THE HANSEATIC LEAGUE AND THE SCANDINAVIAN KINGDOMS
Relations of Germany in the fourteenth century with Scandinavians
and Slavs—The towns of southern and northern Germany—Unions of
German merchants abroad—Trade in the Baltic and the North
Sea—Alliance of Lübeck and Hamburg—Origin of the Hanseatic
League—Aggressions of Eric Menved—Collapse of Denmark and revival of
the League—Waldemar III. and the capture of Wisby—The Hanse towns at
war with Waldemar—Treaty of Stralsund—The League at the zenith of
its power—Queen Margaret and the Union of Kalmar—War between Denmark
and Holstein for the possession of Schleswig—Deposition of Eric of
Pomerania—Christopher of Bavaria re-unites the three
kingdoms—Christian I. of Oldenburg and the severance of Sweden from
the Union—Karl Knudson and the Stures—Christian I. acquires
Schleswig and Holstein—Gradual decline of the Hanseatic League.
The fourteenth century is not a period to which Germans look back with
pride or satisfaction. It produced no great [Sidenote: Relation of
Germany with Scandinavians and Slavs.] rulers, like the Ottos, or
Frederick Barbarossa, or Frederick II., who are the favourite heroes of
German history in the middle ages. In their place we have Lewis the
Bavarian and his pusillanimous struggle with French popes, Charles IV.
with his subtle and cold-blooded policy which has been little understood
or appreciated because it produced no great obvious results, and Wenzel,
whose drunken incompetence led to deposition and schism. There is an
obvious decline of German power and prestige. The crowns of Italy and of
Arles confer upon their holder a nominal dignity as unreal as that of
the Roman Empire itself. The German kingship is more substantial, but
possesses little efficient authority. The king’s influence depends more
upon his private territorial possessions than upon his royal position,
and his chief interest is in the aggrandisement of his family rather
than the extension of the powers of the crown. He cannot extort
obedience from his powerful vassals, still less can he defend the
distant frontiers of his kingdom. Yet in spite of the impotence of the
central authority, there were two points on the frontier on which the
cause of Germany was championed with brilliant though not very lasting
success. To the north-west lay the Scandinavian kingdoms of Norway,
Sweden and Denmark, of which Denmark was the nearest and for a long time
the most powerful. The Danes were of German origin, and for generations
they had recognised the overlordship of German emperors. But they had
gradually become severed from the southern members of their own race,
and their interests and prejudices were in many respects anti-German.
Knud VI. (1182-1202) repudiated any allegiance to the emperor, and the
break-up of the Saxon duchy by Frederick Barbarossa destroyed the most
efficient bulwark of northern Germany against Danish aggression.
Geographical position enabled the Danes to claim a control of the
Baltic, which more than one king from Waldemar II. (1202-1241) to
Waldemar III. (1340-1375) sought to convert into absolute supremacy.
Resistance to a design which would have been disastrous to Germany was
undertaken, not by the emperors, who showed a curious incapacity to
appreciate the importance of the Baltic, but by the famous association
of North German towns which is known as the Hanseatic League. Their
motive was neither patriotism nor a sense of nationality, but a selfish
pursuit of trading interests: nevertheless their action saved Germany
from a serious danger. Farther east was a still greater problem. In the
ninth century the whole of the southern coast of the Baltic was
inhabited by Slavs, who had displaced the earlier German settlers. With
the tenth century began a long struggle on the part of the Germans to
drive back this alien migration, or at any rate to extort submission and
the acceptance of Christianity from the conquered Slavs. Thanks to the
exertions of two great families, the Welfs in Saxony and the Ascanians
in Brandenburg, this task was in great measure accomplished by the
thirteenth century. As far as the Vistula German preponderance had been
established and secured by the introduction of German settlers and the
foundation of German towns. But to the east of the Vistula the struggle
was still going on, and it still involved religious as well as political
and commercial interests. Here again, as in the north-west, the emperors
were absolutely inactive, and the Teutonic Order was left almost unaided
to carry on a crusade in Lithuania and Livonia for the extension at once
of Christianity and of German civilisation. These two very different
corporations, the Hanse towns and the Teutonic knights—with the equally
different Swiss Confederation in the south—are in many ways the most
interesting developments of German life in an age when Germany as a
whole was weak and anarchical.
The towns of Germany developed more slowly than the great Italian
republics, and never attained to the same measure of independence or
fame. Yet in many respects their history is similar. Both owed
[Sidenote: The German towns.] their municipal self-government to the
weakness of the central authority, and both owed their prosperity to an
advantageous position for carrying on trade. The great commercial
routes, by which the commodities made or collected in Italy were
distributed throughout central Europe, ran through southern Germany, and
it was their position on these routes that gave importance to such towns
as Ulm, Ratisbon, Augsburg, and Nürnberg. In the north an almost equally
lucrative trade was conducted along the shores of the Baltic and the
North Sea, and this trade was almost a monopoly in the hands of German
merchants. And the northern sailors had another source of wealth in the
fishing industry, which was of special importance in the Middle Ages,
when strict rules as to fasting were enforced by the Church. The
combination of trade and fishing brought prosperity to the great
northern towns of Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, Rostock, Danzig, and many
others. Between the north and the south lay the great city of Cologne,
interested in the southern trade as it found its way along the Rhine
valley, and having also a large stake in the commerce with England and
other countries bordering on the North Sea. But the real meeting-place
of north and south was in the Flemish city of Bruges, whither merchants
from all parts of Europe thronged to exchange their respective wares.
The fourteenth century is the golden age of the German towns, the period
in which their wealth and political importance were higher than at any
other period. But there is a marked and noteworthy distinction
[Sidenote: Distinction between northern and southern towns.] between the
northern and the southern groups. The great southern cities had many
interests in common with each other. They had to resist the growing
power of the territorial princes, always jealous of municipal
independence; they were eager to put down disorder and private war; and
obvious motives impelled them to oppose excessive tolls on roads and
rivers and to obtain security for travellers. These interests, and
especially the need of police measures to put down robbery or to extort
redress, induced them from time to time to form alliances among
themselves. But still stronger than community of interest was the
jealousy with which the cities regarded each other, and none of these
leagues proved lasting. The dominant aim of the southern cities was
independence and isolation. In the north the sense of rivalry was
equally strong, but the dangers and difficulties were in many ways
greater, and thus there was a more powerful impulse towards union. The
surrounding states were all of them more backward and less civilised
than the Germans; and this gave to the northern towns an infinitely
greater political influence than could be exercised by those of the
south, which had to deal with powerful and highly developed communities.
Hence, while the southern cities could never combine together except for
a short time and an immediate object, those in the north gradually
formed a league, faulty and ill adjusted in many ways, but which gave
its members far greater importance than they could have acquired by
isolated action, and even enabled them to play for a short time a
dominant part in the politics of northern Europe.
