influence of the crown. An honorable gentleman has demanded of me,
whether I was in earnest when I proposed to this House a plan for the
reduction of that influence. Indeed, Sir, I was much, very much, in
earnest my heart was deeply concerned in it; and I hope the public has
not lost the effect of it. How far my judgment was right, for what
concerned personal favor and consequence to myself, I shall not presume
to determine; nor is its effect upon _me_, of any moment. But as to this
bill, whether it increases the influence of the crown, or not, is a
question I should be ashamed to ask. If I am not able to correct a
system of oppression and tyranny, that goes to the utter ruin of thirty
millions of my fellow-creatures and fellow-subjects, but by some
increase to the influence of the crown, I am ready here to declare that
I, who have been active to reduce it, shall be at least as active and
strenuous to restore it again. I am no lover of names; I contend for the
substance of good and protecting government, let it come from what
quarter it will.
But I am not obliged to have recourse to this expedient. Much, very
much, the contrary. I am sure that the influence of the crown will by no
means aid a reformation of this kind, which can neither be originated
nor supported but by the uncorrupt public virtue of the representatives
of the people of England. Let it once get into the ordinary course of
administration, and to me all hopes of reformation are gone. I am far
from knowing or believing that this bill will increase the influence of
the crown. We all know that the crown has ever had some influence in the
Court of Directors, and that it has been extremely increased by the acts
of 1773 and 1780. The gentlemen who, as part of their reformation,
propose "a more active control on the part of the crown," which is to
put the Directors under a Secretary of State specially named for that
purpose, must know that their project will increase it further. But that
old influence has had, and the new will have, incurable inconveniences,
which cannot happen under the Parliamentary establishment proposed in
this bill. An honorable gentleman,[58] not now in his place, but who is
well acquainted with the India Company, and by no means a friend to this
bill, has told you that a ministerial influence has always been
predominant in that body,--and that to make the Directors pliant to
their purposes, ministers generally caused persons meanly qualified to
be chosen Directors. According to his idea, to secure subserviency, they
submitted the Company's affairs to the direction of incapacity. This was
to ruin the Company in order to govern it. This was certainly influence
in the very worst form in which it could appear. At best it was
clandestine and irresponsible. Whether this was done so much upon system
as that gentleman supposes, I greatly doubt. But such in effect the
operation of government on that court unquestionably was; and such,
under a similar constitution, it will be forever. Ministers must be
wholly removed from the management of the affairs of India, or they will
have an influence in its patronage. The thing is inevitable. Their
scheme of a new Secretary of State, "with a more vigorous control," is
not much better than a repetition of the measure which we know by
experience will not do. Since the year 1773 and the year 1780, the
Company has been under the control of the Secretary of State's office,
and we had then three Secretaries of State. If more than this is done,
then they annihilate the direction which they pretend to support; and
they augment the influence of the crown, of whose growth they affect so
great an horror. But in truth this scheme of reconciling a direction
really and truly deliberative with an office really and substantially
controlling is a sort of machinery that can be kept in order but a very
short time. Either the Directors will dwindle into clerks, or the
Secretary of State, as hitherto has been the course, will leave
everything to them, often through design, often through neglect. If both
should affect activity, collision, procrastination, delay, and, in the
end, utter confusion, must ensue.
But, Sir, there is one kind of influence far greater than that of the
nomination to office. This gentlemen in opposition have totally
overlooked, although it now exists in its full vigor; and it will do so,
upon their scheme, in at least as much force as it does now. That
influence this bill cuts up by the roots. I mean the _influence of
protection_. I shall explain myself.--The office given to a young man
going to India is of trifling consequence. But he that goes out an
insignificant boy in a few years returns a great nabob. Mr. Hastings
says he has two hundred and fifty of that kind of raw materials, who
expect to be speedily manufactured into the merchantable quality I
mention. One of these gentlemen, suppose, returns hither laden with
odium and with riches. When he comes to England, he comes as to a
prison, or as to a sanctuary; and either is ready for him, according to
his demeanor. What is the influence in the grant of any place in India,
to that which is acquired by the protection or compromise with such
guilt, and with the command of such riches, under the dominion of the
hopes and fears which power is able to hold out to every man in that
condition? That man's whole fortune, half a million perhaps, becomes an
instrument of influence, without a shilling of charge to the civil list:
and the influx of fortunes which stand in need of this protection is
continual. It works both ways: it influences the delinquent, and it may
corrupt the minister. Compare the influence acquired by appointing, for
instance, even a Governor-General, and that obtained by protecting him.
