FRANCE UNDER THE EARLY VALOIS, 1328-1380
The accession of Philip of Valois—His relations with Navarre and
England—Robert of Artois—Philip’s action in Gascony, Scotland, and
Flanders brings on War with England—Edward III. and Jacob van
Artevelde—Edward III. claims the French Crown—Beginning of the
Hundred Years’ War—English Expedition into Picardy—The succession in
Brittany followed by a war—The Murder of Artevelde—The battle of
Crecy and siege of Calais—Annexation of Dauphiné to France—Accession
of King John and renewal of the war with England—Battle of
Poitiers—Etienne Marcel and the States-General of 1355 and 1357—The
Ordinance of March 3, 1357—Anarchy in France—The Murder of the
Marshals—Royalist reaction—The Jacquerie—The Murder of Marcel and
the capture of Paris—English Invasion of 1359 followed by the Treaty
of Bretigni—The succession to Burgundy—Charles V/’s
Government—Success of his policy in Brittany and Spain—The
reconquest of the English Provinces—Last years of Charles V/—Du
Guesclin and de Clisson.
The first result of the accession of Philip VI. was the severance
[Sidenote: Accession of Philip of Valois, 1328.] of the crowns of France
and Navarre, which had been united since the marriage of Philip the Fair
(see p. 48). Navarre was now given up to Jeanne, the daughter of Louis
X., and her husband, Philip of Evreux. In return Jeanne abandoned all
other claims, either to the French crown or to the provinces of
Champagne and Brie. By this bargain Philip secured his throne against
one possible claimant, and confirmed the exclusion of female succession
in France. Another rival, Edward III. of England, who could contend that
females might transmit a claim to a male heir, was not at the moment
very formidable. He was very young, he had obtained the throne through
his father’s deposition in 1327, and for the time he was under the
tutelage of his mother Isabella and her paramour Mortimer. So far from
putting forward a claim to the French crown, Edward III. came over to
Amiens in 1329, and recognised Philip VI. by doing homage to him for his
inherited possessions in Aquitaine.
So confident was Philip in the strength of his position that he did not
hesitate to provoke enemies both at home and abroad, and this
recklessness ultimately led to a quarrel with England, and to the
outbreak of a war which lasted more than a hundred years, and exercised
the most decisive influence upon the development of both nations. Among
the nobles who had contributed most to bring about Philip VI.’s
accession was his brother-in-law, Robert of Artois. He was a grandson of
Count Robert of [Sidenote: Robert of Artois.] Artois, who had fallen in
the battle of Courtrai in 1302. In spite of the normal preference for
male succession, the grandson had been excluded in favour of his aunt
Matilda, whose daughter Jeanne had married Philip V. Robert had made
several efforts to vindicate his claim to Artois, but without success.
On the accession of Philip VI., however, he was confident of obtaining
justice, and at once commenced a suit for the purpose of proving that
the inheritance had been unlawfully withheld from him. Matilda and
Jeanne came to Paris to defend their rights, and both of them died
within a short interval of each other, not without strong suspicions of
foul play. Their claims now passed to Margaret, the daughter of Jeanne
and Philip V. Robert of Artois found himself accused, not only of
employing poison to rid himself of his rivals, but also of forging
documents in support of his claims, and of employing magic arts against
the king himself. His supposed accomplices were tortured into some sort
of confession, and Robert, finding that he had lost the royal favour on
which he had reckoned, fled from the court. The suit was decided against
him (1332), and he himself sentenced to banishment. He found a refuge in
England, and in his eagerness for revenge set himself to urge Edward
III. to claim the French throne on the ground of his mother’s descent
from Philip IV.
Edward III. might have paid little attention to such obviously
interested advice had not events elsewhere brought him into hostile
relations with France. Philip VI. was suspected, with some justice, of
desiring to imitate his uncle’s policy in Gascony, and to bring that
province directly under his rule. More serious still was his conduct in
regard to [Sidenote: War in Scotland.] Scotland. The treaty of
Northampton in 1328, by which the independence of Scotland had been
recognised, had stipulated for the restoration of their lands to those
nobles who had supported England in the war. Robert Bruce died in 1329
without carrying out this part of the treaty, and the nobles who ruled
during the minority of his son David were not likely to give up
possessions which had fallen into their own hands. The dispossessed
nobles determined to maintain their own cause in arms, and a successful
battle at Dupplin Moor enabled them to place Edward Balliol upon the
Scottish throne. Edward III. had given no aid to this expedition, but
now that the revolution was accomplished, he was willing to profit by it
and to receive Edward Balliol’s homage. But the partisans of David Bruce
rallied from their first defeat and drove Balliol from the throne.
Edward III. now led an army into Scotland, won the battle of Halidon
Hill (1333), captured Berwick, and restored Balliol. The result was a
renewal of the Scottish war, and the party of independence appealed for
aid to France. Philip VI. did not hesitate to secure such a useful ally
in case of future difficulties with England. French troops were
despatched to Scotland, and the safety of the young Scottish king was
secured by sending him to France. From this time may be dated the
permanent alliance between France and Scotland, which was at once a
grievance and a source of serious embarrassment to English rulers.
English and French troops were now fighting each other as auxiliaries on
Scottish soil, and it was obvious that the two countries must soon be
involved in open strife. The final impulse was supplied by events in
Flanders. In the fourteenth [Sidenote: Flanders.] century Flanders was
the most important trading and manufacturing country in western Europe.
Ghent was the Manchester, and Bruges the Liverpool, of that day. In
Bruges we are told that merchants from seventeen kingdoms had settled
homes, while strangers journeyed thither from all parts of the known
world. It was the great centre-point of mediæval commerce, where the
products of north, south, and east were brought together and exchanged
against each other. Still more important to the Flemings themselves and
to their relations with England was the manufacture of wool. England
produced the longest and finest wool, which was woven into cloth and
worsted on the looms of Ghent and Ypres. With France, on the other hand,
the relations of the Flemings were purely political. The Count of
Flanders, who found his subjects very difficult to govern, was the
vassal of the French king, and his authority could hardly be maintained
without the aid of his suzerain. To the material interests of the
Flemings France was almost wholly alien. France, as contrasted with the
other states of Europe, was little affected by the commercial spirit of
the age. While Edward III. and the Black Prince, who appear in the pages
of Froissart as mirrors of chivalry, were yet sufficiently practical to
encourage the industrial interests of their subjects, the Valois kings
pursued a totally different policy. They crushed industry by excessive
and ill-judged imposts. They maintained no police to give safety to the
foreign merchant, and foreign wares were kept out of France by the
insecurity of the roads and the heavy duties upon imports. This
difference is paralleled by the difference in the military system of the
two countries. The English king, supported by the growing wealth of his
subjects, was able to leave the majority of his people at home, and to
make war with a well-paid and equipped mercenary army. The King of
France, after extorting all he could wring from the pockets of his
subjects, compelled them to serve in the old feudal array, and led them
to be butchered by opponents who were numerically inferior, but had been
trained to war, and were not distracted from the work before them by the
sense that they were neglecting their material interests at home.