The word ‘hansa’ is of some importance in the Middle Ages. In its
earliest known use it means a band or troop of soldiers. Hence it
acquires its later meaning of a union or association, especially for
mercantile purposes. It is also used for the charge made by a superior
authority for leave to carry on trade. When Henry the Lion wished to
encourage trade in his newly acquired town of Lübeck, he authorised
foreign merchants to enter and leave it _absque theloneo et absque
hansa_, ‘without tax or toll.’ But its most usual signification is
association or guild; the _hansa_ is the merchant-guild, the _hans-hus_
is the guild-hall. And it is in this sense that it came to be applied to
the great _Hansa_, the league of north German towns. The very name
expresses the important fact that the league of towns had its origin in
a league or leagues of traders.
The whole social and economic life of the Middle Ages is dominated by
the principle of association. The village community or manor is the most
familiar illustration; the Church with its inner corporations is
another. In urban communities we find the same thing. Whoever wished to
practise a handicraft must belong to a guild: whoever wished to engage
in commerce must enter a trade-guild or _hansa_. The individual was
powerless. Only through union with others did he obtain capacity of
action and protection for his activity. Any comparison of the modern
association with the mediæval union is as a rule superficial and
misleading. What is now a matter of use and advantage was then a matter
of necessity, of actual if not of formal compulsion. The essential
distinction is to be found in the very limited area of state action in
early times. In the Middle Ages the corporation fulfilled most of the
duties which the undeveloped state had neither the will nor the power to
undertake.
If the home trader required an association, the merchant who journeyed
to foreign countries needed one still more. There were few commission
agents in the Middle Ages, and the merchant in person had to superintend
[Sidenote: Unions of German merchants abroad.] the carriage and the sale
of his goods. The perils of travelling by land were great; those by sea
were far greater. Pirates were almost as numerous and more difficult to
resist than land-robbers, and the dangers of navigation were a very
serious consideration when sailors had no compass to guide their course,
and owners had no system of insurance to cover their risks. It was no
wonder that traders desired to travel in considerable numbers in order
that perils and disasters might be avoided, or at the worst, chronicled.
But it was when the merchants reached a foreign soil that the necessity
of union became most pressing. It often took a long time to dispose of a
cargo; and as winter travelling was considered impossible, it was
frequently necessary to spend several months in a foreign land. Hence
the merchants combined to acquire joint property in the chief markets
they visited: not only inns for personal lodging, but warehouses for the
stowage of goods, and harbourage for their ships. These ‘factories,’ as
they were called, became the central point of the union or _hansa_
formed by the merchants. The mediæval system of law gave another impulse
towards combination. Law in early time was personal, not territorial; it
did not apply to all persons on the soil. The guest, as the foreigner
was called, if not altogether lawless, was yet at a great disadvantage
as compared with the native. Any disputes among the foreign merchants
had to be settled among themselves and by their own law. In disputes
with natives it was difficult for them to obtain justice, unless they
could secure some powerful support within the state. To carry on trade
at all they required privileges and concessions, which were not easily
to be gained by individuals. All these considerations forced the
merchants to adopt a corporate organisation. At the head of the _hansa_
were elders or aldermen, who administered justice among the members,
held assemblies for the consideration of common interests, and
represented the community in its relations with the outside world. The
more efficient this organisation was, the better able were the merchants
to obtain privileges, especially the remission of duties upon trade,
from the community with which they had to deal. The new-comer could only
share these privileges by obtaining admission to the _hansa_, and for
this he had to obtain the consent of the members and to pay a money fee.
The two chief scenes of mercantile activity in the north were the Baltic
and the North Sea, connected with each other only by the narrow straits
which separate the [Sidenote: Trade in the Baltic and North Sea.]
islands and peninsulas of Scandinavia. The great centre of the Baltic
trade was Wisby, the capital of the island of Gothland. So important and
flourishing was Wisby in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that many
merchants took up their abode there; and though it remained a part of
the Swedish kingdom, it became to all intents and purposes a German
town. Thus an important distinction grew up between the German residents
in Wisby and the older union of merchants, who only visited the town for
purposes of trade. From Wisby factories were organised for the extension
of eastern trade. Of these, by far the most important was at Novgorod,
which became the great centre of trade with Russia. In the course of the
thirteenth century the ascendency of Wisby in the Baltic was threatened
by the rise of a group of towns upon territory which had been won back
for Germany from the Wends, the most westerly of the Slav settlers on
the Baltic coasts. These ‘Wendish’ towns, as they are called, though in
population and character they were wholly German, were Lübeck, Rostock,
Wismar, Stralsund, and Greifswald; and among them Lübeck, thanks to its
advantageous position on the Trave and to the efficient patronage it
received, played from the first by far the most prominent part. In the
North Sea there were three great foreign markets to which German
merchants resorted, and where they formed _hansas_ of notable
importance. These were Bergen in Norway, London in England, and Bruges
in Flanders. For a long time the majority of the North Sea traders came
from Cologne, which was as predominant in the west as Wisby had become
in the east. But other towns became rivals of Cologne, notably Hamburg
on the Elbe, and Bremen on the Weser. Even from inland towns, such as
Soest, Dortmund, and Münster in Westphalia, merchants journeyed to the
coast and hired vessels for the conveyance of their goods to England or
Norway.
It was inevitable that these unions of German merchants in foreign parts
should exercise a marked influence upon the conduct of the towns from
which they came. [Sidenote: Influence of trade on the relations of the
towns.] The merchants were only occasional sojourners in their foreign
abodes; the greater part of their lives was spent at home. And it is
important to remember that the councils of most of the north German
towns were composed almost solely of merchants. Artisans were jealously
excluded and looked down upon, and there are few traces of a land-owning
nobility in the German towns such as that which played a prominent part
in the history of Florence and other Italian cities. Hence the policy of
the town councils was guided by the mercantile interests of their
members. And the foreign _hansas_, if they failed to gain what they
wanted, appealed for support to the towns from which the members came.
Thus when merchants were closely associated in trade, their towns were
naturally drawn into co-operation for common interests. This joint
action for the furtherance of trade and the protection of the fisheries
gave the first great impulse to the formation of town leagues. As long
as the Baltic and the North Sea were fairly distinct units, the tendency
was to form two or more separate groups. The towns on the North Sea
tended to group themselves round Cologne or Hamburg, while in the Baltic
one or two leagues might have been formed under the guidance of Wisby or
of Lübeck. But a new era in the development of northern Germany set in
when the Baltic towns began to encroach upon the North Sea trade, and
when Lübeck undertook to dispute the primacy of Cologne in the west, as
she had already disputed the pre-eminence of Wisby in the east. The
great struggle took place in London. Here German merchants had been
active since the reign of Æthelred II., one of whose laws enacts that
‘the men of the emperor shall be held as worthy of good laws as
ourselves.’ These early traders must have come mostly from Cologne, and
it was the men of Cologne who formed the first German _hansa_ in
England. Other merchants had to obtain admission by payment to the
_Hansa_ of Cologne, and gradually it expanded to admit most of the
traders from the Rhine and Westphalia. But natives of other districts
found it difficult to gain admission, and when the men of Lübeck
appeared upon the scene they set themselves to break down the monopoly
of Cologne. In this struggle they had the support of Hamburg, already a
serious rival to Cologne, and possessed of a more advantageous site for
trade with England. When applicants had money and influence behind them,
it was not difficult to obtain concessions from the English government,
which found a pecuniary interest in the protection of foreign merchants.
