CHAPTER LX.

THE CHANGE OF THINGS.

[Sidenote: 1789--The political condition of France]

The establishment of the American republic meant something more for

England than the loss of her fairest colonies, and meant much more for

Europe than the establishment of a new form of government in the New

World. While the United States were acclaiming Washington as their first

President and rejoicing over the excellence of their carefully framed

Constitution, the principles which had elected the one and had created

the other were working elsewhere to unexpected and mighty issues. French

gentlemen of rank and fortune, fired by a philosophic admiration for

liberty, had fought and fought well for the American colonists. When the

revolt had become a revolution, and the revolution a triumph, the French

gentlemen went back to France with their hearts full of love and their

lips loud in praise for the young republic and its simple, splendid

citizens. The doctrines of liberty and equality, which had been so dear

to the Philosophers and the Encyclopaedists, were now being practically

applied across the Atlantic, and the growth of their success was watched

by the eager eyes of the wisest and the unwisest thinkers in France.

Within five years from the time when the American army was disbanded

French political philosophy found itself making astonishing strides

towards the realization of its cherished ideals. It had long felt the

need of some change in the system of government that had prevailed in

France, but its desires had seemed dim as dreams until the success of a

handful of rebellious colonists in a distant country had made the spirit

of democracy an immediate force in the life and the thought of the world.

Undoubtedly the condition of France was bad. {291} The feudal system, or

what was left of the feudal system, worn out, degraded, and corrupt, was

rapidly reducing France to financial, physical, and political ruin. It

is no part of the business of this history to dwell upon the conditions

prevailing in France towards the close of the eighteenth century,

conditions which prevailed in varying degree over the most part of

Europe. Great French financiers like Turgot, great French thinkers like

Voltaire and Rousseau and the company of the "Encyclopaedia," had been

keenly conscious of the corroding evils in the whole system of French

political and social life, and had labored directly and indirectly to

diminish them. Keen-eyed observers from abroad, men of the world like

Chesterfield, philosophers like Arthur Young, had at different epochs

observed the symptoms of social disease and prognosticated the nature of

its progress. The France of that day has been likened to a pyramid with

the sovereign for its apex, with the nobility, a remnant of antique

feudalism, for its next tier, with the wealthy and influential Church for

the next, and below these the vast unrecognized bulk of the pyramid, the

unprivileged masses who were the people of France. In the hands of the

few who had the happiness to be "born," or who otherwise belonged to the

privileged orders, lay all the power, all the authority which for the

most part they misused or abused. It has been said with truth that the

man who did not belong to the privileged orders had scarcely any more

influence upon the laws which bound him and which ground him than if he

lived in Mars or Saturn instead of in Picardy or Franche Comté. Such a

system of government, which could only have been found tolerable if it

had been swayed by a brotherhood of saints and sages, was, as a matter of

fact, worked in the worst manner possible and for the worst purposes.

The conditions under which the vast mass of the French people lived,

struggled, suffered, and died were so cruel that it is hard indeed to

believe them compatible with the high degree of civilization which, in

other respects, France had reached. A merciless and most comprehensive

process of taxation squeezed life and hope out of the French nation {292}

for the benefit of a nobility whose corruption was only rivalled by its

worthlessness and an ecclesiasticism that had forgotten the Sermon on the

Mount and the way to Calvary.

But if the condition of France was bad it contained the germs of

improvement. A greater freedom of thought, a greater freedom of speech

were beginning, very gradually, to assert themselves and to make their

influence felt. Philosophical speculation on sorrow and suffering turned

the minds of men to thoughts of how that sorrow might be stanched and

that suffering abated. The slowly rising tide of thought was blown into

an angry sea by a wind from the west, and in a little while a scarcely

suspected storm became a hurricane that swept into a common ruin

everything that opposed its fury. England had long been looked up to by

French reformers as the pattern for the changes they desired to see

brought about in their own country. The moderation and equality of its

laws, as compared with those of France, the facilities of utterance

afforded to the popular voice, made it seem a veritable Utopia to eyes

dimmed by the mist of French feudality. But now another and a greater

England had arisen in the New World. Across the Atlantic the descendants

of the men who had overthrown a dynasty and beheaded a king had shaken

themselves free from forms of oppression that seemed mild indeed to

Frenchmen, and had proclaimed themselves the champions of theories of

social liberty and political freedom which had been dreamed of by French

philosophers but had never yet been put into practice. Rebellious

America had fired the enthusiasm of gallant French adventurers;

successful, independent America animated the hopes and spurred the

imaginations of those whose eyes turned in longing admiration from the

seasoned constitution of monarchical England to the as yet green

constitution of republican America.

