recollections much dearer to me than any thing I have known since. There
are minds which can be pleased by honors and preferments; but I see
nothing in them but envy and enmity. It is only necessary to possess
them, to know how little they contribute to happiness, or rather how
hostile they are to it. No attachments soothe the mind so much as those
contracted in early life; nor do I recollect any societies which have
given me more pleasure, than those of which you have partaken with me.
1 had rather be shut up in a very modest cottage, with my books, my
family, and a few old friends, dining on simple bacon, and letting the
world roll on as it liked, than to occupy the most splendid post, which
any human power can give. I shall be glad to hear from you often. Give
me the small news as well as the great. Tell Dr. Currie, that I believe
I am indebted to him a letter, but that like the mass of our countrymen,
I am not, at this moment, able to pay all my debts; the post being to
depart in an hour, and the last stroke of a pen I am able to send by it,
being that which assures you of the sentiments of esteem and attachment,
with which I am, Dear Sir, your affectionate friend and servant,
Th: Jefferson.
LETTER CXXVII.--TO M. WARVILLE, February 12, 1888
TO M. WARVILLE.
Paris, February 12, 1888.
Sir,
I am very sensible of the honor you propose to me, of becoming a member
of the society for the abolition of the slave-trade. You know that
nobody wishes more ardently, to see an abolition, not only of the trade,
but of the condition of slavery: and certainly nobody will be more
willing to encounter every sacrifice for that object. But the influence
and information of the friends to this proposition in France will be
far above the need of my association. I am here as a public servant,
and those whom I serve, having never yet been able to give their
voice against the practice, it is decent for me to avoid too public
a demonstration of my wishes to see it abolished. Without serving the
cause here, it might render me less able to serve it beyond the water. I
trust you will be sensible of the prudence of those motives, therefore,
which govern my conduct on this occasion, and be assured of my wishes
for the success of your undertaking, and the sentiments of esteem and
respect, with which I have the honor to be, Sir, your most obedient,
humble servant,
Th: Jefferson.
LETTER CXXVIII.--TO JOHN ADAMS, March 2, 1788
TO JOHN ADAMS.
Paris, March 2, 1788.--Sunday.
Dear Sir,
I received this day, a letter from Mrs. Adams, of the 26th ultimo,
informing me you would set out on the 29th for the Hague. Our affairs at
Amsterdam press on my mind like a mountain. I have no information to
go on, but that of Willincks and Van Staphorsts, and according to that,
something seems necessary to be done. I am so anxious to confer with
you on this subject, and to see you and them together, and get some
effectual arrangement made in time, that I determine to meet you at the
Hague. I will set out the moment some repairs are made to my carriage:
it is promised me at three o’clock to-morrow; but probably they will
make it night, and that I may not set out till Tuesday morning. In that
case, I shall be at the Hague on Friday night: in the mean time, you
will perhaps have made all your bows there. I am sensible how irksome
this must be to you, in the moment of your departure. But it is a great
interest of the United States, which is at stake, and I am sure you will
sacrifice to that your feelings and your interest. I hope to shake you
by the hand within twenty-four hours after you receive this; and in
the mean time, I am, with much esteem and respect, Dear Sir, your
affectionate friend and humble servant,
Th: Jefferson.
LETTER CXXIX.--TO JOHN JAY, March 16, 1788
TO JOHN JAY.
Amsterdam, March 16, 1788.
Sir,
In a letter of the 13th instant, which I had the honor of addressing you
from this place, I mentioned in general terms, the object of my journey
hither, and that I should enter into more particular details, by the
confidential conveyance which would occur through Mr. Adams and Colonel
Smith.
The board of treasury had, in the month of December, informed me and
our bankers here, that it would be impossible for them to make any
remittances to Europe for the then ensuing year, and that they must,
therefore, rely altogether on the progress of the late loan. But this,
in the mean time, after being about one third filled, had ceased to
get forward. The bankers who had been referred to me for advice, by Mr.
