18. _Charles Kingsley_. "The great Mysticism is the belief which is

becoming every day stronger with me, that all symmetrical natural

objects are types of some spiritual truth or existence. When I walk

the fields, I am oppressed now and then with an innate feeling that

everything I see has a meaning, if I could but understand it. And this

feeling of being surrounded with truths which I cannot grasp, amounts

to indescribable awe sometimes. Everything seems to be full of God's

reflex, if we could but see it. Oh, how I have prayed to have the

mystery unfolded, at least hereafter! To see, if but for a moment, the

whole harmony of the great system! To hear once the music which the

whole universe makes as it performs His bidding! Oh, that heaven! The

thought of the first glance of creation from thence, when we know even

as we are known. And He, the glorious, the beautiful, the incarnate

Ideal shall be justified in all His doings, and in all, and through

all, and over all.... All day, glimpses from the other world, floating

motes from that inner transcendental life, have been floating across

me.... Have you not felt that your real soul was imperceptible to your

mental vision, except at a few hallowed moments? That in everyday life

the mind, looking at itself, sees only the brute intellect, grinding

and working, not the Divine particle, which is life and immortality,

and on which the Spirit of God most probably works, as being most

cognate to Deity" (_Life_, vol. i. p. 55). Again he says: "This earth

is the next greatest fact to that of God's existence."

Kingsley's review of Vaughan's _Hours with the Mystics_ shows that he

retained his sympathy with Mysticism at a later period of his life. It

would be impossible to find any consistent idealistic philosophy in

Kingsley's writings; but the sentences above quoted are interesting as

a profession of faith in Mysticism of the _objective_ type.

19. _R.L. Nettleship_. "The cure for a wrong Mysticism is to realise

the facts, not particular facts or aspects of facts, but the whole

fact: true Mysticism is the consciousness that everything that we

experience is an element, and only an element, in fact; i.e. that in

being what it is, it is symbolic of something more."

The _obiter dicta_ on Mysticism in Nettleship's _Remains_ are of great

value.

20. _Lasson_. "The essence of Mysticism is the assertion of an

intuition which transcends the temporal categories of the

understanding, relying on speculative reason. Rationalism cannot

conduct us to the essence of things; we therefore need intellectual

vision. But Mysticism is not content with symbolic knowledge, and

aspires to see the Absolute by pure spiritual apprehension.... There

is a contradiction in regarding God as the immanent Essence of all

things, and yet as an abstraction transcending all things. But it is

inevitable. Pure immanence is unthinkable, if we are to maintain

distinctions in things.... Strict 'immanence' doctrine tends towards

the monopsychism of Averroes.... Mysticism is often associated with

pantheism, but the religious character of Mysticism views everything

from the standpoint of teleology, while pantheism generally stops at

causality.... Mysticism, again, is often allied with rationalism, but

their ground-principles are different, for rationalism is deistic, and

rests on this earth, being based on the understanding [as opposed to

the higher faculty, the reason].... Nothing can be more perverse than

to accuse Mysticism of _vagueness_. Its danger is rather an

overvaluing of reason and knowledge.... Mysticism is only religious so

long as it remembers that we can here only see through a glass darkly;

when it tries to represent the eternal _adequately_, it falls into a

new and dangerous retranslation of thought into images, or into bare

negation.... Religion is a relation of person to person, a life, which

in its form is an analogy to the earthly, while its content is pure

relation to the eternal. Dogmatic is the skeleton, Mysticism the

life-blood, of the Christian body.... Since the Reformation,

philosophy has taken over most of the work which the speculative

mystics performed in the Middle Ages" (_Essay on the Essence and Value

of Mysticism_).

21. _Nordau_. "The word Mysticism describes a state of mind in which

the subject imagines that he perceives or divines unknown and

inexplicable relations among phenomena, discerns in things hints at

mysteries, and regards them as symbols by which a dark power seeks to

unveil, or at least to indicate, all sorts of marvels.... It is always

connected with strong emotional excitement.... Nearly all our

perceptions, ideas, and conceptions are connected more or less closely

through the association of ideas. But to make the association of ideas

fulfil its function, one more thing must be added--_attention_, which

is the faculty to suppress one part of the memory-images and maintain

another part." We must select the strongest and most direct images,

those directly connected with the afferent nerves; "this Ribot calls

adaptation of the whole organism to a predominant idea.... Attention

presupposes strength of will. Unrestricted play of association, the

result of an exhausted or degenerate brain, gives rise to Mysticism.

