Mr. GERRY.--Some gentlemen consider this as a question of policy; but to

me it appears a question of constitutionality, and I presume it will be

determined on that point alone. The best arguments I have heard urged on

this occasion came from the honorable gentleman from Virginia, (Mr.

MADISON.) He says the constitution has vested the executive power in the

President; and that he has a right to exercise it under the

qualifications therein made. He lays it down as a maxim, that the

constitution vesting in the President the executive power, naturally

vests him with the power of appointment and removal. Now I would be glad

to know from that gentleman by what means we are to decide this

question. Is his maxim supported by precedent drawn from the practice of

the individual States? The direct contrary is established. In many cases

the Executives are not in particular vested with the power of

appointment; and do they exercise that power by virtue of their office?

It will be found that other branches of the Government make

appointments. How then can gentlemen assert that the powers of

appointment and removal are incident to the Executive Department of

Government? To me it appears at best but problematical. Neither is it

clear to me that the power that appoints naturally possesses the power

of removal. As we have no certainty on either of these points, I think

we must consider it as established by the constitution.

It appears very clear to me, that however this power may be distributed

by the constitution, the House of Representatives have nothing to do

with it. Why then should we interfere in the business? Are we afraid

that the President and Senate are not sufficiently informed to know

their respective duties? Our interposition argues that they want

judgment, and are not able to adjust their powers without the wisdom of

this House to assist them; to say the least on this point, it must be

deemed indelicate for us to intermeddle with them. If the fact is, as we

seem to suspect, that they do not understand the constitution, let it go

before the proper tribunal; the judges are the constitutional umpires on

such questions. Why, let me ask gentlemen, shall we commit an infraction

of the constitution for fear the Senate or President should not comply

with its directions?

Mr. AMES.--When this question was agitated at a former period, I took no

part in the debate. I believe it was then proposed, without any idea or

intention of drawing on a lengthy discussion, and to me it appeared to

be well understood and settled by the House; but since it has been

reiterated and contested again, I feel it my bounden duty to deliver the

reasons for voting in the manner I then did, and shall now do. Mr.

Chairman, I look upon every question which touches the constitution as

serious and important, and therefore worthy of the fullest discussion,

and the most solemn decision. I believe, on the present occasion, we may

come to something near certainty, by attending to the leading principles

of the constitution. In order that the good purposes of a Federal

Government should be answered, it was necessary to delegate considerable

powers; and the principle upon which the grant was made, intended to

give sufficient power to do all possible good, but to restrain the

rulers from doing mischief.

The constitution places all executive power in the hands of the

President, and could he personally execute all the laws, there would be

no occasion for establishing auxiliaries; but the circumscribed powers

of human nature in one man, demand the aid of others. When the objects

are widely stretched out, or greatly diversified, meandering through

such an extent of territory as that the United States possess, a

minister cannot see with his own eyes every transaction, or feel with

his hands the minutiæ that pass through his department. He must

therefore have assistants. But in order that he may be responsible to

his country, he must have a choice in selecting his assistants, a

control over them, with power to remove them when he finds the

qualifications which induced their appointment cease to exist. There are

officers under the constitution who hold their office by a different

tenure--your judges are appointed during good behavior; and from the

delicacy and peculiar nature of their trust, it is right it should be

so, in order that they may be independent and impartial in administering

justice between the Government and its citizens. But the removability of

the one class, or immovability of the other, is founded on the same

principle, the security of the people against the abuse of power. Does

any gentleman imagine that an officer is entitled to his office as to an

estate? Or does the Legislature establish them for the convenience of an

individual? For my part I conceive it intended to carry into effect the

purposes for which the constitution was intended.

The executive powers are delegated to the President, with a view to have

a responsible officer to superintend, control, inspect, and check the

officers necessarily employed in administering the laws. The only bond

between him and those he employs, is the confidence he has in their

integrity and talents; when that confidence ceases, the principal ought

to have power to remove those whom he can no longer trust with safety.

If an officer shall be guilty of neglect or infidelity, there can be no

doubt but he ought to be removed; yet there may be numerous causes for

removal which do not amount to a crime. He may propose to do a

mischief; but I believe the mere intention would not be cause of

impeachment. He may lose the confidence of the people upon suspicion, in

which case it would be improper to retain him in service; he ought to be

removed at any time, when, instead of doing the greatest possible good,

he is likely to do an injury to the public interest by being continued

in the administration.

I presume gentlemen will generally admit that officers ought to be

removed when they become obnoxious; but the question is, how shall this

power be exercised? It will not, I apprehend, be contended, that all

officers hold their offices during good behavior. If this be the case,

it is a most singular Government. I believe there is not another in the

universe that bears the least semblance to it in this particular; such a

principle, I take it, is contrary to the nature of things. But the

manner how to remove is the question. If the officer misbehaves, he can

be removed by impeachment; but in this case is impeachment the only mode

of removal? It would be found very inconvenient to have a man continued

in office after being impeached, and when all confidence in him was

suspended or lost. Would not the end of impeachment be defeated by this

means? If Mr. Hastings, who was mentioned by the gentleman from Delaware

(Mr. VINING) preserved his command in India, could he not defeat the

impeachment now pending in Great Britain? If that doctrine obtains in

America, we shall find impeachments come too late; while we are

preparing the process, the mischief will be perpetrated, and the

offender will escape. I apprehend it will be as frequently necessary to

prevent crimes as to punish them; and it may often happen that the only

prevention is by removal. The superintending power possessed by the

President, will perhaps enable him to discover a base intention before

it is ripe for execution. It may happen that the Treasurer may be

disposed to betray the public chest to the enemy, and so injure the

Government beyond the possibility of reparation; should the President be

restrained from removing so dangerous an officer, until the slow

formality of an impeachment was complied with, when the nature of the

case rendered the application of a sudden and decisive remedy

indispensable?

But it will, I say, be admitted, that an officer may be removed. The

question then is, by whom? Some gentlemen say by the President alone;

and others, by the President, by and with the advice of the Senate. By

the advocates of the latter mode, it is alleged, that the constitution

is in the way of the power of removal being by the President alone. If

this is absolutely the case, there is an end to all further inquiry. But

before we suffer this to be considered as an insuperable impediment, we

ought to be clear that the constitution prohibits him the exercise of

what, on a first view, appears to be a power incident to the executive

branch of the Government. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. MADISON) has

made so many observations to evince the constitutionality of the clause,

that it is unnecessary to go over the ground again. I shall therefore

confine myself to answer only some remarks made by the gentleman from

South Carolina, (Mr. SMITH.) The powers of the President are defined in

the constitution; but it is said, that he is not expressly authorized to

remove from office. If the constitution is silent also with respect to

the Senate, the argument may be retorted. If this silence proves that

the power cannot be exercised by the President, it certainly proves that

it cannot be exercised by the President, by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate. The power of removal is incident to Government;

but not being distributed by the constitution, it will come before the

Legislature, and, like every other omitted case, must be supplied by

law.

Mr. LIVERMORE.--I am for striking out this clause, Mr. Chairman, upon

the principles of the constitution, from which we are not at liberty to

deviate. The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. SEDGWICK,)

calls the Minister of Foreign Affairs the creature of the law, and that

very properly; because the law establishes the office, and has the power

of creating him in what shape the Legislature pleases. This being the

case, we have a right to create the office under such limitations and

restrictions as we think proper, provided we can obtain the consent of

the Senate; but it is very improper to draw as a conclusion, from having

the power of giving birth to a creature, that we should therefore bring

forth a monster, merely to show we had such power. I call that creature

a monster that has not the proper limbs and features of its species. I

think the creature we are forming is unnatural in its proportions. It

has been often said, that the constitution declares the President, by

and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint this

officer. This, to be sure, is very true, and so is the conclusion which

an honorable gentleman (Mr. WHITE) from Virginia drew from it, that an

officer must be discharged in the way he was appointed.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, this question depends upon a just construction

of a short clause in the constitution. "The President shall have power,

by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of Supreme

Court, and all other officers of the United States." Here is no

difference with respect to the power of the President to make treaties

and appoint officers, only it requires in the one case a larger majority

to concur than in the other. I will not by any means suppose that

gentlemen mean, when they argue in favor of removal by the President

alone, to contemplate the extension of the power to the repeal of

treaties; because, if they do, there will be little occasion for us to

sit here. But let me ask these gentlemen, as there is no real or

imaginary distinction between the appointment of ambassadors and

ministers, or Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, whether they mean that the

President should have the power of recalling or discarding ambassadors

and military officers, for the words in the constitution are "all other

officers," as well as he can remove your Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

To be sure, they cannot extend it to the judges; because they are

secured under a subsequent article, which declares they shall hold their

offices during good behavior; they have an inheritance which they cannot

be divested of, but on conviction of some crime. But I presume gentlemen

mean to apply it to all those who have not an inheritance in their

offices. In this case, it takes the whole power of the President and

Senate to create an officer, but half the power can uncreate him. Surely

a law passed by the whole Legislature cannot be repealed by one branch

of it; so I conceive, in the case of appointments, it requires the same

force to supersede an officer as to put him in office.

