APRIL 6.--The House accordingly resolved itself into a Committee of the
Whole on said Message.
Mr. BLOUNT brought forward the following resolutions:
"_Resolved_, That, it being declared by the second section
of the second article of the constitution, 'that the
President shall have power, by and with the advice of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senate
present concur,' the House of Representatives do not claim
any agency in making Treaties; but, that when a Treaty
stipulates regulations on any of the subjects submitted by
the constitution to the power of Congress, it must depend,
for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a law or
laws to be passed by Congress. And it is the constitutional
right and duty of the House of Representatives, in all such
cases, to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of
carrying such Treaty into effect, and to determine and act
thereon, as, in their judgment, may be most conducive to
the public good.[74]
"_Resolved_, That it is not necessary to the propriety of
any application from this House to the Executive, for
information desired by them, and which may relate to any
constitutional functions of the House, that the purpose for
which such information may be wanted, or to which the same
may be applied, should be stated in the application."
Mr. HARPER, Mr. DAYTON, and Mr. KITCHELL, offered a few remarks with
respect to the propriety of considering the resolutions now moved, or
those laid upon the table, by Mr. KITCHELL, a few days ago. After
which--
Mr. MADISON rose, and spoke as follows: When the Message was first
proposed to be committed, the proposition had been treated by some
gentlemen not only with levity, but with ridicule. He persuaded himself
that the subject would appear in a very different light to the
committee; and he hoped that it would be discussed on both sides without
either levity, intemperance, or illiberality.
If there were any question which could make a serious appeal to the
dispassionate judgment, it must be one which respected the meaning of
the constitution; and if any constitutional question could make the
appeal with peculiar solemnity, it must be in a case like the present,
where two of the constituted authorities interpreted differently the
extent of their respective powers.
It was a consolation, however, of which every member would be sensible,
to reflect on the happy difference of our situation, on such
occurrences, from that of governments in which the constituent members
possessed independent and hereditary prerogatives. In such governments,
the parties having a personal interest in their public stations, and not
being amenable to the national will, disputes concerning the limits of
their respective authorities might be productive of the most fatal
consequences. With us, on the contrary, although disputes of that kind
are always to be regretted, there were three most precious resources
against the evil tendency of them. In the first place, the
responsibility which every department feels to the public will, under
the forms of the constitution, may be expected to prevent the excesses
incident to conflicts between rival and irresponsible authorities. In
the next place, if the difference cannot be adjusted by friendly
conference and mutual concession, the sense of the constituent body,
brought into the Government through the ordinary elective channels, may
supply a remedy. And if this resource should fail, there remains, in the
third and last place, that provident article in the constitution itself,
by which an avenue is always open to the sovereignty of the people, for
explanations or amendments, as they might be found indispensable.
If, in the present instance, it was to be particularly regretted that
the existing difference of opinion had arisen, every motive to the
regret was a motive to calmness, to candor, and the most respectful
delicacy towards the other constituted authority. On the other hand, the
duty which the House of Representatives must feel to themselves and to
their constituents, required that they should examine the subject with
accuracy, as well as with candor, and decide on it with firmness, as
well as with moderation.
In this temper, he should proceed to make some observations on the
Message before the committee, and on the reasons contained in it.
The Message related to two points. First. The application made for the
papers. Secondly. The constitutional rights of Congress, and of the
House of Representatives, on the subject of Treaties.
On the first point, he observed, that the right of the House to apply
for any information they might want, had been admitted by a number in
the minority, who had opposed the exercise of the right in this
particular case. He thought it clear that the House must have a right,
in all cases, to ask for information which might assist their
deliberations on the subjects submitted to them by the constitution;
being responsible, nevertheless, for the propriety of the measure. He
was as ready to admit that the Executive had a right, under a due
responsibility, also, to withhold information, when of a nature that did
not permit a disclosure of it at the time. And if the refusal of the
PRESIDENT had been founded simply on a representation that the state of
the business within his department, and the contents of the papers asked
for, required it, although he might have regretted the refusal, he
should have been little disposed to criticise it. But the Message had
contested what appeared to him a clear and important right of the House;
and stated reasons for refusing the papers, which, with all the respect
he could feel for the Executive, he could not regard as satisfactory or
proper.
One of the reasons was, that it did not occur to the Executive that the
papers could be relative to any purpose under the cognizance, and in the
contemplation of the House. The other was, that the purpose for which
they were wanted was not expressed in the resolution of the House.
