The Caliphate.
Of all the institutions of Islam the caliphate is the oldest, the most
fundamental, and in essence the most enduring. For its history see
CALIPHATE; the present subject is its origin and nature. Mahomet enjoyed
absolute rule over his people as a divinely inspired and guided prophet.
He led the public prayers; he acted as judge; he ruled. If he consulted
with others or paid attention to public feeling or local usage, it was
as a matter of policy; the ultimate decision lay with himself. He was
the state. On his death a leader was put in his place of similar
authority, though without the divine prophetic guidance. He was called
the "successor" (_khalifa_, caliph) of the Prophet, later also the
_amir-al-mu'minin_, commander of the faithful, and was elected by the
Moslems, just as the Arab tribes had always elected their chiefs. He was
thus an absolute ruler, but was democratically elected; and such is the
essence of the caliphate among Sunnite Moslems to this day. For them it
has been a matter of agreement (see MAHOMMEDAN LAW) from the earliest
times that the Moslem community must appoint such a leader (see IMAM).
The Shi`ites, on the other hand, hold that the appointment lies with
God, and that God always has appointed, though his appointment may not
always have been known and accepted. Their position may be called a
legitimist one. Some few heretical sects have held that the necessity of
a leader was based on reason, not on the agreement of the community.
But, for all, the rule of the leader thus appointed is absolute, and all
authority is delegated from him and, in theory, can be resumed by him at
any time. Just as God can require unreasoning obedience from his
creatures (his "slaves" in Arabic), so can the caliph, his
representative on earth.
But Abu Bekr, the first caliph, nominated his successor, Omar, and that
nomination was accepted and confirmed by the people. So a second
precedent was fixed, which was again carried a step farther, when
Moawiya I., the first Omayyad caliph, nominated his son, Yazid I., as
his successor, and caused an oath of allegiance to be taken to him. The
hereditary principle was thus introduced, though some relics of the form
of election persisted and still persist. The true election possible in
the early days of the small community at Medina became first a formal
acceptance by the populace of the capital; then an assertion, by the
palace guard, of their power; and now, in the investiture of the sultans
of the Ottoman Turks, who claim the caliphate, a formal ceremony by the
`ulema (q.v.) of Constantinople. The Ottoman claim is based on an
asserted nomination by the last Abbasid, who died in exile in Egypt in
1538, of the Ottoman sultan, Suleiman the Great, as his successor. Such
a nomination in itself was a perfectly legal act, but in this case had a
fatal flaw. It is an absolute condition, laid down in tradition, that
the caliph must be of the tribe of Koreish (Quraish), that of the
Prophet.
The duties of this democratically elected autocrat are, in theory,
generally stated as follows. He shall enforce legal decisions and
maintain the divinely revealed restrictive ordinances; guard the
frontiers and equip armies; receive the alms; put down robberies,
thieving, highwaymen; maintain the Friday services and the festivals;
decide disputes and receive evidence bearing on legal claims; marry
minors, male and female, who have no guardians; divide booty. He must be
a free, male, adult Moslem; must have administrative ability; must be an
effective governor and do justice to the wronged. So long as he fulfils
these conditions he is to be absolutely obeyed; private immorality or
even tyranny are not grounds for deposing him. This is a position
reached by Islam practically. But a caliph who openly denied the faith
would be as impossible as an unbelieving pope. The caliph, therefore, is
the highest executive officer of a system assumed to be definite and
fixed. He, in a word, administers Islam; and the content of Islam is
determined by the agreement of the Moslem people, expressed immediately
through the `ulema, and ultimately, if indirectly and half-consciously,
by the people. To depose him a _fatwa_ (see MUFTI) would be required--in
Turkey from the Sheikh-ul-Islam--that he had violated some essential of
the Moslem faith, and no longer fulfilled the conditions of a caliph.
The Diwans.
But it was impossible for the caliph personally to administer the
affairs of the empire, and by degrees the supreme office was gradually
put into commission, until the caliph himself became a mere
figure-head, and vanished into the sacred seclusion of his palace. The
history of the creation of government bureaus (_diwans_; see DIVAN)
must therefore now be sketched. The first need which appeared was that
of a means of regulating and administering the system of taxation and
the revenues of the state. Immense sums flowed into Medina from the
Arab conquests; the surplus, after the requirements of the state were
met, was distributed among the believers. All Moslems had a right to a
certain share of this, which was regarded as booty. Omar, the second
caliph, regulated this distribution and also the system of taxation,
and the result was the first divan and the constitution of Omar,
looked back to now by all Sunnite Moslems as an ideal. The sources of
revenue were (i) the poor-rate (_zakat_), a tithe paid by every
Moslem; (ii) the fifth of all booty; (iii) the poll-tax (_jizya_) on
non-Moslems; and (iv) the land-tax (_kharaj_) also on non-Moslems.
Thus the constitution determined the position of all non-Moslems in a
Moslem state. The ideal was that the Moslems should be kept apart as a
superior, fighting caste, and that the non-Moslems should support them
(cf. CALIPHATE, B. § 8, on the reign of Omar II.). The Moslems,
therefore, were forbidden to acquire land in conquered countries. The
non-Moslems must retain their lands, cultivate them and pay the
land-tax (the Arabic word is also used of revenue from the work of a
slave) and the poll-tax (the Arabic word means also "ransom"), and
give contributions in kind to support the local Moslem garrisons which
were massed in great camp-cities at strategic points. If a non-Moslem
embraced Islam he entered the ruling caste; his land was distributed
among his non-Moslem fellows, and he no longer paid the land-tax but
rather received support from the public funds. The amount of these
pensions varied with the standing of the pensioner from 10,000 dirhems
(a dirhem equalled about a franc) to the widows and relations of the
Prophet down to 300. This bureau had, therefore, not only to keep the
books of the state, but also to maintain a list of all Moslems,
classified genealogically and socially. Its registers were kept by
Greeks, Copts and Persians; the Arabs, it may be said in general,
adopted the method of administration which they found in the captured
countries and drew upon the trained services of their inhabitants.
Such a system led naturally to wholesale conversions to Islam; and the
consequent decline in revenue, combined with large donations of lands
by Othman, the third caliph, to his own family, gradually broke it
down. The first patriarchal period of conquest, unearned wealth and
the simple life--called by Moslems the period of the "four rightly
guided caliphs," and very happily by Sachau, _ein mönchisches
Imperium_--passed rapidly into the genuinely Arab empire of the
Omayyads, with whom came an immediate development of organization in
the state. The constructive genius in this was Moawiya, the first
Omayyad caliph. Under him the old simplicity vanished. A splendid and
ceremonious court was maintained at Damascus. A chamberlain kept the
door; a bodyguard surrounded the caliph, and even in the mosque the
caliph, warned by the murder of Othman and of Ali, prayed in a
railed-off enclosure. The beginning of the seclusion of the caliph had
come, and he no longer walked familiarly among his fellow Moslems.
This seclusion increased still further when the administration of the
state passed by delegation into other hands, and the caliph himself
became a sacrosanct figure-head, as in the case of the later Abbasids;
when theories of semi-divine nature and of theocratic rule appeared,
as in the case of the Fatimites; and finally when all the elaborate
court ritual of Byzantium was inherited by the Ottoman sultans.
But Moawiya I. was still a very direct and personal ruler. He
developed a post-system for the carrying of government despatches by
relays, and thus received secret information from and kept control of
the most distant provinces. He established a sealing-bureau by which
state papers were secured against change. He dealt arbitrarily with
the revenues of the state and the pensions of the Moslems. Governors
of provinces were given a much freer hand, and were required to turn
over to the central treasury their surplus revenue only. As they were
either conquerors or direct successors of conquerors they had an
essentially military government, and were really semi-independent
rulers, unhampered except by direct action of the caliph, acting on
information sent by the postmaster, who was his local spy. Being thus
the heads of armies of occupation, they were not necessarily charged
with the control of religious ritual and of justice. These, like every
other function, inhered in the office of the caliph and he generally
appointed in each province independent cadis over the courts and imams
to be in charge of religious services. Yet the governor was sometimes
permitted to hold these two other offices (see CADI; IMAM).