I acknowledge, that the clause relative to impeachment is for the

benefit of the people; it is intended to enable their representatives to

bring a bad officer to justice who is screened by the President; but I

do not conceive, with the honorable gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr.

SMITH,) that it by any means excludes the usual ways of superseding

officers. It is said in the constitution, that the House shall have the

power of choosing their own officers. We have chosen a clerk, and, I am

satisfied, a very capable one; but will any gentleman contend we may not

discharge him and choose another and another as often as we see cause?

And so it is in every other instance; where they have the power to make,

they have likewise the power to unmake. It will be said by gentlemen,

that the power to make does not imply the power of unmaking; but I

believe they will find very few exceptions in the United States.

Mr. SHERMAN.--I wish, Mr. Chairman, that the words may be left out of

the bill, without giving up the question either way as to the propriety

of the measure. Many of the honorable gentlemen who advocate this clause

have labored to show that the President has, constitutionally, the power

of removal. If this be a well-founded opinion, they ought not to let the

words remain in the bill, because they are of such a nature as to imply

that he had not the power before it was granted him by the law.

If gentlemen would consent to make a general law, declaring the proper

mode of removal, I think we should acquire a greater degree of

unanimity, which, on this occasion, must be better than carrying the

question against a large minority.

The call for the question being now very general, it was put, shall the

words "to be removable by the President," be struck out?

It was determined in the negative; being yeas 20, nays 34.

WEDNESDAY, June 24.

_Department of Foreign Affairs._

The engrossed bill "for establishing an Executive Department, to be

denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs," was read the third time.

Mr. SUMTER.--This bill appears to my mind so subversive of the

constitution, and in its consequences so destructive to the liberties of

the people, that I cannot consent to let it pass without expressing my

detestation of the principle it contains. I do it in this public manner,

in order to fulfil what I think to be my duty to my country, and to

discharge myself of any concern in a matter that I do not approve.

Mr. PAGE discovered the fate of the bill; he knew it must pass, but,

nevertheless, he would decidedly give it his negative, and he hoped the

respectable minority which he had the honor of voting with hitherto on

the question of removability, would unite with him firmly in their

opposition; and in order to record to their constituents the sentiments

they maintained, he moved to take the question by the yeas and nays.

One-fifth of the members present joined in requiring the yeas and nays;

whereupon they were taken, and are,

YEAS.--Messrs. Ames, Benson, Boudinot, Brown, Burke,

Cadwalader, Carroll, Clymer, Contee, Fitzsimons, Gilman,

Goodhue, Griffin, Hartley, Heister, Huger, Lawrence, Lee,

Madison, Moore, Muhlenberg, Schureman, Scott, Sedgwick,

Seney, Sinnickson, Sylvester, Trumbull, and Vining.--29.

NAYS.--Messrs. Coles, Gerry, Grout, Hathorn, Huntington,

Jackson, Leonard, Livermore, Matthews, Page, Parker,

Partridge, Van Rensselaer, Sherman, Smith, of Maryland,

Smith, of South Carolina, Stone, Sturgis, Sumter, Thatcher,

Tucker, and White.--22.

So the question was determined in the affirmative, and the clerk

directed to carry the bill to the Senate, and desire their concurrence.

_Department of War._

The House then went into a committee on the bill for establishing the

Department of War. Mr. TRUMBULL in the chair.

Mr. BENSON proposed, with respect to the Secretary's being removable by

the President, a similar amendment to that which had been obtained in

the bill establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. SHERMAN thought it unnecessary to load this bill with any words on

that subject; he conceived the gentleman ought to be satisfied with

having had the principle established in the other bill.

Mr. PAGE was of the same opinion, but further thought it argued a doubt,

even in the mind of the majority, of the truth of their principles, and

they wanted, by repetition, to force that upon the mind which was not

impressed by right reason. The question on the amendment was taken

without further debate, and carried in the affirmative, twenty-four to

twenty-two.

Some other small alterations being made, the committee rose, and

reported the bill as amended; which being partly considered, the House

adjourned.

THURSDAY, June 25.

_Department of War._

The House resumed the consideration of the amendments reported by the

Committee of the Whole to the bill for establishing the War Department;

which being agreed to, the bill was ordered to be engrossed.

_Treasury Department._

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill

for establishing the Treasury Department, Mr. TRUMBULL in the chair. The

second clause being under consideration,

Mr. PAGE objected to the words making it the duty of the Secretary to

"digest and report plans for the improvement and management of the

revenue, and the support of the public credit;" observing that it might

be well enough to enjoin upon him the duty of making out and preparing

estimates; but to go any further would be a dangerous innovation upon

the constitutional privilege of this House; it would create an undue

influence within these walls, because members might be led, by the

deference commonly paid to men of abilities, who give an opinion in a

case they have thoroughly studied, to support the minister's plan, even

against their own judgment. Nor would the mischief stop here; it would

establish a precedent which might be extended, until we admitted all the

ministers of the Government on the floor, to explain and support the

plans they have digested and reported: thus laying a foundation for an

aristocracy or a detestable monarchy.

Mr. TUCKER.--The objection made by the gentleman near me is,

undoubtedly, well founded. I think it proper to strike out all the words

alluded to, because the following are sufficient to answer every

valuable purpose, namely, "to prepare and report estimates of the public

revenue and public expenditures." If we authorize him to prepare and

report plans, it will create an interference of the executive with the

legislative powers; it will abridge the particular privilege of this

House; for the constitution expressly declares, that all bills for

raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. How can

the business originate in this House, if we have it reported to us by

the Minister of Finance? All the information that can be required, may

be called for, without adopting a clause that may undermine the

authority of this House, and the security of the people. The

constitution has pointed out the proper method of communication between

the executive and legislative departments; it is made the duty of the

President to give, from time to time, information to Congress of the

state of the Union, and to recommend to their consideration such

measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. If revenue plans

are to be prepared and reported to Congress, here is the proper person

to do it; he is responsible to the people for what he recommends, and

will be more cautious than any other person to whom a less degree of

responsibility is attached. Under this clause, you give the Secretary of

the Treasury a right to obtrude upon you plans, not only undigested, but

even improper to be taken up.

I hope the House is not already weary of executing and sustaining the

powers vested in them by the constitution; and yet it would argue that

we thought ourselves less adequate to determine than any individual what

burthens our constituents are equal to bear. This is not answering the

high expectations that were formed of our exertions for the general

good, or of our vigilance in guarding our own and the people's rights.

In short, Mr. Chairman, I can never agree to have money bills originated

and forced upon this House by a man destitute of legislative authority,

while the constitution gives such power solely to the House of

Representatives; for this reason, I cheerfully second the motion for

striking out the words.

Mr. BENSON.--If the proposed amendment prevail, the bill will be nearly

nugatory. The most important service that can be rendered by a gentleman

who is at the head of the Department of Finance, is that of digesting

and reporting plans for the improvement of the revenue, and supporting

public credit; and, for my part, I shall despair of ever seeing your

revenue improved, or the national credit supported, unless the business

is submitted into the hands of an able individual. I thought this

subject was well understood, from the debate on the original motion. It

was then insisted upon by an honorable gentleman, Mr. GERRY, who opposed

the appointment of a Secretary of the Treasury, that his important

duties ought to be "to consider of the means of improving the revenue,

and introducing economy into the expenditures, and to recommend general

systems of revenue." Now, what more than this is required by the clause?

For my part, I am at a loss to see how the privilege of the House is

infringed. Can any of the Secretary's plans be called bills? Will they

be reported in such a form even? But admitting they were, they do not

become bills, unless they are sanctioned by the House; much less is the

danger that they will pass into laws without full examination by both

Houses and the President. From this view of the subject, so far is the

clause from appearing dangerous, that I believe it discovers itself to

be not only perfectly safe, but essentially necessary; and without it is

retained, the great object of the bill will be defeated.

Mr. GOODHUE.--We certainly carry our dignity to the extreme, when we

refuse to receive information from any but ourselves. It must be

admitted, that the Secretary of the Treasury will, from the nature of

his office, be better acquainted with the subject of improving the

revenue or curtailing expense, than any other person; if he is thus

capable of affording useful information, shall we reckon it hazardous to

receive it? For my part, when I want to attain a particular object, I

never shut my ears against information likely to enable me to secure it.

