CHAPTER II

BANKING MACHINERY

Capital, then, is wealth invested in industry, finance is the machinery

by which this process of investment is carried out, and international

finance is the machinery by which the wealth of one country is invested

in another.

Let us consider the case of a doctor in a provincial town who is making

an annual income of about £800 a year, living on £600 of it and saving

£200. Instead of spending this quarter of his income on immediate

enjoyments, such as wine and cigars, and journeys to London, he invests

it in different parts of the world through the mechanism of

international finance, because he has been attracted by the advantages

of a system of investment which was fashionable some years ago, which

worked by what was called Geographical Distribution.[2] This meant to

say that the investors who practised it put their money into as many

different countries as possible, so that the risk of loss owing to

climatic or other disturbances might be spread as widely as possible. So

here we have this quiet country doctor spreading all over the world the

money that he gets for dosing and poulticing and dieting his patients,

stimulating industry in many climates and bringing some part of its

proceeds to be added to his store. Let us see how the process works.

First of all he has a bank, into which he pays day by day the fees that

he receives in coin or notes and the cheques that he gets, each half

year, from those of his patients who have an account with him. As long

as his money is in the bank, the bank has the use of it, and not much of

it is likely to go abroad. For the banks use most of the funds

entrusted to them in investments in home securities, or in loans and

advances to home customers. Part of them they use in buying bills of

exchange drawn on London houses by merchants and financiers all over the

world, so that even when he pays money into his bank it is possible that

our doctor is already forming part of the machinery of international

finance and involving us in the need for an explanation of one of its

mysteries.

A bill of exchange is an order to pay. When a merchant in Argentina

sells wheat to an English buyer, he draws a bill on the buyer (or some

bank or firm in England whom the buyer instructs him to draw on),

saying, "Pay to me" (or anybody else whom he may name) "the sum of so

many pounds." This bill, if it is drawn on a firm or company of well

known standing, the seller of the wheat can immediately dispose of, and

so has got payment for his goods. Usually the bill is made payable two

or three, or sometimes six months after sight, that is after it has been

received by the firm on which it is drawn, and "accepted" by it, that is

signed across the front to show that the firm drawn on will pay the

bill when it falls due. These bills of exchange, when thus accepted, are

promises to pay entered into by firms of first-rate standing, and are

held as investments by English banks. Bills of exchange are also drawn

on English houses to finance trade transactions between foreign

countries, and also as a means of borrowing money from England. When

they are drawn on behalf of English customers, the credit given is given

at home, but as it is (almost always) given in connection with

international trade, the transaction may be considered as part of

international finance. When they are drawn on behalf of foreign

countries, trading with other foreigners, or using the credit to lend to

other foreigners, the connection with international finance is obvious.

They are readily taken all over the world, because all over the world

there are people who have payments to make to England owing to the wide

distribution of our trade, and it has long been England's boast that

bills of exchange drawn on London firms are the currency of

international commerce and finance.

Some people tell us that this commanding position of the English bill

in the world's markets is in danger of being lost owing to the present

war: in the first place because America is gaining wealth rapidly, while

we are shooting away our savings, and also because the Germans will make

every endeavour to free themselves from dependence on English credit for

the conduct of their trade. Certainly this danger is a real one, but it

does not follow that we shall not be able to meet it and defeat it. If

the war teaches us to work hard and consume little, so that when peace

comes we shall have a great volume of goods to export, there is no

reason why the bill on London should not retain much if not all of its

old prestige and supremacy in the marts of the world. For we must always

remember that finance is only the handmaid of industry. She is often a

pert handmaid who steals her mistress's clothes and tries to flaunt

before the world as the mistress, and so she sometimes imposes on many

people who ought to know better, who think that finance is an

all-powerful influence. Finance is a mighty influence, but it is a mere

piece of machinery which assists, quickens, and lives on production.

The men who make and grow things, and carry them from the place where

they are made and grown to the place where they are wanted, these are

the men who furnish the raw material of finance, without which it would

have to shut up its shop.

If they and their work ceased, we should all starve, and the financiers

would have nothing behind the pieces of paper that they handle. If

finance and the financiers were suddenly to cease, there would be a very

awkward jar and jolt in our commercial machinery, but as long as the

stuff and the means of carrying it were available, we should very soon

patch up some other method for exchanging it between one nation and

another and one citizen and another. The supremacy of the London bill of

exchange was created only to a small extent by any supremacy in London's

financial machinery; it was based chiefly on the supremacy of England's

world-wide trade, and on our readiness to take goods from all nations.