I shall push this no further. But I wish gentlemen to roll it a little
in their own minds.
The bill before you cuts off this source of influence. Its design and
main scope is, to regulate the administration of India upon the
principles of a court of judicature,--and to exclude, as far as human
prudence can exclude, all possibility of a corrupt partiality, in
appointing to office, or supporting in office, or covering from inquiry
and punishment, any person who has abused or shall abuse his authority.
At the board, as appointed and regulated by this bill, reward and
punishment cannot be shifted and reversed by a whisper. That commission
becomes fatal to cabal, to intrigue, and to secret representation, those
instruments of the ruin of India. He that cuts off the means of
premature fortune, and the power of protecting it when acquired, strikes
a deadly blow at the great fund, the bank, the capital stock of Indian
influence, which cannot be vested anywhere, or in any hands, without
most dangerous consequences to the public.
The third and contradictory objection is, that this bill does not
increase the influence of the crown; on the contrary, that the just
power of the crown will be lessened, and transferred to the use of a
party, by giving the patronage of India to a commission nominated by
Parliament and independent of the crown. The contradiction is glaring,
and it has been too well exposed to make it necessary for me to insist
upon it. But passing the contradiction, and taking it without any
relation, of all objections that is the most extraordinary. Do not
gentlemen know that the crown has not at present the grant of a single
office under the Company, civil or military, at home or abroad? So far
as the crown is concerned, it is certainly rather a gainer; for the
vacant offices in the new commission are to be filled up by the king.
It is argued, as a part of the bill derogatory to the prerogatives of
the crown, that the commissioners named in the bill are to continue for
a short term of years, too short in my opinion,--and because, during
that time, they are not at the mercy of every predominant faction of the
court. Does not this objection lie against the present Directors,--none
of whom are named by the crown, and a proportion of whom hold for this
very term of four years? Did it not lie against the Governor-General and
Council named in the act of 1773,--who were invested by name, as the
present commissioners are to be appointed in the body of the act of
Parliament, who were to hold their places for a term of years, and were
not removable at the discretion of the crown? Did it not lie against the
reappointment, in the year 1780, upon the very same terms? Yet at none
of these times, whatever other objections the scheme might be liable to,
was it supposed to be a derogation to the just prerogative of the crown,
that a commission created by act of Parliament should have its members
named by the authority which called it into existence. This is not the
disposal by Parliament of any office derived from the authority of the
crown, or now disposable by that authority. It is so far from being
anything new, violent, or alarming, that I do not recollect, in any
Parliamentary commission, down to the commissioners of the land-tax,
that it has ever been otherwise.
The objection of the tenure for four years is an objection to all places
that are not held during pleasure; but in that objection I pronounce the
gentlemen, from my knowledge of their complexion and of their
principles, to be perfectly in earnest. The party (say these gentlemen)
of the minister who proposes this scheme will be rendered powerful by
it; for he will name his party friends to the commission. This objection
against party is a party objection; and in this, too, these gentlemen
are perfectly serious. They see, that, if, by any intrigue, they should
succeed to office, they will lose the _clandestine_ patronage, the true
instrument of clandestine influence, enjoyed in the name of subservient
Directors, and of wealthy, trembling Indian delinquents. But as often as
they are beaten off this ground, they return to it again. The minister
will name his friends, and persons of his own party. Whom should he
name? Should he name his adversaries? Should he name those whom he
cannot trust? Should he name those to execute his plans who are the
declared enemies to the principles of his reform? His character is here
at stake. If he proposes for his own ends (but he never will propose)
such names as, from their want of rank, fortune, character, ability, or
knowledge, are likely to betray or to fall short of their trust, he is
in an independent House of Commons,--in an House of Commons which has,
by its own virtue, destroyed the instruments of Parliamentary
subservience. This House of Commons would not endure the sound of such
names. He would perish by the means which he is supposed to pursue for
the security of his power. The first pledge he must give of his
sincerity in this great reform will be in the confidence which ought to
be reposed in those names.