Mr. PAGE.--I can never consent to establish, by law, this interference

of an executive officer in business of legislation; it may be well

enough in an absolute monarchy, for a minister to come to a Parliament

with his plans in his hands, and order them to be enregistered or

enacted; but this practice does not obtain even in a limited monarchy

like Britain. The minister there, who introduces his plans, must be a

member of the House of Commons. The man would be treated with

indignation, who should attempt in that country to bring his schemes

before Parliament in any other way. Now, why we, in the free republic of

the United States, should introduce such a novelty in legislation, I am

at a loss to conceive. The constitution expressly delegates to us the

business of the revenue; our constituents have confidence in us, because

they suppose us acquainted with their circumstances; they expect, in

consequence of this knowledge, we will not attempt to load them with

injudicious or oppressive taxes; but they have no such security, if we

are blindly to follow perhaps an unskilful minister. It does not answer

me, Mr. Chairman, to say the House has a right of deliberating and

deciding upon these plans, because we may be told, if you prune away

this part or that part of the system, you destroy its efficiency.

Therefore we must act with caution; we must either take or reject the

whole; but if we reject the whole, sir, we are to depend upon ourselves

for a substitute. How are we to form one? For my part, I should not

despair, that the united wisdom of this House could procure one; but if

we are to do this in the second instance, why cannot we attempt it in

the first? I have no objection to our calling upon this or any other

officer for information; but it is certainly improper to have him

authorized by law to intrude upon us whatever he may think proper. I

presume, sir, it is not supposed by the worthy gentleman from New York

(Mr. BENSON) that we shall be at a loss to conceive what information

would be useful or proper for us to require, that we must have this

officer to present us with what he chooses. When the President requires

an opinion of him, the constitution demands him to give it; so under the

law, let him send his opinion in here when it is asked for. If any

further power is given him, it will come to this at last: we, like the

Parliament of Paris, shall meet to register what he dictates. Either

these reports of the Secretary are to have weight, or they are not; if

they are to have weight, the House acts under a foreign influence, which

is altogether improper and impolitic; if they are to have no weight, we

impose a useless duty upon the officer, and such as is no mark of our

wisdom.

Mr. AMES hoped the subject might be treated with candor and liberality;

he supposed the objections were made on those principles, and therefore

required a serious answer. The worthy gentleman who first expressed his

aversion to the clause seemed to be apprehensive that the power of

reporting plans by the Secretary would be improper, because it appeared

to him to interfere with the legislative duty of the House, which the

House ought not to relinquish.

Whenever it is a question, Mr. Speaker, said he, whether this House

ought, or ought not, to establish offices to exercise a part of the

power of either branch of the Government, there are two points which I

take into consideration, in order to lead my mind to a just decision;

first, whether the proposed disposition is useful; and, second, whether

it can be safely guarded from abuse. Now I take it, sir, that the House

by their order for bringing in a bill to establish the Treasury

Department in this way, have determined the point of utility; or, have

they erred in adopting that opinion, I will slightly make an inquiry,

How does it tend to general utility? The Secretary is presumed to

acquire the best knowledge of the subject of finance of any member of

the community. Now, if this House is to act on the best knowledge of

circumstances, it seems to follow logically that the House must obtain

evidence from that officer; the best way of doing this will be publicly

from the officer himself, by making it his duty to furnish us with it.

It will not be denied, sir, that this officer will be better acquainted

with his business than other people can be. It lies within his

department to have a comprehensive view of the state of the public

revenues and expenditures. He will, by his superintending power over the

collection, be able to discover abuses, if any, in that department, and

to form the most eligible plan to remedy or prevent the evil. From his

information respecting money transactions, he may be able to point out

the best mode for supporting the public credit; indeed, these seem to me

to be the great objects of his appointment.

Mr. LIVERMORE.--I shall vote for striking out the clause, because I

conceive it essentially necessary so to do. The power of originating

money bills within these walls, I look upon as a sacred deposit which we

may neither violate nor divest ourselves of, although at first view it

may appear of little importance who shall form a plan for the

improvement of the revenue. Although every information tending to effect

this great object may be gratefully received by this House, yet it

behoves us to consider to what this clause may lead, and where it may

terminate. Might it not, by construction, be said that the Secretary of

the Treasury has the sole right of digesting and reporting plans for the

improvement of the revenue? This construction may appear a little

extraordinary, but it is not more so than some constructions heretofore

put upon other words; but however extraordinary it may be, it may take

place, and I think the best way to avoid it, will be to leave out the

words altogether. It is certainly improper that any person, not

expressly intrusted by our constituents with the privilege of taking

their money, should direct the quantum and the manner in which to take

it.

Mr. SEDGWICK.--If the principle prevails for curtailing this part of the

Secretary's duty, we shall lose the advantages which the proposed system

was intended to acquire. The improvement and management of the revenue

is a subject that must be investigated by a man of abilities and

indefatigable industry, if we mean to have our business advantageously

done. If honorable gentlemen will for a moment consider the peculiar

circumstances of this country, the means of information attainable by

the individual members of this House, and compare them with the object

they have to pursue, they will plainly perceive the necessity of calling

to their aid the advantages resulting from an establishment like the one

contemplated in the bill; if they weigh these circumstances carefully,

their objections, I trust, will vanish.

Mr. BOUDINOT.--A proper jealousy for the liberty of the people is

commendable in those who are appointed and sworn to be its faithful

guardians; but when this spirit is carried so far as to lose sight of

its object, and instead of leading to avoid, urges on to the precipice

of ruin, we ought to be careful how we receive its impressions. So far

is the present measure from being injurious to liberty, that it is

consistent with the true interest and prosperity of the community. Are

gentlemen apprehensive we shall be led by this officer to adopt plans we

should otherwise reject? For my part, I have a better opinion of the

penetration of the representation of the people than to dread any such

visionary phantom.

Let us consider whether this power is essentially necessary to the

Government. I take it to be conceded by the gentlemen, that it is

absolutely so. They say they are willing to receive the information

because it may be serviceable, but do not choose to have it communicated

in this way. If the Secretary of the Treasury is the proper person to

give the information, I can see no other mode of obtaining it that would

be so useful. Do gentlemen mean that he shall give it piecemeal, by way

of question and answer? This will tend more to mislead than to inform

us. If we would judge upon any subject, it would be better to have it in

one clear and complete view, than to inspect it by detachments; we

should lose the great whole in the minutiæ, and, instead of a system,

should present our constituents with a structure composed of discordant

parts, counteracting and defeating the operation of each other's

properties.

Mr. HARTLEY rose to express his sentiments, as he did on every occasion,

with diffidence in his own abilities; but he looked upon the clause as

both unsafe and inconsistent with the constitution. He thought the

gentleman last up proved too much by his arguments; he proved that the

House of Representatives was, in fact, unnecessary and useless; that one

person could be a better judge of the means to improve and manage the

revenue, and support the national credit, than the whole body of

Congress. This kind of doctrine, Mr. Chairman, is indelicate in a

republic, and strikes at the root of all legislation founded upon the

great democratic principle of representation. It is true, mistakes, and

very injurious ones, have been made on the subject of finance by some

State Legislatures; but I would rather submit to this evil, than, by my

voice, establish tenets subversive of the liberties of my country.

Notwithstanding what I have said, I am clearly of opinion it is

necessary and useful to take measures for obtaining other information

than what members can acquire in their characters as citizens;

therefore, I am in favor of the present bill; but I think these words

too strong. If it was modified so as to oblige him to have his plans

ready for this House when they are asked for, I should be satisfied; but

to establish a legal right in an officer to obtrude his sentiments

perpetually on this body is disagreeable, and it is dangerous, inasmuch

as the right is conveyed in words of doubtful import, and conveying

powers exclusively vested by the constitution in this House.

Mr. GERRY expressed himself in favor of the object of the clause; that

was, to get all the information possible for the purpose of improving

the revenue, because he thought this information would be much required,

if he judged from the load of public debt, and the present inability of

the people to contribute largely towards its reduction.

He could not help observing, however, the great degree of importance

they were giving this, and the other executive officers. If the doctrine

of having prime and great ministers of state was once well established,

he did not doubt but we should soon see them distinguished by a green or

red ribbon, or other insignia of court favor and patronage. He wished

gentlemen were aware of what consequences these things lead to, that

they might exert a greater degree of caution.

The practice of Parliament in Britain is first to determine the sum they

will grant, and then refer the subject to a Committee of Ways and Means:

this might be a proper mode to be pursued in this House.

Do gentlemen, said he, consider the importance of the power they give

the officer by the clause? Is it not part of our legislative authority?

