What About Future Tests?
Many people feel that tests should be discontinued. This feeling is
widespread and strong. The question of tests is obviously important. It
may influence our security as individuals. It certainly will influence
our security as a nation. If in a free, democratic country the majority
believes that something should be done—it will be done. The sovereign
power in a democracy is “the people.” It is of the greatest importance
that the people should be honestly and completely informed about all
relevant facts. In no other way can a sound decision be reached. The
basic and relevant facts are simple. The story can be presented without
unnecessary frills or undue emotion. When this has been done, the right
decision will be reached by common sense rather than by exceptional
cleverness.
Unfortunately much of the discussion about continued experimentation
with nuclear explosives has been carried out in a most emotional and
confused manner. One argument concerning tests is so fantastic that it
deserves to be mentioned for that very reason: It has been claimed that
nuclear explosions may change the axis of the earth.
Of course, nuclear explosions do produce such changes. Only the changes
are so small that they are impossible to observe and even difficult to
estimate. Searching for effects connected with past tests that may
displace the axis of the earth, or the position of the North Pole, we
could find no effect that would have caused a change of position even as
great as the size of an atom. One could design tests with the specific
purpose to produce such a change, but these man-made effects could not
be compared even remotely with the forces of nature. The motion of the
Gulf Stream has a small effect on the North Pole; but this effect is
incomparably greater than what any nuclear explosion could accomplish.
It is good to know that the old top on which we live does have some
stability.
The argument about world-wide radioactive fallout is more serious. It is
asserted that fallout is dangerous and that we are ignorant of the
extent of the danger.
In a narrow, literal sense both these statements are correct. But in the
preceding chapters we have seen that the danger is limited. We do not
know precisely how great it is. We do know, however, that the danger is
considerably smaller than the danger from other radiations to which we
continue to expose ourselves without worry. The danger from the tests is
quite small compared with the effects of X-rays used in medical
practice. The fallout produces only a fraction of the increase in cosmic
ray effect to which a person subjects himself when he moves from the
seashore to a place of higher altitude like Colorado. People may or may
not be damaged by the fallout. But it is quite certain that the damage
is far below a level of which we usually take notice.
Fallout in the vicinity of the test sites did cause damage. In the past
this damage was not great although in one Pacific test it was serious.
Precautions have been increased and we may hope that future accidents
will be avoided altogether. The safety record of the Atomic Energy
Commission compares favorably with other enterprises of similar scale.
It seems probable that the root of the opposition to further tests is
not connected with fallout. The root is deeper. The real reason against
further tests is connected with our desire for disarmament and for
peace.
There can be no doubt that the desire for peace is most deep, and this
desire is felt by all thinking and honest people on our earth. All of us
certainly hope that the catastrophe of war can be avoided. This great
and universal wish for peace is the driving force behind the desire for
disarmament. In the minds of most people it would be an important step
toward disarmament if the testing of nuclear weapons were stopped by all
nations. This belief is widely held, but it is not necessarily
well-founded. In fact, there are arguments on the other side which
should be considered carefully.
It is generally believed that the First World War was caused by an arms
race. For some strange reason most people forget that the Second World
War was brought about by a situation which could be called a race in
disarmament. The peace-loving and powerful nations divested themselves
of their military power. When the Nazi regime in Germany adopted a
program of rapid preparation for war, the rest of the world was caught
unawares. At first they did not want to accept the fact of this menace.
When the danger was unmistakable, it was too late to avert a most cruel
war, and almost too late to stop Hitler short of world conquest.
Unfortunately, disarmament is safe only when no one wants to impose his
will by force of arms upon his neighbors.
In the uneasy world in which we live today no reasonable person will
advocate unilateral disarmament. What people hope is that all sides will
agree to reduce their military power and thereby contribute to a more
peaceful atmosphere. The elimination of tests has appeared possible and
proper for two reasons. One is that tests are conspicuous, and therefore
it is believed that we can check whether or not testing has actually
been stopped by everyone. The second reason is that nuclear explosives
already represent such terrifying power that further tests appear
useless and irrational. These arguments are simple and almost
universally accepted. They are based on misconceptions.
A nuclear explosion is a violent event, but in the great expanses of our
globe such tests can be effectively hidden if appropriate care is taken
to hide them. There can be no doubt that this is possible. The question
is only how much it costs to hide a test and how big is the explosion
that can be carried out in secret for a certain amount of expenditure.