Since the mystic cannot express his cloudy thoughts in ordinary

language, he loves mutually exclusive expressions. Mysticism blurs

outlines, and makes the transparent opaque."

The Germans have two words for what we call Mysticism--_Mystik_ and

_Mysticismus_, the latter being generally dyslogistic. The long chapter

in Nordau's _Degeneration_, entitled "Mysticism," treats it throughout

as a morbid state. It will be observed that the last sentence quoted

flatly contradicts one of the statements copied from Lasson's essay. But

Nordau is not attacking religious Mysticism, so much as that unwholesome

development of symbolic "science, falsely so called," which has usurped

the name in modern France. Those who are interested in Mysticism should

certainly study the pathological symptoms which counterfeit mystical

states, and from this point of view the essay in _Degeneration_ is

valuable. The observations of Nordau and other alienists must lead us to

suspect very strongly the following kinds of symbolical representation,

whether the symbols are borrowed from the external world, or created by

the imagination:--(a) All those which include images of a sexual

character. It is unnecessary to illustrate this. The visions of monks

and nuns are often, as we might expect, unconsciously tinged with a

morbid element of this kind. (b) Those which depend on mere verbal

resemblances or other fortuitous correspondences. Nordau shows that the

diseased brain is very ready to follow these false trains of

association. (c) Those which are connected with the sense of smell,

which seems to be morbidly developed in this kind of degeneracy. (d)

Those which in any way minister to pride or self-sufficiency.

22. _Harnack_. "Mysticism is rationalism applied to a sphere above

reason."

I have criticised this definition in my first Lecture, and have

suggested that the words "rationalism" and "reason" ought to be

transposed. Elsewhere Harnack says that the distinctions between

"Scholastic, Roman, German, Catholic, Evangelical, and Pantheistic

Mysticism" are at best superficial, and in particular that it is a

mistake to contrast "Scholasticism and Mysticism" as opposing forces

in the Middle Ages. "Mysticism," he proceeds, "is Catholic piety in

general, so far as this piety is not merely ecclesiastical obedience,

that is, _fides implicita_. The Reformation element which is ascribed

to it lies simply in this, that Mysticism, when developed in a

particular direction, is led to discern the inherent responsibility of

the soul, of which no authority can again deprive it." The conflicts

between Mysticism and Church authority, he thinks, in no way militate

against _both_ being Catholic ideals, just as asceticism and

world-supremacy are both Catholic ideals, though contradictory. The

German mystics he disparages. "I give no extracts from their

writings," he says, "because I do not wish even to seem to countenance

the error that they expressed anything that one cannot read in Origen,

Plotinus, the Areopagite, Augustine, Erigena, Bernard, and Thomas, or

that they represented religious progress." "It will never be possible

to make Mysticism Protestant without flying in the face of history and

Catholicism." "A mystic who does not become a Catholic is a

dilettante."

Before considering these statements, I will quote from another attack

upon Mysticism by a writer whose general views are very similar to

those of Harnack.

23. _Herrmann_ (_Verkehr des Christen mit Gott_). "The most

conspicuous features of the Roman Catholic rule of life are obedience

to the laws of cultus and of doctrine on the one side, and Neoplatonic

Mysticism on the other.... The essence of Mysticism lies in this: when

the influence of God upon the soul is sought and found solely in an

inward experience of the individual; when certain excitements of the

emotions are taken, with no further question, as evidence that the

soul is possessed by God: when at the same time nothing external to

the soul is consciously and clearly perceived and firmly grasped; when

no thoughts that elevate the spiritual life are aroused by the

positive contents of an idea that rules the soul,--then that is the

piety of Mysticism.... Mysticism is not that which is common to all

religion, but a particular species of religion, namely a piety which

feels that which is historical in the positive religion to be

burdensome, and so rejects it."