And does not the constitution expressly declare that the House solely

shall exercise the power of originating revenue bills? Now, what is

meant by reporting plans? It surely includes the idea of originating

money bills, that is, a bill for improving the revenue, or, in other

words, for bringing revenue into the treasury. For if he is to report

plans, they ought to be reported in a proper form, and complete. This

is giving an indirect voice in legislative business to an executive

officer. If this be not the meaning of the clause, let gentlemen say

what is, and to what extent it shall go; but if my construction is true,

we are giving up the most essential privilege vested in us by the

constitution. But what does this signify? The officer is responsible,

and we are secure. This responsibility is made an argument in favor of

every extension of power. I should be glad to understand the term.

Gentlemen say the Secretary of the Treasury is responsible for the

information he gives the House--in what manner does this responsibility

act? Suppose he reports a plan for improving the revenue, by a tax which

he thinks judicious, and one that will be agreeable to the people of the

United States; but he happens to be deceived in his opinion, that his

tax is obnoxious, and excites a popular clamor against the

minister--what is the advantage of his responsibility? Nothing. Few men

deserve punishment for the error of opinion; all that could be done

would be to repeal the law, and be more cautious in future in depending

implicitly on the judgment of a man who had led us into an impolitic

measure. Suppose the revenue should fall short of his estimate, is he

responsible for the balance? This will be carrying the idea further than

any Government hitherto has done. What then is the officer to be

responsible for, which should induce the House to vest in him such

extraordinary powers?

Mr. LAWRENCE.--I do not see consequences so dangerous as some gentlemen

seem to apprehend; nor did they appear to them, I believe, when the

subject was last under consideration. I recollect, Mr. Chairman, that

some difficulty was made about establishing this office, because it was

feared we could not find men of sufficient abilities to fill it. The

duties were then properly deemed of a high and important nature, and

enumerated as those proposed in the bill. It was supposed by an

honorable gentleman, that the powers here expressed might be lodged in a

board, because an individual was incompetent to undertake the whole. But

now we have the wonderful sagacity of discovering, that if an individual

is appointed, he will have capacity to form plans for improving the

revenue in such an advantageous manner, as to supersede the necessity of

having the representatives of the people consulted on the business: he

will not only perform the usual duties of a Treasury Board, but be

adequate to all purposes of legislation. I appeal to the gentleman for

his usual candor on this occasion, which will assure us that he has

wire-drawn his arguments.

Mr. MADISON.--After hearing and weighing the various observations of

gentlemen, I am at a loss to see where the danger lies. These are

precisely the words used by the former Congress, on two occasions, one

in 1783, the other in a subsequent ordinance, which established the

Revenue Board. The same power was also annexed to the office of

Superintendent of Finance, but I never yet heard that any inconvenience

or danger was experienced from the regulation; perhaps, if the power had

been more fully and frequently exercised, it might have contributed more

to the public good.

There is a small probability, though it is but small, that an officer

may derive a weight from this circumstance, and have some degree of

influence upon the deliberations of the Legislature; but compare the

danger likely to result from this clause, with the danger and

inconvenience of not having well-formed and digested plans, and we shall

find infinitely more to apprehend. Inconsistent, unproductive, and

expensive schemes, will be more injurious to our constituents than the

undue influence which the well-digested plans of a well-informed officer

can have. From a bad administration of the Government, more detriment

will arise than from any other source. The want of information has

occasioned much inconvenience and unnecessary burthens under some of the

State Governments. Let it be our care to avoid those rocks and shoals in

our political voyage, which have injured, and nearly proved fatal to,

many of our cotemporary navigators.

A gentleman has asked, what is meant by responsibility? I will answer

him. There will be responsibility in point of reputation, at least a

responsibility to the public opinion with respect to his abilities; and

supposing there is no personal responsibility, yet we know that men of

talents and ability take as much care for the preservation of their

reputation as any other species of property of which they are possessed.

If a superior degree of wisdom is expected to be displayed by them, they

take pains to give proofs that they possess it in the most unequivocal

manner; this of itself will ensure us no small degree of exertion.

With respect to originating money bills, the House has the sole right to

do it; but if the power of reporting plans can be construed to imply the

power of originating revenue bills, the constitution is inconsistent

with itself, in giving the President authority to recommend such

measures as he may think expedient or necessary; but the construction is

too unnatural to require further investigation.

I have admitted there is a small probability of a small inconvenience,

but I do not think it any more an argument against the clause, than it

would be an argument against having windows in a house, that it is

possible the wind and the rain may get in through the crevices.

Mr. STONE was not afraid of giving the officer the power of reporting

plans, because he was sure Congress would, in every case, decide upon

their own judgment. A future Congress would not pay such a deference,

even to their predecessors, as to follow in their footsteps, unless they

were convinced of the good policy of their measures. He thought if the

House wanted to make use of the information acquired by the Secretary,

they ought to give him notice of their intention; consequently,

something of this kind was proper in the bill.

Mr. SHERMAN thought the principle held up by the clause, was absolutely

necessary to be received. It was of such a nature as to force itself

upon them; therefore it was in vain to attempt to elude it by

subterfuge. It was owing to the great abilities of a financier, that

France had been able to make the exertions we were witnesses of a few

years ago, without embarrassing the nation. This able man, after

considerably improving the national revenue, was displaced; but such was

the importance of the officer, that he has been restored again.

Mr. _Baldwin_.--I do not see what we are guarding against by striking

out the words, unless gentlemen mean to go so far as to introduce a

prohibitory clause, and declare that the Secretary of the Treasury shall

be restrained from digesting or preparing plans for the improvement of

the revenue. If there is any evil in having him attend to this branch of

the business, I cannot see how to avoid it. Suppose the officer is a bad

man, and there are others like him in this House, (for this must be what

the gentlemen are afraid of;) and suppose he has prepared a scheme for

peculation, which he hopes to get adopted by making dupes of the honest

part; how are you to hinder it from being brought forward? Cannot his

friends introduce it as their own, by making and seconding a motion for

that purpose? Will you restrain him from having access to the members

out of doors? And cannot he infuse his dangerous and specious arguments

and information into them as well in the closet, as by a public and

official communication? But, Mr. Chairman, can this House, or if it can,

will it prevent any of their constituents from bringing before them

plans for the relief of grievances or oppressions? Every individual of

the community can bring business before us by petition, memorial, or

remonstrance, provided it be done in a decent manner. How then do you

propose to restrain the Secretary of the Treasury?

I think the clause is very well as it stands, and shall therefore be

against the amendment.

Mr. PAGE'S motion for striking out the clause being put and negatived:

The question on Mr. FITZSIMON'S motion to amend the bill, by striking

out the word report, and inserting prepare, was taken and carried by a

great majority.

After which the House adjourned.

FRIDAY, June 26.

A number of the members attending the interesting conference which

to-day took place with the Senate on the impost and tonnage bills, no

business was done in this House.

_Saturday_, June 27.

_Revenue Bill._

Mr. _Boudinot_, from the managers on the part of this House in the

conference with the Senate on the subject of the amendments to the

Impost Bill, reported that the conference had agreed to pass the bill as

amended by the Senate, with some additional amendments, viz: the duty on

distilled spirits of Jamaica proof, to be reduced from fifteen cents to

ten cents per gallon. The duty on all other spirits, to be reduced from

twelve to eight cents per gallon. The duty on beer, ale, porter, or

cider, imported in casks, from eight to five cents per gallon. The duty

on beer imported in bottles, from twenty-five to twenty cents per

gallon. The duty on coal, from three to two cents per bushel.

MONDAY, July 13.

_Western Lands._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of

the Union. Mr. BOUDINOT in the chair.

Mr. SCOTT requested that the report of the committee on the Western

Territory might be read, which was read accordingly, as follows:

_Resolved_, That it is the opinion of this committee, that

an act of Congress should pass for establishing a Land

Office, and to regulate the terms of granting vacant and

unappropriated lands in the Western Territory.

Mr. SCOTT.--In endeavoring, sir, to open the interesting subject now

before you, I shall avoid the repetition of those ideas which I threw

out on a former occasion, as far as my memory will serve me, and the

nature of the subject will permit.

This subject, sir, will appear of great magnitude in point of interest,

if we consider the extent of the territory; I think I shall not be far

beyond the mark, if I say it is one thousand miles long by five hundred

broad; nor if I say it is sufficient to contain two millions of farms;

nevertheless, for greater caution, say it will contain one million,

(which is notoriously and greatly within the real contents,) and that

each of these farms may be peopled by six souls, they will amount to six

millions of inhabitants, double the number of the present inhabitants of

the United States. From this view, it is an object of great concern. It

will appear also an object of concern, if we contemplate the climate,

the soil, and the waters of that country; consider that it lies in the

heart of the temperate zone; its soil infinitely more rich and more

fertile than any in the Atlantic States; its waters pure and good--in a

word, it is such a territory as must command inhabitants, and will be

peopled. Its situation in the middle of our continent, gives the climate

a salubrity that accommodates it to the emigrants from both Northern and

Southern States. It is meeting them on a middle ground, softening the

harsh restrictions of the rugged North, and breathing bland the zephyr

grateful to the sun-scorched South. In short, it is such as gives to all

who have seen it the utmost satisfaction--it is both healthy and

agreeable.