If an agreement were made to discontinue the tests, the United States
would surely keep such an agreement. The very social and political
structure of our country excludes the possibility that many people would
collaborate in breaking an international undertaking. Whether Russia
would or would not keep such an agreement would depend on the ingenuity
of the Russians, on their willingness to make economic sacrifices, and
on their honesty. Of these three factors we can have a firm opinion
about the first. The Russians are certainly ingenious enough to devise
secret methods of testing. As to the other questions, whether the
Russians will want to invest the effort and whether they will be bound
by their word, we feel that each man is entitled to his own opinion.
According to past experience, an agreement to stop tests may well be
followed by secret and successful tests behind the iron curtain.
In a more general way we may ask the question: Is it wise to make
agreements which honesty will respect, but dishonesty can circumvent?
Shall we put a free, democratic government at a disadvantage compared to
the absolute power of a dictatorship? Shall we introduce prohibition in
a new form, just to give rise to bootlegging on a much greater scale? It
is almost certain that in the competition between prohibition and
bootlegging, the bootlegger will win.
All of these arguments, however, would become irrelevant if it were true
that further testing would not accomplish any further desirable result.
It has been said and often repeated that we now possess adequate nuclear
explosives to wipe out the cities of any enemy. What more do we need?
Our main purpose in further experimentation with nuclear bombs is not,
of course, to make city-busters more horrible. We would prefer not to
have to use our nuclear weapons at all. We keep them as a counterthreat
against the danger that we ourselves should be subjected to a
devastating attack. To understand what we are actually trying to do in
the tests, we have to take a closer look at some military problems.
In the Second World War strategic bombing was used for the first time on
a really massive scale. It may well be and, in fact, it is probable that
such strategic bombing will not be repeated in the future.
There are two military reasons for the bombing of cities. One is that
factories are located in cities, and these factories support the war
effort. The other reason is that cities are centers of transportation
through which the supplies of war materials pass. By destroying these
centers the flow of the war supplies can be interrupted.
Nuclear warfare is likely to be quite different from past conflicts. The
great concentration of firepower which a nuclear weapon represents makes
it possible to attack on enemy anywhere, at very short notice. This is
true no matter what the particular target is, whether one is trying to
attack the planes, ships, tanks, or troop concentrations of an enemy.
The great mobility of nuclear firepower makes it highly probable that
the nuclear conflict will be short. What the factory produces during
this conflict will not affect the outcome of the fighting. The only
weapons on which anyone can rely are the weapons which are already
stockpiled. Therefore, it will be militarily useless to bomb factories.
The same fact of mobility also implies that no great flow of war
material will need to be maintained. Practically all movement can be
executed by light and fast methods, by planes, submarines, and small
battle groups. Under these conditions the cities will lose their
importance as centers of transportation.
The only purpose in bombing cities will be to spread terror among the
enemy. This was rarely done in past wars. In fact, terror is
self-defeating because it provokes retaliation from the other side.
We believe that the role of nuclear weapons in a future war is by no
means the killing of millions of civilians. It is rather to stop the
armed forces of an aggressor. This is not easy to do because it requires
not only nuclear weapons, but very special kinds of nuclear weapons
which are hard to develop and harder to perfect. But with proper
experimentation and proper planning the defensive use of nuclear weapons
is possible.
The idea of tactical nuclear weapons is not new. The possibility of
using nuclear explosives in small wars has been frequently discussed.
What kind of weapons do we need in order to fight these small wars and
to defend the freedom of people wherever such defense becomes necessary?
It has often been suggested that in small wars, small weapons will be
used, while big weapons are appropriate for big wars. Such a statement
is much too simple and has no relation to reality. In every case the
right kind of weapon is the one which performs the job of stopping the
enemy’s armed forces without inflicting unnecessary loss on the innocent
bystander. For this purpose we need a great number of weapons which are
adaptable to specific purposes, which are easy to transport and easy to
deliver, and give rise to the kind of effect which the situation
requires.
For instance, a nuclear weapon may be carried by a fighter plane and
used to shoot down an attacking bomber. Since the carrying capacity of
the fighter plane is severely limited, the weapon for this purpose must
be small and light. A major objective of the test program is to develop
such purely defensive weapons.