Adams, stated these circumstances, and pressed their apprehension for
the ensuing month of June, when two hundred and seventy thousand florins
would be wanting for interest. In fine, they urged an offer of the
holders of the former bonds, to take all those remaining on hand,
provided they might receive out of them the interest on a part of our
domestic debt, of which they had also become the holders. This would
have been one hundred and eighty thousand florins. To this proposition,
I could not presume any authority to listen. Thus pressed between the
danger of failure on one hand, and this proposition on the other, I
heard of Mr. Adams being gone to the Hague to take leave. His knowledge
of the subject was too valuable to be neglected under the present
difficulty, and it was the last moment in which we could be availed of
it. I set out immediately, therefore, for the Hague, and we came on to
this place together, in order to see what could be done. It was easier
to discover, than to remove, the causes which obstructed the progress
of the loan. Our affairs here, like those of other nations, are in the
hands of particular bankers. These employ particular, and they have
their particular circle of money-lenders. These moneylenders, as I have
before mentioned, while placing a part of their money in our
foreign loans, had at the same time employed another part in a joint
speculation, to the amount of eight hundred and forty thousand dollars,
in our domestic debt. A year’s interest was becoming due on this, and
they wished to avail themselves of our want of money for the foreign
interest, to obtain payment of the domestic. Our first object was to
convince our bankers, that there was no power on this side the Atlantic
which could accede to this proposition, or give it any countenance. They
at length, therefore, but with difficulty, receded from this ground, and
agreed to enter into conferences with the brokers and lenders, and to
use every exertion to clear the loan from the embarrassment in which
this speculation had engaged it. What will be the result of these
conferences, is not yet known. We have hopes, however, that it is not
desperate, because the bankers consented yesterday, to pay off the
capital of fifty-one thousand florins, which had become due on the first
day of January, and which had not yet been paid. We have gone still
further. The treasury board gives no hope of remittances, till the new
government can procure them. For that government to be adopted, its
legislature assembled, its system of taxation and collection arranged,
the money gathered from the people into the treasury, and then remitted
to Europe, must extend considerably into the year 1790. To secure our
credit then, for the present year only, is but to put off the evil day
to the next. What remains of the last loan, when it shall be filled up,
will little more than clear us of present demands, as may be seen by the
estimate enclosed. We thought it better, therefore, to provide at once
for the years 1789 and 1790 also; and thus to place the government at
its ease, and her credit in security, during that trying interval.
The same estimate will show, that another million of florins will be
necessary to effect this. We stated this to our bankers, who concurred
in our views, and that to ask the whole sum at once would be better than
to make demands from time to time, so small, as that they betray to
the money-holders the extreme feebleness of our resources. Mr. Adams,
therefore, has executed bonds for another million of florins; which,
however, are to remain unissued till Congress shall have ratified
the measure that this transaction is something or nothing, at their
pleasure. We suppose its expediency so apparent, as to leave little
doubt of its ratification. In this case, much time will have been saved
by the execution of the bonds at this moment, and the proposition will
be presented here under a more favorable appearance, according to the
opinion of the bankers. Mr. Adams is under a necessity of setting out
to-morrow morning, but I shall stay two or three days longer, to attend
to and encourage the efforts of the bankers; though it is yet doubtful
whether they will ensure us a safe passage over the month of June. Not
having my letters here to turn to, I am unable to say whether the last I
wrote, mentioned the declaration of the Emperor that he should take part
in the war against the Turks. This declaration appeared a little before,
or a little after that letter, I do not recollect which. Some little
hostilities have taken place between them. The court of Versailles seems
to pursue immoveably its pacific system, and from every appearance in
the country from which I write, we must conclude that its tragedy is
wound up. The triumph appears complete, and tranquillity perfectly
established. The numbers who have emigrated are differently estimated,
from twenty to forty thousand. A little before I left Paris, I received
a piece of intelligence, which should be communicated, leaving you to
lay what stress on it, it may seem to deserve. Its authenticity may be
surely relied on. At the time of the late pacification, Spain had about
fifteen ships of the line nearly ready for sea. The convention
for disarming did not extend to her, nor did she disarm. This gave
inquietude to the court of London, and they demanded an explanation.
One was given, they say, which is perfectly satisfactory. The Russian
minister at Versailles, getting knowledge of this, became suspicious
on his part. He recollected that Spain, during the late war, had been
opposed to the entrance of a Russian fleet into the Mediterranean, and
concluded, if England was not the object of this armament, Russia
might be. It is known that that power means to send a fleet of about
twenty-four ships into the Mediterranean this summer. He sent to the
Count de Montmorin, and expressed his apprehensions. The Count de
Montmorin declared, that the object of Spain in that armament was
totally different; that he was not sure she would succeed; but that
France and Spain were to be considered as one, and that the former would
become guarantee for the latter, that she would make no opposition to
the Russian fleet. If neither England nor Russia be the object, the
question recurs, Who is it for? You know best, if our affairs with Spain
are in a situation to give jealousy to either of us. I think it very
possible, that the satisfaction of the court of London may have been
pretended or premature. It is possible also, that the affairs of Spain
in South America may require them to assume a threatening appearance. I
give you the facts, however, and you will judge whether they are objects
of attention or of mere curiosity.
I have the honor to be, with sentiments of sincere esteem and respect,
Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant,
Th: Jefferson.
P. S. I enclose herewith an extract of a letter from the Count de
Vergennes to the French ambassador at the Hague, which will make a
remarkable chapter in the history of the late revolution here. It is not
public, nor should be made so by us. Probably those who have been the
victims of it, will some day publish it.