In 1266 and 1267 Hamburg and Lübeck were allowed to form _hansas_ of
their own on the model of that of Cologne. These were not in London, but
at Lynn, a favourite port of the Germans on the east coast. In the early
years of Edward I. the three separate _hansas_ were fused into a single
_Hansa Alamanniæ_, of which we first find official mention in the year
1282. Its members were known to the English as the Easterlings or
Osterlings, a name which they afterwards adopted for themselves.
The combination of all German merchants to form a single hansa in
England is in many ways a very significant event. It marks a union
between Baltic and North Sea [Sidenote: Alliance of Lübeck and Hamburg.]
traders, which for the first time rendered possible a general league of
all the towns of northern Germany. It was brought about by the joint
action of Lübeck and Hamburg, and there is a well-founded tradition
which attributes to the alliance of these two towns the origin of the
Hanseatic League. For free trade between the Baltic and the North Sea it
was imperative, if possible, to secure the passage through the narrow
channels of the Sound and the Belt. But these were dominated by Denmark,
which in those days held not only the peninsula of Jutland and the
island of Zealand, but also the southern provinces of what is now
Sweden. Geography enabled the Danes either to close the straits or to
levy a toll upon the vessels that passed through. Moreover, the great
centre of the herring fishery in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
was the coast of Skaania, on the eastern side of the Sound. Here again
the Danes had it in their power to inflict damage upon the German
merchants and sailors who flocked to the coast of Skaania during the
fishing season. Hence one of the most pressing needs of the north German
towns was to protect the straits and the fisheries from Danish
aggression, and the lead in this defence naturally devolved upon the two
towns which stood nearest to the barrier between the two seas—Lübeck to
the east of Jutland, and Hamburg to the west. The two towns were not
very distant from each other; and if, at the worst, the passage of the
Sound was blocked, a merchant could unlade his goods at either port,
carry them overland to the other, and thence renew his voyage either on
the Baltic or the North Sea. The earliest alliance between the two towns
had for its object the protection of the roads leading from one to the
other, and from this they advanced to common action in England and in
Flanders.
It was no wonder that other towns tended to ally themselves with the two
cities which could and did render such invaluable services to a cause
which was common [Sidenote: The origin of the Hanseatic League.] to all.
By the end of the fourteenth century we can find sufficient traces of
combination among the north German towns to justify the fixing of this
as the date of the origin of the Hanseatic League. Lübeck was the more
active and enterprising of the two allies, and had the more commanding
position through her intimate connection with the Wendish and other
Baltic towns, which were already united together by the acceptance of
the Lübeck laws. It was an obvious advantage for German merchants to
have a common legal system for the settlement of disputes in which any
of them might from time to time be involved; and in spite of the
opposition of Wisby, Lübeck had succeeded in procuring the adoption of
its code by most of the eastern traders. The hegemony which was thus
acquired within a limited area both fitted and encouraged Lübeck to
undertake the leadership of a larger and more ambitious combination. It
was from Lübeck that invitations were issued to the other towns to send
delegates for the discussion of matters of common interests, and many of
the early meetings were held within its walls. In 1284 a complaint of
injuries received from Norway led to a decision of the towns at an
assembly at Rostock to close all export and import trade with Norway
until redress had been obtained. It was further determined to cease all
intercourse with Bremen if that city should refuse to accept the
decision of the other towns. In 1293 a meeting of delegates from the
Saxon and Baltic towns resolved that henceforth all appeals from
Novgorod should be carried to Lübeck. Wisby was supported only by Riga
and Osnabrück in opposing a resolution which recognised the ascendency
of its rival. In 1300 the consideration of commercial grievances in
Flanders was undertaken in a general assembly at Lübeck, to which all
the north German towns were invited from the mouths of the Rhine to the
Gulf of Riga.
By the beginning of the fourteenth century the unions of German
merchants in foreign parts had lost their independence, and had become
subject to the control and guidance of the towns. But the combination
thus created among the towns was in many ways incomplete. There was
nothing like a federation involving permanent obligations upon its
members. The meetings were only occasional, when any matter requiring
settlement arose, and there was a great variation in the number of towns
represented, according as the matter was of general or local interest.
Within the large area over which the north German trading communities
were spread, there were many smaller combinations of towns, connected by
joint action in the past, by agreements as to the use of common laws or
a common currency, or merely by local contiguity. These smaller
associations were older and possessed more consistency than any general
league. In fact, such a general league can hardly be said to have come
into existence; and so far as it was beginning to grow up, it was
concerned solely with commerce, and had no political significance
whatever. Some of the towns were free imperial cities, as Lübeck had
become on the fall of Henry the Lion, whereas the majority were subject
to a territorial prince. Under such conditions an efficient federation
for political purposes was impossible. This is illustrated by the
history of the early years of the fourteenth century. In 1307 Lübeck,
threatened by the neighbouring [Sidenote: Aggressions of Eric Menved.]
count of Holstein, appealed for assistance to Eric Menved, king of
Denmark, and actually acknowledged Danish suzerainty. Such an act on the
part of the most flourishing German city on the Baltic shows how little
any sentiment of nationality existed among the citizens. Eric was
emboldened to attempt the recovery of that ascendency over the Baltic
coasts which his predecessor, Waldemar II., had for a time established
till it was overthrown at the battle of Bornhöved in 1227. In carrying
out his aim he had to subdue the Wendish towns. Rostock and Wismar were
compelled to submit, and only Stralsund offered a successful resistance
to the Danes. But the striking fact is that the towns rendered no
assistance to each other. The whole episode proves that their union was
limited to the protection of mercantile interests. As long as the Danish
king abstained from any attack upon German commerce, there was no
machinery for common action. Still it would seem that the loss of
political independence brought with it a diminished ability to act
together in any way. For some years after the submission of Lübeck we
lose any traces of combination among the north German towns, and the
foreign merchants were left once more to protect their own interests
without any assistance or any control from the municipalities at home.
But this decline of the towns, which amounted almost to a dissolution of
the growing league, was as short-lived as the revival of Danish
preponderance on the Baltic. [Sidenote: Decline of Denmark.] Eric Menved
had attempted a task beyond the resources either of his own ability or
of his state. His extravagant and reckless policy forced him to purchase
support by lavish grants of lands and privileges, and the consequent
growth of a powerful nobility in Denmark proved a serious hindrance to
later kings. Eric himself died in 1319, and left his brother,
Christopher II., to face the troubles for which he had been responsible.