For my part, Sir, in this business I put all indirect considerations
wholly out of my mind. My sole question, on each clause of the bill,
amounts to this:--Is the measure proposed required by the necessities of
India? I cannot consent totally to lose sight of the real wants of the
people who are the objects of it, and to hunt after every matter of
party squabble that may be started on the several provisions. On the
question of the duration of the commission I am clear and decided. Can
I, can any one who has taken the smallest trouble to be informed
concerning the affairs of India, amuse himself with so strange an
imagination as that the habitual despotism and oppression, that the
monopolies, the peculations, the universal destruction of all the legal
authority of this kingdom, which have been for twenty years maturing to
their present enormity, combined with the distance of the scene, the
boldness and artifice of delinquents, their combination, their excessive
wealth, and the faction they have made in England, can be fully
corrected in a shorter term than four years? None has hazarded such an
assertion; none who has a regard for his reputation will hazard it.
Sir, the gentlemen, whoever they are, who shall be appointed to this
commission, have an undertaking of magnitude on their hands, and their
stability must not only be, but it must be thought, real; and who is it
will believe that anything short of an establishment made, supported,
and fixed in its duration, with all the authority of Parliament, can be
thought secure of a reasonable stability? The plan of my honorable
friend is the reverse of that of reforming by the authors of the abuse.
The best we could expect from them is, that they should not continue
their ancient, pernicious activity. To those we could think of nothing
but applying _control_; as we are sure that even a regard to their
reputation (if any such thing exists in them) would oblige them to
cover, to conceal, to suppress, and consequently to prevent all cure of
the grievances of India. For what can be discovered which is not to
their disgrace? Every attempt to correct an abuse would be a satire on
their former administration. Every man they should pretend to call to
an account would be found their instrument, or their accomplice. They
can never see a beneficial regulation, but with a view to defeat it. The
shorter the tenure of such persons, the better would be the chance of
some amendment.
But the system of the bill is different. It calls in persons in no wise
concerned with any act censured by Parliament,--persons generated with,
and for, the reform, of which they are themselves the most essential
part. To these the chief regulations in the bill are helps, not fetters:
they are authorities to support, not regulations to restrain them. From
these we look for much more than innocence. From these we expect zeal,
firmness, and unremitted activity. Their duty, their character, binds
them to proceedings of vigor; and they ought to have a tenure in their
office which precludes all fear, whilst they are acting up to the
purposes of their trust,--a tenure without which none will undertake
plans that require a series and system of acts. When they know that they
cannot be whispered out of their duty, that their public conduct cannot
be censured without a public discussion, that the schemes which they
have begun will not be committed to those who will have an interest and
credit in defeating and disgracing them, then we may entertain hopes.
The tenure is for four years, or during their good behavior. That good
behavior is as long as they are true to the principles of the bill; and
the judgment is in either House of Parliament. This is the tenure of
your judges; and the valuable principle of the bill is to make a
judicial administration for India. It is to give confidence in the
execution of a duty which requires as much perseverance and fortitude
as can fall to the lot of any that is born of woman.