[Sidenote: 1789--Revival of the States-General in France]

Those Englishmen whose tastes and sympathies induced them to keep in

touch with political opinion in France, and to watch with interest the

spread of ideas which they themselves held dear, noted with approval many

remarkable {293} signs of activity across the Channel. While the strain

upon the false financial system of France had become so great that the

attempt to stop the hole in the money chest broke the spirit of finance

minister after finance minister, a feeling in favor of some change in the

system that made such catastrophes possible seemed to be on the increase

in educated and even in aristocratic circles. Many Englishmen of that

day knew France, or at least Paris, fairly well. If Pitt had paid the

French capital but a single visit, Fox was intimately acquainted with it,

and Walpole was almost as familiar with a superficial Paris as he was

with a superficial London. Dr. Johnson, not very long before the time of

which we write, had visited Paris with his friends the Thrales, and had

made the acquaintance of a brewer named Santerre. Arthur Young travelled

in France as he travelled in England and in Ireland. On the other hand,

Frenchmen who were soon to be conspicuous advocates of change were not

unknown on the English side of the Channel. Mirabeau was known in

London--not too favorably--and the cousin of the French King, the Duke de

Chartres, afterwards Duke of Orleans, had moved in London society and was

to move there again. So when educated Englishmen heard that Lafayette

had demanded the revival of the States-General, unused and almost

forgotten these two centuries, they knew that the friend of Washington

was not likely to ask for impossibilities. When the Duke of Orleans set

himself openly in opposition to the King, his cousin, they recognized a

significance in the act, and when Mirabeau asserted himself as the

champion of a growing agitation in favor of an oppressed and

unrepresented people they remembered the big, vehement man who had passed

so much of his life in prisons and had played the spy upon the Prussian

Court. Gradually prepared for some change in the administrative system

of France, they were not prepared for the rapid succession of changes

that followed upon the formal convocation of the States-General in the

spring of 1789.

The States-General was the nearest approach to a representative

parliamentary system that was known to France. {294} But the

States-General had not been summoned to aid the deliberations of a French

monarch in the course of many reigns. France had lived under what was

practically a despotism untempered by an expression of organized public

opinion for several generations. It was so long since the States-General

had been convoked that the very forms and ceremonies incidental to or

essential to its convocation had passed out of living memory, and had to

be painfully ascertained by much groping after authority and precedent.

In the end, however, authority and precedent were ascertained, and the

States-General, composed of representatives of the three estates of the

realm--the Church, the Nobility, and the People--met with much ceremony

at Versailles. They were called together for the ostensible purpose of

dealing with the financial difficulties that threatened to make the

country bankrupt. But it was soon clear that they, or at least the

majority of their members, intended to accomplish much more than that.

The news that travelled slowly in those days from the capital of France

to the capital of England grew to be interesting and important with an

interest and an importance that were not to cease in steady activity for

more than a quarter of a century. Event followed event with startling

rapidity. The members of the Third Estate severed themselves from the

Church and the Nobility, met in the Tennis Court in Versailles, and

declared themselves a National Assembly. The people of Paris, profoundly

agitated, and fearing that the King intended to suppress the insurgent

National Assembly by force, broke out into riots, which culminated in an

attack upon the famous and detested prison in the Faubourg St. Antoine,

the Bastille. The Bastille had not for many years been a serious

instrument of oppression, but its record was an evil record, and it

represented in the eyes of the people of Paris all that was most detested

and most detestable in the old order. The Bastille was captured; its few

prisoners were borne in triumph through the streets, while its commander,

De Launay, was decapitated and his head carried about on the point of a

pike.

[Sidenote: 1789--The French Revolution]

If the King of France had been a different man from {295} Louis the

Sixteenth he might have faced the rising storm with some hope of success.