The consequence of this was that traders of all nations sold goods to

us, and so had claims on us and drew bills on us, and bought goods from

us, and so owed us money and wanted to buy bills drawn on us to pay

their debts with. So everywhere the bill on London was known and

familiar and welcome. If the Americans are able and willing to develop

such a world-wide trade as ours, then the bill on New York will have a

vogue all over the world just as is enjoyed by the bill on London. Then

London and New York will have to fight the matter out by seeing which

will provide the best and cheapest machinery for discounting the bill,

that is, turning it into cash on arrival, so that the holder of it shall

get the best possible price at the present moment, for a bill due two or

three months hence.

In this matter of machinery London has certain advantages which ought,

if well used and applied, to stand her in good stead in any struggle

that lies ahead of her. London's credit machinery has grown up in almost

complete freedom from legislation, and it has consequently been able to

grow, without let or hindrance, along the lines that expediency and

convenience have shown to be most practical and useful. It has been too

busy to be logical or theoretical, and consequently it is full of

absurdities and anomalies, but it works with marvellous ease and

elasticity.

In its centre is the Bank of England, with the prestige of antiquity and

of official dignity derived from acting as banker to the British

Government, and with still more practical strength derived from acting

as banker to all the other great banks, several of them much bigger, in

certain respects, than it. The Bank of England is very severely and

strictly restricted by law in the matter of its note issue, but it

luckily happened, when Parliament was imposing these restrictions on the

Bank's business, that note issuing was already becoming a comparatively

unimportant part of banking, owing to the development of the use of

cheques. Nowadays, when borrowers go to the Bank of England for loans,

they do not want to take them out in notes; all they want is a credit in

the Bank's books against which they can draw cheques. A credit in the

Bank of England's books is regarded by the financial community as

"cash," and this pleasant fiction has given the Bank the power of

creating cash by a stroke of its pen and to any extent that it pleases,

subject only to its own view as to what is prudent and sound business.

On p.33 ("A BANK RETURN", below) is a specimen of a return that is published each week

by the Bank of England, showing its position in two separate accounts

with regard to its note issuing business and its banking business: the

return taken is an old one, published before the war, so as to show how

the machine worked in normal times before war's demands had blown out

the balloon of credit to many times its former size.

If the commercial and financial community is short of cash, all that it

has to do is to go to the Bank of England and borrow a few millions, and

the only effect on the Bank's position is an addition of so many

millions to its holding of securities and a similar addition to its

deposits. It may sometimes happen that the borrowers may require the use

of actual currency, and in that case part of the advances made will be

taken out in the form of notes and gold, but as a general rule the Bank

is able to perform its function of providing emergency credit by merely

making entries in its books.

A BANK RETURN

ISSUE DEPARTMENT.

Notes Issued £56,908,235 Government Debt £11,015,100

Other Securities 7,434,900

Gold Coin and Bullion 38,458,235

Silver Bullion ---

----------- -----------

£56,908,235 £56,908,235

----------- -----------

BANKING DEPARTMENT.

Proprietors' Capital £14,553,000 Government Securities £11,005,126

Rest 3,431,484 Other Securities 33,623,288

Public Deposits 13,318,714 Notes 27,592,980

Other Deposits 42,485,605 Gold and Silver Coin 1,596,419

Seven Day and other

Bills 29,010

----------- -----------

£73,817,813 £73,817,813

----------- -----------

With the Bank of England thus acting as a centre to the system, there

has grown up around it a circle of the great joint stock banks, which

provide credit and currency for commerce and finance by lending money

and taking it on deposit, or on current account. These banks work under

practically no legal restrictions of any kind with regard to the amount

of cash that they hold, or the use that they make of the money that is

entrusted to their keeping. They are not allowed, if they have an office

in London, to issue notes at all, but in all other respects they are

left free to conduct their business along the lines that experience has

shown them to be most profitable to themselves, and most convenient for

their customers. Being joint stock companies they have to publish

periodically, for the information of their shareholders, a balance sheet

showing their position. Before the war most of them published a monthly

statement of their position, but this habit has lately been given up. No

legal regulations guide them in the form or extent of the information

that they give in their balance sheets, and their great success and

solidity is a triumph of unfettered business freedom. This absence of

restriction gives great elasticity and adaptability to the credit

machinery of London. Here is a specimen of one of their balance sheets,

slightly simplified, and dating from the days before the war:--

LIABILITIES.