With respect to the first, it implied that the Executive was not only to
judge of the proper objects and functions of the Executive Department,
but, also, of the objects and functions of the House. He was not only to
decide how far the Executive trust would permit a disclosure of
information, but how far the Legislative trust could derive advantage
from it. It belonged, he said, to each department to judge for itself.
If the Executive conceived that, in relation to his own department,
papers could not be safely communicated, he might, on that ground,
refuse them, because he was the competent, though a responsible judge
within his own department. If the papers could be communicated without
injury to the objects of his department, he ought not to refuse them as
irrelative to the objects of the House of Representatives; because the
House was, in such cases, the only proper judge of its own objects.
The other reason of refusal was, that the use which the House meant to
make of the papers was not expressed in the resolution.
As far as he could recollect, no precedent could be found in the records
of the House, or elsewhere, in which the particular object in calling
for information was expressed in the call. It was not only contrary to
right to require this, but it would often be improper in the House to
express the object. In the particular case of an impeachment referred to
in the Message, it might be evidently improper to state that to be the
object of information which might possibly lead to it, because it would
involve the preposterous idea of first determining to impeach, and then
inquiring whether an impeachment ought to take place. Even the holding
out an impeachment as a contemplated or contingent result of the
information called for, might be extremely disagreeable in practice, as
it might inflict a temporary pain on an individual, whom an
investigation of facts might prove to be innocent, and perhaps
meritorious.
From this view of the subject he could not forbear wishing that, if the
papers were to be refused, other reasons had been assigned for it. He
thought the resolutions offered by the gentleman from North Carolina,
one of which related to this subject, ought to stand on the journal
along with the Message which had been entered there. Both the
resolutions were penned with moderation and propriety. They went no
farther than to assert the rights of the House; they courted no reply;
and it ought not to be supposed they could give any offence.
The second object to which the measure related was the constitutional
power of the House on the subject of Treaties.
Here, again, he hoped it may be allowable to wish that it had not been
deemed necessary to take up, in so solemn a manner, a great
constitutional question, which was not contained in the resolution
presented by the House, which had been incidental only to the discussion
of that resolution, and which could only have been brought into view
through the unauthentic medium of the newspapers. This, however, would
well account for the misconception which had taken place in the doctrine
maintained by the majority in the late question. It had been understood
by the Executive, that the House asserted its assent to be necessary to
the validity of Treaties. This was not the doctrine maintained by them.
It was, he believed, fairly laid down in the resolution proposed, which
limited the power of the House over Treaties, to cases where Treaties
embraced Legislative subjects, submitted by the constitution to the
power of the House.
Mr. M. did not mean to go into the general merits of this question, as
discussed when the former resolution was before the committee. The
Message did not request it, having drawn none of its reasoning from the
text of the constitution. It had merely affirmed that the power of
making Treaties is exclusively vested by the constitution in the
PRESIDENT, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Nothing
more was necessary on this point than to observe that the constitution
had as expressly and exclusively vested in Congress the power of making
laws, as it had vested in the PRESIDENT and Senate the power of making
Treaties.
He proceeded to review the several topics on which the Message relied.
First. The intention of the body which framed the constitution.
Secondly. The opinions of the State Conventions who adopted it. Thirdly.
The peculiar rights and interests of the smaller States. Fourthly. The
manner in which the constitution had been understood by the Executive
and the foreign nations, with which Treaties had been formed. Fifthly.
The acquiescence and acts of the House on former occasions.
1. When the members on the floor, who were members of the General
Convention, particularly a member from Georgia and himself, were called
on in a former debate for the sense of that body on the constitutional
question, it was a matter of some surprise, which was much increased by
the peculiar stress laid on the information expected. He acknowledged
his surprise, also, at seeing the Message of the Executive appealing to
the same proceedings in the General Convention, as a clue to the meaning
of the constitution.
It had been his purpose, during the late debate, to make some
observations on what had fallen from the gentlemen from Connecticut and
Maryland, if the sudden termination of the debate had not cut him off
from the opportunity. He should have reminded them that this was the
ninth year since the Convention executed their trust, and that he had
not a single note in this place to assist his memory. He should have
remarked, that neither himself nor the other members who had belonged to
the Federal Convention, could be under any particular obligation to rise
in answer to a few gentlemen, with information, not merely of their own
ideas at that period, but of the intention of the whole body; many
members of which, too, had probably never entered into the discussions
of the subject. He might have further remarked, that there would not be
much delicacy in the undertaking, as it appeared that a sense had been
put on the constitution by some who were members of the Convention,
different from that which must have been entertained by others, who had
concurred in ratifying the Treaty.