But he could do nothing, would do nothing. His advisers, his intimates,

his kinsmen, his captains, despairing at his vacillation and fearing that

they would be abandoned to the fury of insurgent Paris, fled for their

lives from a country that seemed to them as if possessed by a devil. The

country was possessed, possessed by the spirit of revolution. After ages

of injustice a chance had come for the oppressed, and the oppressed had

seized their chance and misused it, as the long oppressed always misuse

sudden power. Rebellious Paris marched upon Versailles, camped outside

the King's palace; broke in the night time into the King's palace,

slaying and seeking to slay. The Royal Family were rescued, if rescue it

can be called, by the interposition of Lafayette. They were carried in

triumph to Paris. Still nominally sovereign, they were practically

prisoners in their palace of the Tuileries. Europe looked on in

astonishment at the unexpected outbreak. In England at first the leaders

of liberal opinion applauded what they believed to be the dawn of a new

and glorious era of political freedom. Fox hailed in a rapture of

exultation the fall of the Bastille. The Duke of Dorset, the English

ambassador to France, saluted the accomplishment of the greatest

revolution recorded by history. Eager young men, nameless then but yet

to be famous, apostrophised the dawn of liberty. "Bliss was it in that

dawn to be alive, but to be young was very heaven," Wordsworth wrote,

with a wistful regret, fifteen years after the Bastille had fallen,

recalling with a kind of tragic irony the emotions of that hour and

contrasting them with his thoughts on the events that had followed

through half a generation. All over England strenuous politicians,

catching the contagion of excitement from excited France, formulated

their sympathy with the Revolution in ardent, eloquent addresses, formed

themselves into clubs to propagate the principles that were making France

free and illustrious, and sent delegates speeding across the Channel to

convey to a confident, constitution-making National Assembly the {296}

assurance that the best hearts and the wisest brains in England pulsed

and moved in unison with their desires.

[Sidenote: 1790--Burke and the French Revolution]

Such assurances were inaccurate and misleading. There was one man in

England the goodness of whose heart, the wisdom of whose brain could

scarcely be questioned, whose censure in England, and not in England

alone, was more serious than the applause of a whole theatre of others.

At a moment when all who represented liberal thought in politics, all who

some ten years earlier had sympathized with the American colonists, were

showing a like sympathy for the insurgent people of France, Edmund Burke

made himself conspicuous by the vehemence and the vigor of his opposition

to a movement which commanded the admiration of his most intimate friends

and closest political allies. While the Revolution was still almost in

its infancy, while Sheridan and Fox vied with each other in the warmth of

their applause, Burke set himself to preach a crusade against the

Revolution with all the unrestrained ardor of his uncompromising nature.

No words of Fox or of Sheridan, no resolution of clubs, no delegated

enthusiasm had anything like the same effect in aiding, that Burke's

famous pamphlet had in injuring the French Revolution, in the eyes not

merely of the mass of the English people, but in the eyes of a very great

number of people in the countries of Europe. People whose business it

was to be king, to use the famous phrase of a then reigning prince,

readily welcomed Burke's "Reflexions on the French Revolution," which was

soon disseminated all over the Continent in a French translation.

Naturally enough it appealed to the Emperor of Germany, to the Empress

Catherine of Russia, to the French princes sheltering in Coblentz and

boasting of the revenge they would take on the Revolution when the King

should enjoy his own again. Naturally enough it appealed to George the

Third as a book which every gentleman ought to read. Kings and princes

everywhere, who felt that at any moment their own thrones might begin to

rock unsteadily beneath them, inevitably applauded the unexpected

assistance of the greatest orator and thinker of his age.

{297}

Such applause alone would not have made Burke's pamphlet the formidable

weapon that it proved to be in the hands of reaction, or have brought

about the grave results that may be directly attributed to Burke's pen.

The words of Burke created, the breath of Burke fanned, a public opinion

in England and abroad that was in direct antagonism to everything that

was meant by those who formed and who guided or were driven by the

Revolution. It would be hard to find a parallel in history for the

influence thus exerted by a single man against so great a force. All the

conservatism of Burke's nature--the conservatism that led him to regard

the English Parliamentary system of his day as well-nigh ideally perfect,

and that prompted him to resist so steadily and so successfully Pitt's

proposals of Parliamentary reform--concentrated itself against what he

believed to be the spirit of anarchy newly arisen in France. The

Revolution was but a year old, and was as yet unstained by the worst

excesses of the Terror, when Burke launched his bolt, shouted his

battle-cry, and animated Europe to arms. It must be admitted that many

of the evils which Burke prophesied in his review of the nascent

revolution were the stigmas of its prime. From the premises he beheld he

drew clear and definite conclusions, which were only too unhappily

verified as the tide of revolution flowed. But it must also be

remembered that Burke was himself in no small measure the cause of the

realization of his own dark and tragic prognostications. Burke's

arguments, Burke's eloquence, Burke's splendid ability were among the

most potent factors in animating the hopes of the refugee princes, of

inspiriting their allies, and of forming that ill-advised and disastrous

coalition of the Powers against France which Danton answered with the

head of a king. It was the genius of Burke that stemmed the sympathy

between England and a nation struggling to be free; it was the genius of

Burke that fostered the spirit of animosity to France which began with

the march upon Paris, and which ended after the disastrous defeats of the

invaders, the deaths of the King and Queen, and all the agonies of the

Terror, in {298} creating for England, in common with Europe at large,

the most formidable enemy that she had ever known.