The Vizierate.
Further administrative developments came with the Abbasids. They created
a new city, Bagdad, between the Tigris and the Euphrates, where the
three races, Syrian, Arab and Persian, met and sought with Bagdad as a
capital to consolidate the empire. The Arab empire, it is true, had
passed away with the Omayyads; yet there might be a chance to create a
world-empire of all the Moslem peoples. But not even the genius and
administrative skill of the early Abbasids could hold together that
unwieldy mass. The semi-independent provinces soon became fully
independent, or at most acknowledged the caliph as a spiritual head and
paid a nominal tribute. His name might stand on the coinage and prayers
be offered for him in the Friday service, the two signs of sovereignty
to this day in Islam. With this crumbling of the empire went a more
elaborate organization; bureaus took the place of principles and of the
energy of individual rulers. As the system of Moslem law was built on
that of the Roman codes, so was the machinery of administration on that
of Persia. And with the Abbasids the chance of the Persians had come.
Abu 'l-Abbas, the first Abbasid caliph, was the first to appoint a
vizier (_wazir_, "helper," so Aaron is wazir to Moses in the Koran), a
confidential minister to advise him and come between him and the people.
Advisers the caliphs had had before; but not a definite adviser with
this name. He must, we are told, have a strain of the ruler in him and a
strain of the people to be able to work with both. He must know how to
be acceptable; fidelity and truthfulness are his capital; sagacity,
firmness, generosity, clemency, dignity, effectiveness of speech are
essential. It is plain that the vizier became as important as the
caliph. But Abu 'l-Abbas was fortunate in early securing as his vizier
the grandfather of the house of the Barmecides (q.v.). On this Persian
family the fortunes of the Abbasids hung, and it secured for them and
for Islam a short golden age, like that of the Antonines, until the
jealous madness of Harun al-Rashid cast them down. Thereafter the
vizierate had many vicissitudes. Technically a vizier could be either
limited or unlimited. The limited vizier had no initiative; he carried
out the commands of the caliph. The unlimited vizier, often afterwards
called the grand vizier, exercised full authority and was the _alter
ego_ of the caliph, to whom he was required only to report. Naturally
the formal distinction is a later theorizing of history; for a weak
ruler his vizier became absolute, for a strong ruler his vizier remained
subordinate. Here, as with regard to all Moslem institutions, a marked
distinction must be made between the historic facts and the speculative
edifices raised by constitutional theorizers. Compare especially
MAHOMMEDAN LAW. Until the time of Radi (934-940) the vizierate thus
fluctuated in importance. In that caliphate the vizier lost all
authority, and in his place came the _amir al-omara_--equivalent to the
_major domus_ of the Franks--the head of the Turkish bodyguard, in
terror of whom the caliph now stood. When in 945 the Buyids captured
Bagdad and the caliph became a purely spiritual sovereign, they took the
title "vizier" for their own chief minister, and the caliphs retained
only a secretary (see CALIPHATE, C. § 22). Under the Seljuks, however,
they regained their viziers and some real authority. Elsewhere, also the
vizierate had its vicissitudes. Under the Mamelukes the vizier fell to
be merely the court purveyor. Under the Omayyads of Spain the title was
given to several responsible officers of the state, but their chief was
called _hajib_, chamberlain. Under the Almohades the chamberlain was
called vizier. In the modern Turkish empire the grand vizier (called
generally _sadr A`zam_) is the sultan's representative in secular
matters, and nominally stands between the sovereign and all the other
officials. He is the president of the council of ministers, but Abd-ul
Hamid II. deprived the office of almost all its importance.
Other Ministers.
Under the early Abbasids the four most important ministers were the
chief cadi, the chief of police or head of the life guards, the
minister of finance and the postmaster, who was the head of the system
of information and espionage which covered the empire. But at
different times the different bureaus varied greatly. Under Motawakkil
we find the bureau of taxes and finance; bureau of the crown estates;
bureau of state book-keeping; bureau of war, i.e. of hired troops;
bureau which kept reckoning and control of the pensions of the clients
and slaves of the ruling family; bureau of the post system; bureau of
expenditures. But in spite of this elaborate system, no Moslem
government has, except sporadically, been highly centralized. Provided
the taxes are paid, a large measure of local autonomy has always been
enjoyed by the country districts. Under the Abbasids almost the only
exception was the necessarily centralized control of the irrigation
system of the Tigris and Euphrates. And similarly elsewhere.
In the case of all these offices, we have delegation by the caliph,
under necessity, of his too heavy burdens. But one duty of an Oriental
ruler he could not so easily lay aside. It had always to be possible
for the oppressed to come into his presence and claim justice; he must
sit in the gate and judge. Therefore, when the caliph found it
necessary to delegate the ordinary administration of justice, he found
it also necessary to set up a special court of oppressions, which
developed, to a certain extent, into a court of appeals. The first to
establish such a separate court was Abdalmalik the Omayyad (685-705),
and his example was followed by the more vigorous of the caliphs up to
the time of Mohtadi the Abbasid (869-870). If any other than the
caliph presided over this court it had to be a man whose dignity,
independence and authority commanded respect. He was not bound by
strict rules of evidence, method and literal application of law as was
the cadi. Rather, he applied a system of equity suited to the absolute
source of authority which he represented.
As the chief of police, mentioned above, was rather the head of the
caliph's bodyguard, there was also a police system after our ideas,
but more thoroughgoing. The _muhtasib_ had charge in the broadest
sense of public order and morals in the streets, and had oversight as
to weights, measures and adulterations; but had no right to interfere
privately or enter houses save in the clearest and most necessary
cases. He had a summary jurisdiction in all minor cases where no trial
was necessary; but where witnesses and oaths entered the case must go
to the cadi. Slaves and beasts of burden were under his guardianship;
he prevented public scandals, such as the sale of wine; he regulated
the public conduct of Jews and Christians. In the interest of public
morals he had to find suitable husbands for widows and see that they
did not marry before the legal time; questions of paternity also he
had to investigate. The outdoor costume of the people he could
regulate. It should, of course, be remembered that the canon law of
Islam covers minutely all sides of life (see MAHOMMEDAN LAW).
It is impossible in Islam to separate logically from the mass of
institutions those which we should call religious, as Islam on all sides
is for the Moslem equally religious. But perhaps the following may
practically be separated under that rubric. Islam, runs a tradition, is
built on five things: testimony that there is no god save Allah, and
that Mahomet is the apostle of Allah; prayer; the poor-rate; pilgrimage;
fasting. For these see MAHOMMEDAN RELIGION.
The law and usage of religious foundations in perpetuity (_waqf_,
mortmain) became as important in Islam as monastic endowments in
medieval Europe, and such foundations tended similarly to absorb the
greater part of the national wealth. It was the only safe way of
providing for posterity. A pious foundation could be erected in such a
way that either so much from its funds would be paid yearly in
perpetuity to the descendants of the erector, or those descendants
would be employed as officials of the foundation.
The Imam.
