CHAPTER XVIII

THE INEVITABLE RESULT

As soon as the government changed its policy and denied

exceptional rewards for exceptional risks virile Americans

refused to assume these risks and internal improvements ceased.

A distinction is drawn between pioneer capital and improvement

capital.

The effect of this changed attitude toward internal improvement and

business generally is exactly what every thoughtful person foresaw. No

railroad construction worth mentioning has been begun in the last

decade. A few unimportant extensions have been made. About five years

ago, John D. Spreckels attempted the construction of a road from San

Diego to the Imperial Valley, but a possible six percent return, if it

proved a success, and total loss if it failed, did not prove inviting

to capital. Facing disaster, he turned it over to one of the old

established lines to be builded on the accumulated credit of that

system.

The United States was never in such great need of additional

transportation as during the last ten years and never before was so

little done to supply it. James J. Hill, the great empire builder of

the Northwest, used to furnish figures to prove that we must invest two

billion dollars new capital per annum to keep pace with the development

of the country. It did not require a sage or a seer to discern that if

we multiplied production from farm and factory, mill and mine,

indefinitely, and failed to provide transportation facilities, we would

ultimately reach a time when crops would rot on the ground while those

who had grown them would be freezing and coal miners starving. Truly,

the American people are “kin-folks.”

For more than three years, liberty hung in the balance simply because

the United States, with all her development, had failed to keep her

transportation facilities abreast of her production.

We had no merchant marine and during the entire period of the war were

dependent largely upon the Allies to transport our troops and our

munitions. Adverse marine laws had been passed rendering it impossible

to sail an American ship in deep sea transportation except at great

loss even if the ship had cost nothing whatever. It became necessary

for the government to take possession of the railroads in order to

avoid the effect of statutes filled with restrictive and prohibitive

provisions. If the railroads had been operated under private ownership

as the government is now operating them, every railroad president in

the United States would be in the penitentiary. The roads asked an

increase of fifteen percent in freight rates, which raised a furore of

objection from both shipper and public, and it was denied. Government

control and operation resulted in a loss of seventy million dollars the

first month. Then both freight and passenger rates were increased

twenty-five percent, generally, and in many instances, one hundred

percent, and no one murmured. And still the loss continues. _It was

four hundred million dollars the first year of government operation._

WILL WE EVER BUILD MORE ROADS?

If someone should predict that the last railroad ever to be built in

the United States of America, has been built, are you prepared to

question its correctness? Will it be necessary to change our policy if

more roads are to be builded?

Listen! Will you invest money in railroad construction, knowing that if

it succeeds you will be allowed no more than six or eight percent on

the money wisely spent, and that if, through misfortune or want of

foresight, it fails, you will lose everything? The theory of public

utility commissions generally, is that if money is unwisely invested it

ought to be lost, and when it is wisely invested, it should earn about

six percent.

Suppose you and I install a hydraulic power plant and build our dam

according to plans and specifications prepared by a reputable engineer.

Then a flood destroys it and demonstrates that the money was _unwisely

spent_ and, therefore, according to these commissions, should be lost.

If the dam stands the strain, and if it was wisely placed, and if it be

economically operated, we will be allowed six percent. Are you ready to

join in an enterprise of this character? If you will not, who will?

Suppose a promoter presents to you an engineer’s report made from a

preliminary survey of a railroad extending, let us say, from St. Louis,

around through Arkansas and Texas to Galveston. I am informed that such

a report exists, and that it shows that the road will go through the

largest body of uncut white oak in the world, extensive pine forests,

tap that belt of zinc ore extending south from Joplin, Missouri, make

available large coal measures, iron deposits and agricultural areas now

obtainable at less than twenty dollars per acre, but which with proper

transportation facilities, and a progressive citizenship, would be

worth two hundred dollars per acre. The engineer estimates that

the road when completed will earn twenty percent on the cost of

construction, and you are asked to buy some of the stock at par. The

statutes of most states forbid the sale of even initial stock issues

for less than par. How much of this stock will you take? Will your

neighbors and friends want some? How much stock in an unbuilt railroad

do you think can be sold at any price when good farm lands adjacent can

be bought at twenty-five percent of par?

While the wisdom of the modern law-maker prohibits the sale of stock at

less than par few if any statutes have been enacted, limiting the price

at which bonds may be sold. Suppose you are offered bonds instead of

stock. Possibly you can get the bonds at less than par. What will you

pay, and how large a block do you desire? Remember, the road has not

yet been built. The money must be placed in the bank to be used in

construction and you must wait for your interest until the road has

earned it. If you will not buy, will your neighbors?