These extracts from Harnack and Herrmann represent the attitude

towards Mysticism of the Ritschlian school in Germany, of which Kaftan

is another well-known exponent. They are neo-Kantians, whose religion

is an austere moralism, and who seem to regard Christianity as a

primitive Puritanism, spoiled by the Greeks, who brought into it their

intellectualism and their sacramental mysteries. True Christianity,

they say, is faith in the historic Christ. "In the human Jesus," says

Herrmann, "we have met with a fact, the content of which is

incomparably richer than that of any feelings which arise within

ourselves,--a fact, moreover, which makes us so certain of God that,

our reason and conscience being judges, our conviction is only

confirmed that we are in communion with Him." "The mystic's experience

of God is a delusion. If the Christian has learnt how Christ alone has

lifted him above all that he had even been before, he cannot believe

that another man might reach the same end by simply turning inward

upon himself." "The piety of the mystic is such that at the highest

point to which it leads Christ must vanish from the soul along with

all else that is external." This curious view of Christianity quite

fails to explain how "our reason and conscience" can detect the

"incomparable richness" of a revelation altogether unlike "the

feelings which arise within ourselves." It entirely ignores the

Pauline and Johannine doctrine of the mystical union, according to

which Christ is _not_ "external" to the redeemed soul, and most

assuredly can never "vanish" from it. Instead of the "Lo I am with you

alway" of our blessed Lord, we are referred to "history"--that is,

primarily, the four Gospels confirmed by "a fifth," "the united

testimony of the first Christian community" (Harnack, _Christianity

and History_). We are presented with a Christianity without knowledge

(Gnosis), without discipline, without sacraments, resting partly on a

narrative which these very historical critics tear in pieces, each in

his own fashion, and partly on a categorical imperative which is

really the voice of "irreligious moralism," as Pfleiderer calls it.

The words are justified by such a sentence as this from Herrmann:

"Religious faith in God is, rightly understood, just the medium by

which the universal law becomes individualised for the particular man

in his particular place in the world's life, so as to enable him to

recognise its absoluteness as the ground of his self-certainty, and

the ideal drawn in it as his own personal end." Thus the school which

has shown the greatest animus against Mysticism unconsciously

approaches very near to the atheism of Feuerbach. Indeed, what worse

atheism can there be, than such disbelief in the rationality of our

highest thoughts as is expressed in this sentence: "Metaphysics is an

impassioned endeavour to obtain recognition for thoughts, the contents

of which have no other title to be recognised than their value for

us"? As if faith in God had any other meaning than a confidence that

what is of "value for us" is the eternally and universally good and

true! Herrmann's attitude towards reason can only escape atheism by

accepting in preference the crudest dualism, "behind which" (to quote

Pfleiderer again) lies concealed simply "the scepticism of a

disintegrating Nominalism."

24. _Victor Cousin_. "Mysticism is the pretension to know God without

intermediary, and, so to speak, face to face. For Mysticism, whatever

is between God and us hides Him from us." "Mysticism consists in

substituting direct inspiration for indirect, ecstasy for reason,

rapture for philosophy."

25. _R.A. Vaughan_. "Mysticism is that form of error which mistakes

for a Divine manifestation the operations of a merely human faculty."

This poor definition is the only one (except "Mysticism is the romance

of religion") to be found in _Hours with the Mystics_, the solitary

work in English which attempts to give a history of Christian

Mysticism. The book has several conspicuous merits. The range of the

author's reading is remarkable, and he has a wonderful gift of

illustration. But he was not content to trust to the interest of the

subject to make his book popular, and tried to attract readers by

placing it in a most incongruous setting. There is something almost

offensive in telling the story of men like Tauler, Suso, and Juan of

the Cross, in the form of smart conversations at a house-party, and

the jokes cracked at the expense of the benighted "mystics" are not

always in the best taste. Vaughan does not take his subject quite

seriously enough. There is an irritating air of superiority in all his

discussions of the lives and doctrines of the mystics, and his hatred

and contempt for the Roman Church often warp his judgment. His own

philosophical standpoint is by no means clear, and this makes his

treatment of speculative Mysticism less satisfactory than the more

popular parts of the book. It is also a pity that he has neglected the

English representatives of Mysticism; they are quite as interesting in

their way as Madame Guyon, whose story he tells at disproportionate

length. At the same time, I wish to acknowledge considerable

obligations to Vaughan, whose early death probably deprived us of even

better work than the book which made his reputation.

