in the higher vertebrata, was made with the precise structure which it
exhibits, to make the animal which possesses it to see, has undoubtedly
received its death-blow. But it is necessary to remember that there is a
higher teleology, which is not touched by the doctrine of evolution, but
is actually based on the fundamental proposition of evolution. That
proposition is, that the whole world, living and not living, is the
result of the mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of forces
possessed by the molecules of which the primitive nebulosity of the
universe was composed. If this be true, it is no less certain that the
existing world lay potentially in the cosmic vapor; and that a
sufficient intelligence could, from a knowledge of the properties of
that vapor, have predicted, say, the state of fauna of Great Britain in
1869, with as much certainty as one can say what will happen to the
vapor of the breath on a cold winter's day." This is the doctrine of the
self-evolution of the universe. We know not what may lie behind this in
Mr. Huxley's mind; but we are very sure that there is not an idea in the
above paragraph which Epicurus of old, and Büchner, Vogt, Haeckel, and
other "Materialisten von Profession," would not cheerfully adopt. His
distinction between a higher and lower teleology is of no account in
this discussion. What is the teleology to which, he says, Mr. Darwin has
given the death-blow, the extracts given above clearly show. The eye,
Huxley says, was not made for the purpose of seeing, or the ear for the
purpose of hearing. "According to teleology," he says, "each organism is
like a rifle bullet fired straight at a mark; according to Darwin,
organisms are like grapeshot, of which one hits something and the rest
fall wide."[26]
FOOTNOTES:
[19] Mr. Huxley, if we may judge from what he says of himself, is
somewhat liable to be misunderstood. He says he was fourteen years
laboring to resist the charge of Positivism made against the class of
scientific men to which he belongs. He also tells us in his letter to
Professor Tyndall, prefixed to his volume of _Lay Sermons and
Addresses_, that the "Essay on the Physical Basis of Life," included in
that volume, was intended as a protest, from the philosophical side,
against what is commonly called Materialism. It turned out, however,
that the public regarded it as an argument in favor of Materialism. This
we think was a very natural, if not an unavoidable mistake, on the part
of the public. For in that Essay, he says that Protoplasm, or the
physical basis of life, "is a kind of matter common to all living
beings, that the powers or faculties of all kinds of living matter,
diverse as they may be in degree, are substantially of the same kind."
Protoplasm as far as examined contains the four elements,--carbon,
hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. These are lifeless bodies, "but when
brought together under certain conditions, they give rise to the still
more complex body Protoplasm; and this protoplasm exhibits the phenomena
of life." There is no more reason, he teaches, for assuming the
existence of a mysterious something called vitality to account for vital
phenomena, than there is for the assumption of something called Aquasity
to account for the phenomena of water. Life is said to be "the product
of a certain disposition of material molecules." The matter of life is
"composed of ordinary matter, differing from it only in the manner in
which its atoms are aggregated. I take it," he says, "to be demonstrable
that it is utterly impossible to prove that anything whatever may not be
the effect of a material and necessary cause, and that human logic is
equally incompetent to prove that any act is really spontaneous. A
really spontaneous act is one, which, by the assumption, has no cause;
and the attempt to prove such a negative as this, is on the face of the
matter absurd. And while it is thus a philosophical impossibility to
demonstrate that any given phenomenon is not the effect of a material
cause, any one who is acquainted with the history of science will admit
that its progress has, in all ages, meant, and now more than ever means,
the extension of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant
gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call
spirit and spontaneity."
[20] It cannot escape the attention of any one that Mr. Darwin, Mr.
Wallace, Professor Huxley, and all the other advocates or defenders of
Darwinism, do not pretend to prove anything more than that species _may_
be originated by selection, not that there is no other satisfactory
account of their origin. Mr. Darwin admits that referring them to the
intention and efficiency of God, accounts for everything, but, he says,
that is not science.
[21] _Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews_. By Thomas Henry Huxley, LL.
D., F. R. S. London, 1870, p. 323.
[22] _Evidence of Man's Place in Nature_. London, 1864, p. 107.
