Mr. Blaine was a member of the cabinets of President Garfield and
of President Arthur for ten months, retiring at his own request, in
January, 1881.
The Foreign Policy of the Garfield administration, as conducted by Mr.
Blaine, was emphatically a Peace Policy. It was without the motive or
disposition of war in any form. It was one of dignity and uprightness,
as a work of twelve hundred and fifty pages, entitled “Foreign
Relations of the United States for 1881,” and another book entitled
“War in South America, and attempt to bring about Peace, 1880-81,” a
book of about eight hundred pages, both printed by the United States
Government, and now before us, amply testify.
Its two objects, as distinctly stated by him, were: first, to bring
about peace, and prevent future wars in North and South America;
second, to cultivate such friendly commercial relations with all
American countries as would increase the export trade of the United
States, by supplying those fabrics in which we are abundantly able to
compete with the manufacturing nations of Europe.
The second depended on the first. For three years Chili, Peru, and
Bolivia had been engrossed in war, and the friendly offices of the
United States Government had barely averted it between Chili and the
Argentine Republic, postponed it between Guatemala and Mexico; so also
it might in these South American Republics. War was threatened between
Brazil and Uruguay, and foreshadowed between Brazil and the Argentine
states.
To induce the Spanish American states to adopt some peaceful mode of
adjusting their frequently recurring contentions, was regarded by
President Garfield as one of the most honorable and useful ends to
which the diplomacy of the United States could contribute; and in the
line of the policy indicated, is a letter from Mr. Blaine to Gen. S. A.
Hurlbut, United States Minister to Peru. While it shows the spirit of
the president, it shows as well the hand and heart of his secretary:--
“DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
“WASHINGTON, June 15, 1881.
“SIR:--The deplorable condition of Peru, the disorganization of its
government, and the absence of precise and trustworthy information
as to the state of affairs now existing in that unhappy country,
render it impossible to give you instructions as full and definite as
I would desire.
“Judging from the most recent despatches from our ministers, you will
probably find on the part of the Chilian authorities in possession
of Peru, a willingness to facilitate the establishment of the
provisional government which has been attempted by Senor Calderon.
If so you will do all you properly can to encourage the Peruvians
to accept any reasonable conditions and limitations with which this
concession may be accompanied. It is vitally important to Peru,
that she be allowed to resume the functions of a native and orderly
government, both for the purposes of internal administration and the
negotiation of peace. To obtain this end it would be far better to
accept conditions which may be hard and unwelcome, than by demanding
too much to force the continuance of the military control of Chili.
It is hoped that you will be able, in your necessary association
with the Chilian authorities, to impress upon them that the more
liberal and considerate their policy, the surer it will be to obtain
a lasting and satisfactory settlement. The Peruvians cannot but be
aware of the sympathy and interest of the people and government of
the United States, and will, I feel confident, be prepared to give to
your representations the consideration to which the friendly anxiety
of this government entitles them.
“The United States cannot refuse to recognize the rights which the
Chilian government has acquired by the successes of the war, and it
may be that a cession of territory will be the necessary price to be
paid for peace....
“As a strictly confidential communication, I inclose you a copy of
instructions sent this day to the United States minister at Santiago.
You will thus be advised of the position which this government
assumes toward all the parties to this deplorable conflict. It is
the desire of the United States to act in a spirit of the sincerest
friendship to the three republics, and to use its influence solely in
the interest of an honorable and lasting peace.
“JAMES G. BLAINE.”
The appointment of William Henry Trescot as Spanish envoy, with the
rank of Minister Plenipotentiary to the republics of Chili, Peru,
and Bolivia, was done in the same regard, not only of the nation’s
honor, but also of peace and that commerce which brings prosperity and
happiness.
It has long been felt, and is felt deeply to-day, that there are many
kindly offices of state which this great nation may offer to weaker,
feebler, and distressed peoples, for their good and for our glory;
that it is not enough to be simply an example and an asylum, but to
be a potent benefactor in a direct and personal way, teaching them
that peace, not war, is the secret of growth and greatness. This, in
effect, was the object of the peace congress, which was a cherished
design of the administration, and to which Mr. Blaine was fully
committed.
No wonder that such a project commanded the thought and enlisted the
sympathies of such men as Garfield and his great _premier_; and Mr.
Blaine tells us that it was the intention, resolved on before the fatal
shot of July 2d, to invite all the independent governments of North
and South America to meet in such a congress at Washington, on March
15, 1882, and the invitations would have been issued directly after
the New England tour the president was not permitted to make. But the
invitations were sent out by Mr. Blaine on the 22d of November, when in
Mr. Arthur’s cabinet. It met with cordial approval in South American
countries, and some of them at once accepted the invitations. But in
six weeks President Arthur caused the invitations to be recalled, or
suspended, and referred the whole matter to congress, where it was lost
in debate, just as the Panama congress was wrecked when Mr. Clay was
secretary of state over fifty years ago.
It was argued that such an assemblage of representatives from those
various states would not only elevate their standard of civilization,
and lead to the fuller development of a continent at whose wealth
Humboldt was amazed, but it would also bring them nearer us and turn
the drift of their European trade to our American shores. As it is,
they have a coin balance of trade against us every year, of one hundred
and twenty millions of dollars, and this money is shipped from our
country to Europe, to pay for their immense purchases there. Their
petroleum comes from us, but crosses the Atlantic twice before it gets
to them, and the middle-men in Europe receive a larger profit on it
than the producers of the oil in north-western Pennsylvania.