LETTER CXXX.--TO MR. DUMAS, March 29, 1788
TO MR. DUMAS.
Amsterdam, March 29, 1788.
Sir,
I have now to acknowledge the receipt of your favors of the 14th, 18th,
and 23rd instant. I would have preferred doing it in person, but the
season, and the desire of seeing what I have not yet seen, invite me to
take the route of the Rhine. I shall leave this place to-morrow morning,
and probably not reach Paris till the latter end of April. In the moment
we were to have conferred on the subject of paying the arrears due to
you, a letter of the 20th of February, from the board of treasury, was
received, forbidding the application of money to any purpose, (except
our current claims,) till the June interest should be actually in hand.
Being by the letter, tied up from giving an order in your favor, I
return you the letter you had written to Mr. Jay, on the supposition
that the order for your arrears was given. It has been suggested,
however, that if you could receive bonds of the loan, you could make
them answer your purpose, and the commissioners say, this would in no
wise interfere with the views of the treasury board, nor the provision
for the June interest. I have, therefore, recommended to them in
writing, to give you bonds to the amount of your balance, if you choose
to take them, rather than to wait. I wish this may answer your purpose.
I remember that in the conversation which I had the honor of having with
you, on the evening I was at the Hague, you said that your enemies had
endeavored to have it believed, that Congress would abandon you, and
withdraw your appointments. An enemy generally says and believes what
he wishes, and your enemies, particularly, are not those who are most in
the counsels of Congress, nor the best qualified to tell what Congress
will do. From the evidences you have received of their approbation, and
from their well known steadiness and justice, you must be assured of
a continuance of their favor, were they to continue under the present
form. Nor do I see any thing in the new government which threatens us
with less firmness. The Senate, who will make and remove their foreign
officers, must, from its constitution, be a wise and steady body.
Nor would a new government begin its administration by discarding old
servants; servants who have put all to the risk, and when the risk was
great, to obtain that freedom and security under which themselves
will be what they shall be. Upon the whole, my Dear Sir, tranquillize
yourself and your family upon this subject. All the evidence, which
exists as yet, authorizes you to do this, nor can I foresee any cause
of disquiet in future. That none may arise, that yourself and family may
enjoy health, happiness, and the continued approbation of those by whom
you wish most to be approved, is the sincere wish of him, who has the
honor to be, with sentiments of sincere esteem and attachment, your most
obedient and most humble servant,
Th: Jefferson.
LETTER CXXXI.--TO THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE TREASURY, March 29, 1788
TO THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE TREASURY.
Gentlemen,
Amsterdam, March 29, 1788.
*****
I cannot close my letter, without some observations on the transfer of
our domestic debt to foreigners. This circumstance, and the failure to
pay off Fiseaux’ loan, were the sole causes of the stagnation of our
late loan. For otherwise our credit would have stood on more hopeful
grounds than heretofore. There was a condition in the last loan, that,
the lenders furnishing one third of the money, the remaining two thirds
of the bonds should remain eighteen months unsold, and at their option
to take or not, and that in the mean time, the same bankers should
open no other loan for us. These same lenders became purchasers of our
domestic debt, and they were disposed to avail themselves of the power
they had thus acquired over us as to our foreign demands, to make us
pay the domestic one. Should the present necessities have obliged you
to comply with their proposition for the present year, I should be of
opinion it ought to be the last instance. If the transfer of these debts
to Europe meet with any encouragement from us, we can no more borrow
money here, let our necessities be what they will. For who will give
ninety-six per cent, for the foreign obligations of the same nation,
whose domestic ones can be bought at the same market for fifty-five
per cent.; the former, too, bearing an interest of only five per cent.,
while the latter yields six. If any discouragements can be honestly
thrown on this transfer, it would seem advisable, in order to keep the
domestic debt at home. It would be a very effectual one, if, instead of
the title existing in our treasury books alone, it was made to exist
in loose papers, as our loan office debts do. The European holder would
then be obliged to risk the title paper of his capital, as well as his
interest, in the hands of his agent in America, whenever the interest
was to be demanded; whereas, at present, he trusts him with the interest
only. This single circumstance would put a total stop to all future
sales of domestic debt at this market. Whether this, or any other
obstruction, can or should be thrown in the way of these operations,
is not for me to decide; but I have thought the subject worthy your
consideration.
I have the honor to be, with sentiments of the most perfect esteem and
respect, Gentlemen, your most obedient and most humble servant,
Th: Jefferson.
LETTER CXXXII.--TO GENERAL WASHINGTON, May 2, 1788
TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.
Paris, May 2, 1788.