Philip VI. had been involved in a Flemish war at the very beginning of
his reign. The citizens of West Flanders, headed by Bruges and Ypres,
rose in revolt against their Count, Lewis, who appealed for aid to the
French king. A feudal army was led to his assistance, and the citizens,
weakened by the abstention of Ghent, were crushed at the battle of
Cassel (1328). The Flemings had to suffer, not only for their
unsuccessful rebellion, but also for their previous victory at Courtrai,
which had now been so ruinously reversed. Their leaders were mercilessly
hunted to death, the town charters were confiscated, and their
fortifications razed to the ground. The authority of the count was
restored, but he was more than ever the dependent vassal of the French
king. In 1336, at the command of Philip VI., he ordered the imprisonment
of all Englishmen in Flanders. Edward III. promptly retaliated by
prohibiting the exportation of English wool and the import of foreign
cloth. Flemish artisans were induced to emigrate to England, and to lay
the foundations of a prosperous woollen manufacture in Norfolk.
These events, which may be taken as the actual origin of the hundred
years’ war, illustrate the folly and recklessness of [Sidenote: Alliance
of England with the Flemings.] Philip VI. So far his quarrel with Edward
III. in Aquitaine and in Scotland had been a personal quarrel; and the
English people, though reluctant to lose the profitable trade with
Bordeaux, were by no means enthusiastic either for the continental
dominions of their king, or even for the establishment of his suzerainty
over Scotland. But to strike at English trade with Flanders was to
inflict a mortal blow at the most sensitive of English interests. From
this time the quarrel with France became a national as well as a royal
quarrel, and Edward could count upon the unanimous support of his
subjects. Still more serious was the effect of Philip’s action in
Flanders. In the fourteenth century, as in the Napoleonic wars at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, England had the stronger position
in a trade dispute with the Continent. The Flemish market was important
to England, but English wool was indispensable to Flanders. The
reprisals of Edward III., forced upon him by the action of the French
king, threatened the Flemings with the ruin of their most important
industry. A new rising, more formidable than that of 1328, was at once
planned. Ghent, which had then held aloof, was now prepared to play its
part; and in Ghent arose a leader, Jacob van [Sidenote: Jacob van
Artevelde.] Artevelde, whose eloquence and decision gave him for a time
practical omnipotence, while his guidance gave to the movement a unity
and consistency which previous rebellions had too often lacked. His
avowed object was to restore the supply of wool to the Flemish looms,
and for this purpose to establish friendly relations with England. He
assembled at Ghent the men of the chief cities, and ‘showed them that
they could not live without the King of England; for all Flanders was
supported by cloth-making, and without wool one could not make cloth;
therefore he urged them to keep the English king their friend.’ At the
same time he was anxious to avoid any needless infraction of feudal law,
and therefore suggested that Edward should claim the French crown,
pointing out that the Flemings could not lawfully serve the King of
England against the King of France, but that they could serve the lawful
King of France against the usurper.
Edward III. saw that war was inevitable; and the arguments of Artevelde
convinced him, if any conviction were needed, [Sidenote: Edward III.
claims the French crown.] that by putting forward a claim to the crown
he would gain powerful supporters, and in the end more substantial
advantages. In 1337 he published his claim before a parliament, and set
to work to form continental alliances. The Emperor, Lewis the Bavarian,
indignant at Philip’s dictation to the Pope, Benedict XII., was willing
to support the English king. In September, 1338, he met Edward at
Coblentz, and formally invested him with the office of imperial vicar in
the provinces on the left bank of the Rhine. The Duke of Brabant and
several other princes of the Netherlands were persuaded or bribed to
promise contingents to the English army. Edward’s position seemed to be
of overwhelming strength. He could attack France on both sides, from
Flanders and Artois on the north-east, and from Guienne and Gascony on
the south-west.
But the English successes were by no means so great as had been
confidently expected. Edward’s first expedition [Sidenote: Opening of
hostilities.] into Picardy in 1339 was a complete failure. The Emperor,
vacillating as ever, would give no effective aid, the Flemings were
content with the recovery of the wool supply, and it was only the
sluggishness of Philip VI. which enabled the English forces to retire
without serious loss. In 1340 the enterprise was renewed. A French and
Genoese fleet had been collected off Sluys to dispute the landing. The
Genoese commander refused to fight in a position which made it
impossible to manœuvre, and left the French vessels to be utterly
destroyed in the first important encounter of the war. But this naval
victory was the solitary triumph of the campaign. Although the Flemings,
under the influence of Artevelde, gave more active assistance than in
the previous year, Edward was repulsed from the walls of St. Omer and
Tournai. In September he concluded a truce for nine months with Philip
VI. The only gainers by the war were the Flemings, who had practically
abrogated the authority of their count, and had organised an independent
federation of communes.
It seemed for the moment as if the war might collapse altogether in
1340. Edward’s allies had either deserted him or were obviously lukewarm
in his cause. He had spent vast sums of money without having any
substantial result to show for it. His subjects were discontented, and
Edward chose this moment for a violent quarrel with his chief minister,
Archbishop Stratford, who was backed up by the English parliament. But
the dwindling flames of the war were rekindled into a blaze by a quarrel
about the succession in Brittany. Duke John III. died in 1340,
[Sidenote: Succession quarrel in Brittany.] leaving no children. Of his
two brothers, the elder was dead, but had left a daughter, Jeanne, who
was married to Charles of Blois, a nephew of Philip VI. The younger
brother was John de Montfort, who claimed the vacant duchy as the
nearest male heir. The Count of Blois appealed, on behalf of his wife,
to the Parliament of Paris, and that court decided in her favour. The
result was a civil war between the French and the Celtic population of
Brittany, the Celts supporting de Montfort and rejecting the rule of
Charles of Blois as an alien. Philip VI. determined to support the cause
of his nephew and the decision of his parliament. De Montfort crossed
over to England and recognised Edward III. by doing homage to him for
Brittany. Thus in the case of Brittany, as in that of Artois, the two
kings were committed to principles which ran counter to their own
claims. The French king, who owed his crown to the so-called Salic
law,[5] appeared as the champion of female succession; while Edward
III., who claimed to be King of France through his mother, contended for
the exclusive right of the male heir.
The war in Brittany offered to Edward III. ‘the finest [Sidenote: War in
Brittany.] possible entry for the conquest of the kingdom of France,’
but his intervention served rather to prolong than to decide the
struggle. Charles of Blois, with the aid of John of Normandy, the heir
to the French crown, began by gaining important successes. Nantes was
captured, and John de Montfort sent prisoner to Paris. But the heroic
Countess of Montfort, a sister of the Count of Flanders, supported her
husband’s cause with masculine energy and courage, and the arrival of
English succour restored the balance of forces in Brittany. But Edward
III. still found himself confronted by superior numbers, and in 1343
papal mediation succeeded in arranging a general truce for three years.