[23] Since writing the above paragraph our eye fell on the following
note on the 89th page of the Duke of Argyle's _Reign of Law_, which it
gives us pleasure to quote. It seems that a writer in the _Spectator_
had charged Professor Huxley with Atheism. In the number of that paper
for February 10, 1866, the Professor replies: "I do not know that I care
very much about popular odium, so there is no great merit in saying that
if I really saw fit to deny the existence of a God I should certainly do
so, for the sake of my own intellectual freedom, and be the honest
atheist you are pleased to say I am. As it happens, however, I cannot
take this position with honesty, inasmuch as it is, and always has been,
a favorite tenet, that Atheism is as absurd, logically speaking, as
Polytheism." In the same paper he says, "The denying the possibility of
miracles seems to me quite as unjustifiable as speculative Atheism." How
this can be reconciled with the passages quoted above, we are unable to
see.
[24] _Lay Sermons_, etc., p. 330.
[25] _Contemporary Review_, vol. xviii. 1871, p. 444. In this same
article Mr. Huxley says: "Elijah's great question, Will ye serve God or
Baal? Choose ye, is uttered audibly enough in the ears of every one of
us as we come to manhood. Let every man who tries to answer it seriously
ask himself whether he can be satisfied with the Baal of authority, and
with all the good things his worshippers are promised in this world and
the next. If he can, let him, if he be so inclined, amuse himself with
such scientific implements as authority tells him are safe and will not
cut his fingers; but let him not imagine that he is, or can be, both a
true son of the Church and a loyal soldier of science." "And, on the
other hand, if the blind acceptance of authority appear to him in its
true colors, as mere private judgment _in excelsis_, and if he have
courage to stand alone face to face with the abyss of the Eternal and
Unknowable, let him be content, once for all, not only to renounce the
good things promised by 'Infallibility,' but even to bear the bad things
which it prophesies; content to follow reason and fact in singleness and
honesty of purpose, wherever they may lead, in the sure faith that a
hell of honest men will to him be more endurable than a paradise full of
angelic shams." There can be no doubt that the Apostle Paul believed in
the infallibility of the Scriptures. Imagine Professor Huxley calling
St. Paul to his face, a sham! What are all the Huxleys who have ever
lived or ever can live, to that one Paul in power for good over human
thought, character, and destiny!
Professor Huxley goes on in the next paragraph to say: "Mr. Mivart
asserts that 'without belief in a personal God there is no religion
worthy of the name.' This is a matter of opinion. But it may be
asserted, with less reason to fear contradiction, that the worship of a
personal God, who, on Mr. Mivart's hypothesis, must have used words
studiously calculated to deceive his creatures and worshippers, is 'no
religion worthy of the name.' 'Incredibile est, Deum illis verbis ad
populum fuisse locutum quibis deciperetur,' is a verdict in which for
once Jesuit casuistry concurs with the healthy moral sense of all
mankind." (p. 458). Mr. Huxley calls believers in the Scriptures, and
(apparently) believers in a personal God, bigots, old ladies of both
sexes, bibliolators, fools, etc., etc.
[26] _Lay Sermons_, etc. p. 331.
_Büchner._
Dr. Louis Büchner, president of the medical association of
Hessen-Darmstadt, etc., etc., is not only a man of science but a popular
writer. Perhaps no book of its class, in our day, has been so widely
circulated as his volume on "Kraft und Stoff," Matter and Force. It has
been translated into all the languages of Europe. He holds that matter
and force are inseparable; there cannot be the one without the other;
both are eternal and imperishable; neither can be either increased or
diminished; life originated spontaneously by the combination of
molecules of matter under favorable conditions; all the phenomena of the
universe, inorganic and organic, whether physical, vital, or mental, are
due to matter and its forces. Consequently there is no God, no creation,
no mind distinct from matter, no conscious existence of man after death.