26. _James Hinton_. "Mysticism is an assertion of a means of knowing

that must not be tried by ordinary rules of evidence--the claiming

authority for our own impressions."

Another poor and question-begging definition, on the same lines as the

last.

APPENDIX B

The Greek Mysteries And Christian Mysticism

The connexion between the Greek Mysteries and Christian Mysticism is

marked not only by the name which the world has agreed to give to that

type of religion (though it must be said that [Greek: mystêria] is not

the commonest name for the Mysteries--[Greek: orgia, teletai, telê]

are all, I think, more frequent), but by the evident desire on the

part of such founders of mystical Christianity as Clement and

Dionysius the Areopagite, to emphasise the resemblance. It is not

without a purpose that these writers, and other Platonising

theologians from the third to the fifth century, transfer to the faith

and practice of the Church almost every term which was associated with

the Eleusinian Mysteries and others like them. For instance, the

sacraments are regularly [Greek: mystêria]; baptism is [Greek:

mystikon loutron] (Gregory of Nyssa); unction, [Greek: chrisma

mystikon] (Athanasius); the elements, [Greek: mystis edôdê] (Gregory

Naz.); and participation in them is [Greek: mystikê metalêpsis].

Baptism, again, is "initiation" [Greek: myêsis]; a baptized person is

[Greek: memyêmenos], [Greek: mystês] or [Greek: symmystês] (Gregory Ny.

and Chrysostom), an unbaptized person is [Greek: amyêtos]. The

celebrant is [Greek: mystêriôn lanthanontôn mystagôgos] (Gregory Ny.);

the administration is [Greek: paradosis], as at Eleusis. The

sacraments are also [Greek: teletê] or [Greek: telê], regular

Mystery-words; as are [Greek: teleiôsis, teleiousthai, teleiopoios],

which are used in the same connexion. Secret formulas (the notion of

secret formulas itself comes from the Mysteries) were [Greek:

aporrêta]. (Whether the words [Greek: phôtismos] and [Greek: sphragis]

in their sacramental meaning come from the Mysteries seems doubtful,

in spite of Hatch, _Hibbert Lectures_, p. 295.) Nor is the language of

the Mysteries applied only to the sacraments. Clement calls purgative

discipline [Greek: ta katharsia], and [Greek: ta mikra mystêria], and

the highest stage in the spiritual life [Greek: epopteia]. He also

uses such language as the following: "O truly sacred mysteries! O

stainless light! My way is lighted with torches, and I survey the

heavens and God! I am become holy while I am being initiated. The Lord

is my hierophant," etc. (_Protr._ xii. 120). Dionysius, as I have

shown in a note on Lecture III., uses the Mystery words frequently,

and gives to the orders of the Christian ministry the names which

distinguished the officiating priests at the Mysteries. The aim of

these writers was to prove that the Church offers a mysteriosophy

which includes all the good elements of the old Mysteries without

their corruptions. The alliance between a Mystery-religion and

speculative Mysticism within the Church was at this time as close as

that between the Neoplatonic philosophy and the revived pagan Mystery

cults. But when we try to determine the amount of direct _influence_

exercised by the later paganism on Christian usages and thought, we

are baffled both by the loss of documents, and by the extreme

difficulty of tracing the pedigree of religious ideas and customs. I

shall here content myself with calling attention to certain features

which were common to the Greek Mysteries and to Alexandrian

Christianity, and which may perhaps claim to be in part a legacy of

the old religion to the new. My object is not at all to throw

discredit upon modes of thought which may have been unfamiliar to

Palestinian Jews. A doctrine or custom is not necessarily un-Christian

because it is "Greek" or "pagan." I know of no stranger perversity

than for men who rest the whole weight of their religion upon

"history," to suppose that our Lord meant to raise an universal

religion on a purely Jewish basis.