It may perhaps be objected, that the measure now proposed will lead or

tend to a depopulation of the Atlantic States, and therefore ought not

to be adopted. This is a circumstance I by no means wish. I am as far

from desiring a depopulation of the Atlantic shores, as I am from

fearing it on this ground. I am confident it will not operate in any

considerable degree to bring about that event; but if it should be

thought it would, that could be no solid objection against the measure.

Whilst the desire of emigration continues, and lands are to be procured,

settlers will find their way into that territory; nor is it in the power

of Congress to withhold lands altogether, because they are to be got of

others on better terms. There is superior encouragement held out to the

people settling on the other side of the river Mississippi, where the

soil is fertile, and the climate equally agreeable. In proof of this

assertion, I will read to the committee the translation of a kind of

proclamation issued by the Governor of the Spanish posts at the

Illinois. [This paper contains an invitation to all persons inclined to

settle in the Western country, offering as inducements, lands without

charge, exemptions from taxes, protection in civil and religious

liberties, besides provision and the implements of husbandry.] After

this, Mr. S. proceeded: Now, sir, if Congress fear to sell their lands

lest it tend to depopulate the Atlantic States, what must they apprehend

from propositions like these? They will certainly have all the effect

which encouragement from this quarter can have. It may be said, that

Americans will not venture to live under the Spanish Government, or

settle a Spanish colony. To this it may be replied, that when people,

from their necessities or inclinations, are determined to emigrate, in

order to mitigate their distresses, they think little of the form of

government; all they care for is relief from their present or

approaching wants and troubles.

Nobody will emigrate from the Atlantic States but a certain description

of men, and they will go whether you hold out this encouragement to them

or not; they will pay little regard to Congressional restrictions. And

here let me make one remark, drawn from my own observation. The forming

settlements in a wilderness upon the frontiers, between the savages and

the least populated of the civilized parts of the United States,

requires men of enterprising, violent, nay, discontented and turbulent

spirits. Such always are our first settlers in the ruthless and savage

wild; they serve as pioneers to clear the way for the more laborious and

careful farmer. These characters are already in that country by

thousands, and their number is daily increasing, and will continue to

increase; for congenial spirits will assimilate maugre all our endeavors

to the contrary. But how will you prevent them? I should be glad to see

a plan for hemming in the emigration to that territory; I think the

thing wholly impracticable, therefore it becomes the immediate interest

of Congress, to direct the emigration to a proper point; direct it to

their own territory, rather than be inactive spectators of its silent,

though rapid course to the Spanish and British dependencies; rather sell

your lands and get something for them, than let your citizens leave your

dominions. By improving a part, you add to the value of the remainder;

their population will produce a hardy race of husbandmen and warriors,

always at the command of the United States, to support and defend your

liberty and property. These being facts, I leave it to the wisdom of the

House to draw the inference.

I will make one further remark, with respect to the encouragement or

discouragement of emigration. Suppose it was in the power of Congress to

stop the course of the impetuous current, which has already won its way

through insuperable obstructions, and spread itself over the fertile

lands of the Ohio. I ask, with perfect security, if it is not such an

act of contumacy, and inconsistency with the fundamental principles of

the Government, that Congress could not adopt it? Consider that many of

your citizens are destitute of the comforts, nay, the common necessaries

of life, without a prospect of providing for the subsistence of

themselves and families: I ask, would Congress prevent the emigration of

such persons if they could? I think not; they would not act as kind

protecting fathers to their people if they did. I presume this would be

too serious an objection for any man to face, with a restraining

proposition. I question if any man would be hardy enough to point out a

class of citizens by name, that ought to be the servants of the

community; yet, unless that is done, to what class of the people could

you direct such a law? But if you passed such an act, it would be

tantamount to saying that there is some class which must remain here,

and by law must be obliged to serve the others, for such wages as they

please to give.

This being the case, let us make the best of liberty, our people, and

our land. Your citizens, I tell you, are already there by thousands;

they are going by thousands more, and are every hour growing up into

consequence. They never expect to return into the Atlantic States; plant

them in your soil, add this wealth of population to your own, and form

an empire illustrious as it is extended. Remember, ye sages of my

country, an historic truth recorded for your instruction, that empire

has been slowly, but invariably, moving from East to West; emigration

has uniformly receded in that direction, from the time that our common

parents quitted the garden of Eden, till the present hour; nor doubt but

it will continue to pursue that course, as long as there are lands to be

inhabited.

Much will depend upon the energy and force of the Government established

in that country; it ought to be such as will furnish sufficient power

for its own internal purposes, and also to secure it to the Union. But

that is not the only tie by which its union is held. That country is

attached to the Atlantic States by its natural situation. To be

convinced of this truth, nothing more is necessary than to look upon

the chart: all the commerce of that country must come through the States

upon the sea-coast. We know, at Pittsburg, that we are a thousand miles

nearer to the market than settlers at the mouth of the Ohio river. When

we export our produce by that and the Mississippi, we know we can get

easier home with our returns by the way of Philadelphia, than the others

can by turning up and stemming the current of the Mississippi.

Therefore, the imports for all that territory must come through the

United States. From these considerations, I conclude it would be madness

in the extreme for them to think of a separation, unless they were

driven to it by a fatal necessity; they will be too sensible of its ill

effects ever to attempt it.

But suppose, for a moment, that they break off from the Union, and even

become our enemies, it would be good policy in us to get as much as we

can from them first, especially as they are disposed to give it us; let

us make them extinguish part of our national debt before they leave us.

The soil and climate of that country, as I said before, will be great

inducements for emigrants to settle there. If they were to break off,

they would know how to get money enough from the sale of the territory

to support their Government, without any other resource whatever. If I,

as a resident in that country, had the remotest view of a separation

from the Atlantic States, I should be sorry to see Congress sell an acre

of that land; for selling it, in that case, would be neither more nor

less than preventing us from putting the money into our pockets when we

became independent. If they meditate independency, the most likely way

to make them so, will be to let their lands alone, in order to supply

them with funds sufficient to support them in the measure. If they are

sold, it will not be in their power.

I apprehend it will be found that a Land Office will effect these

objects better than any other plan that can be devised. If this should

be effectual, and no doubt can be entertained but it will, the

inhabitants of the United States cannot, with a good grace, be called

upon for heavy taxes in order to pay the interest on a debt which can be

so easily and properly extinguished. Every individual who contemplates

the subject, will see how much it is his interest to buy a few dollars

in certificates, and purchase a piece of land with them, which will

annihilate the debt, and prevent the demand for taxes to pay the

interest; besides, it will remain as a security to reimburse the

principal to the proprietor, as the population of the country extends;

but, at all events, it would be but advancing four or five years'

interest, and the whole debt would be absorbed.

If we mean to sell our lands for ready money, or mean to trust, we have

a superior advantage. It is more probable that the necessitous person

who wants the land for the subsistence of himself and family, will labor

harder to procure a property of this kind, and secure it for himself,

than the speculator who never means to pay a farthing until he has

received it from the sale of the land; besides, the necessitous person

is better able to buy of Government than of the speculator, because he

can get it cheaper. The purchasers of large tracts retail out their land

to this class of men, and certainly charge them something for their

trouble. But if we sell on credit, as under the Proprietary Government

was the practice in Pennsylvania, those who take out small quantities

get their land surveyed, and set themselves down; they cultivate the

ground, and erect buildings for their own accommodation. Land, in this

improved state, furnishes a better security to Government for any

arrearage of purchase money, than a large tract sold on speculation, and

which lies in the same state of nature as it did when it was disposed

of, perhaps adding thereto the expense of making the survey. If the land

must revert to Congress at last for default of payment, we get nothing

in the latter case; whereas, when sold in lots, if a man has settled

himself down, and paid for his warrant and survey, which costs the Union

nothing, but for the first price and interest thereon, it must strike

every gentleman's mind that it would be disagreeable, after a man had

made a settlement for three or four years, to have to turn out. Rather

than do this, he would make every exertion to discharge the price: if

his situation was so wretched as not to furnish the means, some of his

neighbors, on such security, might befriend him; but at any rate

Government would be secure. By this argument, I do not mean to insist

that Congress should sell their lands on trust; they may do so, or sell

for ready pay, as their wisdom may think eligible. I shall be satisfied

either way.