After taking notice of the doctrine of Judge Wilson, who was a member of
the Federal Convention, as quoted by Mr. GALLATIN from the Pennsylvania
debates, he proceeded to mention that three gentlemen, who had been
members of the convention, were parties to the proceedings in
Charleston, South Carolina, which, among other objections to the Treaty,
represented it as violating the constitution. That the very respectable
citizen, who presided at the meeting in Wilmington, whose resolutions
made a similar complaint, had also been a distinguished member of the
body that formed the constitution.
It would have been proper for him, also, to have recollected what had,
on a former occasion, happened to himself during a debate in the House
of Representatives. When the bill for establishing a National Bank was
under consideration, he had opposed it, as not warranted by the
constitution, and incidentally remarked, that his impression might be
stronger, as he remembered that, in the convention, a motion was made
and negatived, for giving Congress a power to grant charters of
incorporation. This slight reference to the convention, he said, was
animadverted on by several in the course of the debate, and particularly
by a gentleman from Massachusetts, who had himself been a member of the
convention, and whose remarks were not unworthy the attention of the
committee. Here Mr. M. read a paragraph from Mr. GERRY's speech, from
the Gazette of the United States, page 814, protesting, in strong terms,
against arguments drawn from that source.
Mr. M. said, he did not believe a single instance could be cited in
which the sense of the convention had been required or admitted as
material in any constitutional question. In the case of the Bank, the
committee had seen how a glance at that authority had been treated in
this House. When the question on the suability of the States was
depending in the Supreme Court, he asked, whether it had ever been
understood that the members of the bench, who had been members of the
convention, were called on for the meaning of the convention on that
very important point, although no constitutional question would be
presumed more susceptible of elucidation from that source?
He then adverted to that part of the Message which contained an extract
from the Journal of the convention, showing that a proposition "that no
Treaty should be binding on the United States, which was not ratified by
law," was explicitly rejected. He allowed this to be much more precise
than any evidence drawn from the debates in the convention, or resting
on the memory of individuals. But, admitting the case to be as stated,
of which he had no doubt, although he had no recollection of it, and
admitting the record of the convention to be the oracle that ought to
decide the true meaning of the constitution, what did this abstract vote
amount to? Did it condemn the doctrine of the majority? So far from it,
that, as he understood their doctrine, they must have voted as the
convention did; for they do not contend that no Treaty shall be
operative without a law to sanction it; on the contrary, they admit that
some Treaties will operate without this sanction; and that it is no
further applicable in any case than where Legislative objects are
embraced by Treaties. The term "ratify" also deserved some attention;
for, although of loose signification in general, it had a technical
meaning different from the agency claimed by the House on the subject of
Treaties.
But, after all, whatever veneration might be entertained for the body of
men who formed our constitution, the sense of that body could never be
regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the constitution. As the
instrument came from them it was nothing more than the draft of a plan,
nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it
by the voice of the people, speaking through the several State
Conventions. If we were to look, therefore, for the meaning of the
instrument beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it, not
in the General Convention, which proposed, but in the State Convention,
which accepted and ratified the constitution. To these also the Message
had referred, and it would be proper to follow it.
2. The debates of the convention in three States (Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and North Carolina) had been before introduced into the
discussion of this subject, and were believed the only publications of
the sort which contained any lights with respect to it. He would not
fatigue the committee with a repetition of the passages then read to
them. He would only appeal to the committee to decide whether it did not
appear, from a candid and collected view of the debates in those
conventions, and particularly in that of Virginia, that the
Treaty-making power was a limited power; and that the powers in our
constitution, on this subject, bore an analogy to the powers on the
same subject in the Government of Great Britain. He wished, as little
as any member could, to extend the analogies between the two
Governments; but it was clear that the constituent parts of two
Governments might be perfectly heterogeneous, and yet the powers be
similar.
At once to illustrate his meaning, and give a brief reply to some
arguments on the other side, which had heretofore been urged with
ingenuity and learning, he would mention, as an example, the power of
pardoning offences. This power was vested in the PRESIDENT; it was a
prerogative also of the British King. And, in order to ascertain the
extent of the technical term "pardon," in our constitution, it would not
be irregular to search into the meaning and exercise of the power in
Great Britain. Yet, where is the general analogy between an hereditary
Sovereign, not accountable for his conduct, and a Magistrate like the
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, elected for four years, with limited
powers, and liable to impeachment for the abuse of them?