The truce, however, was not allowed to run its full term. John de
Montfort escaped from his prison, and the severity with which Philip VI.
punished some nobles in Brittany and Normandy for suspected treason led
to a renewal of hostilities in 1345. Edward III. determined to make
greater efforts than ever, and to attack France on three sides—from
Guienne, Brittany, and Flanders. In Guienne Henry of Lancaster gained a
considerable victory at Auberoche, and captured several fortresses which
were held by the French. In Brittany John de Montfort died, leaving his
claims to his son, and his death prevented any important operations from
being undertaken. Meanwhile Edward himself prepared to co-operate with
the Flemings on the north-east. But his plans were interrupted by what
appeared to be a great disaster to his cause. Jacob van Artevelde had
incurred the distrust of his fellow-citizens. [Sidenote: Murder of
Artevelde.] He had found it increasingly difficult to reconcile the
jarring pretensions of the rival cities, or to compose the jealous
divisions of the fullers and weavers of Ghent. In his alliance with
England he had gone further than the majority of the Flemings desired.
They would have been content to impose conditions upon their count,
whereas Artevelde had schemed to depose him altogether, and to transfer
the direct government of Flanders to the Prince of Wales. But the final
accusation against the once popular leader was that he had placed the
great treasure of Flanders at the disposal of the English king. In a
rising of the infuriated mob, Artevelde’s house was stormed and he
himself slain. For the moment Edward feared that he might lose his hold
upon Flanders. But Artevelde’s policy survived him. The Flemings were
not prepared to make unconditional submission to their count, and to
extort conditions the alliance with England must be maintained. They
hastened to excuse their conduct to the English king, to assure him of
the continuance of their support. But Edward had received the news of
another loss, which checked his advance in 1345. This was the death of
his brother-in-law, William IV. of Holland, Hainault, and Zealand. As he
left no children, his territories were seized by Lewis the Bavarian and
conferred upon one of his younger sons (see p. 108). The Emperor had
already deserted the English alliance, and the establishment of the
House of Wittelsbach in the dominions of William IV. broke up the
coalition which Edward III. had formed on the borders of France.
These checks induced Edward, not to relax his efforts, but to alter his
plans. The military interest of 1346 seemed likely to [Sidenote:
Campaign of 1346.] be concentrated in the south-west. A large French
army under Philip’s eldest son, John of Normandy, entered Guienne,
recovered many of the places lost in the previous year, and besieged the
inferior English troops in Aiguillon. Edward III. collected a large army
at Southampton, and set sail on July 2. His intention was to land at
Bordeaux, and march to the relief of Aiguillon. But his voyage was
hindered by storms, and the advice of some of his French followers
induced him to make for the coast of Normandy. The province was wholly
unprepared for attack, and the English met with little resistance on
their devastating march. Along the valley of the Seine they advanced as
far as Poissi, where the flames of the burning houses were seen from the
walls of Paris. Meanwhile, Philip VI. had strained every nerve to
collect a second army for the defence of his capital. Among the allies
who came to his aid were John of Bohemia and the newly elected King of
the Romans, Charles IV. But Edward declined to assault Paris, or to face
an army which was now larger than his own. Misleading Philip by a feint
in the direction of Tours, he crossed the Seine at Poissi, and marched
at full speed towards Picardy, in order to effect a junction with the
Flemings. Philip followed with his enormous force, and the destruction
of the bridges over the Somme seemed to shut the English in a trap. But
a captured peasant guided Edward to a comparatively unguarded ford at
Blanche Taque, and the French arrived just as the last of the enemy had
crossed. The battle, however, was only postponed, though the crossing of
the river enabled Edward to choose his own ground, instead of fighting
at a disadvantage with an impassable river behind him. To continue the
retreat with an exhausted army pursued by superior numbers must have
ended in disaster, and Edward drew up his troops at Crecy, near
Abbeville, [Sidenote: Battle of Crecy, 1346.] to try the hazard of the
first pitched battle of the war. The result was to teach the world a
lesson in the art of warfare which had only been imperfectly suggested
by the battles of Stirling Bridge, Bannockburn, and Courtrai. It was a
combat of infantry against cavalry, of missile weapons against heavy
armour and lances, of trained professional soldiers against a
combination of foreign mercenaries with disorderly feudal levies. And
the inevitable result was made the more decisive by the utter want of
generalship on the part of the French king. Obeying a momentary impulse
of rage, he ordered his troops to engage when they were exhausted by a
long march. The Genoese crossbows were wetted by rain, and their bolts
fell harmless, while they were exposed to a hail of arrows from the
English longbows. Then the men-at-arms charged over the unfortunate
Genoese, and were already in disorder before they could reach the enemy.
There was individual prowess in plenty, but no organisation or
discipline, and the bravest of the assailants only rushed upon a certain
fate. Philip fled in despair, but the King of Bohemia, the Counts of
Flanders and Alençon, and many lesser princes and nobles, were left dead
upon the field. Edward III. made no attempt to turn back upon France. It
would have been difficult for him to feed his soldiers in a district
which had been already swept bare by the requisitions and the pillage of
two great armies. After allowing three days for rest and the burying of
the dead, he continued his march northwards, and laid siege to Calais.
His victory had decisive results both in the west and the south. The
siege of Aiguillon was raised, and the retirement of the Duke of
Normandy left Guienne at the mercy of the English. Henry of Lancaster
recovered the places lost at the beginning of the year, and, entering
Poitou, took and sacked Poitiers. In Brittany the French cause met with
almost equal disasters. Charles of Blois was captured and carried a
prisoner to England, and, though his wife continued the struggle, the
party of de Montfort had for a time a secure predominance. To complete
the list of failures, an attempted diversion by David of Scotland, who
invaded England in the autumn of 1346, ended in the king’s defeat and
capture at the battle of Nevill’s Cross.
Meanwhile Edward III. was engaged in the blockade of Calais, where Jean
de Vienne held out with heroic obstinacy [Sidenote: Siege of Calais,
1346-7.] for nearly a whole year. The death of Lewis of Flanders at
Crecy seemed to open the prospect of a reconciliation of the Flemings
with France, and if this could have been effected, the siege would
probably have ended in failure. The young Count, Lewis de Mâle, had done
nothing to incur the enmity of his subjects, and they welcomed his
return with enthusiasm. But in their treaty with Edward III. the
Flemings had agreed that their new ruler should marry an English
princess. This stipulation Lewis refused to fulfil, and when the
citizens tried to coerce him, he escaped from subjects who had become
his gaolers and returned to the French court. His departure left the
Flemings bound to the English alliance, and to Philip VI.’s lavish
offers of bribes they turned a deaf ear. The siege could only be raised
by force, and Philip collected an army for that purpose. But when he
approached he found the English too strongly entrenched, and retired
without risking a battle. Thus, deprived of all hope of succour from
outside, the defenders were forced to accept Edward’s terms, and to hand
over the town, with six of the principal burghers, to his mercy. The
burghers were spared on the entreaty of Queen Philippa, but the whole
population of Calais was expelled to make room for English settlers.