I think the convenience of the people is a subject not unworthy of being

taken into view. My plan proposes that they should be able to perfect

their titles on the spot. I fear not the objection which has been

raised. It may be said, the titles ought not to be completed until it

was done immediately under the eye of Congress. Let this be as it may, I

will make one remark: can we not have every tie, every check, and

security upon these officers that we have upon the collectors of the

revenue? I think there is as much room for confidence in the one case as

in the other. We can take care that the Secretary of the Land Office

shall send in his accounts of patents and warrants. I think we may

depend here upon a true return.

The Receiver of the office shall take nothing but public securities,

which are not quite so great a temptation to embezzlement or illicit

practices as money. The Surveyor will be a check upon both. I think the

gentlemen employed in this business cannot be of very trifling

character. In short, this department may be as well checked and balanced

as any other; the expense of it will be nothing, because the officer may

be supported out of the fees. This being the case, I shall conclude with

moving that the committee adopt the resolution reported by the

committee, and recommend it to the House to appoint a select committee

to bring in a bill accordingly.

Mr. FITZSIMONS asked if it would not be better to settle all the

principles of the bill first, that the select committee might not lose

their labor, as had been once or twice experienced, for want of this

precaution.

He was in favor of some measure of this kind, though he had some doubts

of the necessity there was supposed to be of establishing a Land Office.

The question was now taken on the resolution, and agreed to.

_Compensation of the President, &c._

Mr. VINING wished to call the attention of the House to a business he

apprehended not very lengthy; it was the report of a committee on the

subject of compensation to be made to the President, Vice President, the

members of the Senate and House of Representatives, for their services;

he wished gentlemen to consider the situation of every one concerned in

this business, themselves, and the continent at large. He hoped they

would consent to take it up, and he flattered himself the discussion

would not last longer than a day.

Mr. WHITE wished to go into a Committee of the Whole on the business.

Mr. FITZSIMONS did not like to enter upon a lengthy discussion of a

point that was incapable of much elucidation by reasoning; he therefore

was against going into a committee at this stage of the business. He

observed, that the committee had reported something, and the members had

been pretty generally consulted on the same. He hoped the House would

despatch the business without delay or loss of time, if they were at all

inclined to take it up.

Mr. WHITE thought it necessary to go into a committee, because there

were a number of things mentioned, the reasons for which appeared to him

very uncertain.

Mr. VINING said it was a subject of considerable delicacy, and he

supposed very few gentlemen would be inclined to speak three or four

times on a point; yet this was all the advantage gained by going into a

committee. He was no more interested than others; every gentleman might

judge of his own case, but after it had been before a committee of

twelve, in order to get the fullest sense of the House upon the subject,

he was inclined to receive it without so much circumlocution. He

observed, that the business had originated in a Committee of the Whole,

and it was unusual to recommit it without showing some reasons why.

Mr. WHITE gave up his motion for a Committee of the Whole, and said,

before he consented to the report, he should be glad to know in what

style it was expected that the President would live. He observed there

was provision for the expenses of a house, furniture, secretaries,

clerks, carriages and horses. Perhaps the sum proposed might be too much

or too little. He should like to see an estimate of how much was

necessary for keeping the table, the equipage, &c. before he decided. He

hoped the committee would elucidate this subject.

There was another thing he wished to inquire of them. The Vice

President's salary was charged at five thousand dollars; he could not

conceive upon what principle that sum was reported. Did it bear a

proportion to his services, or was it in proportion to what the members

of the Senate and this House were to be allowed? There is nothing which

obliges him to be attentive to his business. No doubt but the gentleman

who holds that office at present will be regardful and diligent in

executing the business assigned him; yet there is nothing to prevent the

Vice President from residing at home and receiving his salary, without

coming within the walls of the Senate room. The Union is obliged to

support him; but I, said he, would make that support conditional; he

should have a liberal provision while in public life, but no longer. As

to delicacy, I know of none, sir, that ought to be used while we are in

pursuit of the public good. I speak therefore with candor what are my

sentiments on this subject. Other gentlemen, no doubt, do the same; but

I am clearly for examining into the principles before I agree to the

conclusion.

Mr. PAGE was sorry to see gentlemen spinning out the time to little

purpose; certainly, after having the subject under consideration for

nearly three months, they might be able to decide.

If this business was fixed, and gentlemen knew they were to have but

moderate salaries, it might perhaps tend to make them more expeditious;

but at all events, they ought to know the rate at which they attend, in

order to regulate their expenses. To some it might be a matter of no

concern, because they could bear every thing of this kind for a

twelvemonth, without inconvenience; but they ought to consider the

situation of others. We are, said he, keeping the President here without

any provision for his support; but in this we may think ourselves right,

because, in his patriotic ardor, his love for his country, he told us he

was willing to pursue that illustrious example which he set during the

period of our calamity; he refused compensation for his services. But

the constitution requires that he shall receive a compensation, and it

is our duty to provide it. We must also provide something for our own

expenses, or it may reduce gentlemen not better prepared than I am to

depend upon a friend for what the public ought to furnish.

Mr. VINING had said the subject was delicate, but he did not conceive

there was any indelicacy in asking or answering questions on this or any

other occasion, where the good of his country was concerned.

Mr. LAWRENCE did not know, whether the sum proposed was enough for the

President or not; but according to the terms of the constitution, it

ought to be granted as one sum, because he is to receive no other

emolument whatever from the United States, or either of them. Now, if it

is declared he shall receive twenty thousand dollars, and, exclusive of

that sum, we make him an allowance for furniture, horses, carriages,

&c., such an allowance is an emolument beyond the compensation

contemplated in the constitution; but I have no objection to blend these

sums together, declaring the whole to be the compensation required by

the constitution. Besides, if we establish salaries for his secretaries

and clerks, we establish them officers of the Government; this will be

improper, because it infringes his right to employ a confidential person

in the management of those concerns, for which the constitution has made

him responsible. For these reasons, Mr. L. moved to strike out all that

related to horses, carriages, furniture, &c.

Mr. SHERMAN thought it much better to give a net sum, because the

President would then have no accounts to settle with the United States.

Mr. SEDGWICK considered this a constitutional question, and therefore

thought it deserved serious investigation. The provision made in the

report, for paying the expenses of enumerated articles, does not leave

the President in the situation intended by the constitution, which was,

that he should be independent of the Legislature, during his continuance

in office; that he should have a compensation for his services, not to

be increased or diminished during that period; but there is nothing that

will prevent us from making further allowances, provided that the twenty

thousand dollars is all that is given as a compensation. By this

construction, one of the most salutary clauses in the constitution will

be rendered nugatory. From these considerations, he was led to believe

that the report was founded on unconstitutional principles.

Mr. BALDWIN said, the Committee of the Whole, when the business was

before them, had not determined any thing on this point; that,

consequently, the select committee were to frame a report upon such

principles as they judged proper. In order then to have every thing

distinct and accurate, they had brought their opinion forward in the

form it now appears. If it be deemed proper to grant an aggregate sum,

the House would no doubt add to the twenty thousand dollars, what it was

supposed these expenses would amount to.

However, he did not think the constitution was infringed; it was

intended that the compensation should not be increased or diminished,

during the President's continuance in office. Now it might be as well

fixed, by making the allowance in part money, and part furniture, &c. as

by declaring a precise sum; it will still be a stated compensation.

Mr. TUCKER thought furniture and plate ought always to be provided by

government, because, if it was necessary for every new President to buy

these articles, it might put him to great inconvenience, unless he

received a year's salary in advance; besides, when he retired from his

situation, they would not sell for half the first cost. He therefore

wished this part of the report to stand, together with the rent of a

house; but would join in striking out all the rest.

Mr. MADISON did not think the report interfered with either the spirit

or letter of the constitution, and therefore was opposed to any

alteration, especially with respect to the property of a fixed nature.

He was sure, if the furniture and plate, and house rent, could be

allowed, some of the other articles might also. The horses and carriages

will cost money, and sell for little, after being used for four years;

this will be a certain loss to the President, or his family; besides the

House have already undertaken to defray expenses of this kind, and so

set a precedent for the enumeration which had been reported.

Mr. WHITE said, if a certain sum was assigned for the expenses, the

report would be better; but as it now stood, there was no certainty in

it. One President might circumscribe it to a quarter part of the expense

another would; consequently, the compensation could not be fixed.

He admitted the propriety of paying the salary in advance for the first

year, as mentioned by the gentleman from South Carolina. He expected

this would be sufficient to defray the extra expenses, without

subjecting the President to any inconvenience.

Mr. BOUDINOT.--If the Legislature may provide the house and furniture,

they may go further on the same principle, and provide for the rest; he

was satisfied it should be so, because it could be no infringement on

the constitution.