It will help to solve these problems if you recognize early in your

calculations that men with much money are not much bigger fools than we

with little. If you and I will not invest in railroad construction

under present conditions, men of means and experience will not, and the

last railroad ever to be built beneath the Stars and Stripes is now in

operation unless—unless!

THE OLD WAY

During the half century and more of the unparalleled growth and

development of the United States, bonds of unbuilt railroads were

offered with fifty percent or more of stock as a bonus. The estimates

indicated that the roads would earn not only interest on the bonds but

dividends on the stock, and a portion of the unearned increment

resulting from development was in this way awarded to those who took

the risks. Investors were thus encouraged to expect reasonable returns,

plus fifty percent or more of water. The promoters who had paid the

expenses of preliminary surveys (often abandoned as worthless) also

labored with hopes of great gain if they should discover a meritorious

proposition. Those who bought and occupied the lands contiguous to new

roads endured some hardships but took no risks and yet expected to add

at least four hundred percent of water to their investments. They

realized in most instances more than one thousand percent profit on the

original cost.

Does anyone doubt that a return to the policy of apportioning unearned

increment equitably among those who shall in any way contribute to the

general result will revive internal improvements? No one asks, and no

one would consent, that all the unearned increment should go to the

stockholders of a railroad. Every one favors governmental supervision

and control of rates. The point where a few diverge from the mass is in

recommending that those whose vision and courage are solely responsible

for development, shall have an equitable share of the unearned

increment.

Lest I be misunderstood, I desire to state parenthetically that I have

never owned a railroad bond or a share of railroad stock; and I have

never promoted a railroad or been employed in any capacity by a

railroad. Most of what little I now possess, I have made by watering

the capitalization of real estate. Occasionally, in times past, when I

have known of a railroad about to be constructed, and have recognized

an opportunity to make a little money through another man’s vision, on

another man’s courage and at the other man’s risk, I have purchased a

little contiguous real estate, watered the capitalization from one

hundred to one thousand percent, and then insisted that the road should

haul me and my produce at cost plus six percent.

PIONEER CAPITAL

Does it occur to you that pioneer capital should be accorded pioneer

rewards? Pioneer people make sacrifices, endure hardships, suffer

privations; but in America they take no risks and their rewards have

been certain and speedy. But their rewards would be neither certain nor

speedy did not pioneer capital precede them, blaze the way and assume

all risks. During the period when pioneer capital was liberally

rewarded, development outstripped the imagination of men. It will do

the same again if given like encouragement.

I assume that a return of six percent would be ample on capital, let us

say, to construct an additional track for the Pennsylvania Railroad

between New York and Philadelphia. That would be improvement capital.

Would the same rate be satisfactory for money invested in an unbuilt

road into an undeveloped country? To state the case is to state the

argument, and yet no railroad commissioner has yet been created with

both the wisdom and the courage to stand openly for a distinction

between development capital and pioneer capital. Unless returns are

permitted large enough to induce a reasonable man to take a risk none

will take it, for the unreasonable man has no money to risk.

In a preceding paragraph I referred to the attempt of Mr. Spreckels to

build a railroad across, or rather through, and much of the way under,

the most barren succession of mountain peaks and defiles I have ever

seen. An automobile road has been built at great expense across the

mountain. Nine-tenths of the way not a green leaf or living thing—not

even a bird or insect—will be seen.

Mr. Spreckels is a very wealthy man. He is supposed to own over

fifty-one percent of the gas, electric light, street railways and

ferries of San Diego. He does not, however, consume fifty-one percent

of the food cooked by the gas he generates; he does not enjoy fifty-one

percent of the light that illuminates that beautiful little city; he

does not take fifty-one percent of the rides on street car or ferry;

and not one percent of the unearned increment, the advance in the value

of property occasioned by his public-spirited enterprises, inures to

him. Having more money than he can use and more than his children can

legitimately spend, why does he risk everything on a railroad involving

an aggregate of more than twenty miles of tunnel through solid granite?

I will tell you why.

For some reason, let us hope a sufficient reason, the All-wise Father

has implanted in certain natures somewhat more than the average vision,

somewhat more than the average courage, somewhat more than the average

desire to achieve, and He seems to have ordained that these men shall

be happy only when achieving. Service expresses the thought admirably

when he put into the mouth of the returning Klondiker:

“Yes, there’s gold and it’s haunting and haunting;

It lures me on as of old.

But it isn’t the gold that I’m wanting,

So much as just finding the gold.”

So it has ever been, and thus it is and ever will be. These daring,

progressive souls risk their past, their present, their future and the

future of their families, upon gigantic propositions, the consummation

of which makes the appellation, “I am an American,” the proudest boast

of man.

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