Christopher found it impossible to resist the combination of foreign
attack with domestic rebellion. The whole of Denmark was lost, either to
the native nobles or to German invaders; while Skaania and the adjacent
provinces were seized by Magnus of Sweden, who had also obtained the
crown of Norway as the grandson of King Hakon. When Christopher died in
exile in 1332 the Danish monarchy seemed for the next eight years to be
practically extinguished. The sudden collapse of [Sidenote: Revival of
the League.] Denmark restored independence to the Wendish towns, and
with it revived the activity of the League. The anarchy and disorder in
the north during and after the reign of Christopher II. rendered the
duty of defending trade-routes and fishing-stations more imperative than
ever. Between 1330 and 1360 we find evidence of more and more regular
meetings of the town delegates; and it is in these years that the name
of Hansa, hitherto used only for the mercantile unions in England and
other foreign countries, came to be applied to the league of towns. In
1358 an assembly was summoned of ‘all towns belonging to the Hansa of
the Germans,’ and the invitation was sent to Cologne and Wisby, to the
towns of Brandenburg, Saxony, Westphalia, Prussia, and Livonia. Already,
in 1352, Magnus of Sweden speaks of ‘the merchants of the sea-towns,
called hanse-brothers.’ The decrees of the assembly are binding upon all
members, and the penalty is expulsion from the League and its
privileges. ‘If any town of the German Hansa shall refuse to observe
this,’ says one decree, ‘the town shall remain for ever outside the
German Hansa, and shall be deprived for ever of German law.’ About this
time Bremen, which had been excluded ever since the quarrel with Norway
in 1284, was restored to membership of the League. Within the wider
association, which champions the interests of all north German traders,
we find distinct evidence of a recognised division into three parts for
more local purposes. The Wendish and Saxon towns under the leadership of
Lübeck constitute one division. Another is formed of the eastern
settlements in Gothland, Livonia, and Sweden, with Wisby as a sort of
capital; while a curious and unexplained combination of Westphalian and
Prussian towns are grouped round Cologne. In 1347 an agreement was made
that each third should elect two elders every year to manage the German
depôt at Bruges. Thus by the middle of the fourteenth century we find
that the Hanseatic League has gained a definite organisation, although
its functions are still limited to matters of trade, and have no
strictly political character. But events were soon to occur which were
to try the stability of the League and to give it more political
importance than it had yet possessed.
For eight years after the death of Christopher II. Denmark was without a
king, but in 1340 Waldemar III., Christopher’s youngest son, undertook
the task of recovering [Sidenote: Waldemar III and the capture of
Wisby.] his father’s dominions. He received the assistance of the
Wendish towns, which had no interest in the prolongation of anarchy,
while they seized the opportunity to obtain a confirmation of their
privileges as the price of their help. They even watched with equanimity
when, in 1360, he wrested the province of Skaania from the feeble hands
of Magnus of Sweden. But they found that success had rendered Waldemar
less easy to deal with than he had been in the days of his weakness, and
they had to pay a heavy sum for the renewal of their fishing rights.
Still, the relations with Denmark were altogether peaceful when, in
1361, the news arrived that a Danish fleet had sailed to the island of
Gothland, and that a Danish army had sacked the ancient town of Wisby,
whose wealth gave rise to the current phrase that the pigs ate out of
silver troughs. The old tradition assigned greed of plunder as the
motive for the raid. Later writers have suggested that it was merely the
continuance of the quarrel with Sweden about Skaania, or that Waldemar
intended to use the central position of Gothland for the purpose of
carrying out the ambitious plans of Waldemar II. and Eric Menved.
The delegates of the Hanse towns were assembled at Greifswald when the
astounding news arrived. The action [Sidenote: First war with Waldemar
III.] of Waldemar created a wholly novel problem for a mercantile
association to deal with. Wisby was subject to Sweden, and it was
against Sweden that an act of open hostility had been committed. But
Wisby was also a great centre of German trade, its wealth had been
created by Germans, and it was one of the chief towns of the Hanseatic
League. It was instinctively felt rather than reasoned that it was
impossible to allow Waldemar’s action to pass without active resentment,
and that the League must justify its existence by undertaking new duties
and responsibilities. The assembly passed a decree forbidding all trade
and intercourse with Denmark, and then adjourned in order to give time
for negotiations with Magnus of Sweden and his son Hakon, who had been
since 1350 independent king of Norway in his father’s place. On
September 7, 1361, the second meeting was held, and it was decided to go
to war with Denmark in alliance with Sweden, Norway, and Holstein. For
the first time a federal tax was imposed, in the form of an export duty
of fourpence in the pound, which was to be levied by all the towns until
Michaelmas 1362.
The Hanse towns had promised to furnish two thousand men with the
necessary ships, and Sweden and Norway were to do the same. In April the
Hanseatic fleet sailed to the [Sidenote: Disastrous campaign of 1362.]
Sound under the command of John Wittenborg, the burgomaster of Lübeck.
The Swedish contingent failed to appear, but the Germans were persuaded
by their allies to abandon the projected attack upon Copenhagen and to
lay siege to Helsingborg, a strong fortress on the coast of Skaania. Too
many of the sailors had been taken from the ships in order to press the
siege, when Waldemar suddenly appeared with the Danish fleet. He at once
attacked the ships of the League—sunk some, and carried off the rest
with their cargoes and the remnant of their crews. Wittenborg had
perforce to abandon the siege, and returned home to pay the penalty for
failure with his life. The disaster was as terrible as it was
unexpected, and the towns considered themselves lucky to be able to
conclude a truce in November for fourteen months, during which trade was
to be resumed and no new charges were to be imposed by the Danish king.
But there was no security that Waldemar would observe his promises,
especially when he succeeded in depriving the Hanse towns of their
allies. Magnus and Hakon had never been eager for the war with Denmark,
which was really the work of the nobles in the Swedish Council. The
Council had arranged a marriage between Hakon and the daughter of the
count of Holstein, but Waldemar seized the lady as she was on her way to
Sweden, and kept her a prisoner until the match was broken off. In 1363
he persuaded Hakon to marry his own daughter Margaret, and thus laid the
foundation for the future union of the three kingdoms. This marriage was
a serious blow to the League, which seemed to be on the verge of
dissolution. The Wendish towns had been most active in the war, and
would have been the chief gainers by its successful issue. Upon them
inevitably fell the chief blame for the disaster. The Prussian towns
refused to pay the export duty; they said that they had granted it for
the protection of the Sound, but the Sound was now less protected than
ever. It was quite useless to make the obvious reply that Lübeck and its
neighbours had spent far more and lost far more, and that their losses
included men as well as money.