In spite of Burke and Burke's melancholy vaticinations the course of the

Revolution in France seemed at first to most liberal-minded Englishmen to

move along reasonable lines and to confine itself within the bounds of

moderation. The excesses and outrages that followed immediately upon the

first upheaval, the murders of Foulon and Berthier in Paris, the peasant

war upon the castles, were regarded as the unavoidable, deplorable

ebullitions of a long dormant force which, under the guidance of capable

and honorable men, would be directed henceforward solely to the

establishment of a stable and popular system of government. The men who

were, or who seemed to be, at the head of affairs in France had names

that for the most part commended themselves to such Englishmen as had

anything more than a superficial knowledge of the country. The fame of

Lafayette, the hero of the American war, seemed to answer for the conduct

of the army. In Bailly, the astronomer whom unhappy chance had made

Mayor of Paris, constitutionalism recognized a man after its own heart.

The majority of the members of the National Assembly seemed to be

gloriously occupied in evolving out of the chaos of the old order a new

and entirely admirable framework of laws modelled boldly after the

English pattern. Most English observers thought, in opposition to Burke,

what the majority of the members of the National Assembly themselves

thought, that the Revolution was an accomplished fact, a concluded page

of history, brought about not indeed bloodlessly, but still, on the

whole, with comparatively slight shedding of blood, considering the

difficulty and the greatness of the accomplished thing. The practical

imprisonment of the King and Queen within the walls of Paris, within the

walls of the Tuileries, seemed no great hardship in the eyes of the

Englishmen who sympathized with the aims of those of the French

revolutionaries with whom they were acquainted. The French King himself

seemed to be reconciled to his lot, to have joined himself frankly and

{299} freely enough to the party of progress within his dominions, and to

be as loyally eager to accept the new constitution which the National

Assembly was busy framing as the most ardent patriot among its members.

Even the flight of the Royal Family, the attempted flight that began with

such laborious pomp at Paris to end in such pitiful disaster at Varennes,

the flight that condemned the King and Queen to a restraint far more

rigorous than before, did not greatly disturb British equanimity.

[Sidenote: 1791--Burke and the coalition against France]

To the mind of Burke, however, his prophecies were already justifying

themselves. He could see nothing in the Revolution but its errors, and

he hailed the coalition of Europe against France as a league of light

against the powers of darkness. He broke away furiously from his friends

and allies of so many great political battles. He could not understand,

he could not bear to realize that men who had struggled with him to

champion the rights of the American colonists, and to punish the offences

of Warren Hastings, should now be either avowed sympathizers with or

indifferent spectators of the events that were passing in France. He had

loved Charles Fox greatly ever since Fox had shaken off the traditions of

Toryism and become the most conspicuous champion of liberal ideas in

England. But he could not and would not forgive him for his attitude

towards the French Revolution and the French Revolutionists. Burke saw

nothing but evil in, thought nothing but evil could come of, what was

happening in France, and he feared disasters for his own country if it

became impregnated with the poison of the revolutionary doctrine. That

Fox should in any way advocate that doctrine made him in Burke's eyes an

enemy of England, and not merely of England but of the whole human race.