Gradually, as Edward’s wrath at the prolonged resistance died away, some
of the original inhabitants were allowed to return, but the population
of Calais continued to be preponderantly English during the two
centuries that it remained subject to England.
The fall of Calais was the last military disaster of Philip VI.’s reign.
Both England and France were exhausted by the strain of the contest, and
the outbreak of the terrible Black Death, which ravaged western Europe
in 1348 and 1349, diverted men’s minds from international quarrels. A
truce, originally concluded for ten months, was prolonged by mutual
consent for several years. Philip concluded his reign in peace, and
before his death (August 22, 1350) he was able to add an important
province to France, and thus to gain some consolation for the losses
[Sidenote: Dauphiné annexed to France.] of the English war. Among the
largest fragments of the old kingdoms of Arles was Dauphiné, ruled as a
fief of the Empire by the Dauphins of Vienne. The last of these princes,
Humbert, had supported Lewis the Bavarian in his struggles against
France and the Avignon Popes. But like so many of the Emperor’s allies,
he was alienated by Lewis’s weakness and selfishness, and pecuniary
troubles forced him to change his policy and to draw closer to France.
In 1343 he concluded a treaty with Philip VI. by which Dauphiné, in
default of lawful issue to himself, was to fall to a younger son of the
French king. In the next year this treaty was modified to secure the
inheritance to the heirs to the French crown; and finally in 1349
Humbert’s life-interest in the province was bought out by payment of a
large sum, and Dauphiné was handed over to the House of Valois, and in
the course of the next generation became the regular appanage of the
eldest son of the reigning king. About the same time, France acquired
another advantage on the side of Flanders. In 1348 Lewis de Mâle
recovered his county, and by encouraging internal quarrels among his
subjects, he not only evaded the hated obligation of an English
marriage, but also restored some measure of authority over the turbulent
Flemings. As long as his power could be maintained, it might be hoped
that France would escape the dangers of Flemish co-operation with the
English.
John the Good, as he is called by the caprice of historical
nomenclature, was no better a ruler than his father, and was even more
unfortunate. He had already been active both in military and civil
affairs, but had [Sidenote: Accession of King John, 1350.] profited
little by his experience. War, in his eyes, was nothing but a tournament
on a large scale. Of orderly finance he had no conception; and as to the
welfare of his subjects he had neither interest nor insight. He was a
reckless spendthrift, imbued with the chivalrous ideals of the day, and
subject to sudden gusts of passion, alternating with fitful and
uncalculating acts of generosity. His accession marks the appearance on
the scene of a new generation of actors. The Black Death had been most
fatal to the lower classes, but it had by no means spared those of
higher rank. In a single year John had lost his mother, Jeanne of
Burgundy; his first wife, the sister of Charles IV.; his uncle Eudes
IV., who had added Franche-Comté to the duchy of Burgundy, and now left
both Burgundies to an infant grandson, Philip de Rouvre; and his cousin,
Jeanne of Navarre, whose kingdom and possessions in France passed to her
son, deservedly known in history as Charles the Bad, and destined to be
the evil genius of France in the hour of her worst misfortunes. In
England there had been a similar clearance of prominent personages.
Edward III. still lived, but he played little further part in the French
war, where his place was taken by the Black Prince.
The truce with England expired in 1351, but for some years the revived
hostilities were only local and unimportant. So great was the mutual
exhaustion of the two states, that the new Pope, Innocent VI., elected
in 1352, almost succeeded in negotiating a general peace. But, as
before, it was internal disturbances in France which led to a renewal of
the war. Charles of Navarre had been invested with the county of Evreux
and with the large possessions of his [Sidenote: Renewed war with the
English.] mother in Normandy and the Ile-de-France. He had also received
in 1352 the hand of the king’s daughter, Jeanne. But his ambition was
still unsatisfied, and John took no further pains to conciliate a prince
who could advance claims to Champagne and Brie, and might, under
favourable circumstances, become a rival candidate for the crown. In
1354 the king’s favourite, Charles of Spain, was assassinated by the
emissaries of the King of Navarre. John was induced to pardon his
son-in-law; but the reconciliation was only hollow, and Charles was
impelled by real or imaginary grievances to open negotiations with
Edward III. The English king could not resist the temptation of invading
France with the aid of so powerful an ally, and prepared to enter
Normandy through Calais in 1355. This danger compelled John once more to
make overtures to his rebellious son-in-law, and Edward found himself
deprived of the promised aid. He landed at Calais, ravaged the
neighbouring districts, and then withdrew to repel a Scottish invasion.
The Black Prince was more successful. Starting from Bordeaux, he marched
through Languedoc, treating that province as Edward III. had treated
Normandy in 1346. But the French king was as reckless as ever. Early in
1356 he surprised Charles of Navarre as he was banqueting with the
Dauphin at Rouen, put his chief supporters to death, and carried the
king a prisoner to Paris. The result of this violent act was to excite
general disaffection. Charles’s brother, Philip of Navarre, promptly
took up arms, and appealed for English support. The Black Prince was not
slow to respond. His plan was to march northward through the most
fertile districts of France, cross the Loire, and advance through Maine
to join the rebels in Normandy. But his force was insufficient for such
an enterprise. John hastily collected an army, the Loire valley was
blocked, and Prince Edward had to retire before vastly superior numbers.
John hurried eagerly in pursuit, and actually reached Poitiers before
the enemy. A battle was now inevitable. So hopeless [Sidenote: Battle of
Poitiers, 1356.] were the odds that the Black Prince was willing to
accept any honourable terms, but John declined to let the enemy escape.
All the advantages, however, of superior numbers were thrown away by the
egregious folly of the French king. He sent a small detachment of
men-at-arms to attack the English position on the hill, while he ordered
the bulk of his army to dismount on the plain. The men-at-arms, who had
to advance by a narrow lane under the arrows of the English archers,
were speedily routed, and the English cavalry followed up this success
by butchering the dismounted host, who could neither stand their charge
nor fly. The king, after fighting bravely to the last, was taken
prisoner with his youngest son Philip, and the flower of the French
nobility either shared his captivity or escaped it only by death on the
field. As at Crecy, the English made no attempt to profit by their
victory. The Black Prince was content to carry his illustrious prisoner
to Bordeaux, whence he subsequently despatched him to London.