If Waldemar had behaved with statesmanlike prudence and moderation, he
might have permanently weakened, if not destroyed, the League, which was
the chief [Sidenote: Temporary peace.] obstacle in his way. If once the
more distant towns had been convinced that their interests in Danish
waters were as secure after defeat as they had been before, they would
hardly have adhered to an alliance which proved costly as well as
useless. But Waldemar was eager to deprive the German traders of all the
privileges they had obtained through the weakness of Denmark since the
days of Eric Menved, and this danger served to keep the Hanse towns
together in spite of their discouragement and their quarrels with each
other. Before the truce had expired, Waldemar set out at the end of 1363
on a long tour to the principal courts of Europe. During his absence the
Danish Council agreed to prolong the truce, but it seemed almost
impossible to arrange any permanent peace upon terms that the German
merchants could accept. It was still doubtful whether the towns would
give way or venture on a renewal of hostilities, when events in Sweden
compelled the Danes to moderate their demands. The Swedish nobles had
long been alienated by the feeble government of Magnus. They had
resented the loss of Skaania and the humiliating conquest of Gothland.
Their fierce indignation was roused by the change of policy in 1363,
when the Holstein alliance was abandoned and Hakon was married to
Margaret of Denmark. In 1364 they declared Magnus deposed, and elected
in his place Albert, the second son of the duke of Mecklenburg, and of
Euphemia, a sister of Magnus. The elder brother was passed over because
he had married Ingeborg, another daughter of Waldemar III., and the
Swedes would have no connection with Denmark. A civil war followed, in
which the forces of Magnus and Hakon were defeated, and the former was
taken prisoner. The greater part of Sweden acknowledged Albert. When
Waldemar returned from his travels, he found his plans checkmated by
this Swedish revolution, and resolved to overthrow the new dynasty in
alliance with his son-in-law Hakon. In order to prepare for this new
war, he concluded the treaty of Wordingborg in September 1365 with the
Hanse towns. Freedom of trade through the Sound and a confirmation of
German privileges on the coast of Skaania were granted, but only for a
period of six years. It was obviously a truce rather than a real treaty;
neither side was satisfied with its terms; and the inevitable struggle
between Danish and German interests in the Baltic was only postponed.
That Waldemar, in attacking the new king of Sweden, was influenced by
wholly selfish motives, is proved by the treaty [Sidenote: Second Danish
war.] which he concluded in July 1366 with the duke of Mecklenburg. In
return for the formal cession of Gothland and other considerable
territories, he abandoned the cause of Magnus and Hakon, and agreed to
recognise and support Albert and his successors in the remaining
provinces of Sweden. This unprincipled policy raised Denmark to a
greater height of power than it had reached since the days of Waldemar
II. Emboldened by success, the king did not scruple to break his recent
agreement with the Hanse towns. In the course of 1367 several German
ships were seized and plundered in the Sound, and increased tolls were
levied upon vessels resorting to the coast of Skaania for the fishing
season. Even the distant south-western towns, which had taken hardly any
part in the previous war, felt that these outrages were intolerable, and
clamoured for active measures in defence of their trade and industry. It
is significant of the greater unanimity of the League on this occasion
that the decisive meeting was held, not as usual in a Baltic town, but
at Cologne. There in November 1367 it was decided to go to war with the
Danish king; and if any town should hold aloof from the common cause,
‘its burghers and merchants shall have no intercourse with the towns of
the German Hansa, no goods shall be bought from them or sold to them;
they shall have no right of entry or exit, of lading or unlading, in any
harbour.’ A new export duty was imposed for a year, and the sum raised
was to be divided among the towns in proportion to the contingent which
each furnished. To avoid the quarrels which had followed the last
campaign, it was expressly enacted that no injury or loss on the part of
any town should give it a claim upon the others for compensation. All
privileges or other advantages which should be gained in the war were to
belong equally to all the members of the League.
It was a formidable array of enemies that Waldemar had to face in 1368.
His treaty with the duke of Mecklenburg [Sidenote: triumph of the
League.] had come to nothing, because the Swedes refused to sacrifice
their own interests to their new dynasty, and would not surrender the
stipulated territories. So Waldemar had to renew both the alliance with
Hakon and the war with Albert of Sweden. On the mainland both
Mecklenburg and Holstein were on the side of his enemies, the nobles of
Jutland were on the verge of rebellion, and now he had provoked the
Hanse towns to a new campaign. In the presence of these dangers he
adopted an extraordinary course of action. In April 1368 he placed all
his accumulated treasure upon a ship, and sailed to Pomerania, leaving
the Danish Council to govern the kingdom during his absence, and to
carry on the war which he had provoked. For two years he wandered about
Europe from one court to another, while his dominions were overrun by
his enemies. The Hanseatic fleet appeared in the Sound soon after the
king’s departure, and at once attacked Copenhagen. The town was taken
and destroyed, and the fortress was occupied by a German garrison. From
Zealand the victorious traders turned to Skaania, and by the end of the
year every fortress, except the redoubtable Helsingborg, had fallen into
their hands. It was decided to keep their forces in the field during the
winter and to prolong the tax on exports for another year. In 1369
Helsingborg surrendered after an obstinate resistance, and the Danes,
attacked also from Holstein and Mecklenburg, opened negotiations with
the Hanse towns. Hakon of Norway had already concluded a truce by which
all the rights and privileges of German merchants in his kingdom were
confirmed. On [Sidenote: Treaty of Stralsund.] May 24, 1370, the Treaty
of Stralsund put an end to the Danish war. For fifteen years all the
castles and fortified places on the coast of Skaania were to be held by
the League, which was to receive two-thirds of the revenue of the
province in order to cover the cost of their maintenance. These terms,
which transferred the control of the Sound and its fisheries from
Denmark to the Hansa, were to be confirmed by Waldemar as the condition
of his return to his kingdom. No future king was to be placed on the
Danish throne without the consent of the Hanse towns and until he had
confirmed all their privileges and concessions.
The second Danish war marks an important epoch in the history of the
Hanseatic League. Not only was it raised to the position of an
influential power in northern [Sidenote: The League at the zenith of its
power.] Europe, but its whole character had undergone an important
change. Hitherto it had been a mercantile league for the extension and
strengthening of trade privileges, and for the settlement of trade
disputes. The decisions of the Cologne assembly in 1377 had superadded
to this mercantile association a political and military alliance. It is
true that that alliance was in express terms only temporary and for the
achievement of an immediate object—the protection of the narrow waters
from outrage and oppression. But the new obligations which success
brought to the League gave to the Cologne decrees a more permanent
importance than had been contemplated at the time of their adoption. The
occupation of the forts on the Sound conceded by the treaty of
Stralsund, and the necessity of constantly watching the changes and
struggles in the Scandinavian kingdoms—a necessity which was all the
more pressing after the Union of Kalmar—compelled the League to maintain
an armed force in constant readiness, and to continue the collection of
a federal revenue for military purposes. When new towns applied for
admission to the League, and there were many such applications in the
years following the Treaty of Stralsund, they had to accept, not only
the old conditions as to trade, but also the more stringent obligations
imposed by the assembly at Cologne. Thus the League became more
concentrated and more highly organised than it had been before the war.