It may be both wise and prudent, in order to completeness of biography,
to state two aspersions,--one of war, and the other of gain,--cast upon
the policy of Mr. Blaine.
William Henry Trescot, in a published letter dated July 17, 1882,
states “his knowledge of certain matters connected with Mr. Blaine’s
administration as secretary of state”:--
“2. As to your designing a war, that supposition is too absurd for
serious consideration. If you had any such purpose it was carefully
concealed from me, and I left for South America with the impression
that I would utterly fail in my mission if I did not succeed in
obtaining an _amicable settlement of the differences_ between the
belligerents.
“3. In regard to the Cochet and Landreau claims, it is sufficient to
say that you rejected the first, absolutely. As to the second, you
instructed General Hurlbut to ask, if the proper time for such request
should come, that Landreau might be heard before a Peruvian tribunal in
support of his claim.
“General Hurlbut, although approving the justice of Landreau’s claim
in his dispatch of Sept. 14, 1881, never brought it in any way to
the notice of the Peruvian government. During my mission in South
America, I never referred to it, so that, in point of fact, during
your secretaryship the Landreau claim was never mentioned by ministers
of the United States, either to the Chilian or Peruvian government.
It could not, therefore, have affected the then pending diplomatic
questions in the remotest degree.”
But for these he appeared and answered, in company with Mr. Trescot,
before the House committee on foreign affairs, Hon. Charles G.
Williams, of Wisconsin, chairman.
“He received a vindication,” is the simple report.
“I think Mr. Blaine has rather enjoyed his opportunity, and his
triumph,” writes one. “It is inspiring to have Mr. Blaine associated
with public affairs again, if only as a witness before a committee. How
the country rings with his name, the moment he breaks silence! His
familiar face, framed in rapidly whitening hair; his elastic figure,
growing almost venerable, from recent associations; his paternal manner
toward young Jimmie, his name-sake son, whom by some whim of fancy,
he had with him during the examination,--all these were elements of
interest in the picture.”
And now comes a beautiful prophecy, two years old, which shows how
one may argue his way into the future by the hard and certain logic
of events. It is this: “The administration will have to do something
that shall appeal strongly to the popular heart; something out of the
line of hospitalities within its own charmed circle; something magnetic
and heroic, or else ‘Blaine, of Maine,’ will become so idolized in the
minds of the people that he will be invincible in 1884.”
In all of his foreign correspondence there is, in one particular, a
striking likeness between Mr. Blaine and President Lincoln,--the man is
not lost in the statesman, but rather the man is the statesman.
As Abraham Lincoln in all his giant form appears upon the forefront of
every public document that came from his hand, so James G. Blaine is
photographed from life in every state-paper that bears his name. He
copies no model, he stands on no pedestal,--his personality is free
and untrammeled in every utterance.
In his paper to Mr. Lowell, our Minister to England, of Nov. 29, 1881,
we get a full view of the man at his work.
A modification of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of April 19, 1850, is the
subject in hand. His instructions had been sent ten days before. A week
afterwards the response of Lord Granville to his circular note of June
24, in relation to the neutrality of any canal across the Isthmus of
Panama, had been received.
And so he proceeded to give a summary of the historical objections
to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and the very decided differences of
opinion between the two governments, to which its interpretation has
given rise. And this he does with singular skill and aptness, which is
not unusual to him, when the philosophy of history is needful as the
servant of his genius.
No less than sixteen direct quotations of from two to eight lines each,
are given in a letter of six large pages, taken from the discussion of
the subject for thirty years, while the main body of the letter, in its
various parts, shows a comprehensive grasp of details, a familiarity
with utterances of the leading men of the past, and with England’s
operations under the treaty, as to prove conclusively that in the
highest realms of statesmanship, mastery is still the one word that
defines the man.
His previous letter of instructions, presenting an analysis of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, singling out the objectionable features to be
abrogated, and stating his reasons, is of the same clear, strong type,
compactly written, and applying the great arguments of common sense to
a subject of international importance.
“The convention,” he says, “was made more than thirty years ago, under
exceptional and extraordinary conditions, which have long since ceased
to exist,--conditions which at best were temporary in their nature, and
which can never be reproduced.
“The development of the Pacific coast places responsibility upon
our government which it cannot meet, and not control the canal now
building, and just as England controls the Suez canal.
“England requires and sustains an immense navy, for which we have no
use, and might at any time seize the canal, and make it impossible for
us to marshal a squadron in Pacific waters, without a perilous voyage
ourselves around the Horn.”
Great events of permanent importance would doubtless have been the
result, had the president and his secretary been permitted to continue
as they were for the full term of office. Already Mr. Blaine was
showing himself a master in the arts of diplomacy, not with aught of
cunning artifice or sly interrogation, but with straight-forward, solid
utterances upon the great interests of the nation’s weal. Not only of
the loved and honored president did the assassin’s bullet deprive us,
but also of the services of Mr. Blaine, as well. A Providence more kind
seems to be giving him back to the nation, to complete their unfinished
work.
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