In referring to the debates of the State Conventions as published, he
wished not to be understood as putting entire confidence in the accuracy
of them. Even those of Virginia, which had been probably taken down by
the most skilful hand, (whose merit he wished by no means to disparage,)
contained internal evidence in abundance of chasms and misconceptions of
what was said.
The amendments proposed by the several conventions were better
authority, and would be found, on a general view, to favor the sense of
the constitution which had prevailed in this House. But even here it
would not be reasonable to expect a perfect precision and system in all
their votes and proceedings. The agitations of the public mind on that
occasion, with the hurry and compromise which generally prevailed in
settling the amendments to be proposed, would at once explain and
apologize for the several apparent inconsistencies which might be
discovered.
He would not undertake to say that the particular amendment referred to
in the Message, by which two States require that "no Commercial Treaty
should be ratified without the consent of two-thirds of the whole number
of Senators, and that no Territorial right, &c. should be ceded without
the consent of three-fourths of the members of both Houses," was
digested with an accurate attention to the whole subject. On the other
hand, it was no proof that those particular conventions, in annexing
these guards to the Treaty power, understood it as different from that
espoused by the majority of the House. They might consider Congress as
having the power contended for over Treaties stipulating on Legislative
subjects, and still very consistently wish for the amendment they
proposed. They might not consider the Territorial rights and other
objects for which they required the concurrence of three-fourths of the
members of both Houses, as coming within any of the enumerated powers
of Congress, and, therefore, as not protected by that control over
Treaties. And although they might be sensible that Commercial Treaties
were under that control, yet, as they would always come before Congress
with great weight after they had passed through the regular forms and
sanctions of the Treaty department, it might be deemed of real
importance that the authority should be better guarded which was to give
that weight to them.
He asked, whether it might not happen, even in the progress of a Treaty
through the Treaty department, that each succeeding sanction might be
given, more on account of preceding sanctions than of any positive
approbation? And no one could doubt, therefore, that a Treaty which had
received all these sanctions would be controlled with great reluctance
by the Legislature, and, consequently, that it might be desirable to
strengthen the barriers against making improper Treaties, rather than
trust too much to the Legislative control over carrying them into
effect.
But, said Mr. M., it will be proper to attend to other amendments
proposed by the ratifying conventions, which may throw light on their
opinions and intentions on the subject in question. He then read from
the Declaration of Rights proposed by Virginia to be prefixed to the
constitution, the seventh article, which is as follows:
"That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of
laws, by any authority, without the consent of the
Representatives of the people in the Legislature, is
injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised."
The Convention of North Carolina, as he showed, had laid down the same
principle in the same words. And it was to be observed that, in both
conventions, the article was under the head of a Declaration of Rights,
"asserting and securing from encroachment the essential and inalienable
rights of the people," according to the language of the Virginia
Convention; and "asserting and securing from encroachment the great
principles of civil and religious liberty, and the inalienable rights of
the people," as expressed by the Convention of North Carolina. It must
follow that these two Conventions considered it as a fundamental,
inviolable, and universal principle in a free Government, that no power
could supersede a law without the consent of the Representatives of the
people in the Legislature.
In the Maryland Convention also, it was among the amendments proposed,
though he believed not decided on, "that no power of suspending laws, or
the execution of laws, unless derived from the Legislature, ought to be
exercised or allowed."
The Convention of North Carolina had further explained themselves on
this point, by their twenty-third amendment proposed to the constitution
in the following words: "That no Treaties shall be directly opposed to
the existing laws of the United States in Congress assembled, shall be
valid until such laws shall be repealed or made conformable to such
Treaty; nor shall any Treaty be valid which is contradictory to the
Constitution of the United States."
The latter part of the amendment was an evidence that the amendment was
intended to ascertain rather than to alter the meaning of the
constitution; as it could not be supposed to have been the real
intention of the constitution that a Treaty contrary to it should be
valid.
He proceeded to read the following amendments accompanying the
ratification of State Conventions:
The New York Convention had proposed "that no standing army or regular
troops shall be raised or kept up in time of peace without the consent
of two-thirds of the Senators and Representatives in each House."
"That no money be borrowed on the credit of the United States, without
the assent of two-thirds of the Senators and Representatives in each
House."
The New Hampshire Convention had proposed "that no standing army shall
be kept up in time of peace, unless with the consent of three quarters
of the members of each branch of Congress." In the Maryland Convention a
proposition was made in the same words.
The Virginia Convention had proposed "that no navigation law, or law
regulating commerce, shall be passed without the consent of two-thirds
of the members present in both Houses."