As to the gain by party from the right honorable gentleman's bill, let
it be shown that this supposed party advantage is pernicious to its
object, and the objection is of weight; but until this is done, (and
this has not been attempted,) I shall consider the sole objection from
its tendency to promote the interest of a party as altogether
contemptible. The kingdom is divided into parties, and it ever has been
so divided, and it ever will be so divided; and if no system for
relieving the subjects of this kingdom from oppression, and snatching
its affairs from ruin, can be adopted, until it is demonstrated that no
party can derive an advantage from it, no good can ever be done in this
country. If party is to derive an advantage from the reform of India,
(which is more than I know or believe,) it ought to be that party which
alone in this kingdom has its reputation, nay, its very being, pledged
to the protection and preservation of that part of the empire. Great
fear is expressed that the commissioners named in this bill will show
some regard to a minister out of place. To men made like the objectors
this must appear criminal. Let it, however, be remembered by others,
that, if the commissioners should be his friends, they cannot be his
slaves. But dependants are not in a condition to adhere to friends, nor
to principles, nor to any uniform line of conduct. They may begin
censors, and be obliged to end accomplices. They may be even put under
the direction of those whom they were appointed to punish.
The fourth and last objection is, that the bill will hurt public credit.
I do not know whether this requires an answer. But if it does, look to
your foundations. The sinking fund is the pillar of credit in this
country; and let it not be forgot, that the distresses, owing to the
mismanagement, of the East India Company, have already taken a million
from that fund by the non-payment of duties. The bills drawn upon the
Company, which are about four millions, cannot be accepted without the
consent of the Treasury. The Treasury, acting under a Parliamentary
trust and authority, pledges the public for these millions. If they
pledge the public, the public must have a security in its hands for the
management of this interest, or the national credit is gone. For
otherwise it is not only the East India Company, which is a great
interest, that is undone, but, clinging to the security of all your
funds, it drags down the rest, and the whole fabric perishes in one
ruin. If this bill does not provide a direction of integrity and of
ability competent to that trust, the objection is fatal; if it does,
public credit must depend on the support of the bill.
It has been said, If you violate this charter, what security has the
charter of the Bank, in which public credit is so deeply concerned, and
even the charter of London, in which the rights of so many subjects are
involved? I answer, In the like case they have no security at all,--no,
no security at all. If the Bank should, by every species of
mismanagement, fall into a state similar to that of the East India
Company,--if it should be oppressed with demands it could not answer,
engagements which it could not perform, and with bills for which it
could not procure payment,--no charter should protect the mismanagement
from correction, and such public grievances from redress. If the city
of London had the means and will of destroying an empire, and of cruelly
oppressing and tyrannizing over millions of men as good as themselves,
the charter of the city of London should prove no sanction to such
tyranny and such oppression. Charters are kept, when their purposes are
maintained: they are violated, when the privilege is supported against
its end and its object.
Now, Sir, I have finished all I proposed to say, as my reasons for
giving my vote to this bill. If I am wrong, it is not for want of pains
to know what is right. This pledge, at least, of my rectitude I have
given to my country.
And now, having done my duty to the bill, let me say a word to the
author. I should leave him to his own noble sentiments, if the unworthy
and illiberal language with which he has been treated, beyond all
example of Parliamentary liberty, did not make a few words
necessary,--not so much in justice to him as to my own feelings. I must
say, then, that it will be a distinction honorable to the age, that the
rescue of the greatest number of the human race that ever were so
grievously oppressed from the greatest tyranny that was ever exercised
has fallen to the lot of abilities and dispositions equal to the
task,--that it has fallen to one who has the enlargement to comprehend,
the spirit to undertake, and the eloquence to support so great a measure
of hazardous benevolence. His spirit is not owing to his ignorance of
the state of men and things: he well knows what snares are spread about
his path, from personal animosity, from court intrigues, and possibly
from popular delusion. But he has put to hazard his ease, his security,
his interest, his power, even his darling popularity, for the benefit
of a people whom he has never seen. This is the road that all heroes
have trod before him. He is traduced and abused for his supposed
motives. He will remember that obloquy is a necessary ingredient in the
composition of all true glory: he will remember that it was not only in
the Roman customs, but it is in the nature and constitution of things,
that calumny and abuse are essential parts of triumph. These thoughts
will support a mind which only exists for honor under the burden of
temporary reproach. He is doing, indeed, a great good,--such as rarely
falls to the lot, and almost as rarely coincides with the desires, of
any man. Let him use his time. Let him give the whole length of the
reins to his benevolence. He is now on a great eminence, where the eyes
of mankind are turned to him. He may live long, he may do much; but here
is the summit: he never can exceed what he does this day.