The federal assemblies were more frequent, and their sessions were
longer and more full of business. Every year there was a general
assembly at midsummer, but there were also frequent provincial meetings,
especially of the Wendish towns, which continued to form the most
central and the most influential unit within the League. And not only
was the external activity of the League greater, but it began to concern
itself with the internal affairs of its members. In the fourteenth
century the ascendency of the merchants in municipal government was
threatened by the rise of the artisans in Germany, as it was in Florence
and other southern towns. The Hanseatic League, essentially mercantile
in its origin and its aims, naturally made itself the champion of the
old exclusive oligarchy. In 1374 a rising took place in Brunswick
against the ruling council: some of its members were executed, and the
rest were driven into exile. For this offence Brunswick was formally
expelled from the League, and its merchants were excluded from all the
markets under its control. This mercantile excommunication was now a
formidable weapon, and the men of Brunswick had to make humble
reparation for their democratic aspirations before they could obtain
their readmission to the confederacy. But in emphasising the greater
unity and greater influence of the League after its victory over
Waldemar III., it is imperative to remember that there were several
defects and weaknesses in its federal constitution. The very wide extent
over which the towns were spread, from the Scheldt to the Gulf of
Finland, and the jealousy which mercantile rivalry must almost
inevitably create, rendered any complete real unity of interest and
purpose almost impossible. There was never any assembly at which all the
towns were represented, and, in fact, it would be difficult to give a
precise enumeration of the members of the League at any given date.
Sometimes several towns would combine to give authority to a single
delegate, but no town considered itself bound to take part in the
meeting. Not infrequently the delegates would declare that their
instructions did not allow them to consent to a proposal, and that they
must refer the matter back to their respective town-councils. Hence
arose uncertainty and delay. But the chief defect was that membership of
the League was not and could not be the only political obligation of the
towns. Most of them were subject to some immediate authority, usually
that of a territorial prince. Thus they had a double allegiance, and the
two might come into collision with each other. The princes might allow
their towns to gain trading privileges by joining the League, but they
were not likely to consent to any diminution of their own authority.
Under such conditions it is wonderful that the League held together as
long as it did.
The increased dignity and importance of the Hanseatic League after the
Treaty of Stralsund are illustrated by the action of the emperor.
Charles IV., as is shown [Sidenote: Charles IV and the League.] in the
Golden Bull, disapproved of confederations of towns and of the rapid
growth of municipal independence. Waldemar III. was his personal friend,
and during the recent war the emperor had more than once endeavoured to
use his influence in behalf of the Danish king. But in 1373 Charles had
obtained Brandenburg from the last Wittelsbach Margrave (see p. 120),
and thus acquired a new interest of his own in the politics of northern
Germany. He was now eager to conciliate the League and to obtain the
privileges which it could give to the towns of his new dominion. In 1375
he left Prague to pay a visit to Lübeck, where the magnificence of his
reception made a profound impression on contemporaries. Tradition
declared that he began his speech in acknowledgment of civic hospitality
with the words ‘My Lords’; and when the burgomaster shook his head to
deprecate such a title, the emperor continued: ‘You are Lords! The old
imperial registers prove that Lübeck is one of the five chief towns of
the empire; that your city councillors are also imperial councillors;
and that they may enter his council without waiting for his permission.’
The chronicler complacently adds that the five chief towns were Rome,
Venice, Pisa, Florence, and Lübeck.
The Treaty of Stralsund was followed by a general restoration of peace
in the north. Waldemar III. returned to his kingdom, and obtained the
restoration of the Mecklenburg conquests by a treaty with Duke Albert,
who had established one son on the throne of Sweden, and now hoped with
Waldemar’s support to gain Denmark for his grandson. In 1371 the long
strife between Sweden and Norway came to an end. On condition that
Magnus and Hakon should abandon all claims to the Swedish crown, Albert
agreed to release the former from his imprisonment and to allow him an
annual income till his death, which [Sidenote: Death of Waldemar III.]
occurred three years later. The most pressing question in the north was
the succession to Waldemar in Denmark. His only son had died in 1363, so
that Waldemar was the last male of his dynasty. Of his two daughters who
had lived to become brides, the elder, Ingeborg, had married Henry of
Mecklenburg, the elder brother of the reigning king of Sweden, and the
younger, Margaret, had married Hakon of Norway. Thus the choice lay
between two children—Albert, the son of Ingeborg and Henry, and Olaf,
the son of Hakon and Margaret. The Mecklenburg claimant was recognised
as his heir by Waldemar, and had the support of the Emperor Charles IV.
and of the powerful count of Holstein. But the Danes had not forgotten
the rule of the German invaders in the time of Christopher II.; and when
Waldemar died in 1375, they elected the five-year-old Olaf as his
successor. Both by treaty rights and by actual power the Hanse towns
were entitled to a voice in the decision, and they seem to have
preferred the possibility of a union between Denmark and Norway to an
extension of the already formidable power of the House of Mecklenburg.
Olaf was acknowledged by the League, and one of his first acts was to
confirm the provisions of the Treaty of Stralsund.
In 1380 Hakon of Norway died, and Olaf wore his father’s crown in
addition to that of Denmark. During his minority his mother Margaret
ruled in both kingdoms. [Sidenote: Queen Margaret and the Union of
Kalmar.] In 1386 she found it necessary to conciliate the count of
Holstein by the cession of Schleswig, which was to be held as a fief of
Denmark; but in other respects her government was so successful, that on
her son’s death in 1387 she was invited to succeed him by the Danes and
Norwegians. At the same time she received an offer of the crown of
Sweden. The government of Albert of Mecklenburg, who had rewarded his
German followers with lands and offices, had excited great ill-will
among the Swedish nobles, whose power was more than a match for that of
the king. The conquest of the distracted kingdom proved a comparatively
easy task. At Falköping in 1389 Albert was completely defeated, and
after seven years’ imprisonment he could only procure his liberty by
abdication. Stockholm, aided by forces from Mecklenburg, held out for
some years; and the famous association of the _Vitalien-Brüder_, or
‘Victualling Brothers,’ originally formed for its relief, became a
formidable body of pirates in the Baltic. The interference which they
caused to trade induced the Hanse towns to employ their mediation in
favour of Margaret, who became queen of the three Scandinavian kingdoms.
Her great ambition was to render this union permanent. As she had no
surviving child of her own, she adopted Eric of Pomerania, the grandson
of her sister Ingeborg. In 1397 she convened the councils of the three
kingdoms to Kalmar, and induced them to agree to a formal act of union.