When it became impossible for the caliph to lead the people personally
in prayer in the mosque, he delegated that part of his duties to
another, hence called imam (q.v.). Naturally, then, the appointment of
the imam would lie with the supreme ruler. This holds of the daily
prayers in the principal mosque (_al-masjid al-jami'_) supported by
the ruler where the Friday service is held, but in the separate
smaller mosques built by each community the community chooses its own
imam. With regard to the Friday service, the schools of law disagree
as to the necessity of the presence of an imam appointed by the chief
ruler. But the imam should certainly make mention of the ruler in his
sermon and pray for him. At the occasional prayers, such as those for
rain, &c., the presence of an imam appointed by the ruler is not
necessary. The imam appoints the _muaddhin_, the announcer of the hour
of prayer from the minaret, and both have a claim on the state
treasury.
Another office exercised when possible by the caliph, but very
frequently delegated to some high dignitary, such as the heir to the
caliphate or a prince, was the leadership of the pilgrimage caravan to
Mecca and back. Sometimes this official, called _amir-al-hajj_, was
appointed imam as well. He then led all the pilgrimage ceremonies at
Mecca. When outside of towns where there was a cadi he exercised also
over the caravan the rights of a judge.
The Cadi.
Mahommedan law (q.v.) is treated separately. Here, again, as judging
is a duty of the caliph, a cadi is the delegate, or, when appointed by
a vizier or governor, a delegate of his delegate. He examines into
disputes brought before him and enforces his judgments, he names
administrators of the estates of minors, the insane, &c.; he
supervises the _waqf_ property of mosques and schools in his district
and inspects highways and public buildings; he watches over the
execution of wills; he inflicts the due legal penalties for apostasy,
neglect of religious duties, refusal to pay taxes, theft, adultery,
outrages, murder; he can inflict the penalties of imprisonment, fine,
corporal punishment, death; if there is no imam, he can perform his
duty, as in fact can anyone who has the requisite knowledge. But it
should be noticed that all this holds only of the un-europeanized
Moslem state.
The Army.
For the existence of an army in Islam, there are two grounds, the holy
war (_jihad_, q.v.) against unbelievers without the state and the
suppression of rebellion within. Under the ordinance of Omar the entire
community was preserved and used as a weapon for the subduing of the
world to Islam, and every able-bodied male Moslem was theoretically a
fighting man, part of the national militia. This army was divided into
corps situated in the conquered lands, as armies of occupation, where
they eventually came to form military colonies in great camp-cities. The
occupied countries had to support them, and they were bound to render
military service at any time. But as the ideal of Omar broke down before
facts the use of mercenary and slave troops finally increased; although
there has always continued in Moslem armies acting against unbelievers a
proportion of volunteers not paid a fixed wage but subsidized by the
state from the poor-rate and alms funds. The generals were appointed by
the caliph, and had either unlimited authority to act as his
representatives, concluding peace, acting as cadi and imam, distributing
booty; or were restricted within limits, e.g. to simple leading of the
troops and carrying on military operations. They, in turn, appointed
their subordinates; this principle of giving a head full powers and full
responsibility was very generally applied in Islam. It was controlled of
course by the espionage of the postal system. As war by a Moslem power
is essentially sacred war, the regulations of _jihad_ must be considered
here. Unbelievers must first be invited to embrace Islam and, if they
follow a sacred book and are not idol-worshippers, are given a choice
between (a) becoming Moslems; or (b) submitting to the Moslems and
entering on a treaty with them of protection and tribute; or (c)
fighting. If they accept Islam, their lives, families and property are
secure, and they form henceforth part of the Moslem community. The
ability of Islam to create a common feeling between highly different
races is one of its most striking features. If they submit and enter on
treaty relations, they pay a poll-tax, for which their personal safety
is assured, and assume a definitely inferior status, having no technical
citizenship in the state, only the condition of protected clients
(_dhimmis_). If they elect to fight, the door of repentance is open,
even when the armies are face to face. But after defeat their lives are
forfeit, their families are liable to slavery, and all their goods to
seizure. It is open to the sovereign either to put them to death; or to
enslave them; or to give them their liberty; or to exchange them for
ransom or against Moslem prisoners. The sovereign will choose that which
is best for Islam. As for their families and wealth, the sovereign can
release them only with consent of the army that has captured them.
Apostates must be put to death. Four-fifths of the booty after a battle
goes to the conquering army.
The technical art of war seems to have been little studied among
Moslems; they have treatises on archery but very little upon tactics.
Their writers recognize, however, the essential difference between the
European and Persian methods of charging in solid lines and holding the
ground stubbornly, and the Arab and Berber method of flying attacks and
retreats by clouds of cavalry. Therefore, one explained, the custom grew
of using a mass of European mercenaries as a fixed nucleus and
rallying-point. The early Moslem armies, too, had used the solid,
unyielding charge, which may have been the secret of their success. For
one of the greatest puzzles of history is the cause which changed the
erratic, untrustworthy swarms of Arab horsemen with their childish
strategy into the ever-victorious legions of the first caliphs. They
certainly learned rapidly. Byzantium and Persia taught them the use of
military engines and the entrenched camp. Before that they had been, at
the best, single knights with mail-shirt, helmet, sword and lance.
Bowmen, too, they used, but the principal use of the bow seems to have
come with the Turks.
Education.
The glory of Moslem education was its university system, which fed the
higher learning and did not serve everyday needs. Its primary system
was very poor, almost non-existent; and technical education has never
been recognized in Islam. Primary teachers were despised as ignorant
and foolish. Apparently, if we may trust the many stories of how
ignorant men set up for themselves, there was no control of them by
the state. Their pupils were young only; they taught the rudiments of
reading, Koran, catechism, prayer, writing and arithmetic, but very
little of the latter. Technical education was given by the gilds
through their apprentice system, teaching mechanical arts and crafts.
This was genuine instruction, but was not so regarded; it was looked
upon rather as are the mysteries and secrets of operative masonry. It
produced artisans of independent character, but not artists. Thus
there was no distinction between architect and builder; there was no
sculpture; and painting, so far as it went, was like carving, a craft.
All Moslem university education, like all Moslem science, revolved
round theology. There were, apparently, only two outstanding
exceptions to this rule, the academy of Mamun (813-833) at Bagdad, and
the hall of wisdom of the Fatimites at Cairo (1004-1171); both of
these are explained by their environment. From the earliest times,
independent scholars instructed classes in mosques--the common places
of meeting for the community--and gave their pupils personal
certificates. Their subjects were the reading and interpretation of
the Koran; the body of traditions from the Prophet; the thence deduced
system of theology; the canon law. But the interpretation of the Koran
involved grammatical and lexicographical studies of early Arabic, and
hence of the early Arabic literature. Theology came to involve
metaphysical and logical studies. Canon law required arithmetic and
mensuration, practical astronomy, &c. But these last were strictly
ancillary; the object of the instruction was primarily to give
knowledge of value for the life of the next world, and, secondarily,
to turn out theologians and lawyers. Medicine was in Jewish and
Christian hands; engineering, architecture, &c., with their
mathematical bases, were crafts. Then this instruction was gradually
subsidized and organized by the state, or endowed by individuals. How
early this took place is uncertain. But the individual teacher, with
his certificate, remained the object of the student; there was nothing
corresponding to our general degrees. Thirdly, educational
institutions came to be equipped with scholarships of money or in kind
for the students. The first instance of this is generally ascribed to
Nishapur (Naisabur) in 1066; but it soon became general in the system
and afforded a means of control and centralization. A final, and most
important, characteristic was the wide journeying of the students "in
search of knowledge." Aided by Arabic as the universal language of
learning, students journeyed from teacher to teacher, and from
Samarkand to the Atlantic, gathering on their way hundreds of personal
certificates. Scholars were thus kept in touch all over the Moslem
world, and intellectual unity was maintained.
The Sayyids.