There was no middle way with Burke. Those who were not with him were

against him, not merely as a politician, but as a man. To the day of his

death, in 1797, he hated the Revolution and denied his friendship to

those who expressed anything less than execration for its principles and

its makers. Although it is always easy to exaggerate the influence that

any single spirit may have upon a movement embracing {300} many

nationalities and many different orders of mind, it would be difficult to

overestimate the effect of Burke's words and Burke's actions in animating

the coalition of monarchical Europe against insurgent France. And upon a

responsibility for the intervention of other States in the affairs of

France depends also a proportionate degree of responsibility for the

results of that intervention. Burke was to see all the horrors he had so

eloquently anticipated realized as the direct consequence of the invasion

of France by the allied armies. The French people in the very hour in

which they believed their cherished revolution to be an accomplished fact

saw it menaced by the formidable league which proposed to bring the

King's brothers back in triumph from Coblentz, and which threatened, in

the extraordinary language to which Brunswick put his name, to blot Paris

from the map of Europe if any injury were done to the King, who had

already formally accepted the constitution that the Revolution had

created. Paris went mad with fear and rage. The September massacres,

the attacks upon the Tuileries, the proclaimed republicanism of the

Convention, the rise of the men of the Mountain, Marat, Danton, and

Robespierre, the execution first of the King and then of the Queen, the

dominion of the guillotine and the Reign of Terror, were the direct

results of a coalition whose only excuse would have been its complete

success. The coalition proved to be an absolute failure. To the cry

that the country was in danger ragged legions of desperate men rushed to

the frontiers, and, to the astonishment of the world, proved more than a

match for the armies that were sent against them.

[Sidenote: 1789-92--Pitt and the French Revolution]

Pitt was not himself eager to see England dragged into the European

quarrel with France. But it was not easy for a minister who loved

popularity, and who very sincerely believed his presence at the head of

affairs to be essential to the welfare of the State, to avoid being

involved in the controversy. The result of the unsuccessful coalition

had been to increase the crimes that marked the course of the French

Revolution, and seemingly to justify the fierce indignation of Burke.

The country that had {301} been profoundly impressed by Burke's eloquence

was profoundly shocked by the horrors that lost nothing of their

magnitude in the reports that crossed the Channel. The country was

flooded with fugitives from France, emigrants who presented in themselves

moving pictures of the sufferings of those who were opposed to the

Revolution, and who were not slow to express their sense of the ruin that

had fallen upon their country. King George's native shrewdness and

native narrowness of mind had made him from the first an active opponent

of the Revolution. He declared that if a stop were not put to French

principles there would not be a king left in Europe in a few years. To

him, whose business above all things it had been to be king, the prospect

was unlovely and alarming. The fear that he felt for his office was

shared in varying degree by all those who felt that they would have much

to lose if the example set by France came to be followed in England. The

Church and the aristocracy, with all wealthy and vested interests, were

naturally ranked to resist by all means the spread of the new doctrines.

There were a few noblemen who, like Lord Stanhope and Lord Lauderdale,

professed themselves to be champions of the French Revolution; there were

some statesmen among the Opposition who were either sympathizers with the

Revolution or asserters of the doctrine that it was no part of England's

duty to interfere with the way in which another nation chose to govern

herself. But the strength of public opinion was against these, as it was

against the minister who was as eager as any Englishman living to remain

on good terms with France.

Pitt from the first had looked with a favorable eye upon the changes that

were taking place across the Channel. To maintain a friendship with

France was a radical part of his policy. Friendship with France was

essential in his mind in order to combat the aggrandizement of Russia and

Prussia, and friendship with France seemed more possible under an

enlightened constitution than under a despotic king. While Burke, who

could only make the House of Commons smile and sneer by his denunciations

{302} of Jacobin intrigues and his display of Jacobin daggers, was

playing on the heart-strings of England and reviving all the old

hostility to France, Pitt pursued as long as he was allowed to pursue it

a policy of absolute neutrality. But he was not long allowed to pursue

that policy, although he reaped some reward for it in a proof that the

French Government appreciated his intentions and shared his desire for

friendship. An English settlement at Nootka Sound, in Vancouver Island,

had been interfered with by Spain. England was ready to assert her

rights in arms. Spain appealed to France for her aid by the terms of the

Family Compact. The French King and the French Ministers were willing

enough to engage in a war with England, in the hope of diverting the

course and weakening the power of the Revolution. But the National

Assembly, after a long and angry struggle, took away from the King the

old right to declare war, save with the consent of the National Assembly,

which consent the National Assembly, in that particular crisis, was

decided not to give. Pitt was delighted at this proof of the friendly

spirit of the French people and the advantage of his principle of

neutrality. But he was not able to act upon that principle. The forces

brought against him were too many and too potent for him to resist. From

the King on the throne to the mob in the streets, who sacked the houses

of citizens known to be in sympathy with the Revolution, the English

people as a whole were against him. The people who sympathized with the

Revolution, who made speeches for it in Westminster and formed

Constitutional Clubs which framed addresses of friendship to France, were

but a handful in the House of Commons, were but a handful in the whole

country. Their existence dazzled and deluded the French Revolutionists

into the belief that the heart of England was with them at a time when

every feeling of self-interest and of sentiment in England was against

them. Pitt clung desperately to peace. He thought, what the Opposition

thought then and for long years later, that it was wisest to leave France

to settle her internal affairs and her form of government in her own way.