Mr. LIVERMORE hoped the words would be struck out; indeed he was sorry

they had ever been put in. The clause in the constitution is intended to

tie down the Legislature, as well as the President; they shall make him

no compliments while in office, he shall receive nothing but a fixed

compensation for his services. Give him then this compensation, let it

be equal to his usefulness; but do not direct him to employ so much to

one use, and so much to another; it cannot be called a compensation when

you direct how it is to be expended; besides, it was wrong on another

account; why should we pretend to direct him in the style in which he

shall live? Let him have a salary, and expend it in the manner he shall

think proper.

Mr. PAGE was for striking out all the words, because he conceived it

would be against the spirit of the constitution. It would be much more

handsome to make one general provision, than to be thus particular in

enumerating the articles of expense. It has been hinted, that these

articles of expense would amount to half the sum mentioned in the report

to be given as a compensation; if so, he would propose to strike out all

that related to the subject, and so insert twenty-five or thirty

thousand, as the House shall deem most eligible.

Mr. STONE thought the President ought to be at liberty to live in any

style he thought proper, and that the House ought to give him such

compensation as they thought his services merited. If you furnish him

with a house, horses, and carriages, you declare that this is the house,

the horses, and the carriages which he shall use. There is certainly

some degree of indelicacy in this; if he was a private gentleman, he

would be at liberty to use such as he liked best. Suppose he dislikes

them, and will not have them, he is guilty of a breach of the law, is it

intended by the House to impeach him for it? I apprehend it is not, for

no part of the constitution gives us a right to dictate to him on this

head. He would rather let the President set the example how he ought to

live, than see the Legislature direct him. Economy is by no means

disadvantageous to the United States; if the President chooses to live

in an economical manner, we ought not to prevent him.

Mr. VINING thought, as the President was the representative of the

nation, that there ought to be a proper degree of dignity attached to

the office; he did not wish for splendor, but hoped to avoid the

appearance of penury. If he was right in this opinion, the House had a

right to show what they expected of the President, and, consequently,

had a right to enter into the enumeration proposed in the report, and

establish a uniform rule of conduct in the presidential chair.

With respect to its constitutionality, his mind was perfectly easy, the

constitution appeared to be silent; if so, the House had the right of

interfering. He wondered how gentlemen could agree to provide plate and

furniture, yet hesitate with respect to the clerks and secretary. Were

not the latter as necessary as the former? If so, they ought to be

equally provided for.

The question on Mr. LAWRENCE'S motion was now taken, and decided in the

affirmative.

Mr. PAGE now moved to strike out twenty thousand dollars, and insert

thirty thousand.

Mr. SMITH inquired whether it was the intention of the House to saddle

the President with the expense incurred, in consequence of their

resolution of the 15th April. He understood that near ten thousand

dollars had been laid out in purchasing furniture, and putting the house

in order for his reception; it might be disagreeable to the President to

take it. Perhaps he would be a considerable loser by such a bargain, and

many of the things might be of a nature he disliked. He thought the

House had been inconsistent with itself in ordering these things for the

President, and then refusing to let them be applied to his use.

Mr. SHERMAN thought the House need not be embarrassed on this point. The

expense is to be paid by the United States, and the furniture will be

their property, to do what they please with. Neither did he think the

House inconsistent, because it was the object of the Legislature, by

their former vote, to provide only for the temporary accommodation of

the President.

Mr. BENSON said, the business had been properly conducted. It was not in

contemplation to throw the furniture or any other expense upon the

President. He presumed the property belonged to the United States, but

they would sell to the President such part as he chose to purchase. As

to the house, the President was not confined to it; he might give it up

when he pleased, and take another if he thought proper.

The question on striking out twenty thousand and inserting thirty

thousand was divided, and the first part was agreed to, but the latter

rejected.

It was now moved to strike out the words secretary and clerks.

Mr. MADISON thought the Executive Magistrate ought not to have the power

of creating officers; yet if he appointed his secretary and clerks, and

they were recognized, either with respect to salary or official acts,

they became officers of the Government.

Mr. BENSON did not think it necessary to recognize any such officers;

they were to be esteemed the mere instruments of the President, and not

as sharing in the administration.

The motion was put, and carried in the affirmative, and then the House

adjourned.

THURSDAY, July 16.

_Compensation of the President, &c._

The House resumed the consideration of the Report of the Committee on

the Compensation to the President, Vice President, and Members of

Congress.

The blank occasioned by striking out on Monday last, was now proposed to

be filled.

Mr. LIVERMORE moved to fill it with 18,000 dollars.

Mr. BURKE said, there were some members of the committee in favor of

15,000 dollars; others indeed were for a much larger sum--he believed

they went so far as 70,000 dollars; that 20,000 dollars was an

accommodation, and as such he had agreed to it; but he was of opinion

that 15,000 dollars was sufficient; that 20,000 had been once agreed to,

but the expenses were added at a subsequent meeting of the committee;

now, as the House had concurred in striking out 20,000 dollars, and a

proposition was come forward more correspondent to his judgment, he

should give it support.

Mr. FITZSIMONS presumed it was not a question before the House what the

report of the committee had been, nor were the sentiments any gentleman

had there delivered to operate against the sense expressed by the

committee in their report; if any thing done in committee was to

influence the decision of the House, it must be the report, which spoke

the sense of the majority. He further presumed, that when the 20,000

dollars were struck out, after all the expense had been erased, it was

in the contemplation of the honorable mover to increase the sum so as to

include both articles. It was with this view he voted in favor of

striking out the 20,000 dollars.

Mr. TUCKER said it might happen, that the expenses a President would

incur at the first entering on the office would be so great as to injure

his private fortune and distress his family. A quarter's salary might be

insufficient to defray the expense; yet if the President continued but

three months in office, this sum would be all he was entitled to. He

thought it just and requisite to provide against accidents of this kind,

if it could be done consistently with the constitution. With this object

in view, he would propose that the President's compensation should be

26,000 dollars for the first year, and 16,000 dollars for every other

year; that 10,000 dollars should be paid him in advance, on his coming

to the chair, and the remainder in quarterly payments. Its amount, he

said, would be nearly what was proposed by the gentleman from New

Hampshire (Mr. LIVERMORE); and if the House was disposed to fix on that

sum, as a proper compensation, they might, without any material change,

admit his proposition; but if they meant to grant either a greater or a

less sum, he hoped they would accommodate it to his principle.

Mr. STONE said, that a sum of 25,000 dollars would be as small a sum as

would answer the purpose; and provided that amount should be agreed to,

the expense of the Executive would be less to the people than that of

any Government in the world. If it is considered that the unavoidable

expense will be great, and that the assistance of two or more

secretaries will be necessary for the President to discharge his high

and important trust, and that it cannot be expected that persons in such

a station should be in straitened or dependent circumstances, this sum

will not be found to exceed the absolute expense, with a moderate

compensation for the services of the President. It is also a maxim of

sound policy, that executive officers should be independent.

Mr. WHITE.--Sir, I do not say that 25,000 dollars will or will not be

sufficient; but in order to determine the necessary sum, I should wish

to know the style in which the President is expected to live. If a style

of magnificence and splendor is to be adopted, the sum is too small; and

if economy is pursued, it may be too much. Until this is known, it will

be extremely difficult to decide upon a proper sum; and when I give my

vote, I wish to give it on such information as will satisfy my mind with

respect to its propriety, and show my constituents the reasonableness of

the measure. Will he live in a more expensive style than the former

Presidents of Congress, or will he live nearly in the same? If so, what

was that expense, or what will be the probable increase? How was that

money applied, and what will now be necessary? If these questions can

be answered, gentlemen may decide with more precision than they can

while the subject is left afloat.

Mr. BALDWIN said, it was impossible to get the information the gentleman

required, the committee had made all the examination in their power with

respect to the actual expense of supporting the office. They found

former Presidents of Congress, whose office, by the by, was less

important, and whose assistants were less numerous, expended 7,000,

8,000, and so on to 13,000 dollars annually. From this, some gentlemen

were led to believe 17,000 dollars might be sufficient in this instance.

But we were, said he, left without any thing satisfactory on this

subject, and when the question was pressed on the committee, they varied

from 15,000 to 25,000 dollars; we were therefore obliged to average the

sum.

We were satisfied that it must be left to experiment to determine what

the allowance ought to be; and we were certain that the gentleman who

had to make the first experiment would do it in such a manner as to give

satisfaction to every body. He knows the way to blend dignity and

economy; and I would rather, on this account, make the allowance too

much than too little. I would, therefore, prefer making the experiment

at 25,000 dollars; a sum that, in the President's hands, will give

umbrage to no one.

Mr. BOUDINOT made some further observations respecting the examination

made by the committee, from which it appeared that the expenses of the

President of the United States would exceed the expenses of the late

President of Congress in a variety of cases. Two secretaries would be

wanting; they must be men of abilities and information; but the

committee conceived extra provision would be made for them by the House.