All this is asserted in the most explicit terms. Dr. Büchner has
published a work on Darwinism in two volumes. Darwin's theory, he says,
"is the most thoroughly naturalistic that can be imagined, and far more
atheistic than that of his decried predecessor Lamarck, who admitted at
least a general law of progress and development; whereas, according to
Darwin, the whole development is due to the gradual summation of
innumerable minute and accidental operations."[27]
FOOTNOTE:
[27] _Sechs Vorlesungen über die Darwinische Theorie_. Von Ludwig
Büchner. Zweite Auflage, Leipzig, 1848, vol. i. p. 125.
_Carl Vogt._
In his preface to his work on the "Descent of Man," Mr. Darwin quotes
this author as a high authority. We see him elsewhere referred to as one
of the first physiologists of Germany. Vogt devotes the concluding
lecture of the second volume of his work on Man, to the consideration
of Darwinism. He expresses his opinion of it, after high commendation,
in the following terms. He says that it cannot be doubted that Darwin's
"theory turns the Creator--and his occasional intervention in the
revolutions of the earth and in the production of species--without any
hesitation out of doors, inasmuch as it does not leave the smallest room
for the agency of such a Being. The first living germ being granted, out
of it the creation develops itself progressively by natural selection,
through all the geological periods of our planets, by the simple law of
descent--no new species arises by creation and none perishes by divine
annihilation--the natural course of things, the process of evolution of
all organisms and of the earth itself, is of itself sufficient for the
production of all we see. Thus Man is not a special creation, produced
in a different way, and distinct from other animals, endowed with an
individual soul and animated by the breath of God; on the contrary, Man
is only the highest product of the progressive evolution of animal life
springing from the group of apes next below him."[28]
After this no one can be surprised to hear him say, that "the pulpits of
the orthodox, the confessionals of the priests, the platforms of the
interior missions, the presidential chairs of the consistories, resound
with protestations against the assaults made by Materialism and
Darwinism against the very foundations of society." (p. 286) This he
calls "Das Wehgeschrei der Moralisten" (the Wail of the Moralists). The
designation Moralists is a felicitous one, as applied to the opponents
of Vogt and his associates. It distinguishes them as men who have not
lost their moral sense; who refuse to limit their faith to what can be
proved by the five senses; who bow to the authority of the law written
by the finger of God, on the hearts of men, which neither sophistry nor
wickedness can effectually erase. All Vogt thinks it necessary to reply
to these Moralists is, "Lasst sie bellen, bis sie ausgebellt haben" (Let
them bark till they are tired). "Ende."
FOOTNOTE:
[28] _Vorlesungen über den Menschen, seine Stellung in der Schoepfung
und in der Geschichte der Erde_. Von Carl Vogt. Giessen, 1863, vol. ii.
p. 260.
_Haeckel._
Dr. Ernst Haeckel, Professor in the University of Jena, is said to stand
at the head of the living naturalists of Germany. His work on "Natural
History of Creation" contains a course of lectures delivered to the
professors, students, and citizens of Jena. It is, therefore, somewhat
popular in its character. The ability of the writer is manifest on every
page. The distinctness of his perceptions, precision of language,
perspicuity of style, and the strength of his convictions, give the
impression of a man fully master of his subject, who has thought himself
through, and is perfectly satisfied with the conclusions at which he has
arrived. At the same time it is the impression of a man who is developed
only on one side; who never looks within; who takes no cognizance of the
wonders revealed in consciousness; to whom the intuitions of reason and
of the conscience, the sense of dependence on a will higher than our
own--the sense of obligation and responsibility are of no account,--in
short a man to whom the image of God enstamped on the soul of man is
invisible. This being the case, he that is least in the kingdom of
heaven is greater than he.
