateful to the author, of deceit. The strength that extracts this

multiplex resonance of meaning from a single note is matched by the grace

that gives to Latin words like “secure,” “arrive,” “obsequious,”

“redound,” “infest,” and “solemn” the fine precision of intent that art

can borrow from scholarship.

Such an exactitude is consistent with vital change; Milton himself is

bold to write “stood praying” for “continued kneeling in prayer,” and

deft to transfer the application of “schism” from the rent garment of the

Church to those necessary “dissections made in the quarry and in the

timber ere the house of God can be built.” Words may safely veer to

every wind that blows, so they keep within hail of their cardinal

meanings, and drift not beyond the scope of their central employ, but

when once they lose hold of that, then, indeed, the anchor has begun to

drag, and the beach-comber may expect his harvest.

Fixity in the midst of change, fluctuation at the heart of sameness, such

is the estate of language. According as they endeavour to reduce letters

to some large haven and abiding-place of civility, or prefer to throw in

their lot with the centrifugal tendency and ride on the flying crest of

change, are writers dubbed Classic or Romantic. The Romantics are

individualist, anarchic; the strains of their passionate incantation

raise no cities to confront the wilderness in guarded symmetry, but

rather bring the stars shooting from their spheres, and draw wild things

captive to a voice. To them Society and Law seem dull phantoms, by the

light cast from a flaming soul. They dwell apart, and torture their

lives in the effort to attain to self-expression. All means and modes

offered them by language they seize on greedily, and shape them to this

one end; they ransack the vocabulary of new sciences, and appropriate or

invent strange jargons. They furbish up old words or weld together new

indifferently, that they may possess the machinery of their speech and

not be possessed by it. They are at odds with the idiom of their country

in that it serves the common need, and hunt it through all its

metamorphoses to subject it to their private will. Heretics by

profession, they are everywhere opposed to the party of the Classics, who

move by slower ways to ends less personal, but in no wise easier of

attainment. The magnanimity of the Classic ideal has had scant justice

done to it by modern criticism. To make literature the crowning symbol

of a world-wide civilisation; to roof in the ages, and unite the elect of

all time in the courtesy of one shining assembly, paying duty to one

unquestioned code; to undo the work of Babel, and knit together in a

single community the scattered efforts of mankind towards order and

reason;—this was surely an aim worthy of labour and sacrifice. Both have

been freely given, and the end is yet to seek. The self-assertion of the

recusants has found eulogists in plenty, but who has celebrated the

self-denial that was thrown away on this other task, which is farther

from fulfilment now than it was when the scholars of the Renaissance gave

up their patriotism and the tongue of their childhood in the name of

fellow-citizenship with the ancients and the œcumenical authority of

letters? Scholars, grammarians, wits, and poets were content to bury the

lustre of their wisdom and the hard-won fruits of their toil in the

winding-sheet of a dead language, that they might be numbered with the

family of Cicero, and added to the pious train of Virgil. It was a noble

illusion, doomed to failure, the versatile genius of language cried out

against the monotony of their Utopia, and the crowds who were to people

the unbuilded city of their dreams went straying after the feathered

chiefs of the rebels, who, when the fulness of time was come, themselves

received apotheosis and the honours of a new motley pantheon. The tomb

of that great vision bears for epitaph the ironical inscription which

defines a Classic poet as “a dead Romantic.”

In truth the Romantics are right, and the serenity of the classic ideal

is the serenity of paralysis and death. A universal agreement in the use

of words facilitates communication, but, so inextricably is expression

entangled with feeling, it leaves nothing to communicate. Inanity dogs

the footsteps of the classic tradition, which is everywhere lackeyed,

through a long decline, by the pallor of reflected glories. Even the

irresistible novelty of personal experience is dulled by being cast in

the old matrix, and the man who professes to find the whole of himself in

the Bible or in Shakespeare had as good not be. He is a replica and a

shadow, a foolish libel on his Creator, who, from the beginning of time,

was never guilty of tautology. This is the error of the classical creed,

to imagine that in a fleeting world, where the quickest eye can never see

the same thing twice, and a deed once done can never be repeated,

language alone should be capable of fixity and finality. Nature avenges

herself on those who would thus make her prisoner, their truths

degenerate to truisms, and feeling dies in the ice-palaces that they

build to house it. In their search for permanence they become unreal,

abstract, didactic, lovers of generalisation, cherishers of the dry bones

of life; their art is transformed into a science, their expression into

an academic terminology. Immutability is their ideal, and they find it

in the arms of death. Words must change to live, and a word once fixed

becomes useless for the purposes of art. Whosoever would make

acquaintance with the goal towards which the classic practice tends,

should seek it in the vocabulary of the Sciences. There words are fixed

and dead, a botanical collection of colourless, scentless, dried weeds, a

_hortus siccus_ of proper names, each individual symbol poorly tethered

to some single object or idea. No wind blows through that garden, and no

sun shines on it, to discompose the melancholy workers at their task of

tying Latin labels on to withered sticks. Definition and division are

the watchwords of science, where art is all for composition and creation.

Not that the exact definable sense of a word is of no value to the

stylist; he profits by it as a painter profits by a study of anatomy, or

an architect by a knowledge of the strains and stresses that may be put

on his material. The exact logical definition is often necessary for the

structure of his thought and the ordering of his severer argument. But

often, too, it is the merest beginning; when a word is once defined he

overlays it with fresh associations and buries it under new-found moral

significances, which may belie the definition they conceal. This is the

burden of Jeremy Bentham’s quarrel with “question-begging appellatives.”

A clear-sighted and scrupulously veracious philosopher, abettor of the

age of reason, apostle of utility, god-father of the panopticon, and

donor to the English dictionary of such unimpassioned vocables as

“codification” and “international,” Bentham would have been glad to

purify the language by purging it of those “affections of the soul”

wherein Burke had found its highest glory. Yet in censuring the ordinary

political usage of such a word as “innovation,” it was hardly prejudice

in general that he attacked, but the particular and deep-seated prejudice

against novelty. The surprising vivacity of many of his own

figures,—although he had the courage of his convictions, and laboured,

throughout the course of a long life, to desiccate his style,—bears

witness to a natural skill in the use of loaded weapons. He will pack

his text with grave argument on matters ecclesiastical, and indulge

himself and literature, in the notes with a pleasant description of the

flesh and the spirit playing leap-frog, now one up, now the other, around

the holy precincts of the Church. Lapses like these show him far enough

from his own ideal of a geometric fixity in the use of words. The claim

of reason and logic to enslave language has a more modern advocate in the

philosopher who denies all utility to a word while it retains traces of

its primary sensuous employ. The tickling of the senses, the raising of

the passions, these things do indeed interfere with the arid business of

definition. None the less they are the life’s breath of literature, and

he is a poor stylist who cannot beg half-a-dozen questions in a single

epithet, or state the conclusion he would fain avoid in terms that

startle the senses into clamorous revolt.

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