To the democratic equality of Islam, in which the slave of to-day may be
the prime minister of to-morrow, there is one outstanding exception. The
descendants of the Prophet and of his relatives (the family of Hashim)
formed and form a special class, held in social reverence, and guarded
from contamination and injury. These are the _sayyids_ (lords), and
genealogical registers of them are carefully preserved. They are of all
degrees of wealth and poverty, but are guarded legally from
_mésalliances_ with persons of ignoble origin or equivocal occupation.
Their influence is very great, and in some parts of the Moslem world
they have the standing and reverence of saints.
See Von Kremer, _Culturgeschichte des Orients_, based largely on
Mawardi's _Ahkam_, trans. in part by Ostrorog; McG. de Slane's trans.
of Ibn Khaldun, _Prolégomènes_; Lane, _Manners and Customs of the
Modern Egyptians_; R. F. Burton, _Pilgrimage to Mekka_; Snouck
Hurgronje, _Mekka_; Hughes, _Dictionary of Islam_; Juynboll, _De
Mohammedaansche Wet_; Macdonald, _Development of Muslim Theology_, &c.
For women in Islam, see HAREM. (D. B. Ma.)
MAHOMMEDAN LAW. The legal situation in the Moslem world is of the
highest complexity, and can be made intelligible only by tracing its
historical development. First came the system (_fiqh_, _sharia_) which
takes the place in Islam of canon law in Roman Christendom. It begins
with Mahomet sitting as judge over the primitive Moslem community at
Medina. He was the Prophet of God, and judged, as he ruled, absolutely;
any decision of his was valid. But he found it, in general, advisable
and fitting to follow the local law or usage of Medina when the new
faith did not require a change. It thus came about that his decisions
followed, at one time, the usage of the Arab tribes of Medina; at
another, the law respected by the Jewish tribes there--a rabbinic
development of the law of Moses, deeply affected by Roman law; at
another, the more developed commercial law of Mecca, known to his
followers who had fled thence with him; or, finally, his own personal
judgment, stated it might be as his own sense of right or as the
decision of Allah and even incorporated in the Koran. In his use of
these he was an eclectic opportunist, and evidently, except as regards
such frequently recurring subjects as inheritance, marriage, &c., had no
thought of building up a system or code. At his death he left behind
only a few specific prescriptions in the Koran and a mass of recorded
decisions of cases that had come before him. He had used himself, in our
terms, common law, equity, legislation; to guide his followers he left
his legislative enactments and the record of his use of common law.
Since his death there has been no new legislation in orthodox Islam.
With the death of Mahomet began the development and codification of
Moslem law. It was at first entirely practical. Cases had to be decided,
and to decide them there was, first, the Koran; secondly, if nothing _ad
rem_ was found in the Koran, there were the decisions of the Prophet;
thirdly, if these failed, there was the common law of Medina; and,
fourthly, if it, in turn, failed, the common sense of the judge, or
equity. A knowledge of the decisions of Mahomet came thus to be of great
importance, and records of such decisions were eagerly sought and
preserved. But this was simply a part of a much wider movement and
tendency. As among primitive peoples in general, custom and usage have
always been potent among the Arabs. The ways of the fathers, the old
paths, they love to tread. Very early there arose a special reverence
for the path and usage (_sunna_) of Mahomet. Whatever he did or said, or
left unsaid or undone, and how he did it, has become of the first
importance to the pious Moslem, who would act in every way as did the
Prophet. There is evidence that for this purpose the immediate
companions of Mahomet took notes, either in memory or in writing, of his
table talk and wise sayings, just as they took down or learned by heart
for their private use the separate fragments of the Koran. His sayings
and doings, manners and customs, his answers to questions on religious
life and faith, above all his decisions in legal disputes, came to be
recorded on odd sheets in private notebooks. This was the beginning of
the enormous literature of traditions (_hadith_) in Islam. The
collecting and preserving of these, which was at first private, for
personal guidance and edification, finally became one of the most
powerful weapons of political and theological propaganda, and coloured
the whole method and fabric of Moslem thought. All knowledge tended to
be expressed in that form, and each element of it to be traced back to,
and given in the words of, some master or other through a chain of
transmitters. Above all there grew up an enormous mass of evidently
forged sayings put into the mouth of Mahomet. At every important
political or theological crisis each party would invent and put into
circulation a tradition from him, supporting its view. By a study of
these flatly opposed "sayings" it is possible to reconstruct the
different controversies of Islam in the past, and to discover what each
party regarded as the essence of its position.
The first collecting of traditions was for private purposes, and the
first publication dealing with them was legal. This was the Muwatta'
of Malik ibn Anas (d. 795), a _corpus juris_ based partly on
traditions, and a protest in its methods against the too speculative
character of the books of canon law which preceded it. Thereafter came
collections of two different types. The earlier kind was arranged
according to the companions of Mahomet, on whose authority the
traditions were transmitted; after each companion came the traditions
going back to him. The best known example of this kind is the _Musnad_
of Ahmad ibn Hanbal. The other kind, called _Musannaf_ (classified),
contains traditions arranged in chapters according to their subject
matter. That of Bukhari is the most famous, and is arranged to give a
traditional basis for a complete system of canon law; its rubrics are
those of such a system. Another is that of Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, who
paid less attention to legal aspects and more to minute accuracy.
There are many others of more or less acceptance and canonicity.
Bukhari's book enjoys a reverence only second to that of the Koran.
But in all these publications the primary object was to purify the
mass of traditions of forged accretions and to give to the believer a
sound basis for his knowledge of the usages of the Prophet, whether
for his personal or for public use. These two kinds were a natural
development. In the Moslem community there were from the first
students of tradition proper whose interest lay in collecting, testing
and transmitting, not in combining, systematizing and elucidating;
whose preference was to take a single statement from the Prophet and
apply it to a case, without reasonings or questionings. And there were
students of canon law who were interested rather in the system and
results, and who, while they used traditions, used them only to an end
and insisted on the free application of speculative principles. The
conflict of the future was to be between these traditionalists, on the
one hand, and rationalists, on the other; and the result was to be a
compromise.
With the wide sweep of Moslem conquest another element came into the
development. This was Roman law, which the Moslem jurist found at work
in the conquered Roman provinces and in the law courts of which they
went to school. It is to be remembered that the Arab armies were not
devastating hordes; they recognized the need of law and order wherever
they went, and it was the policy of their leaders to take over the
administrative systems of the countries which they seized. Even the
Arabic legal nomenclature shows evident signs of literal translation
from Latin, and many Moslem principles can be traced to the Roman codes.
One important development was plainly influenced by the liberty involved
in the _Responsa prudentium_ of Roman lawyers, and by the broad
conception of the law of nature in the Edict of the Praetor. In its
earliest stages Moslem law recognized in the judge a liberty of opinion
(_ra'y_) which went beyond even that of the _Responsa_ and became plain
equity, in the English sense, and one school (the Hanifite) established
as a basis the right of preference (_istihsan_) even when the analogy of
the code dictated otherwise; while another (the Malikite) used the term
_istislah_, "a seeking of (general) benefit" to the community, in a
similar situation. But these developments were bitterly contested, and
the liberty of opinion was in the end narrowed down to a principle of
analogy (_qiyas_), the nearest approach to which in Western law is legal
fiction.
It is necessary now to return to the first successors of Mahomet. "For
thirty years after my death," he is said to have declared, "my people
will tread in my path (_sunna_); thereafter will come kings and
princes." This tradition crystallizes the later feeling of Islam. The
first thirty years were a golden age; the centre of the state was the
Prophet's own city of Medina; the conditions of the state continued in
close conformity to those of his own time. The study of tradition, i.e.
of his usage, went hand in hand with the study of law. They were vital
functions of the state, and it encouraged both.