If the whole was to be comprehended in one grant to the President, he

would rather increase the sum reported by the committee than diminish

it. Originally he was in favor of allowing 16,000; but then he thought

the expense of secretaries, carriages, furniture, &c., was to be an

additional allowance. Since the House had determined otherwise, he

favored an addition to the 20,000 dollars.

Mr. JACKSON was disposed to move 30,000 dollars; but he was willing to

accommodate, and agree to 25,000 dollars.

Mr. VINING observed, that the committee had no documents whereby they

could form a judgment; they had no light to guide them. They could not

foresee what ambassadors and foreign ministers might be sent to this

country, nor the expenses the President must necessarily incur upon that

account, to support the honor and dignity of the United States. He

further remarked, that there are cases in which generosity is the best

economy, and no loss is ever sustained by a decent support of the

Magistrate. A certain appearance of parade and external dignity is

necessary to be supported. Did I, said he, represent a larger State, I

would speak with more confidence on the subject. We are haunted by the

ghost of poverty; we are stunned with the clamor of complaint throughout

the States. But under the auspices of an energetic Government, our funds

will be established and augmented, and, I make no doubt, will be found

sufficient to answer all the purposes of the Union. But our calculations

ought not to be confined to the present moment alone. If it should be

contended by any gentleman, that we have it not in our power to support

the Government in a proper style, then there is an end of the business.

We should remember that the present time is the season for organizing

the Government. A patient and mature deliberation is requisite to

investigate it, and by that means the amount of the civil list will be

increased; in future, the sessions will be short, and the load of

expense greatly diminished. He was opposed to any reduction of the sum,

as he had always thought it too small, and would rather propose to fill

the blank with 30,000 dollars.

Mr. PAGE mentioned that 30,000 dollars had been proposed; though he

thought the sum adequate, it was not sufficient to support pomp and

parade. Those, he said, were entirely out of the question. He had made a

calculation upon the probable necessary expenses, and found, that

exclusive of that dignity and pageantry talked of, this sum would

suffice. If he had contemplated the splendor and pageantry alluded to,

he should not have thought of 30,000 dollars, nor 40,000 dollars, for he

believed 100,000 dollars insufficient. But if the committee, upon

investigation, were convinced that 20,000 dollars would be a

compensation for his services, exclusive of an allowance for his

expenses, when the whole was taken together it must at least amount to

30,000 dollars; for this reason he moved to fill the blank with that

sum.

The question on 30,000 dollars was put, and rejected.

Mr. PAGE then moved 25,000 dollars, which was carried; affirmative 30,

negative 17.

The House then proceeded to the second part of the report, viz: "That

there be paid in like quarterly payments to the Vice President of the

United States, 5,000 dollars per annum."

Mr. WHITE.--I do not like the principle on which this provision is made

for the Vice President; there is nothing, I believe, in the constitution

which gives him a right to an annual sum; it fixes no duty upon him as

Vice President, requiring a constant attendance. He may be called upon

to act as President, and then I would give him the salary of the

President; at other times, he is to preside as President of the Senate,

then I would pay him for his services in that character. On this

principle, I shall move to strike out the clause; if that is agreed to,

I propose to offer one, allowing him the pay of President, when he acts

as President; and a daily pay during the time he acts as President of

the Senate.

Mr. PAGE would second the motion for striking out five thousand dollars,

but with a different view from what had been intended by his worthy

colleague. He wished it struck out, in order to introduce a larger sum.

His idea was, that a proper proportion was not observed between the

salary of the First and Second Magistrates. As to the utility of the

office, he had nothing to say. He had no hand in forming the

constitution; if he had, perhaps he should never have thought of such an

officer; but as we have got him, we must maintain him; and those

gentlemen who talk of respectability being attached to high offices,

must admit, in a comparative view, that he is not supported with

dignity, provided a situation derives its dignity from the money given

him by way of salary; for his part, he thought money, abstractedly

considered, could not bestow dignity. Real dignity of character proceeds

from a much nobler source; but he apprehended the people of the United

States, whose representative the Vice President was, would be displeased

to see so great a distinction made between the President and him.

Mr. SEDGWICK said, the arguments of the honorable gentleman from

Virginia (Mr. WHITE) did not strike him with any force, nor did he see

the impropriety spoken of. One reason why the pay of the members of the

Senate and House is per diem is, because they contemplate their being

together but a very inconsiderable part of their time; but I suppose,

said he, that every gentleman who has considered the subject, has

determined in his own mind that the Vice President ought to remain

constantly at the seat of Government; he must always be ready to take

the reins of Government when they shall fall out of the hands of the

President; hence it will be necessary that he should, for this cause, if

not for any other, preclude himself from every object of employment, and

devote his whole time to prepare himself for the great and important

charge for which he is a candidate. Under these circumstances, it is

necessary that he should be provided with a constant salary, to support

that rank which we contemplate for him to bear; I therefore conceive it

must be such a perpetual salary as the President is entitled to receive.

If the principles of the motion are inadmissible, it cannot be supported

by argument, because very little information can be obtained on which to

ground our reasoning.

Mr. SENEY said, that, according to the constitution, a compensation is

to be made for services performed. The Vice President may absent himself

the whole time. He proposed giving him a handsome allowance while

employed, but thought he ought to be paid per diem.

Mr. SHERMAN adverted to the circumstance of salaries being allowed to

Lieutenant Governors in the several States where such officers are

appointed; so that, according to this mode, the grant made to the Vice

President would correspond with the practice of the States

individually. It appeared also, he said, to be necessary, inasmuch as

this officer would be taken from all other business.

Mr. WHITE.--If I thought, sir, the attendance of the Vice President as

necessary as that of the President, I would not hesitate to allow him an

annual salary; but I do not conceive it to be so necessary; it is not

made so by the constitution. If he had been appointed Vice President as

a perpetual counsel for the President, it would have altered the case;

he would then have had services to render, for which we ought to

compensate him. The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.

SEDGWICK) has intimated that he will be precluded from following any

other business; there is nothing in the constitution which precludes him

from following what profession he thinks proper. I am willing to pay him

a full and liberal allowance for all the services he renders; but I do

not think we are authorized to institute sinecures for any man.

It ought to be considered that the Vice President has personal

advantages from the appointment to that office; it holds him up as the

successor of the President; the voice of the people is shown to be

considerably in his favor; and if he be a deserving person, there will

be but little doubt of his succeeding to the presidential chair; not

that I would make this an argument to diminish his compensation. I would

pay him amply for all the services he renders, at least as amply as the

Government and circumstances of the people will admit. When performing

the duties of President, he should receive the salary as such.

The constitution has stipulated, that the President shall be compensated

for his services, that we shall ascertain it by law; but it has not said

one syllable with respect to the pay of the Vice President; hence I

consider it would be improper to pay him on any other principle than in

proportion to his services. If these require five thousand dollars a

year, it may be made to amount to that sum, at so much per diem.

As to the observations of the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. SHERMAN,)

that Lieutenant Governors receive salaries in the several States, and

therefore it will be proper to grant one to the Vice President, in order

to comport with the practice of the States individually, I shall only

remark, that in some States they have no such officer; in others, where

they have such an officer, they give him no pay at all; in some, they

are paid according to their attendance on business, in the manner that I

propose to pay the Vice President. But admitting that every State had an

officer of this kind, and that they paid him a salary like that proposed

in the report, it would be no argument why the General Government should

pursue a practice inconsistent with that economy and sense of propriety

which it ought to be the study of the Representatives of the people of

the United States to preserve to their constituents.

Mr. MADISON.--I do not concur, Mr. Speaker, in sentiment, with my

colleague on this subject. I conceive, sir, if the constitution is

silent on this point, that it is left to the Legislature to decide

according to its nature and its merits. The nature of the office will

require that the Vice President shall always be in readiness to render

that service which contingencies may require; but I do not apprehend it

to be in our power to derive much advantage from any guides furnished by

the examples of the several States; because we shall find them

differently provided for by the different Governments. If we consider

that the Vice President may be taken from the extremity of the

continent, and be from the nature of his office obliged to reside at or

within the convenient reach of the seat of Government, to take upon him

the exercise of the President's functions, in case of any accident that

may deprive the Union of the services of their first officer, we must

see, I think, it will often happen that he will be obliged to be

constantly at the seat of Government. No officer under a State

Government can be so far removed as to make it inconvenient to be called

upon when his services are required; so that, if he serve without a

salary, it may be he can reside at home, and pursue his domestic

business; therefore the application in that case does not appear to me

to be conclusive.

My colleague says that he will derive advantages from being in the line

of appointment to the presidential chair. If he is to be considered as

the apparent successor of the President, to qualify himself the better

for that office, he must withdraw from his other avocations, and direct

his attention to the obtaining a perfect knowledge of his intended

business.