The crushing defeat at Poitiers and the captivity of the king marked the
climax of a long series of disasters, of which [Sidenote: Discontent in
France.] the cause was to be sought in the continued maladministration
of French kings and ministers. No country could be brought into such a
plight as that to which France was reduced without giving rise to
serious and dangerous discontent, and this discontent had already found
expression before the campaign of 1356. From 1350 to 1355 frequent
assemblies of local estates had been held for the raising of supplies,
and these had not been voted without ominous grumbling and demands for
redress of grievances. At last, in November 1355, King John had found it
necessary to convoke the States-General of Languedoil, [Sidenote:
States-General of 1355.] in order to deliberate on the best mode of
resisting the national foes. The ‘deputies of the three estates’—for
nobles and clergy could only attend when elected by their order—met in
Paris on November 30. The orator of the third estate, in the formal
reply to the chancellor’s opening speech, was Etienne Marcel, provost of
the merchants in Paris, and for the next four years one of the most
important men in France. After deliberating on the matters submitted to
them, the States drew up the great ordinance of December 28, 1355. They
granted to the king a _gabelle_ upon salt, and a tax of eight deniers
the pound on the sale of all commodities. These are to be levied upon
all classes—clergy, nobles, non-nobles, and even the members of the
royal family. The collection of the taxes is to be superintended by
delegates chosen by the estates, and the expenditure is to be controlled
by a council of nine, three from each estate. Purveyance and the
arbitrary alteration of the money-standard were forbidden. Finally, the
dates were fixed for two subsequent sessions—one in March and the other
in November of the next year.
It is obvious that the States-General acted, whether consciously or
unconsciously, in imitation of the English Parliament, and took
advantage of the financial difficulties of the crown to impose
constitutional checks upon the royal power. But, unfortunately, the
financial skill of the estates was by no means equal to [Sidenote:
Financial blunders of the States.] the importance of their objects, or
to their energy in striving after them. The _gabelle_ on salt has in all
ages been the most unpopular tax in France, and the tax upon sales
breaks all the canons of taxation which modern economists have agreed to
accept. Great disaffection was excited by the attempt to collect the
tax, and in some provinces serious disturbances took place. When the
States-General met in March they yielded at once to the expression of
public opinion, repealed the obnoxious taxes, and imposed in their place
an extraordinary income-tax, which was so adjusted that the percentage
increased as the income diminished. After taking steps to control the
collection and expenditure of the revenue, the estates adjourned till
May 6. They then discovered that the amount raised was wholly
insufficient to defray the necessary expenditure, and in their ignorance
and perplexity they reimposed the unpopular taxes on salt and sales, and
ordered the levy in June and August of two extra charges upon incomes.
After the battle of Poitiers matters seemed more hopeless than ever. The
king’s eldest son, Charles,[6] assumed the government on his father’s
imprisonment, but he displayed little of the wisdom or capacity for
which he was afterwards renowned. His first act was to convene the
States-General [Sidenote: States-General of Oct. 1356.] on October 17.
The assembly was unusually large, the third estate being represented by
exceptional numbers. Of the nobles, however, the attendance was very
small. Large numbers of them had perished at Poitiers, and the survivors
were discredited. Thus the balance of classes, so necessary for the
success of constitutional changes, was overthrown. The third estate
became preponderant in the assembly, and its leader, Marcel, obtained
considerable support from the clergy through his ally Robert Lecoq,
Bishop of Laon. The demands of the estates were far more extreme than
those of the earlier assemblies. They were no longer content to impose
checks upon the government, but determined to take it into their own
hands. The royal ministers were to be dismissed, and thirty-six
delegates—twelve from each estate—were to be appointed to manage the
affairs of the kingdom. At the same time, outspoken complaints were made
of the failure to carry out promised reforms, especially in the matter
of the coinage, and the release of the King of Navarre was demanded. But
the Dauphin, encouraged by the grant of a considerable subsidy from the
estates of Languedoc, was not prepared to hand over his authority to the
States-General. He prorogued the assembly, endeavoured to raise money
from the provincial estates, and even ventured on a new debasement of
the currency. The reforming party was driven by this obstinacy to
revolutionary methods. The mob rose in Paris, and Marcel ordered the
royal officials to cease minting the inferior coins. The Dauphin, who
had gone to Metz to demand the mediation of Charles IV. with England,
returned to find his capital in open revolt. Unable to resist the
popular demands, he was forced to hold a new meeting of the
States-General on February 5, and to accept the ordinance which they
drew up of March 3, 1357. In [Sidenote: Ordinance of March 3, 1357.]
this the policy which had been proposed in the earlier session was
carried out, and the royal power was subordinated to that of the States.
The commission of thirty-six was definitely appointed to superintend
every branch of the administration. An aid was granted for the
maintenance of 3000 men-at-arms, but it was to be collected and spent,
not by royal officials, but by nominees of the States. The predominance
of the third estate is conspicuous in the articles directed against the
nobles. They were forbidden to carry on private wars, and if they
disregarded the prohibition, the local authorities or the people might
arrest them and compel them to desist by fines or imprisonment. Not only
was purveyance forbidden, but it was permitted to the people to assemble
at the ringing of a bell, and to oppose its collectors by force.
King John, who was about to start from Bordeaux to London, sent a
message to Paris to annul an ordinance which dealt so shrewd a blow at
the royal authority. But the Parisians were not prepared to submit to a
distant and captive king, the Dauphin was forced to promulgate the
ordinance, and the revolution in the government of France was completed.
[Sidenote: Anarchy in France.] The thirty-six showed their power by
purging the royal council and the magistracy of all who were suspected
of hostility to the popular party. But any hopes that the change of
rulers would bring prosperity to France were doomed to disappointment.
The revolutionary government was no more successful than that which it
had superseded. The provinces were not prepared to submit to the
dictation of Paris, and their discontent encouraged the Dauphin to wait
for an opportunity of recovering power. The nobles became more and more
indignant at the predominance of the bourgeois. The English, still
exulting in their triumph of the previous year, were content to accept a
truce for two years; but the mercenary troops, deprived of their
legitimate occupation, wandered about the country pillaging or levying
blackmail on the people. Conscious that their position was insecure, and
that the Dauphin might at any moment become actively hostile, Marcel and
his associates endeavoured to secure a powerful ally by releasing
Charles of Navarre (November, 1357). The only result was to kindle a
civil war. The Dauphin had been compelled to promise the restoration of
all his cousin’s possessions, but his lieutenants would not give up the
strong places, and Charles the Bad took up arms. For the moment he was
the ally of the bourgeois, but he had no real sympathy with the cause of
reform, and sought to fish in troubled waters for his own gain. The
disasters of the ruling dynasty seemed to offer him a fair chance of
establishing a right to the throne. In his speeches to the people he was
careful to point out that his own claim was much stronger than that of
Edward III.