When England {303} no longer had an ambassador at the French capital Pitt

adhered doggedly, tenaciously, to a peace policy; persisted in preserving

the neutrality of Holland; was ready, were it only possible, only

permitted to him, to recognize the new Republic. But even if the

execution of Louis the Sixteenth had not roused irresistible indignation

in England the action of the new Republic made the prolongation of peace

an impossibility. When, in the winter of 1792, the Convention made the

famous offer of its aid in arms to all peoples eager to be free, it must

have been plain to Pitt that, with France in that temper and England

tempest-tossed between hatred of the Revolution and fear lest its

theories were being insidiously fostered in her own confines, the

preservation of peace was a dream. The dream was finally dissipated when

France made ready to attack Holland and, rejecting all possible

negotiations, declared war in the early days of 1793.

[Sidenote: 1793--France declares war against Holland]

At first the war went ill with France, and if the German Powers had

co-operated earnestly and honestly with England it is at least within the

limits of possibility that Paris might have been occupied and the

Revolution for the time retarded. France seemed to be circled by foes;

her enemies abroad were aided by civil war at home. La Vendée was in

Royalist revolt; Marseilles and Lyons rose against the tyranny of Paris;

Toulon, turning against the Republic, welcomed an English fleet. For a

moment the arms of England and the aims of the Allies seemed to have

triumphed. But the passionate determination of the French popular

leaders and the mass of the French people to save the Revolution seemed

to inspire them with a heroism that grew in proportion to the threatened

danger. Her armies were swollen with enthusiastic recruits. Her

internal revolts were coped with and crushed with savage severity. Loyal

La Vendée was beaten. The rebellious towns of Lyons and Marseilles

almost ceased to exist under the merciless repression of their

conquerors. Many of the allied armies were defeated, while those of the

two German Powers for their own selfish ends played the game of

revolutionary France by abstaining from any serious effort to {304}

advance into the country. Germany and Austria were confident that they

could whenever they pleased crush revolutionary France, and they

preferred to postpone the process, in order to occupy themselves in a new

partition of Poland, which they could scarcely have carried out if the

French monarchy had been restored. If there was nothing to justify the

conduct of the two German Powers, there was much to warrant their

confidence in their own strength when they judged that the time had come

for them to exert it. They counted upon the known when they measured

their forces with those of revolutionary France; they could not count

upon the unknown quantity which was to disturb all their calculations.

The unknown quantity asserted itself just at the moment when France, in

spite of some successes, seemed to be deeply wounded by the loss of

Toulon.

With the great port of Toulon in their hands the adversaries of France

might well believe that a serious blow had been struck at her strength,

and that the spirit which so long had defied them might yet be broken.

But the success which had seemed to menace France so gravely proved to be

but the point of departure for a new era of French glory. The occupation

of Toulon is forever memorable, because it gave an opportunity to a young

lieutenant of artillery in the French service, quite obscure in that

service and wholly unknown outside of it. The quick intelligence of this

young soldier perceived that the seizure of a certain promontory left

unguarded by the invaders would place Toulon and those who had held it at

the mercy of the French cannon. The suggestion was acted upon; was

entirely successful; the English admiral was obliged to retire with all

his fleet, and Toulon was once again a French citadel garrisoned by

French soldiers. But the importance of the event, for France and the

world lay not in the capture but in the captor. Though Barras, confident

in his dominion over the Directory, might sneer at the young adventurer

from Corsica and minimize his share in a success that had suddenly made

him conspicuous, the name of Bonaparte then for the first time took its

{305} place in the history of Europe. The youth whose military genius

had enabled him to see and to seize upon the fatal weakness in a

well-defended city was destined to prove the greatest soldier France had

ever known, the greatest as well as the most implacable enemy England had

ever to reckon with, and one of the greatest conquerors that ever

followed the star of conquest across the war-convulsed earth.

[Sidenote: 1793--Napoleon Bonaparte]

This is the story of England, not the story of France, and Napoleon was

at his best and worst rather an influence upon than an integral part of

English history. It must be enough to say here that he is assumed to

have been born in Ajaccio, in Corsica, in 1769; that when he was ten

years old he tried to become French rather than Italian--a feat which he

never successfully accomplished--by entering the military school of

Brienne; that he served Louis the Sixteenth with indifference and the

Revolution with an ambition that was often baffled, and that he struck

the first of his many strokes at England when he won Toulon for France.

{306}

A History of the Four Georges and of William IV, Volume III · 第 19 / 22 章