Capital (subscribed) £14,000,000

----------

Paid up 3,500,000

Reserve 4,000,000

Deposits 87,000,000

Circular Notes, etc. 3,000,000

Acceptances 6,000,000

Profit and loss 500,000

-----------

£104,000,000

-----------

ASSETS

Cash in hand and

at Bank of England £12,500,000

Cash at call and

short notice 13,000,000

Bills discounted 19,000,000

Govt. Securities 5,000,000

Other Investments 4,500,000

Advances and loans 42,000,000

Liability of customers

on account of

Acceptances 6,000,000

Promises 2,000,000

-----------

£104,000,000

-----------

On one side are the sums that the bank has received, in the shape of

capital subscribed, from its shareholders, and in the shape of deposits

from its customers, including Dr. Pillman and thousands like him; on the

other the cash that it holds, in coin, notes and credit at the Bank of

England, its cash lent at call or short notice to bill brokers (of whom

more anon) and the Stock Exchange, the bills of exchange that it holds,

its investments in British Government and other stocks, and the big item

of loans and advances, through which it finances industry and commerce

at home. It should be noted that the entry on the left side of the

balance sheet, "Acceptances," refers to bills of exchange which the bank

has accepted for merchants and manufacturers who are importing goods and

raw material, and have instructed the foreign exporters to draw bills on

their bankers. As these merchants and manufacturers are responsible to

the bank for meeting the bills when they fall due, the acceptance item

is balanced by an exactly equivalent entry on the other side, showing

this liability of customers as an asset in the bank's favour.

This business of acceptance is done not only by the great banks, but

also by a number of private firms with connections in foreign countries,

and at home, through which they place their names and credit at the

disposal of people less eminent for wealth and position, who pay them a

commission for the use of them.

Other wheels in London's credit machinery are the London offices of

colonial and foreign banks, and the bill brokers or discount houses

which deal in bills of exchange and constitute the discount market. Thus

we see that there is in London a highly specialized and elaborate

machinery for making and dealing in these bills, which are the currency

of international trade. Let us recapitulate the history of the bill and

see the part contributed to its career by each wheel in the machine. We

imagined a bill drawn by an Argentine seller against a cargo of wheat

shipped to an English merchant. The bill will be drawn on a London

accepting house, to whom the English merchant is liable for its due

payment. The Argentine merchant, having drawn the bill, sells it to the

Buenos Ayres branch of a South American bank, formed with English

capital, and having its head office in London. It is shipped to London,

to the head office of the South American bank, which presents it for

acceptance to the accepting house on which it is drawn, and then sells

it to a bill broker at the market rate of discount. If the bill is due

three months after sight, and is for £2000, and the market rate of

discount is 4 per cent. for three months' bills, the present value of

the bill is obviously £1980. The bill broker, either at once or later,

probably sells the bill to a bank, which holds it as an investment until

its due date, by which time the importer having sold the wheat at a

profit, pays the money required to meet the bill to his banker and the

transaction is closed. Thus by means of the bill the exporter has

received immediate payment for his wheat, the importing merchant has

been supplied with credit for three months in which to bring home his

profit, and the bank which bought the bill has provided itself with an

investment such as bankers love, because it has to be met within a short

period by a house of first-rate standing.

All this elaborate, but easily working machinery has grown up for the

service of commerce. It is true that bills of exchange are often drawn

by moneylenders abroad on moneylenders in England merely in order to

raise credit, that is to say, to borrow money by means of the London

discount market. Sometimes these credits are used for merely speculative

purposes, but in the great majority of cases they are wanted for the

furtherance of production in the borrowing country. The justification of

the English accepting houses, and bill brokers, and banks (in so far as

they engage in this business), is the fact that they are assisting

trade, and could not live without trade, and that trade if deprived of

their services would be gravely inconvenienced and could only resume its

present activity by making a new machinery more or less on the same

lines. The bill whose imaginary history has been traced, came into being

because the drawer had a claim on England through a trade transaction.

He was able to sell it to the South American bank only because the bank

knew that many other people in Argentina would have to make payments to

England and would come to it and ask it for drafts on London, which, by

remitting this bill to be sold in London, it would be able to supply.

International finance is so often regarded as a machinery by which paper

wealth is manufactured out of nothing, that it is very important to

remember that all this paper wealth only acquires value by being

ultimately based on something that is grown or made and wanted to keep

people alive or comfortable, or at least happy in the belief that they

have got something that they thought they wanted, or which habit or

convention obliged them to possess.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 2: All this imaginary picture is of events before the war. At

present Dr. Pillman, being a patriotic citizen, is saving much faster

than before, and putting every pound that he can save into the hands of

the British Government by subscribing to War Loans and buying Exchequer

bonds. He is too old to go and do medical work at the front, so he does

the next best thing by cutting down his expenses and finding money for

the war.]

International Finance · 第 2 / 8 章