Haeckel admits that the title of his book, "Natural Creation," _i. e._
creation by natural laws, is a contradiction. He distinguishes,
however, between the creation of substance and the creation of form. Of
the former he says science knows nothing. To the scientist matter is
eternal. If any one chooses to assume that it was created by an
extramundane power, Haeckel says he will not object. But that is a
matter of faith; and "where faith begins, science ends." The very
reverse of this is true. Science must begin with faith. It cannot take a
single step without it. How does Haeckel know that his senses do not
deceive him? How does he know that he can trust to the operations of his
intellect? How does he know that things are as they appear? How does he
know that the universe is not a great phantasmagoria, as so many men
have regarded it, and man the mere sport of chimeras? He must believe in
the laws of belief impressed on his nature. Knowledge implies a mind
that knows, and confidence in the act of knowing implies belief in the
laws of mind. "An inductive science of nature," says President Porter,
"presupposes a science of induction, and a science of induction
presupposes a science of man."[29] Haeckel, however, says faith is the
mere product of the poetic imagination; science, of the understanding;
if its conclusions come into conflict with the creations of the
imagination, the latter, of course, must give way.[30]
He says, there have ever been two conflicting theories of the universe:
the one, monistic; the other, dualistic. The one admits of only one
substance, matter; the other of two, matter and mind. He prefers to call
the former monism rather than materialism, because the latter term often
includes the idea of moral materialism, _i. e._ the doctrine that
sensual pleasure is the end of life; a doctrine, he says, much more
frequently held by princely church-men than by men of science. He
maintains, however, that "all knowable nature is one; that the same
eternal, immutable (ehernen, brazen) laws are active in the life of
animals and plants, in the formation of crystals, and the power of
steam; in the whole sphere of biology, zoölogy, and botany. We have,
therefore, the right to hold fast the monistic and mechanical view,
whether men choose to brand the system as Materialism or not. In this
sense, all natural science, with the law of causation at its head, is
thoroughly materialistic." (p. 32)
The monistic theory he calls "mechanical or causal," as distinguished
from the dualistic theory, which he calls "teleological or vitalistic."
According to the latter, "the vegetable and animal kingdoms are
considered as the products of a creative agency, working with a definite
design. In looking on an organism, the conviction seems unavoidable that
so skilfully constructed a machine, such a complicated working
apparatus, as an organism is, could be produced only by an agency
analogous to, although far more perfect than the agency of man." "This,"
he says, "supposes the Creator to be an organism analogous to man,
although infinitely more perfect; who contemplates his formative powers,
lays the plan of the machine, and then, by the use of appropriate means,
produces an effect answering to the preconceived plan.... However highly
the Creator may be exalted, this view involves the ascription to Him of
human attributes, in virtue of which he can form a plan, and construct
organisms to correspond with it. That is the view to which Darwin's
doctrine is directly opposed, and of which Agassiz is, among
naturalists, the most important advocate. The famous work of Agassiz,
'Essay on Classification,' which is in direct opposition to Darwin's,
and appeared about the same time, has carried out logically to the
utmost the absurd anthropomorphic doctrine of a Creator." (p. 17)
The monistic theory is called "mechanical and causal," because it
supposes that all the phenomena of the universe, organic and inorganic,
vegetable and animal, vital and mental, are due to mechanical or
necessarily operating causes (causæ efficientes); just as the dualistic
theory is called "teleological or vitalistic," because it refers natural
organisms to causes working for the accomplishment of a given end (causæ
finales). (p. 67)
The grand difficulty in the way of the mechanical or monistic theory was
the occurrence of innumerable organisms, apparently at least, indicative
of design. To get over this difficulty, Haeckel says, some who could not
believe in a creative and controlling mind adopted the idea of a
metaphysical ghost called vitality. The grand service rendered by Darwin
to science is, that his theory enables us to account for the
appearances of design in nature without assuming final causes, or, a
mind working for a foreseen and intended end. "All that had appeared
before Darwin," he says, "failed to secure success, and to meet with
general acceptance of the doctrine of the mechanical production of
vegetable and animal organisms. This was accomplished by Darwin's
theory." (p. 20)
The precise difficulty which Mr. Darwin's doctrine has, according to
Haeckel, enabled men of science to surmount, is thus clearly stated on
p. 633. It is, "that organs for a definite end should be produced by
undesigning or mechanical causes." This difficulty is overcome by the
doctrine of evolution. "Through the theory of descent, we are for the
first time able to establish the monistic doctrine of the unity of
nature, that a mechanic-causal explanation of the most complicated
organisms, _e. g._ the formation and constitution of the organs of
sense, have no more difficulty for the common understanding, than the
mechanical explanation of any physical process, as, for example,
earthquakes, the direction of the winds, or the currents of the sea. We
thus arrive at the conviction of the last importance, that all natural
bodies with which we are acquainted are equally endowed with life
(gleichmässig belebt sind); that the distinction between living and dead
matter does not exist. When a stone is thrown into the air and falls by
certain laws to the ground, or when a solution of salt forms a crystal,
the result is neither more nor less a mechanical manifestation of life,
than the flowering of a plant, the generation or sensibility of animals,
or the feelings or the mental activity of man. In thus establishing the
monistic theory of nature lies the highest and most comprehensive merit
of the doctrine of descent, as reformed by Darwin." (p. 21) "As to the
much vaunted design in nature, it is a reality only for those whose
views of animal and vegetable life are to the last degree superficial.