The three kingdoms were to be irrevocably united under the same king,
and the election of successors to the crown was limited to the
descendants of Eric. Each state was to retain its own laws and
institutions, but treaties with foreign powers were to be binding upon
all. The arrangement had one obvious defect. No single electing body was
created; and if each kingdom could choose a king, even within the limits
of a single family, there was no security that their choice would fall
upon the same person.
The fifteenth century was a troubled period in the history of northern
Europe, but its events are far less interesting and far less important
than those of the fourteenth century. There were two great questions at
issue: Whether the Union
of Kalmar could be permanent, and whether the Hanse towns could retain
either their unity of action or the preponderance in the north which it
had given them. Both questions remained in doubt during the century, but
ultimately both were answered in the negative. To maintain the union of
the three Scandinavian kingdoms, which had no great love for each other,
while in two of them a powerful noble class had obtained a considerable
measure of independence, would have required either exceptional good
fortune or exceptional ability, and the successors of Margaret had
neither. Even the ‘Union Queen’ herself made a serious blunder in her
later years. Count Gerhard of [Sidenote: War between Denmark and
Holstein.] Holstein, to whom she had granted Schleswig, as a hereditary
fief, died in 1404, leaving a young son Henry to succeed him. Encouraged
by her previous triumphs, Margaret could not resist the temptation of
trying to escape from the bargain she had made in 1386, and to gain
Schleswig for the crown. Various claims to the duchy were put forward on
behalf of Denmark, but the Schauenburg princes were resolute in support
of Gerhard’s son. The struggle lasted for thirty years, and in the
course of it most of the north German states became involved. Margaret
died suddenly in 1412, but Eric of Pomerania continued to maintain the
claims which his great-aunt had put forward with the mingled obstinacy
and violence which marked his character. The authority of the king of
the Romans was called in to settle the dispute, and twice Sigismund gave
a formal decision in favour of the Danish crown. But as had happened
more than once before, the Hanseatic League showed a greater regard for
the interests of Germany than the German king. Hamburg, closely
associated with Holstein, from the first supported the House of
Schauenburg, and gradually Lübeck and the other Hanse towns were
involved in the war against Eric. Their intervention, combined with
disturbances in Sweden, turned the balance; and in 1435 Adolf of
Holstein, who had succeeded his brother Henry in 1428, was recognised as
duke of Schleswig.
The war with Holstein was not only unsuccessful, it also involved Eric
in serious domestic difficulties. Sweden and Norway, which required the
constant attention of the king, were left unvisited and unregarded. In
Denmark, Eric could only induce the nobles to serve in a war in which
they had little interest by lavish concessions which further weakened
the royal authority. In all the kingdoms discontent was excited by
increased taxation and by debasement of the coinage. Another grievance
was furnished by Eric’s partiality for his Pomeranian relatives, and his
avowed desire to secure the succession to his cousin, Boguslav. In 1434
the first rising took place in Sweden among the peasants of Dalecarlia,
but Eric succeeded in conciliating Karl Knudson, the leader of the
nobles, who was appointed Marshal of the kingdom, and in 1435 the Union
of Kalmar was confirmed by the Swedish diet. But the king’s neglect of
the duties of government had become intolerable, and in 1439 he was
formally deposed [Sidenote: Deposition of King Eric.] by the Danish
Council. As neither of the other kingdoms had the slightest desire to
support Eric, this act rendered vacant the three Scandinavian thrones.
The deposed king lived for another twenty years, but he never had any
chance of recovering the dignity he had forfeited.
The Danes proceeded in 1439 to offer the crown to Christopher of
Bavaria, whose mother was a sister of Eric, [Sidenote: Christopher of
Bavaria.] and he accepted it upon conditions which narrowly limited the
royal power. One of his first acts was to settle the dispute about
Schleswig by confirming the duchy to Adolf of Holstein as a hereditary
fief. The action of Denmark had no binding force upon the other
kingdoms, but lavish bribes to Karl Knudson and the clergy purchased the
acceptance of the Swedish diet; and Norway, which had shown less enmity
to Eric than the other states, was induced to follow the example of its
neighbour. In 1442 Christopher was recognised in the three Scandinavian
kingdoms, and the Union of Kalmar was continued for another generation.
In 1446 he strengthened his position by marrying Dorothea of
Brandenburg, but no heir had been born to continue the Bavarian dynasty,
when Christopher was carried off by a sudden death in January 1448.
With the death of Christopher the severance of the kingdoms seemed to be
inevitable. There was no obvious heir to any one of them, and it was
hardly possible that they should combine to find the same [Sidenote:
Severance of Sweden.] successor. Sweden and Denmark were the first to
act, and neither paid the slightest regard to the proceedings in the
other. In Sweden there was a strong party hostile to the union; and an
organised demonstration on the part of the mob led to the hasty election
of Karl Knudson, who had been for years the most powerful and wealthy
noble of the kingdom (June 1448). Meanwhile the Danes had offered the
crown to Adolf, count of Holstein and duke of Schleswig. He refused the
offer, but suggested the choice of his sister’s son, Christian of
Oldenburg, who could claim descent from a daughter of Eric Glipping, the
predecessor and father of Eric Menved. Christian was accepted, but the
conditions which were imposed upon him gave the chief control of the
government to the council of nobles. And he also had to pay for his
uncle’s support by a formal document, in which assurance was given that
the duchy of Schleswig or south Jutland ‘shall never be united or
annexed to the kingdom of Denmark, so that one person shall be lord of
both.’ In Norway, less energetic and independent than the other two
kingdoms, there was a prolonged struggle as to whether the Danish or the
Swedish king should be chosen. Karl Knudson believed that he had assured
his own election, and he actually assumed the crown in Trondhjem, but
the party which supported the Danish connection proved the stronger, and
in August 1450 the diet decreed the permanent union of Denmark and
Norway.
Denmark and Norway remained united under the Oldenburg dynasty until the
latter was combined with Sweden by the [Sidenote: Christian I. recovers
Sweden.] decision of the allies in 1815. It would probably have been
better if Christian I. had abandoned all idea of recovering Sweden. But
the Union of Kalmar was not to perish without giving rise to a long and
exhausting struggle. Many of the Swedish nobles were jealous of the
elevation of Karl Knudson to royal rank, and the archbishop of Upsala
headed an opposition party which appealed for Danish intervention.