As the reforming movement became weaker and more discredited, it began
to adopt more violent and revolutionary methods. The career of Marcel is
marked by increasing narrowness and selfishness. He had begun by
advocating measures for the regeneration of France, then he had become
the champion of the third estate; within that estate he was driven to
maintain the preponderance of Paris and its mob; and at last he had to
fight in Paris for his own personal ascendency. At the beginning of 1358
his adherents adopted as their ensign a red and blue cap. The Dauphin
was raising an army against the King of Navarre, and had recalled many
of his former ministers. A new exhibition of mob violence was necessary
to intimidate him into submission. Marcel forced his way into the
Louvre, [Sidenote: Murder of the marshals.] where the marshals of
Normandy and Champagne were murdered in their master’s presence. The
unfortunate prince fell on his knees to beg for his own life, and had to
submit to the indignity of wearing the parti-coloured cap, which was
placed on his head by Marcel himself. For the moment this deplorable act
seemed to have achieved its end. The Dauphin was cowed into submission;
his unpopular advisers were dismissed, and Charles of Navarre was
admitted to Paris and formally reconciled with his cousin.
But the murder of the marshals was really as impolitic as it was
criminal. The open dictation of the mob, and the failure of the
bourgeois government to remedy the misfortunes of France, provoked a
violent reaction in [Sidenote: Royalist reaction.] favour of the
monarchy which had been so insultingly defied. With fatal
self-confidence Marcel allowed the Dauphin, who now assumed the title of
regent, to leave Paris and to throw himself upon the loyalty of the
provinces. Charles summoned the States-General to meet in May 1358, at
Compiègne instead of in Paris. The meeting was not very numerous, but it
expressed the prevalent sentiment of France in favour of royalty. Marcel
endeavoured to strengthen himself by forming a league of towns for the
maintenance of common interests, but it was only joined by the towns in
the immediate neighbourhood of Paris. Civil war was inevitable, and the
new fortifications which Marcel had built to protect the capital against
English attack were now to be employed for the defence of the citizens
against their fellow-countrymen.
At this critical moment the evils of France were suddenly multiplied by
the rising of a class for which neither king, nobles, nor citizens had
done anything. The [Sidenote: The Jacquerie.] serfs or villeins of
France had suffered terrible hardships within the last decade. Their
numbers had been decimated by the Black Death, and the survivors had to
add to their own tasks the work of those who had perished. Their
hard-won savings had been wrung from them to pay the ransom of their
lords, who had fallen into the hands of the English at Poitiers or
elsewhere. The lands from which they extracted a scanty living were
devastated by the mercenary soldiers in peace as well as in war.
Despairing of redress, they determined, at any rate, to avenge their
sufferings. The story of their revolt is one of almost unredeemed
horror. It began in the district of Beauvais, and rapidly spread over
Champagne, Picardy, and the Ile-de-France. Castles were burned; men,
women, and even children were tortured and put to death. But the nobles
soon recovered from the first panic, and took arms against enemies whom
they now loathed as much as they had previously despised them. The
ill-armed peasants were unable to face the trained men-at-arms, and the
suppression of the revolt was as murderous and destructive as its
outbreak.
There was little real sympathy between peasants and bourgeois. They had,
it is true, a common enemy in the nobles, and Marcel had tried to use
the Jacquerie as a diversion in his own favour. But he gave no efficient
aid to his allies, and his half-hearted connection only brought upon
himself the discredit and disaster of their ruinous defeat. From the
victorious troops of the nobles the regent was able to form an army for
the reduction of his rebellious capital. The citizens were bellicose,
but they were not warlike, and it was necessary to bring trained troops
to [Sidenote: Siege of Paris.] the aid of their undisciplined valour.
Charles of Navarre was appointed captain-general of Paris, and brought a
mercenary army for its defence. But the king’s aims were as purely
selfish as ever. While professing to defend the city, he was negotiating
with the regent for its surrender. Such proceedings excited serious
mistrust, which was increased by quarrels between the citizens and the
soldiers of Navarre. At last the king left Paris for St. Denis, and
further resistance seemed almost hopeless. The citizens were willing to
make terms, but the Dauphin would not negotiate with the murderer of the
marshals. Marcel felt that in such a dilemma he could no longer trust
his followers. A party was already formed within the city which was
hostile to his continued ascendency, and in favour of restoring the
royal authority. If the citizens had to choose between their own safety
and the interests of their provost, their choice could not be long
delayed. There was only one apparent means of escape, and Marcel
clutched at it. He offered to surrender Paris to Charles of Navarre, and
to proclaim him King of France. But on the very night when this
treacherous design was to be carried out, Marcel was assassinated by one
of his [Sidenote: Murder of Marcel.] own followers (July 31, 1358). It
is easy to see and condemn the errors of his later career, but his name
will always be memorable in French history as the leader of the most
notable attempt, before 1789, to give to France a constitutional form of
government.
Two days after the death of Marcel the regent Charles entered Paris, and
the restoration of the royal authority was signalised by the severe
punishment of its chief opponents. In the next year Charles bought off
the King of Navarre, who had lost all hopes of gaining the crown with
the collapse of the bourgeois revolution. There still remained the war
with England. During the truce John had been negotiating for his
release, and in 1359 he agreed to the cession of nearly the whole of
northern and western France. But the Dauphin was of opinion that the
mutilation of his inheritance was too high a price to pay for his
father’s liberty. He convened the States-General, now the docile
instrument of the prince whose authority had been so recently defied by
its predecessors. The so-called treaty of London was unanimously
rejected, and Edward III. had no alternative but to renew the war. He
collected an enormous army for the invasion of France in October, 1359.
But the Dauphin had learned a lesson from experience, and would fight no
more battles like Crecy and Poitiers. The English army [Sidenote:
English invasion, 1359.] advanced to Rheims, but found the city too
strongly defended. An attack upon Burgundy was repelled, not by arms,
but by the payment of a large sum of money. Edward marched against
Paris, but the Dauphin refused to quit the shelter of the walls, and the
invaders had to turn westwards to Chartres. The country had been so
desolated by war and pestilence that it was difficult to feed the army,
the season was wet and unfavourable, and Edward III., finding that his
army was wasting away without gaining any success, agreed to negotiate.
By the treaty of Bretigni (May 8, 1360) he renounced [Sidenote: Treaty
of Bretigni.] his claims to the French throne and to the Norman and
Plantagenet provinces north of the Loire. In return he was to enjoy full
sovereignty, without any homage to the French king, in his own conquest
of Calais, and in the possessions which Eleanor had brought to Henry
II., viz. Guienne, Gascony, Poitou, Saintonge, and a number of smaller
territories. France was to renounce the Scottish, and England the
Flemish alliance. The ransom of King John was fixed at three million
crowns, to be paid in six yearly instalments. On receipt of the first
instalment the king was to be released, but hostages were to be given
for the payment of the remainder. It was not easy to raise the ransom
from exhausted France; but Galeazzo Visconti was opportunely willing to
pay six hundred thousand gold florins to gain for his son the hand of a
French princess, and this bargain with the Milanese despot enabled John
to return to his kingdom. He seems, however, to have found the cares of
government a disagreeable burden after the comparative gaiety of his
imprisonment in London. In 1363 his second son, Louis of Anjou, escaped
from Calais, whither he had gone as one of his father’s hostages. John
seized the opportunity to parade a chivalrous regard for his plighted
word, and at the same time to abandon duties which had become difficult
and distasteful. Leaving the regency once more to his eldest son, he
sailed to England in January 1364, and died in London three months
later. Before his departure he had done one act which is of cardinal
importance in the history of France. In 1361 a return of the plague had
carried off Philip de Rouvre, the childless ruler of Burgundy,
Franche-Comté, and Artois. The two latter provinces, which had come to
Philip through the female line, passed to Margaret of Flanders, but the
duchy [Sidenote: Duchy of Burgundy.] of Burgundy escheated to the crown.