Dear Sir,
I am honored with your Excellency’s letter by the last packet, and thank
you for the information it contains on the communication between the
Cayahoga and Big Beaver. I have ever considered the opening a canal
between those two water courses, as the most important work in that
line, which the state of Virginia could undertake. If will infallibly
turn through the Potomac all the commerce of Lake Erie, and the country
west of that, except what may pass down the Mississippi; and it is
important that it be soon done, lest that commerce should, in the mean
time, get established in another channel. Having, in the spring of the
last year, taken a journey through the southern parts of France, and
particularly examined the canal of Languedoc, through its whole course,
I take the liberty of sending you the notes I made on the spot, as you
may find in them something perhaps, which may be turned to account, some
time or other, in the prosecution of the Potomac canal. Being merely a
copy from my travelling notes, they are undigested and imperfect, but
may still, perhaps, give hints capable of improvement in your mind.
The affairs of Europe are in such a state still, that it is impossible
to say what form they will take ultimately. France and Prussia, viewing
the Emperor as their most dangerous and common enemy, had heretofore
seen their common safety as depending on a strict connection with
one another. This had naturally inclined the Emperor to the scale
of England, and the Empress also, as having views in common with the
Emperor, against the Turks. But these two powers would, at any time,
have gladly quitted England, to coalesce with France, as being the power
which they met every where, opposed as a barrier to all their schemes
of aggrandizement. When, therefore, the present King of Prussia took
the eccentric measure of bidding defiance to France, by placing his
brother-in-law on the throne of Holland, the two empires immediately
seized the occasion of soliciting an alliance with France. The motives
for this appeared so plausible, that it was believed the latter would
have entered into this alliance, and that thus the whole political
system of Europe would have taken a new form. What has prevented this
court from coming into it, we know not. The unmeasurable ambition of the
Emperor, and his total want of moral principle and honor, are suspected.
A great share of Turkey, the recovery of Silesia, the consolidation of
his dominions by the Bavarian exchange, the liberties of the Germanic
body, all occupy his mind together; and his head is not well enough
organized, to pursue so much only of all this, as is practicable.
Still it was thought that France might safely have coalesced with these
powers, because Russia and herself holding close together, as their
interests would naturally dictate, the Emperor could never stir, but
with their permission. France seems, however, to have taken the worst
of all parties, that is, none at all. She folds her arms, lets the
two empires go to work to cut up Turkey as they can, and holds Prussia
aloof, neither as a friend nor foe. This is withdrawing her opposition
from the two empires, without the benefit of any condition whatever. In
the mean time, England has clearly overreached herself. She excited
the war between the Russians and Turks, in hopes that France, still
supporting the Turks, would be embarrassed with the two empires. She did
not foresee the event which has taken place, of France abandoning the
Turks, and that which may take place, of her union with the two empires.
She allied herself with Holland, but cannot obtain the alliance of
Prussia. This latter power would be very glad to close again the breach
with France, and therefore, while there remains an opening for this,
holds off from England, whose fleets could not enter into Silesia, to
protect that from the Emperor. Thus you see, that the old system is
unhinged, and no new one hung in its place. Probabilities are rather
in favor of a connection between the two empires, France, and Spain.
Several symptoms show themselves, of friendly dispositions between
Russia and France, unfriendly ones between Russia and England, and such
as are barely short of hostility between England and France. But into
real hostilities, this country would with difficulty be drawn. Her
finances are too deranged, her internal union too much dissolved, to
hazard a war. The nation is pressing on fast, to a fixed constitution.
Such a revolution in the public opinion has taken place, that the crown
already feels its powers bounded, and is obliged, by its measures, to
acknowledge limits.
A States-General will be called at some epoch not distant; they will
probably establish a civil list, and leave the government to temporary
provisions of money, so as to render frequent assemblies of the national
representative necessary. How that representative will be organized, is
yet uncertain. Among a thousand projects, the best seems to me, that of
dividing them into two Houses, of Commons and Nobles; the Commons to be
chosen by the Provincial Assemblies, who are chosen themselves by the
people, and the Nobles by the body of _Noblesse_, as in Scotland. But
there is no reason to conjecture, that this is the particular scheme
which will be preferred.
The war between the Russians and Turks has made an opening for our
Commodore Paul Jones. The Empress has invited him into her service.
She insures to him the rank of rear-admiral; will give him a separate
command, and it is understood, that he is never to be commanded. I think
she means to oppose him to the Captain Pacha, on the Black Sea. He is by
this time, probably, at St. Petersburg. The circumstances did not permit
his awaiting the permission of Congress, because the season was close at
hand for opening the campaign. But he has made it a condition, that he
shall be free at all times to return to the orders of Congress, whenever
they shall please to call for him; and also, that he shall not, in any
case be expected to bear arms against France. I believe Congress had it
in contemplation to give him the grade of admiral, from the date of
his taking the Serapis. Such a measure now, would greatly gratify him,
second the efforts of fortune in his favor, and better the opportunities
of improving him for our service, whenever the moment shall come in
which we may want him.