Christian could not resist the temptation of gaining a third crown. In
1457 Karl Knudson was forced to flee to Danzig. Christian was crowned at
Upsala, and his son John or Hans was acknowledged as his heir. This
success was followed by another conspicuous triumph. In 1459 the death
of Adolf of Holstein [Sidenote: Schleswig and Holstein.] and Schleswig
extinguished the male line of the chief branch of the House of
Schauenburg. Christian could advance a double claim to the vacant county
and duchy. He was the nearest relative of his uncle Adolf on the female
side, and he could contend that Schleswig as a Danish fief escheated to
the overlord on the extinction of the family to which it had been
granted. On the other hand, the surviving Schauenburg princes claimed to
be the nearest male heirs, and they could point to Christian’s own
pledge in 1448 that Schleswig should never be united to the Danish
crown. The dispute enabled the estates of the two provinces to exercise
powers which had never hitherto belonged to them. On condition that
Schleswig and Holstein should remain united, and that they should be
free to elect any member of the family and not be bound to take the
successor to the Danish throne, they accepted Christian as duke and
count in March 1460. The Schauenburg princes were bought off by a money
payment. In 1479 the Emperor Frederick III. raised Holstein from a
county to a duchy, and granted the formal investiture to Christian I.
Good fortune had suddenly raised the House of Oldenburg to an
extraordinary preponderance of territorial power in the north. No
previous ruler had succeeded in uniting the [Sidenote: Independence of
Sweden.] three Scandinavian kingdoms with two considerable provinces on
the mainland. But the real strength of Christian I. was in no way
proportioned to its appearance. He had purchased every state by
concessions which sapped the very foundations of the central authority.
In Sweden especially his kingship was merely nominal. The strong
national sentiment of the Swedes objected to the Union of Kalmar
because, in spite of stipulated equality, it made their state little
more than a province of Denmark. The archbishop of Upsala, whose quarrel
with Karl Knudson had given the crown to Christian, was really more
powerful than the king. Disputes were inevitable, and in 1467 Karl was
invited to quit his exile in Danzig and to resume possession of the
crown. On his death in 1470, his nephew, Sten Sture, was proclaimed
regent of Sweden. Christian led an army to compel his submission, but
was completely defeated and driven from the kingdom. For the next half
century a succession of Stures ruled Sweden in practical independence.
Sweden was not the only territory that was lost to Christian I. In 1469
his daughter Margaret was married to James III. of Scotland; and the
Orkneys and Shetlands, which had been in the hands of Denmark since the
tenth century, were pledged to the Scottish king as security for the
princess’s dowry. As the pledge was never redeemed, the islands were to
all intents and purposes ceded to Scotland. The death of Christian in
1481 left his dominions to his eldest son John. The new king was
weakened by having to divide Schleswig and Holstein with his younger
brother Frederick, and by an unsuccessful war which he carried on to
extort the submission of the independent peasants of Ditmarsh. Thus
though he was able for a time to recover Sweden and to assume the crown,
he could not retain his hold upon the kingdom. Sten Sture regained the
government in 1500, and after his death it was transmitted to his
successors, Svante Sture and a younger Sten. The desperate effort of the
next Danish king, Christian II., to restore the Kalmar Union, and the
cruelty which he displayed in the famous ‘blood-bath of Stockholm’ only
led to the final vindication of Swedish independence by Gustavus Vasa.
Meanwhile the fifteenth century had been a period of difficulty and
stress to the Hanseatic League. The Union of Kalmar in itself
constituted a serious danger [Sidenote: Gradual decline of the Hanseatic
League.] to the north German towns. The privileges which they had
extorted from the Scandinavian rulers amounted to a practical monopoly
of trade and fishing rights along their coasts. The obvious interest and
duty of a really strong ruler would impel him to repudiate such
restrictions on the freedom of his subjects. Fortunately for the League,
the Union was never much more than nominal. The policy of the Wendish
towns was steadily directed to place difficulties in the way of the
Scandinavian rulers, and to encourage every tendency to independence in
the subject provinces. Thanks to the weakness of the successive kings
and the turbulent opposition of the Swedes to the Union, this policy was
successful, and the Hanse towns were enabled to retain for a time their
political and mercantile ascendency in the north. But in spite of this
the century was on the whole a period of decline in the history of the
League. The weaknesses which were inherent in the coalition from the
first became more and more visible. Foreign competition, especially that
of the English, was a constant and increasing source of trouble. In the
fourteenth century the Germans still had a preponderant share of the
import and export trade of England. In the fifteenth century the native
traders steadily set themselves to get the better of the privileged
foreigners, and by the reign of Henry VII. the English had established a
considerable direct trade, not only with Flanders and Norway, but also
with the countries on the Baltic. But foreign competition was a less
serious danger than internal weakness and disruption. In the course of
the fifteenth century a notable change began in the balance of northern
trade. At first the western towns of the League had been for the most
part engaged in trade in the North Sea, whereas the eastern towns had
carried on their trade in both the North Sea and the Baltic. In the
fifteenth century the western towns, and especially those of the
Netherlands, began to encroach upon the Baltic trade and entered into
rivalry with Lübeck, Rostock, Stralsund, and Danzig. This growing
importance of the western and non-Baltic merchants was completed by two
changes which could neither be foreseen nor controlled. For more than a
century the gregarious herrings had made the coast of Skaania their
favourite summer resort, and in consequence this had been the scene of
the largest and most lucrative fishing industry in Europe. In the middle
of the fifteenth century the fish made one of those sudden and
inexplicable changes of habitat, which have more than once affected the
social and economic relations of the northern states. They ceased to
enter the Baltic in any large numbers, and transferred themselves to the
coast of Holland. The privileged position in Skaania for which the Hanse
towns had struggled so long and so successfully became all at once
almost valueless, and the gains of the Dutch were measured by the losses
of the Wendish and other Baltic towns. This change was followed by the
great geographical discoveries which began at the end of the century.
These had the effect of transferring the great trade routes from
European waters to the outlying oceans, and this proved as fatal to the
towns on the Baltic as it was to those on the Mediterranean.
Commercial jealousy and the growth of wholly separate interests of their
own impelled the towns of the Netherlands to independent political
action, which in the end led to the severance of their connection with
the League. Thus in the war waged by King Eric to gain possession of
Schleswig the chief Hanse towns supported Holstein, but the
Netherlanders sent assistance to Eric in order to gain a share in those
commercial privileges in the Scandinavian kingdoms which Lübeck and its
immediate associates tried to keep in their own hands. Also it must be
remembered that the Netherlands became less German as they fell under
the rule of the Valois dukes of Burgundy. There was no formal rupture of
vassalage to the empire, but practically there was complete independence
of control, and the new rulers directed the conduct of their subjects to
suit their own ends. This points to the fundamental weakness of the
Hanseatic League, which led to its gradual dissolution in the course of
the next century and a half. If Germany could have been made into a
single united state, the League, as the champion of common German
interests, might have had a prolonged existence. But Germany became a
very loose federation of territorial princes, and in such a state there
was no room for an active and efficient league of towns. The local
prince would not allow the burghers within his dominions sufficient
independence to make their membership of such a league a reality. As the
provinces became more compact, the towns were withdrawn from their
federal allegiance and tied down to their direct duties as subjects of
the prince. This gradual process destroyed the Hanseatic League. A few
imperial cities, as Lübeck, Hamburg, and Bremen, retained the name of
Hanse towns till the present century, but the name was used to express
independence rather than union.