Then came the great _débâcle_. The _ancien régime_, a semi-monkish,
theocratic empire, went down, and the Omayyad dynasty, kings and princes
of the old Arab type, took its place (see CALIPHATE, B). The public life
of the state was no longer deeply religious; the pious said that it was
godless. Under these conditions law was indeed still needed; but it had
to be opportunist. Its development went on, but became speculative. The
study of tradition was now private, and its students were more and more
the personally pious. There were, thus, two results. On the one hand,
the framers of systems of canon law--as it now was--no longer lived in
contact with reality; hypothetical and ideal structures were reared
which could never stand the touch of the practical law-court. And on
another, traditions and law, even this hypothetical law, came to take
separate roads. The interest of the students of tradition became the
gathering of traditions for their own sake, going no farther than a
striving to regulate each detail of life by some specific, concrete,
prophetic dictum. They had no use for systems that went beyond the mere
registering of these dicta. The feeling also became widespread that any
system of government which did not simply reproduce the patriarchal form
of Medina was of the world and the devil--a thing with which no
religious man could have aught to do. At every turn he would have to
peril his soul.
Here we must place the transition of this law with which we have
hitherto dealt from being the law of the land to being in essence a
variety of canon law. It was always broader than any western secular
law. It regulated all the aspects of life--duty to God, to one's
neighbour, to one's self. It was really a system of duties, ethical,
legal, religious. It did not limit itself to defining the forbidden
(_haram_); but designated actions also as required (_fard_, _wajib_),
recommended (_mandub_, _mustahabb_), indifferent (_ja`iz_, _mubah_),
disliked (_makruh_). It played the part of, or rendered necessary, a
religious director quite as much as a lawyer. And for a time at Medina
it was really the law of the land. But from the Omayyad period on it has
held the position of the canon law of the Roman Church in countries that
will not recognize it and yet dare not utterly reject it. It governs, in
one or other of its four schools, the private lives of all pious
Moslems; it regulates some semi-public relationships--e.g. marriage,
divorce, inheritance; it compels respect, if not acceptance, from the
state; and by its ideal standard the world, filled with righteousness by
the Mahdi, will be ruled in the Moslem millennium.
The rise of the Abbasids brought a change, but not a great one. They had
promised a return to the old religious attitudes, and the promise was
formally kept. But in substance they were as much as the Omayyads, and
though the state was outwardly on a pious footing, and the religious
sentiment of the people was respected, the old, absolute canon law was
not restored. It was made possible for more theologians and lawyers to
work with the state, but an irreconcilable party still remained, and the
situation was fixed as it is to this day. It is true that the struggle
to adapt such a single and detailed system to all the varying
conditions, climates and times of the great empire was impossible; but
the failure marked the great rent in the supposed unity of Islam between
the church and the world, religion and law.
Yet the Abbasids did, in their way, encourage legal studies, and under
them processes and results, long pursued in private, became public.
Almost within the first century of their dynasty the four legal schools,
or rites, were formed and the principles established which survive to
this day.
The first school to take definite form was the Hanifite, founded by
Abu Hanifa (d. 767), who left behind him a definite system and many
enthusiastic pupils. He was a man of means, in touch with commercial,
but not with practical legal life, a speculative or philosophical
jurist. Being of non-Arab origin, the usage of Medina had small
interest for him. He therefore used few traditions, and preferred to
go back to the Koran, and extract from it by reasoning the rulings
which fitted his ideas. This he called the use of analogy (_qiyas_);
but, in his hands, it became practically legal fiction, the
application of a law in some sense undreamed by its first imposer. But
he had another, and still freer instrument. The effect of differences
in local conditions had been early observed and admitted in general
terms. Abu Hanifa reduced it to a subjective formula. Under such
conditions he claimed the right of preference (_istihsan_) of a ruling
suited to the local needs, even when the strict analogy indicated
otherwise. This met and meets with vehement protest when formally
stated, but the usage of Islam has practically accepted it. His
system, finally, was not developed through the exigencies of actual
cases, but was worked out as a system of casuistry, though in a good
sense. He tried, that is, to construct a system of rules to answer any
conceivable question. After his death his pupils elaborated it still
further, and accepted public office. The `Abbasids adopted his school,
and threw their influence on its side; its philosophic breadth and
casuistic possibilities evidently commended it to them. Later, the
Ottoman Turks also adopted it, and it may be said to hold now a
leadership among the four legal rites. Its influence has undoubtedly
tended to broaden and humanize Moslem law.
Twenty-eight years after Abu Hanifa, Malik ibn Anas, the founder of
the Malikite school, died at Medina. In many points his situation was
precisely opposite to that of Abu Hanifa, and yet his results were
very similar. He was a working jurist, in practical touch with actual
life; he was in the centre of the tradition of the usage of the
Prophet, in the line, one might say, of the apostolic succession. He,
therefore, used traditions much more generally than did Abu Hanifa,
and when he, under pressure, took refuge in opinion, he certainly felt
that he, under his conditions, had a better right to do so than any
outsider. But two of his principles marked a distinct advance and
showed that he was no mere traditionalist. For one, he laid down the
conception of public advantage (_istislah_); when a rule founded on
even a valid analogy would work a general injury it was to be set
aside; justice must not be overcome by logic. And, for the other, he
laid stress on the conception of the agreement (_ijma`_), an idea
which was to have indefinite importance in the future. When the
surviving companions of the Prophet, after his death, agreed upon any
point as belonging to their store of tradition and experience, their
agreement was accepted as final. In the first instance they agreed
that such had been the statement of the Prophet. That easily passed
over into an agreement that such was the true Moslem view, and finally
into an acceptance of the principle that the Moslem Church, when
unanimous, could formulate truth--practically as in the canon of
Vincent of Lérins, _Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus_. But
such a broadly catholic position was still in the future, and for
Malik, juristic agreement meant the agreement of Medina, though there
are signs that he permitted the same latitude to other places also. It
was a way of allowing for local conditions rather than of reaching the
voice of the Church. His law book, the _Muwatta'_, the earliest in our
possession written by the founder of a school, has already been
mentioned. It is a collection of about seventeen hundred traditions of
juristic importance, arranged according to subject, with appended
remarks on the usage of Medina and on his own view of each matter.
So far opinion and local usage had fully held their own, and the
philosophical jurist had been free to work out his system. The
difference between the _istihsan_ of Abu Hanifa and the _istislah_ of
Malik was not great; students attended the lectures of both and
combined their systems. But a reaction now began, and the
traditionalist party finally made itself felt. We have the inevitable
rivalry between the historical-empirical and the
speculative-philosophical schools of jurisprudence, rendered all the
more bitter in that the historical lawyers believed, in this case,
that they were defending a divine institution. There resulted, first,
one of the most important schools, the Shafi`ite; secondly, an
extremely literal school for which ash-Shafi`i did not go far enough,
and which has now vanished; and thirdly, the Hanbalite school, still
surviving in small numbers, more moderately traditional than the last.
The school founded by ash-Shafi`i (d. 820), a pupil of Malik, came
first in order of time. The others were really revolts against the
mildness of his compromise. His characteristics were a broad-minded,
steady grasp of means and ends, a perception of what could and what
could not be done, a willingness to admit all the tried principles in
due balance, and, at one point especially, the insight of genius as to
the possibilities of these principles. He laid great stress on
tradition; a clear, authentic tradition he regarded as no less valid
than the Koran itself. If the tradition was chronologically later than
a Koranic passage and corrected that passage, he followed the
tradition. But in this he was only regulating a fixed tendency. The
Koran may be regarded theoretically as the first of all the sources of
law and theology; practically its clear statements have been
over-ridden in many cases. Most important of all, the principle of
agreement (_ijma`_) came finally with him to its full rights. The
agreement of the Moslem peoples was to be the voice of God. "My
people," said a tradition from Mahomet, "will never agree in an
error." And so, over traditions and over the Koran itself, the
agreement tacitly or explicitly ruled and rules. It stamps as
authoritative that which the other principles lay down. At the head of
each section of a Shafi`ite law book we read, "The basis of this,
before the agreement, is such and such." But with the aid of a
principle of this breadth it was easy to reject the opinion which was
so objectionable to the traditionalist party. In its place he took
analogy (_qiyas_), which, discreetly used, could serve almost the same
purpose. The Koranic passage or the tradition with which an analogy
was suggested should, he taught, be examined to see if there was a
reason clearly stated for the command. If so, that reason would give a
basis for the analogy. Analogy based on the mechanical or external
could not hold.