"That no standing army or regular troops shall be raised or kept up in
time of peace, without the consent of two-thirds of the members present
in both Houses."
"That no soldier shall be enlisted for any longer term than four years,
except in time of war, and then for no longer term than the continuance
of the war."
The Convention of North Carolina had proposed the same three amendments
in the same words.
On a review of these proceedings, may not, said he, the question be
fairly asked, whether it ought to be supposed that the several
Conventions who showed so much jealousy with respect to the powers of
commerce, of the sword, and of the purse, as to require, for the
exercise of them, in some cases two-thirds, in others three-fourths of
both branches of the Legislature, could have understood that, by the
Treaty clauses in constitution, they had given to the PRESIDENT and
Senate, without any control whatever from the House of Representatives,
an absolute and unlimited power over all those great objects?
3. It was with great reluctance, he said, that he should touch on the
third topic--the alleged interest of the smaller States in the present
question. He was the more unwilling to enter into this delicate part of
the discussion, as he happened to be from a State which was in one of
the extremes in point of size. He should limit himself, therefore, to
two observations. The first was, that if the spirit of amity and mutual
concession from which the constitution resulted was to be consulted on
expounding it, that construction ought to be favored which would
preserve the mutual control between the Senate and House of
Representatives, rather than that which gave power to the Senate not
controllable by, and paramount over those of the House of
Representatives, whilst the House of Representatives could in no
instance exercise their powers without the participation and control of
the Senate. The second observation was, that, whatever jealousy might
unhappily have prevailed between the smaller and larger States, as they
had most weight in one or the other branch of Government, it was a fact,
for which he appealed to the journals of the old Congress from its birth
to its dissolution, and to those of the Congress under the present
Government, that in no instance would it appear, from the yeas and nays,
that a question had been decided by a division of the votes according to
the size of the States. He considered this truth as affording the most
pleasing and consoling reflection, and as one that ought to have the
most conciliating and happy influence on the temper of all the States.
4. A fourth argument in the Message was drawn from the manner by which
the Treaty power had been understood by both parties in the negotiations
with foreign Powers. "In all the Treaties made _we_ have declared and
_they_ have believed," &c. By _we_, he remarked, was to be understood
the Executive alone, who had made the declaration, and in no respect the
House of Representatives. It was certainly to be regretted, as had often
been expressed, that different branches of the Government should
disagree in the construction of their powers; but when this could not be
avoided, each branch must judge for itself; and the judgment of the
Executive could in this case be no more an authority overruling the
judgment of the House than the judgment of the House could be an
authority overruling that of the Executive. It was also to be regretted
that any foreign nation should at any time proceed under a misconception
of the meaning of our constitution. But no principle was better
established in the laws of nations, as well as in common reason, than
that one nation is not to be the interpreter of the constitution of
another. Each nation must adjust the forms and operations of its own
government, and all others are bound to understand them accordingly. It
had before been remarked, and it would be proper to repeat it here, that
of all the nations Great Britain would be the least likely to object to
this principle, because the construction given to our Government was
particularly exemplified in her own.
5. In the fifth and last place, he had to take notice of the suggestion,
that every House of Representatives had concurred in the construction of
the Treaty power, now maintained by the Executive; from which it
followed that the House could not now consistently act under a
different construction. On this point, it might be sufficient to remark,
that this was the first instance in which a foreign Treaty had been made
since the establishment of the constitution; and that this was the first
time the Treaty-making power had come under formal and accurate
discussion. Precedents, therefore, would readily be perceived to lose
much of their weight. But whether the precedents found in the
proceedings preparatory to the Algerine Treaty, or in the provisions
relative to the Indian Treaties, were inconsistent with the right which
had been contended for in behalf of the House, he should leave to be
decided by the committee. A view of these precedents had been pretty
fully presented to them by a gentleman from New York, (Mr. LIVINGSTON,)
with all the observations which the subject seemed to require.
On the whole it appeared that the rights of the House on the two great
constitutional points had been denied by a high authority in the Message
before the committee. This Message was entered on the journals of the
House. If nothing was entered in opposition thereto, it would be
inferred that the reasons in the Message had changed the opinion of the
House, and that their claims on those great points were relinquished. It
was proper, therefore, that the questions, brought fairly before the
committee in the propositions of the gentleman (Mr. BLOUNT) from North
Carolina, should be examined and formally decided. If the reasoning of
the Message should be deemed satisfactory, it would be the duty of this
branch of the Government to reject the propositions and thus accede to
the doctrines asserted by the Executive. If, on the other hand, this
reasoning should not be satisfactory, it would be equally the duty of
the House, in some such firm, but very decent, terms as are proposed, to
enter their opinions on record. In either way the meaning of the
constitution would be established, as far as depends on the vote of the
House of Representatives.