Any one who has gone deeper into the organization and vital activity of
animals and plants, who has made himself familiar with the action and
reaction of vital phenomena, and the so-called economy of nature, comes
of necessity to the conclusion, that design does not exist, any more
than the vaunted goodness of the Creator" (die vielgerühmte Allgüte des
Schöpfers). (p. 17)
Professor Huxley, in his review of this work of Haeckel, already quoted,
says: "I do not like to conclude without reminding the reader of my
entire concurrence with the general tenor and spirit of the work, and of
my high estimate of its value." If you take out of Haeckel's book its
doctrine of Monism, which he himself says means Materialism, it has no
"tenor or spirit" in it. It is not, however, for us to say how far
Professor Huxley intended his indorsement to go.
Haeckel says that Darwin's theory of evolution leads inevitably to
Atheism and Materialism. In this we think he is correct. But we have
nothing to do with Haeckel's logic or with our own. We make no charge
against Mr. Darwin. We cite Haeckel merely as a witness to the fact that
Darwinism involves the denial of final causes; that it excludes all
intelligent design in the production of the organs of plants and
animals, and even in the production of the soul and body of man. This
first of German naturalists would occupy a strange position in the sight
of all Europe, if, after lauding a book to the skies because it teaches
a certain doctrine, it should turn out that the book taught no such
doctrine at all.
FOOTNOTES:
[29] _The Science of Nature versus the Science of Man_. By Noah Porter,
President of Yale College. New York, 1871, p. 29.
[30] _Natürlische Schöpfungsgeschichte_. Von Dr. Ernst Haeckel,
Professor in der Universität Jena. Zweite Auflage, Berlin, 1873, pp. 8,
and 9.
_The Opponents of Darwinism._
_The Duke of Argyll._
When cultivated men undertake to refute a certain system, it is to be
presumed that they give themselves the trouble to ascertain what that
system is. As the advocates of Mr. Darwin's theory defend and applaud it
because it excludes design, and as its opponents make that the main
ground of their objection to it, there can be no reasonable doubt as to
its real character. The question is, How are the contrivances in nature
to be accounted for? One answer is, They are due to the purpose of God.
Mr. Darwin says, They are due to the gradual and undesigned accumulation
of slight variations. The Duke's first objection to that doctrine is,
that the evidence of design in the organs of plants and animals is so
clear that Mr. Darwin himself cannot avoid using teleological language.
"He exhausts," he says, "every form of words and of illustration by
which intention or mental purpose can be described. 'Contrivance,'
'beautiful contrivance,' 'curious contrivance,' are expressions which
occur over and over again. Here is one sentence describing a particular
species (of orchids): 'The labellum is developed _in order_ to attract
the Lepidoptera; and we shall soon see reason for supposing that the
nectar is purposely so lodged, that it can be sucked only slowly _in
order_ to give time for the curious chemical quality of the matter
setting hard and dry.'"[31] We have already seen that Mr. Darwin's
answer to this objection is, that it is hard to keep from personifying
nature, and that these expressions as used by him mean no more than
chemists mean when they speak of affinities, and one element preferring
another.
A second objection is, that a variation would not be useful to the
individual in which it happens to occur, unless other variations should
occur at the right time and in the right order; and that the concurrence
of so many accidents as are required to account for the infinite
diversity of forms in plants and animals, is altogether inconceivable.