The encounter between the fighter plane and the bomber may well take
place in our own country over populated areas. This possibility would
fill most people with alarm lest the population underneath the explosion
should be hurt. Fortunately, in a recent nuclear test in Nevada, five
well-informed and courageous Air Force officers demonstrated that there
is complete safety to people on the ground. They did this by standing
directly beneath the explosion at ground zero.
This important test took place only a few months ago—on July 19, 1957.
An F-89 jet fighter plane flying at 19,000 feet above sea level
delivered an air-to-air atomic rocket to a preassigned point in the sky.
The ground zero men were 15,000 feet immediately below. They wore no
helmets, no sun-glasses, and no protective clothing.
At the instant of the explosion the men looked up, saw the fireball and
felt the heat. There was no discomfort, only a gentle warmth. Then they
waited for the shock wave to arrive—approximately ten seconds. When the
shock came, it was actually just a loud noise. However, one of the men
ducked his head instinctively. (See pictures 9 and 10.)
The blast and the thermal pulse were over. But the Air Force men stood
their ground. One question still remained: Would there be any fallout?
They checked their radiation instruments and waited while the cloud
drifted slowly away. There was no significant rise in the radiation
level. The test had been a complete success. The effects of the
explosion were utterly insignificant on the ground. But high in the air
an enemy plane could have been demolished even if the nuclear explosion
had missed it by a considerable distance.
In order that nuclear weapons should be effective against armed
invaders, it is clear that great numbers of these weapons are needed.
Such great numbers of weapons, some of which must be ground-burst, will
produce a considerable amount of radioactive contamination, and this
contamination will endanger friend and foe alike. In particular, the
radioactivity is likely to kill people in the very country whose liberty
we are trying to defend. For this reason it is most important that we
should be able to use nuclear weapons which cause the least possible
contamination. In recent nuclear tests more and more attention has been
paid to the development of such clean weapons, and most fortunately
these efforts are well on the way toward success.
The radioactive fallout from nuclear testing gives rise to a possible
danger which is quite limited in size. The danger from the fallout in a
nuclear war, however, would be real and great. If we stop testing now,
and if we should fail to develop to the fullest possible extent these
clean weapons, we should unnecessarily kill a great number of
noncombatants. Not to develop the explosives with the smallest
radioactive fallout would, indeed, be completely inexcusable.
The only alternative is that nuclear weapons should not be used at all.
Since these weapons have been presented as purely evil instruments, most
people hope that they will never be used, and indeed one should hope
that wars, and therefore the use of these weapons, can be avoided.
But in our conflict with the powerful communistic countries which strive
for world domination, it may be too much to hope for uninterrupted
peace. If we abandon our light and mobile weapons, we shall enable the
Red bloc to take over one country after another, close to their borders,
as opportunities arise. The free nations cannot maintain the massive
armies throughout the world which would be required to resist such
piecemeal aggression. On the other hand, the flexible power of clean
nuclear explosives would put us in a position where we could resist
aggression in any part of the world, practically at a moment’s notice.
The announced policy of our country is to maintain peace and stability
in the world. By being patient and prepared we are trying to arrive at a
world order based on law and justice for all peoples. There is no doubt
that this policy is supported by the overwhelming majority of Americans.
Our armed forces need the greatest possible flexibility in order to give
strength to this policy. Such flexibility we can possess only if we have
in our possession the strongest, best developed weapons which are also
the cleanest, so that they may be used for defense rather than for
random destruction.
If we renounce nuclear weapons, we open the door to aggression. If we
fail to develop clean explosives, we expose people to disaster from
radioactive fallout in any serious military conflict. To our way of
thinking these are weighty arguments in favor of continued
experimentation and development of nuclear weapons. But still another,
more general, point of view should be considered.
The spectacular developments of the last centuries, in science, in
technology, and in our everyday life, have been based on one important
premise: to explore fearlessly any consequences to which greater
knowledge and improved skills can lead us. When we talk about nuclear
tests, we have in mind not only military preparedness but also the
execution of experiments which will give us more insight and more
ability to control the forces of nature. There are many specific
political and military reasons why such experiments should not be
abandoned. There also exists this very general reason—the tradition of
exploring the unknown. We can follow this tradition, and we can at the
same time be increasingly careful that radioactivity, carelessly
dispersed, should not interfere with human life.