The four bases thus laid down by ash-Shafi`i--Koran; prophetic usage
as expressed in traditions; analogy; agreement--have come to be
accepted by all existing schools. This applies to all spheres of life,
ethical, social, theological, legal, and it should never be forgotten
that the Koran is only one of the sources for Moslem faith and
conduct.
Few words are needed for the other, reactionary schools. One, now long
extinct, was founded by a certain Da`ud uz-Zahiri, "David the
Literalist," born three or four years before the death of ash-Shafi`i,
and so called because he insisted upon an absolutely literal
interpretation of his texts--Koran or tradition--without account of
context or metaphor. In consequence he had to reject analogy, and
limited agreement to that of the companions of Mahomet; the Church of
Islam was to have no constructive authority. In one point he showed
great sanity of judgment, namely in his rejection of the principle
_jurare in verba magistri_, otherwise regnant in Islam. His school had
long and interesting consequences, mostly theological, but is now
extinct, and never took rank with the others. The Moslem world found
his positions too impossible, and now no one swears to his words. The
other, the Hanbalite school, was founded by the scholars of Ahmad ibn
Hanbal after his death in 885. He himself would never have revolted
against his master, ash-Shafi`i, but it was soon felt that his system,
so far as he had any, was in essential opposition. He had been no
lawyer, but a theologian and a collector and student of traditions.
All his life had been a protest against speculation in divine things.
Where the Koran and traditions were silent, he, too, had been silent.
For this agnostic principle he had witnessed and suffered, and his
standing with the people was that of a saint. Naturally, then, the
last still existent school of traditionalist protest was launched in
his name. It minimizes agreement and analogy, is literal in its
interpretations, and is now by far the smallest of the four surviving
schools. Its external history is that of a testifying and violent
minority.
Other men, such as Tabari, the historian and commentator, have had
dreams that they, too, might join the Four Imams (see IMAM) as
founders of legal rites, but none has succeeded. The Four remain the
ultimate exponents of this canon law, and under the banner of one or
other of them every Moslem must range himself. As there is a principle
of unity in Islam, expressed in the alleged prophetic saying, "My
people will never agree in an error," so there is a principle of
variety, also expressed in an alleged prophetic saying, "The
disagreement of my people is a mercy from God." The four rites may
differ upon many points, yet the adherents of one never dream of
regarding the adherents of the others as outside the Church of Islam;
they are not "dissenters" in the English sense. God is merciful to his
creatures, and gives them so much liberty of choice. Yet in practice
this liberty is not great. The principle of swearing to the words of
the master is a dead hand laid upon Islam. A man's legal rite is
generally settled by the place and other conditions of his birth, and
after he has once accepted a rite, he must, if good and pious, follow
it in all its details. Only the avowed sceptic or the recognized
eccentric can be an eclectic.
The geographical distribution of the rites is roughly as follows:
Moslems in Central Asia and northern India and the Turks everywhere
are Hanifites; in Lower Egypt, Syria, southern India and the Malay
Archipelago they are Shafi`ites; in Upper Egypt and in north Africa,
west of Egypt, they are Malikites; only the Wahhabis (q.v.) in central
Arabia are Hanbalites. But the will of the sovereign has also had a
powerful influence and has frequently dictated the legal, as well as
the theological, affiliations of his subjects. The Turks, for example,
have thrown their weight almost everywhere on the Hanifite side. Their
policy is to appoint only Hanifite judges (see CADI), although for
private and personal questions they appoint and pay Muftis (q.v.) of
the other rites. In other cases, with a population of mixed legal
adherence, the government has been known to appoint judges of
different rites.
The Shi`ite canon law is dealt with separately, but some mention of
two outstanding sects is here in place. The Ibadites (see MAHOMMEDAN
RELIGION: _Sects_) have a system of canon law which in essentials is
of older codification than that of any of the orthodox schools, going
back to Abdallah ibn Ibad himself, of the first century of the Hijra
(Hejira). Its basis is above all the Koran, then a sparing use of
traditions, natural to their early origin, and finally the agreement
of their own learned men, again natural to an extreme dissenting sect,
and it still rules the Ibadite communities at Oman, Zanzibar and the
Mzab in southern Algeria. At all these places they, the last
descendants of the Kharijites, hold severely apart, while the other
Moslems shrink from them as heretics of the worst. Not nearly so far
from ordinary Islam, but still of an extreme self-conscious Puritanism
are the Wahhabis. They are really Hanbalites, but apply the rules of
that school with uncompromising, reforming energy. The doctrine of the
agreement of the Church of Islam they reject; only that of the
immediate companions of Mahomet is valid. The people of Mahomet can
err and has erred; each man must, on his own responsibility, draw his
doctrine from the Koran and the traditions. Here they follow the
Zahirites.
All these schools of law administer a scheme of duties, which, as has
already been remarked, comes nearest to the canon law of the Roman
Church, and which for centuries has had only a partial connexion with
the real legal systems of the Moslem peoples. Among the Wahhabis and
Ibadites alone is it the whole of law. Elsewhere, since the Omayyad
period, its courts have been in great part pushed aside by others, and
its scheme has come to be regarded as an expression of impossible
theory, to be realized at best with the coming of the millennium. The
causes and methods of this change call now for detailed notice.
As Islam spread beyond the desert and the conditions in which the life
of Mahomet and his companions had been cast, it came to regions,
climates, customs, where the Arabian usages no longer held. Not only
were the prescripts of Medina ill adapted to the new conditions; the new
people had legal usages of their own to which they clung and which
nothing could make them abandon. It was rather the Moslem leaders who
were compelled to abandon their ideas and for the sake of the spread of
Islam to accept and incorporate much that was diametrically opposed to
the original legislation either of the Koran or of Mahomet's recorded
decisions. As in religion the faiths of the conquered peoples were
thinly veneered with Moslem phrases, so in law there grew up a customary
code (_`adat_) for each country, differing from every other, which often
completely obscured and annulled the prescriptions of the canon law. The
one was an ideal system, studied and praised by the pious learned; the
other was the actual working of law in the courts.
But besides the obstinate adherence of various peoples to their old
paths, the will of individual rulers was a determining factor. When
these ceased to be saints and students of divine things, and came to be
worldly statesmen and opportunists, followers of their own objects and
pleasures, no system could hold which set a limit to their authority.
The Oriental ruler must rule and judge on his own initiative, and the
schools of canon law tended to reduce everything to an academic
fixedness. There thus arose a new and specific statute law, emanating
from the sovereign. At first he judged in the gate as seemed good in his
eyes and as was his right and duty (cf. "court of oppressions"; see
MAHOMMEDAN INSTITUTIONS); later, his will was codified as in the Turkish
statute law (_qawanin_) derived from various European codes. Thus there
has grown up in almost every Moslem country at least two systems of
courts, the one administering this canon law, and taking cognisance of
private and family affairs, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, its
officials also giving rulings on purely personal religious questions,
such as details of the ritual law, the law of oaths and vows, &c.; the
other, the true law courts of the land, administering codes based on
local custom and the decrees of the local rulers.