A prudent king would have retained the direct rule of so valuable a
possession; but John, with reckless generosity, gave it away to his
fourth son Philip, who had fought boldly by his side at Poitiers, and
had shared his captivity. This Philip the Bold is the founder of the
great line of the Valois Dukes of Burgundy.
The new king, Charles V., had been the practical ruler of France since
the battle of Poitiers. During those eight years [Sidenote: Government
of Charles V.] he had learned from harsh experience many lessons which
stood him in good stead when circumstances enabled him to gain some
success. The very weakness of his bodily health, which contemporaries
attributed to poison administered by Charles of Navarre during their
early friendship, debarred him from the active exercises of chivalry,
and impelled him to cultivate his mental faculties. Fragile, timid, a
stranger to the joys of the tournament and the battle-field, he seems
strangely out of place in the days of the Black Prince and Bertrand du
Guesclin, of John Chandos and the Captal de Buch. Yet Charles V. is the
greatest of the Valois kings before Louis XI., and must be reckoned
among the founders of modern France. His chief task was to restore the
despotic power of the crown, which had been so rudely shaken between
1355 and 1358. Arbitrary taxation was to supersede the grant of supplies
by the estates; military and civil officials were to be royal nominees;
even the local assessors and collectors of taxes were to be under the
supervision and control of the crown. Only once did the States-General
meet during the reign, and then they were summoned merely to strengthen
the king’s hands. But the despotism of Charles V. was a capable and
orderly government, wholly different from that of his predecessors. It
is curious to note how this absolute king adopts and turns to his own
advantage the expedients of his enemies. He reimposed the _gabelle_ on
salt, and the _aides_ or taxes on the sale of commodities, the two
financial expedients of the States of 1355. He retained the _élus_, the
local collectors whom the States had nominated to levy these charges,
though he was careful to take their appointment into his own hands. He
gave tardy expression to the will of the estates by putting an end to
the debasement of the currency, the worst of all grievances, and by
imposing strict limitations on the right of purveyance. When his
brother, Louis of Anjou, provoked discontent by his brutal
administration in Languedoc, Charles did not hesitate to dismiss him
from the governorship, and to grant redress to the complainants. Such a
government was a great and a novel boon in the fourteenth century, and
it is only on its financial side that it is open to hostile criticism.
The expenses, both civil and military, were enormous, and the people
were subjected to a heavier burden of taxation than they had ever
experienced before. And the taxes were not only excessive in amount and
arbitrary in their imposition, they were also oppressive and unequal. To
increase the receipts from the _gabelle_, Charles V. introduced the
practice of requiring every family to purchase at least a fixed amount
of salt from the royal granaries; and the principle of equality, which
is enjoined in his ordinances, was infringed by the frequent grant or
sale of exemptions, sometimes to a class, sometimes to a district or a
corporation. It is these exemptions, multiplied as time goes on, which
make the financial system of France, down to the Revolution, so unjust,
so disorderly, and so inefficient. And Charles V. was also responsible
for a disastrous innovation. His predecessors had received a revenue
from customs duties levied on the frontiers of their kingdom. Charles
was the first to hamper domestic trade by imposing customs on the
transit from one province to another.
But in spite of these drawbacks the administration of Charles V. was
eminently successful, and it was this success which led his subjects to
approve, or even to welcome, the [Sidenote: The French welcome absolute
rule.] arbitrary character of his rule. A people which had suffered from
every kind of misfortune, from foreign invasion, pestilence, and civil
strife, as the French had done in the middle of the fourteenth century,
is never very eager to limit the power of a capable ruler. What it needs
is a government which will maintain order at home, and retrieve the
national honour by victories over foreign foes; and to such a government
much will be forgiven. If the English had reason to approve the personal
rule of the Tudor sovereigns, the French a century earlier had
infinitely more reason to support a king who gratified their most
imperious desires. For not only did Charles V. remedy the most glaring
defects of his predecessors’ administration, but this most unmilitary of
kings was able to gain triumphs over the hated English which a few years
before must have seemed impossible.
The first opportunity for an indirect renewal of the strife with England
was offered by affairs in Brittany. The treaty [Sidenote: War in
Brittany.] of Bretigni had left unsettled the long struggle between John
de Montfort and Charles of Blois, and England and France were not
pledged to abandon the cause of their respective candidates. In the very
year of his accession Charles V. determined to strike a vigorous blow in
favour of the House of Blois, and sent Bertrand du Guesclin, whose
military genius he had already detected, to lead a considerable force
into Brittany. But this first enterprise was not crowned with success.
The superior discipline of the English mercenaries enabled them to gain
a decisive victory in the hard-fought battle of Aurai (September 29,
1364). Charles of Blois was slain, and Bertrand du Guesclin was left a
prisoner in the hands of John Chandos. To prevent a complete transfer of
the allegiance of Brittany to the English king Charles V. found it
necessary to negotiate, and in April, 1365, John de Montfort was
recognised as duke, with the proviso that if he died without male issue
the duchy should pass to the eldest son of Charles of Blois.
More important in its ultimate results was French intervention in
Castile. The government of Peter the Cruel had excited the bitter enmity
of his subjects, who [Sidenote: War in Castile.] found a champion in the
king’s bastard half-brother, Henry of Trastamara. Henry appealed for aid
to France, and Charles V. welcomed the opportunity to rid his country of
the hated free companies. Bertrand du Guesclin, who had been ransomed
from his captors, raised an army among these professional soldiers, and
crossed the Pyrenees at the end of 1365. The task of the invaders was
facilitated by a general revolt of the Castilians. Henry of Trastamara
was crowned king, and Peter fled to Bordeaux to implore English
assistance. The Black Prince was conscious that French ascendency in the
Spanish peninsula threatened his duchy of Aquitaine, and chivalrous
motives impelled him to support a legitimate king against a usurper.