He has faults; but they are faults that, though they may in a small
degree tarnish the lustre and sometimes impede the march of his
abilities, have nothing in them to extinguish the fire of great virtues.
In those faults there is no mixture of deceit, of hypocrisy, of pride,
of ferocity, of complexional despotism, or want of feeling for the
distresses of mankind. His are faults which might exist in a descendant
of Henry the Fourth of France, as they did exist in that father of his
country. Henry the Fourth wished that he might live to see a fowl in the
pot of every peasant in his kingdom. That sentiment of homely
benevolence was worth all the splendid sayings that are recorded of
kings. But he wished perhaps for more than could be obtained, and the
goodness of the man exceeded the power of the king. But this gentleman,
a subject, may this day say this at least with truth,--that he secures
the rice in his pot to every man in India. A poet of antiquity thought
it one of the first distinctions to a prince whom he meant to celebrate,
that through a long succession of generations he had been the progenitor
of an able and virtuous citizen who by force of the arts of peace had
corrected governments of oppression and suppressed wars of rapine.
Indole proh quanta juvenis, quantumque daturus
Ausoniæ populis ventura in sæcula civem!
Ille super Gangem, super exauditus et Indos,
Implebit terras voce, et furialia bella
Fulmine compescet linguæ.--
This was what was said of the predecessor of the only person to whose
eloquence it does not wrong that of the mover of this bill to be
compared. But the Ganges and the Indus are the patrimony of the fame of
my honorable friend, and not of Cicero. I confess I anticipate with joy
the reward of those whose whole consequence, power, and authority exist
only for the benefit of mankind; and I carry my mind to all the people,
and all the names and descriptions, that, relieved by this bill, will
bless the labors of this Parliament, and the confidence which the best
House of Commons has given to him who the best deserves it. The little
cavils of party will not be heard where freedom and happiness will be
felt. There is not a tongue, a nation, or religion in India, which will
not bless the presiding care and manly beneficence of this House, and of
him who proposes to you this great work. Your names will never be
separated before the throne of the Divine Goodness, in whatever
language, or with whatever rites, pardon is asked for sin, and reward
for those who imitate the Godhead in His universal bounty to His
creatures. These honors you deserve, and they will surely be paid, when
all the jargon of influence and party and patronage are swept into
oblivion.
I have spoken what I think, and what I feel, of the mover of this bill.
An honorable friend of mine, speaking of his merits, was charged with
having made a studied panegyric. I don't know what his was. Mine, I am
sure, is a studied panegyric,--the fruit of much meditation, the result
of the observation of near twenty years. For my own part, I am happy
that I have lived to see this day; I feel myself overpaid for the labors
of eighteen years, when, at this late period, I am able to take my
share, by one humble vote, in destroying a tyranny that exists to the
disgrace of this nation and the destruction of so large a part of the
human species.
FOOTNOTES:
[52] An allusion made by Mr. Powis.
[53] Mr. Pitt.
[54] Mr. Pitt.
[55] Mr. Dundas, Lord Advocate of Scotland.
[56] The paltry foundation at Calcutta is scarcely worth naming as an
exception.
[57] Mr. Fox.
[58] Governor Johnstone.
A
REPRESENTATION TO HIS MAJESTY,
MOVED IN
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
BY THE RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE, AND SECONDED BY WILLIAM WINDHAM, ESQ.,
ON MONDAY, JUNE 14, 1784,
AND NEGATIVED.
WITH A PREFACE AND NOTES.
PREFACE.