A rift almost as important entered the legal life of the Moslem lands on
another side. Non-Moslem communities, settled in Moslem territory, have
been uniformly permitted to administer and judge themselves according to
their own customs and laws. Save when they come into direct contact and
conflict with Moslems, they are left to themselves with a contemptuous
tolerance. The origin of this attitude in Islam appears to be threefold:
(i) The Islam of theory cannot conceive of a mixed state; it takes
account, only, of a state containing none but Moslems, and its ideal is
that the whole world will, in the end, form such a state. In practice,
then, Moslems try to shut their eyes to the existence of non-Moslems in
their midst and make no provision for them until compelled. That a
non-Moslem should have the same civil position as a Moslem is
unthinkable. (ii) This, of course, produces an attitude of extreme
contempt. The only citizens are Moslems and all others are to be looked
down upon and left to themselves. What they do or think among themselves
does not matter; they are outside the ring-fence of Islam. (iii) A
different, but equally important, cause is the Moslem indolence. When
the Arabs conquered, they knew that they must administer the conquered
lands, and they, very wisely, sought help from the machinery which they
found in operation. But besides the ordinary organization of the state,
they found also various ecclesiastical organizations, Christian and
Jewish, and to these they gave over the administration of the non-Moslem
sections of the community, making their rabbis and bishops their
responsible heads and the links of contact with the Moslem rulers. They,
unquestionably, found the same method in use by the Byzantine
government; but in Moslem hands it went so far as to make a number of
little states (_millet_, _milal_) within the state and effectually to
preclude the possibility of ever welding all the inhabitants of the land
into one corporate life.
But this indolence, when applied to resident aliens, had consequences
still more serious, because external as well as internal. Following the
same method of leaving the unbeliever to settle his affairs for himself,
the European merchant, living and trading in the East, was put first by
usage and finally by treaty under the jurisdiction and control of his
own consul. Thus there grew up the extra-territorial law of the
capitulations and conventions, by which the sanctity of the person and
household of an ambassador is extended to every European. And this in
turn, has reacted on the status of the non-Moslem subject races, and has
come to be the indirect but chief support on which they lean. Through
it, an element has developed which makes it practically impossible for a
Moslem state to introduce legal changes even remotely affecting its
non-Moslem population, alien or subject, without the consent of the
European embassies. Any change may be upset by their refusal to accept
it as incompatible with the capitulations and conventions. The embassies
have thus, as interpreters of a part, at least, of the constitution,
come to hold a position remarkably, if absurdly, like that of the
Supreme Court of the United States (see Young, _Corps de droit Ottoman,
passim_).
There may be said, then, in short, to be three elements in the legal
life of a Moslem state: the sacred and fixed canon law of Islam; the
civil law, based on the usages of the different peoples, Moslem and
non-Moslem, and on statutes going back to the will of rulers; the
international law of the capitulations, with a contractual sanction of
its own. The hope for the future in Islam, there can be little doubt,
lies in the principle of the agreement of the Moslem people, with its
conception of catholic unity, and its ability, through that unity, to
make and abrogate laws. As the Moslem peoples advance, their law can,
thus, advance with them, and the grasp of the dead hand of the canon law
be gradually and legally released.
See I. Goldziher, _Muhammedanische Studien_, I. and II. (Halle a.S.,
1889-1890); _Zahiriten_ (Leipzig, 1884); E. Sachau, _Zur ältesten
Geschichte des muhammedanischen Rechts_ (Vienna Akad., 1870) and
_Muhammedanisches Recht_ (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1897); Snouck
Hurgronje, review of preceding in _Z.D.M.G._ liii. 125 seq. and "Le
droit musulman" (_Rev. de l'hist. des religions_, xxxvii. 1 seq. and
174 seq.); Juynboll, _Handleiding tot de Kennis von de mohammedaansche
Wet_ (Leiden, 1903); Von Kremer, _Culturgeschichte des Orients unter
den Chalifen_, i. 470 seq. (Vienna, 1875-1877); Hughes, _Dictionary of
Islam_, pp. 285 seq. (London, 1896); D. B. Macdonald, _Development of
Muslim Theology_, &c., pp. 65 seq. (New York, 1903); Bukhari, _Les
Traditions islamiques traduites ... par O. Houdas et W. Marcel_
(Paris, 1906); N. B. E. Bailie, _Digest of Moohummadan Law_ (2 vols.,
London, 1875-1887). A good bibliography appeared in the _Bulletin of
the New York Public Library_ for January 1907. (D. B. Ma.)
MAHOMMEDAN RELIGION. The Mahommedan religion is generally known as
_Islam_--the name given to it by Mahomet himself--and meaning the
resigning or submitting oneself to God. The participle of the same
Arabic verb, _Muslim_ (in English usually spelt Moslem), is used for one
who professes this religion. The expression "Mahommedan religion" has
arisen in the West probably from analogy with "Christian religion," but
is not recognized as a proper one by Moslem writers. Islam claims to be
a divinely revealed religion given to the world by Mahomet, who was the
last of a succession of inspired prophets. Its _doctrine_ and
_practices_ are to be found in (i) the Book of God--the Koran--which was
sent down from the highest heaven to Gabriel in the lowest, who in turn
revealed it in sections to Mahomet; (2) the collections of tradition
(_hadith_) containing the sayings and manner of life (_sunna_) of the
Prophet; (3) the use of analogy (_qiyas_) as applied to (i) and (2); and
(4) the universal consent (_ijma'_) of the believers. The _worship_ of
Islam consists in (1) the recital of the creed; (2) the recital of the
ordained prayers; (3) the fast during the month of Ramadhan; (4)
alms-giving; (5) the _hajj_, the pilgrimage to Mecca. The _theology_ of
Islam finds its first public expression among the orthodox in the
teaching of al-Ash`ari (d. after 932), but had its real beginning among
the sects that arose soon after the death of Mahomet.
Islam is the latest of the so-called world-religions, and as several of
the others were practised in Arabia at the time of Mahomet, and the
Prophet undoubtedly borrowed some of his doctrines and some of his
practices from these, it is necessary to enumerate them and to indicate
the extent to which they prevailed in the Arabian world.
_Relations with Other Religions._--The religions practised in Arabia at
the time of Mahomet were heathenism, Judaism, Christianity, and
Zoroastrianism.
i. _Heathenism_ was the religion of the majority of the Arabs. In the
cities of south Arabia it was a survival from the forms represented in
the Sabaean, Minaean and Himyaritic inscriptions of south Arabia (see
ARABIA: _Antiquities_). The more popular form current among the nomads
is known very imperfectly from the remains of pre-Islamic poetry and
such works as the _Kitab ul-Asnam_ contained in Yaqut's geography,
from Shahrastani's work on the sects, and from the few references in
classical writers. From these we have mostly names of local deities
(cf. J. Wellhausen, _Reste arabischen Heidentums_, 2nd ed., Berlin,
1897) and ancient religious customs, which remained in part after the
introduction of Islam (cf. W. Robertson Smith, _The Religion of the
Semites_, Edinburgh, 1889, and _Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia_,
Cambridge, 1885). From these sources we learn that Arabian religion
was a nature-worship associated with fetishism. Sun, moon and stars
were worshipped, some tribes being devoted to the worship of special
constellations. Certain stones, wells and trees were regarded as
sacred and as containing a deity. Many (perhaps most) tribes had their
own idols. Hobal was the chief god of the Ka`ba in Mecca with its
sacred stone, but round him were grouped a number of other tribal
idols. It was against this association (_shirk_) of gods that Mahomet
inveighed in his attempt to unify the religion and polity of the
Arabs. But there were features in this heathenism favourable to unity,
and these Mahomet either simply took over into Islam or adapted for
his purpose. The popularity of the Ka`ba in Mecca as a place of resort
for worshippers from all parts of Arabia led Mahomet not only to
institute the _hajj_ as a duty, but also to take over the customs
connected with the heathen worship of these visits, and later to make
Mecca the _qibla_, i.e. the place to which his followers turned when
they prayed. The name of Allah, who seems to have been the god of the
Koreish (cf. D. S. Margoliouth, _Mohammed_, p. 19, London, 1905), was
accepted by Mahomet as the name of the one God, though he abandoned
the corresponding female deity Al-lat.