APRIL 7.--The order of the day being called for on the consideration of
the PRESIDENT's Message, the House resolved itself into a Committee of
the Whole on that subject, and the resolutions of Mr. BLOUNT having been
read--
Mr. SWIFT and Mr. W. SMITH rose together, but Mr. SMITH giving way, Mr.
SWIFT proceeded to remark, that he did not rise for the purpose of going
into the subject, but to move that the question might be then taken. The
same principles which were involved in the present question, had already
undergone a discussion of three weeks, and no doubt could remain on the
mind of any gentleman in that House on the subject; nor did he think
that if three weeks more were to be consumed in the discussion, one
opinion would be changed. Therefore, as business of the utmost
consequence called for their attention, as it was of the last importance
that the Treaties lately formed with foreign nations should be carried
into effect, he hoped they would enter upon the question of the state of
the Union. If gentlemen wished to carry the Treaties into effect, he
entreated them to come forward and do so; or, if they meant to defeat
them, he wished them at once to say so. If they went into the present
discussion at length, there would not be time sufficient to determine
upon the Treaties. He was willing to let the matter rest upon the
representation of the gentleman from Virginia. He himself had taken no
share in the debate, though if it were to be again gone into, he should
desire to be heard as well as others. But he was fully satisfied that
gentlemen who had spoken on a former occasion would unite with him in
wishing the question to be then taken.
The resolutions were then severally put and carried--51 members rising
for each.
The House then took them up.
The previous question was called, viz: Shall the question now be
put?--on which the yeas and nays were taken, and stood--yeas 54, nays
37.
The yeas and nays were taken on the first resolution, and stood--yeas
57, nays 35, as follows:
YEAS.--Theodorus Bailey, Abraham Baldwin, David Bard,
Lemuel Benton, Thomas Blount, Nathan Bryan, Dempsey Burges,
Samuel J. Cabell, Gabriel Christie, John Clopton, Isaac
Coles, Jeremiah Crabb, Henry Dearborn, George Dent, Samuel
Earle, William Findlay, Jesse Franklin, Albert Gallatin,
William B. Giles, Nicholas Gilman, Andrew Gregg, William B.
Grove, Wade Hampton, George Hancock, Carter B. Harrison,
John Hathorn, Jonathan N. Havens, John Heath, Daniel
Heister, George Jackson, Edward Livingston, Matthew Locke,
William Lyman, Samuel Maclay, Nathaniel Macon, James
Madison, John Milledge, Andrew Moore, Frederick A.
Muhlenberg, John Nicholas, Alexander D. Orr, John Page,
Josiah Parker, John Patton, Francis Preston, John Richards,
Robert Rutherford, John S. Sherburne, Israel Smith, Samuel
Smith, Thomas Sprigg, John Swanwick, Absalom Tatom, Philip
Van Cortlandt, Joseph B. Varnum, Abraham Venable, and
Richard Winn.
_Nays._--Fisher Ames, Benjamin Bourne, Theophilus Bradbury,
Daniel Buck, Joshua Coit, William Cooper, Abiel Foster,
Dwight Foster, Ezekiel Gilbert, Henry Glenn, Benjamin
Goodhue, Chauncey Goodrich, Roger Griswold, Robert Goodloe
Harper, Thomas Hartley, Thomas Henderson, James Hillhouse,
William Hindman, John Wilkes Kittera, Samuel Lyman, Francis
Malbone, William Vans Murray, John Reed, Theodore Sedgwick,
Jeremiah Smith, Nathaniel Smith, William Smith, Zephaniah
Swift, George Thatcher, Richard Thomas, Mark Thompson,
Uriah Tracy, John E. Van Allen, Peleg Wadsworth, and John
Williams.
The second resolution was then taken up, and the yeas and nays stood as
on the first.
The following members were absent when the yeas and nays were called on
the main questions:
Messrs. Brent, Claiborne, Gillespie, Greenup, Holland, New, and
Sitgreaves.
The following members were away upon leave of absence:
Messrs. Freeman, Kitchell, Leonard and Isaac Smith.
It was understood that the following members would have voted for the
resolutions had they been present:
Messrs. Brent, Claiborne, Gillespie, Greenup, Holland, and New.