The Greek Mysteries were perhaps survivals of an old-world ritual,

based on a primitive kind of Nature-Mysticism. The "public Mysteries,"

of which the festival at Eleusis was the most important, were so

called because the State admitted strangers by initiation to what was

originally a national cult. (There were also private Mysteries,

conducted for profit by itinerant priests [Greek: agyrtai] from the

East, who as a class bore no good reputation.) The main features of

the ritual at Eleusis are known. The festival began at Athens, where

the _mystæ_ collected, and, after a fast of several days, were

"driven" to the sea, or to two salt lakes on the road to Eleusis, for

a purifying bath. This kind of baptism washed away the stains of their

former sins, the worst of which they were obliged to confess before

being admitted to the Mysteries. Then, after sacrifices had been

offered, the company went in procession to Eleusis, where

Mystery-plays were performed in a great hall, large enough to hold

thousands of people, and the votaries were allowed to handle certain

sacred relics. A sacramental meal, in which a mixture of mint,

barley-meal, and water was administered to the initiated, was an

integral part of the festival. The most secret part of the ceremonies

was reserved for the [Greek: epoptai] who had passed through the

ordinary initiation in a previous year. It probably culminated in the

solemn exhibition of a corn-ear, the symbol of Demeter. The obligation

of silence was imposed not so much because there were any secrets to

reveal, but that the holiest sacraments of the Greek religion might

not be profaned by being brought into contact with common life. This

feeling was strengthened by the belief that _words_ are more than

conventional symbols of things. A sacred formula must not be taken in

vain, or divulged to persons who might misuse it.

The evidence is strong that the Mysteries had a real spiritualising

and moralising influence on large numbers of those who were initiated,

and that this influence was increasing under the early empire. The

ceremonies may have been trivial, and even at times ludicrous; but the

discovery had been made that the performance of solemn acts of

devotion in common, after ascetical preparation, and with the aid of

an impressive ritual, is one of the strongest incentives to piety.

Diodorus is not alone in saying (he is speaking of the Samothracian

Mysteries) that "those who have taken part in them are said to become

more pious, more upright, and in every way better than their former

selves."

The chief motive force which led to the increased importance of

Mystery-religion in the first centuries of our era, was the desire for

"salvation" ([Greek: sôtêria]), which both with pagans and Christians

was very closely connected with the hope of everlasting life.

Happiness after death was the great promise held out in the Mysteries.

The initiated were secure of blessedness in the next world, while the

uninitiated must expect "to lie in darkness and mire after their

death" (cf. Plato, _Phædrus_, 69).

How was this "salvation" attained or conferred? We find that several

conflicting views were held, which it is impossible to keep rigidly

separate, since the human mind at one time inclines to one of them, at

another time to another.

(a) Salvation is imparted by _revelation_. This makes it to depend

upon _knowledge_; but this knowledge was in the Mysteries conveyed by

the spectacle or drama, not by any intellectual process. Plutarch (_de

Defect. Orac._ 22) says that those who had been initiated could

produce no demonstration or proof of the beliefs which they had

acquired. And Synesius quotes Aristotle as saying that the initiated

do not _learn_ anything, but rather receive impressions ([Greek: ou

mathein ti dein alla pathein]). The old notion that monotheism was

taught as a secret dogma rests on no evidence, and is very unlikely.

There was a good deal of [Greek: theokrasia], as the ancients called

it, and some departures from the current theogonies, but such doctrine

as there was, was much nearer to pantheism than to monotheism. Certain

truths about nature and the facts of life were communicated in the

"greatest mysteries," according to Clement, and Cicero says the same

thing. And sometimes the [Greek: gnôsis sôtêrias] includes knowledge

about the whence and whither of man ([Greek: tines esmen kai ti

gegonamen], Clem. _Exc. ex Theod._ 78). Some of the mystical formulæ

were no doubt susceptible of deep and edifying interpretations,

especially in the direction of an elevated nature-worship.

Christian Mysticism · 第 25 / 27 段