2. _Judaism_ had long been known in Arabia at the time of the Prophet.
Whether Hebrews settled in Arabia as early as the time of David (cf.
R. Dozy, _Die Israeliten zu Mecca_, Leipzig, 1864), or not, is of
little importance here as Judaism cannot be said to have existed until
the end of the 5th century B.C. The Seleucid persecutions and the
political troubles that ended with the fall of Jerusalem (A.D. 70)
probably sent many Jews to Arabia. In the 5th and 6th centuries the
history of south Arabia and of Nejran is largely that of the strife
between Jews and Christians. In the north-west the Jews possessed
Tema, Khaibar, Yathrib (Medina), Fadak, and other smaller settlements.
In these they lived as self-contained communities, not seeking to
proselytize but working at their trades, especially concerned with
money and jewelry. Mahomet seems to have expected their help in his
proclamation of monotheism, and his first _qibla_ was Jerusalem. It
was only when they refused to accept him as prophet that he turned in
anger against them. They had, however, supplied him with much material
from the Old Testament, and the stories of creation, the patriarchs
and early kings and prophets occur continually in the Koran, told
evidently as they were recited by the common people and with many
mistakes caused by his own misunderstanding.
3. _Christianity_, though later than Judaism, had a sure footing in
Arabia. It had suffered persecution in Nejran and had been supported
in the south by the Abyssinian invasions. The kingdom of Hira was
largely Christian; the same is true of the north Arabian tribes of
Bakr and Taghlib, and east of the Jordan and on the Syrian boundary as
well as in Yemama Christianity had made progress. Pre-Islamic
literature contains many allusions to the teaching and practices of
Christianity. Of the time of its introduction little is known; little
also of the form in which it was taught, save that it came from the
Eastern Church and probably to a large extent through Monophysite and
Nestorian sects. Tradition says that Mahomet heard Christian preaching
at the fair of Ukaz, and he probably heard more when he conducted the
caravans of Khadija. Gospel stories derived apparently from
uncanonical works, such as the Gospel of the Nativity, occur in the
Koran. The asceticism of the monks attracted his admiration. A
mistaken notion of the Trinity was sharply attacked by him. It is
curious that his followers in the earliest times were called by the
heathen Arabs, Sabians (q.v.), this being the name of a semi-Christian
sect. In the time of the Omayyads Christianity led to some of the
earliest theological sects of Islam (see below).
4. _Zoroastrianism_ was known to the Arab tribes in the north-east,
but does not seem to have exercised any influence in Mecca or Medina
except indirectly through Judaism in its angelology. As soon, however,
as the armies of Islam conquered Mesopotamia it began to penetrate the
thought and practices of Islam (see below).
_Sources of Authority._--Islam, as we have said, is founded on: (1) the
Koran; (2) the tradition or rather the _sunna_ (manner of life of
Mahomet) contained in the tradition (_Hadith_); (3) _ijma`_; the
universal agreement; (4) _qiyas_ (analogy).
1. The _Koran_[1] (properly _Qur'an_ from _qara'a_ to collect, or to
read, recite) is the copy of an uncreated original preserved by God (see
below), sent down from the seventh heaven to Gabriel in the first
heaven, and revealed to Mahomet in sections as occasion required. These
revelations were recited by the Prophet and in many cases written down
at once, though from ii. 100 it would seem that this was not always the
case. God is the speaker throughout the revelations. It seems probable
that the whole Koran was written in Mahomet's lifetime, but not brought
together as a whole or arranged in order.
As it exists now the Koran consists of 114 chapters called _suras_
(from _sura_, a row of bricks in a wall, a degree or step). The first
is the _Fatiha_ (opening), which occupies the place of the Lord's
Prayer in Christianity. The others are arranged generally in order of
length, the longest coming first, the shortest (often the earliest in
date) coming at the end. Certain groups, however, indicated by initial
unvowelled letters, seem to have been kept together from the time of
the Prophet. At the head of each _sura_ is a title, the place of its
origin (Mecca or Medina) and the number of its verses (_ayat_)
together with the formula, "In the name of God the Merciful, the
Compassionate" (except in _sura 9_). For liturgical purposes the whole
book is divided into 60 sections (_ahzab_) or into 30 divisions
(_ajza_), each subdivided into a number of prostrations (_ruk`a_ or
_sajda_). The origin of the collected and written Koran is due to
Omar, who in the caliphate of Abu Bekr pointed out that many
possessors of _suras_ were being slain in the battles of Islam and
their property lost, that there was a danger in this way that much of
the revelation might disappear, and that men were uncertain what was
to be accepted as genuine revelation. Accordingly Zaid ibn Thabit who
had been secretary to Mahomet, was commissioned to collect all he
could find of the revelation. His work seems to have been simply that
of a collector. He seems to have done his work thoroughly and made a
copy of the whole for Abu Bekr. The collection was thus chiefly a
private matter, and this copy passed after Abu Bekr's death into the
hands of Omar, and after his death to Hafsa, daughter of Omar, a widow
of Mahomet. In the caliphate of Othman it was discovered that there
were serious differences between the readings of the Koran possessed
by the Syrian troops and those of the Eastern soldiers, and Othman was
urged to have a copy prepared which should be authoritative for the
Moslem world. He appointed Zaid ibn Thabit and three members of the
tribe of Koreish (Quraish) to do the work. Each of these made a copy
of Abu Bekr's collection, carefully preserving Koreishite forms of
words. How far the text was amended by the help of other copies is
doubtful; in any case the mode of procedure was undoubtedly very
conservative. The four similar manuscripts were sent, one each to
Medina, Cufa (Kufa), Basra and Damascus, and an order was issued that
all differing copies should be destroyed. In spite of the personal
unpopularity of Othman this recension was adopted by the Moslem world
and remains the only standard text. A few variant readings and
differences of order of the _suras_ in the collections of Ubay ibn
Ka`b and of Ibn Mas`ud were, however, known to later commentators. The
only variants after the time of Othman were owing to different
possible ways of pronouncing the consonantal text. These are usually
of little importance for the meaning. As the text is now always
vowelled, variations are found in the vowels of different copies, and
the opinions of seven leading "readers" are regarded as worthy of
respect by commentators (see Th. Nöldeke, _Geschichte des Qorans_, pp.
279 seq., Göttingen, 1860). Various characteristics enable one to
establish with more or less certainty the relative chronological order
of the _suras_ in the Koran, at any rate so far as to place them in
the first or second Meccan period or that of Medina. The form of the
sentences is a guide, for the earliest parts are usually written in
the _saj`_ form (see ARABIA: _Literature_). The expressions used also
help; thus the "O ye people" of the Meccan period is replaced in the
Medina _suras_ by "O ye who believe." The oaths in the first Meccan
period are longer, in the second shorter, and are absent in the
Medinan. In the earliest period the style is more elevated and
passionate. Occasionally the time of origin is determined by reference
to historical events. In accordance with such principles of criticism
two leading scholars, Nöldeke (_loc. cit._) and H. Grimme (in his
_Mohammed Zweiter Teil_. _Einleitung in den Koran. System der
koranischen Theologie_, Münster, 1895), have arranged the _suras_ as
follows:--
_Order of Suras in Koran._