Peter made the most lavish promises of pay to his auxiliaries, and the
Black Prince became surety for the good faith of his guest. In 1367 all
preparations were complete, and the treacherous Charles of Navarre gave
a passage through his kingdom to the invaders. Between Najara and
Navarrette, not far from the later battle-field of Vittoria, a complete
victory was won over the French and Castilian forces. Du Guesclin was
once more a captive, Peter the Cruel recovered his crown, and Henry of
Trastamara had to seek safety in exile. But Peter proved to be as
faithless as he was cruel. He declined to fulfil his promises to allies
who seemed to be no longer necessary, and the English prince was in
great straits to satisfy the soldiers who had trusted in his surety. To
make matters worse the troops were wasted with disease, and the Black
Prince himself contracted a fever which remained in his blood and led to
his early death. With his temper embittered and his health broken, he
led the remnants of his army back to Gascony. His departure was followed
by a new revolution in Castile. Henry of Trastamara returned to reclaim
the crown, and du Guesclin, whom the Black Prince imprudently allowed to
pay a second ransom, once more entered his service. In 1369 the French
troops won the battle of Montiel, and in a personal interview which
followed Peter was stabbed to the heart by his half-brother. Thus all
the fruits of the battle of Najara were lost, and a king was seated in
Castile who was pledged to the French alliance.
These events in Castile encouraged Charles V. to carry out a
long-cherished design for the reconquest of the English [Sidenote:
Renewal of English war.] provinces. A pretext for a rupture was found in
the discontent which was excited in Aquitaine by the heavy taxes levied
by the Black Prince to defray the expenses of his Spanish expedition. In
1368 several of the Gascon nobles, regardless of the treaty of Bretigni,
appealed to Charles V., as their suzerain, to redress their grievances.
Charles delayed a final rupture until he had made his preparations, and
had heard of the triumph of his ally in Castile. In 1369 he summoned the
Black Prince to appear in Paris to answer the complaints of his subjects
before the court of peers. Edward replied grimly that he would willingly
go to Paris, but with sixty thousand men in his company. It was easier,
however, to utter the threat than to carry it out. The conditions which
had enabled the English to gain some conspicuous successes in the
earlier war were now altered, and to some extent reversed. The wise
government of Charles V. had already removed many of the administrative
evils which had crippled France under his grandfather and his father.
Thanks to du Guesclin, the French king could now put into the field a
professional army under capable leaders, in place of the disorderly
feudal levies which had been cut to pieces at Crecy and Poitiers. The
Black Prince was no longer the active and resolute commander that he had
shown himself before his illness, and he lost some of his most capable
lieutenants, notably Chandos, who died in 1370. The provinces ceded at
Bretigni had had some years’ experience of English rule, and their
discontent was stimulated by a growing sense of national sympathy with
the rest of France. Another very prominent cause of the reversal of
military success in the years following 1369 is to be found in the
cautious tactics deliberately adopted and enforced by Charles V.
himself. For an invading army victory is imperatively necessary; for the
defenders it is enough not to be defeated. Charles forbade his generals,
no matter what provocation they received, to risk an engagement in the
open field. They were to shut their troops in the strong towns, and to
leave the English armies to be wasted by disease, by want of provisions,
and by the difficulty of coercing a [Sidenote: English disasters.]
hostile population. As the invaders departed, the French could harass
their march, cut off stragglers and supplies, and occupy the territory
which the enemy was compelled to evacuate. These tactics were eminently
successful, and they were immensely aided by the support of the
Castilian fleet, which enabled the French to gain a temporary naval
ascendency. This deprived the English of direct communication with the
coast of Aquitaine, and forced them to carry on military operations at a
disastrous distance from their ultimate base of supplies. Almost the
only English success was the capture of Limoges in 1370 by the Black
Prince, who blackened his own reputation by ordering an indiscriminate
massacre of the inhabitants. Soon afterwards he was compelled by illness
to return to England, and to resign his duchy of Aquitaine, which he
never revisited. In 1372 the English fleet, which was carrying an army
under the Earl of Pembroke to Bordeaux, was destroyed off La Rochelle by
the combined naval forces of France and Castile. A new and larger force
was prepared in 1373 under John of Gaunt, but in consequence of this
maritime disaster it was necessary to land the troops at Calais. Thence
John of Gaunt marched right across France, but he found no enemy to beat
in the field, and he could not take a single fortress. Meanwhile his
troops melted away through desertion, disease, and famine. A defeated
army could hardly have been in a more lamentable condition than that of
which a scanty and impoverished remnant succeeded in reaching Bordeaux.
The failure of this great effort on the part of England was decisive.
Already several provinces had been practically lost, and by 1374, of all
the vast possessions which had been gained at Bretigni, there remained
only Calais in the north, and the strip of land stretching from Bordeaux
to Bayonne. In 1375 the Pope succeeded in negotiating a truce for two
years, and before its expiry both the Black Prince and Edward III. had
died, and England, bitterly chagrined at such complete and unexpected
disasters, had passed under the rule of a child.
In 1378 hostilities were resumed, though the English wished to prolong
the truce, and it seemed almost inevitable that Charles V. would
complete his task of expelling [Sidenote: Last years of Charles V.] the
foreigner from French soil. The English had no longer any allies in
France. John de Montfort, who had clung to his old protectors ever since
the outbreak of war in 1369, had been expelled from Brittany, which was
now almost wholly occupied by royal troops. Charles of Navarre, who had
been a traitor to both sides in turn, discovered his mistake in allowing
the English power to be so completely depressed, and opened negotiations
with John of Gaunt for a joint effort to recover the lost provinces. But
between France and Castile the King of Navarre found himself powerless.
The royal troops seized the strong places which he possessed in France,
while the Castilians entered Navarre and laid siege to Pampeluna.
Charles the Bad was deserted even by his own son, and was forced to make
a humiliating peace in 1378. If the French forces had now been
concentrated on the reduction of Bordeaux and Bayonne, and if the
Castilian fleet had been employed to cut off reinforcements by sea, the
English must have lost their last strongholds in Aquitaine. But Charles
V. was tempted by his successes to undertake a more ambitious
project—the annexation of the duchy of Brittany to the royal domain.
Such a plan at once raised the whole of Brittany against him. The
supporters of the House of Blois, who had fought for the king against de
Montfort, were resolute to defend the independence of their province.
The great soldiers of France, Bertrand du Guesclin and Olivier de
Clisson, were Bretons by birth, and though they obeyed the royal orders,
their action in Brittany was reluctant and inefficient. The rebellion
was wholly successful; John de Montfort was restored to his duchy, and
was even welcomed by the widowed Countess of Blois, who had so long
championed the cause of her husband against him. This failure in
Brittany was a bitter disappointment to Charles V., and his chagrin was
increased by the death of Bertrand du Guesclin. The king himself did not
long survive his most brilliant and faithful servant, and at the time of
his death (September 16, 1380), the English still possessed a foothold
in the north and south of France, which enabled them to make disastrous
use of the disorders of the next reign.
Footnote 5:
See above, p. 64.
Footnote 6:
Charles had been created by his father Duke of Normandy as well as
Dauphin of Vienne. It is shorter and simpler to call him the Dauphin,
though to contemporaries he was known by his higher title.