There is, Sir, also a circumstance which convinces me that this mode of

criminal proceeding is not (at least in the present stage of our

contest) altogether expedient,--which is nothing less than the conduct

of those very persons who have seemed to adopt that mode, by lately

declaring a rebellion in Massachusetts Bay, as they had formerly

addressed to have traitors brought hither, under an act of Henry the

Eighth, for trial. For, though rebellion is declared, it is not

proceeded against as such; nor have any steps been taken towards the

apprehension or conviction of any individual offender, either on our

late or our former address; but modes of public coercion have been

adopted, and such as have much more resemblance to a sort of qualified

hostility towards an independent power than the punishment of rebellious

subjects. All this seems rather inconsistent; but it shows how

difficult it is to apply these juridical ideas to our present case.

In this situation, let us seriously and coolly ponder. What is it we

have got by all our menaces, which have been many and ferocious? What

advantage have we derived from the penal laws we have passed, and which,

for the time, have been severe and numerous? What advances have we made

towards our object, by the sending of a force, which, by land and sea,

is no contemptible strength? Has the disorder abated? Nothing

less.--When I see things in this situation, after such confident hopes,

bold promises, and active exertions, I cannot, for my life, avoid a

suspicion that the plan itself is not correctly right.

If, then, the removal of the causes of this spirit of American liberty

be, for the greater part, or rather entirely, impracticable,--if the

ideas of criminal process be inapplicable, or, if applicable, are in the

highest degree inexpedient, what way yet remains? No way is open, but

the third and last,--to comply with the American spirit as necessary,

or, if you please, to submit, to it as a necessary evil.

If we adopt this mode, if we mean to conciliate and concede, let us see

of what nature the concession ought to be. To ascertain the nature of

our concession, we must look at their complaint. The colonies complain

that they have not the characteristic mark and seal of British freedom.

They complain that they are taxed in a Parliament in which they are not

represented. If you mean to satisfy them at all, you must satisfy them

with regard to this complaint. If you mean to please any people, you

must give them the boon which they ask,--not what you may think better

for them, but of a kind totally different. Such an act may be a wise

regulation, but it is no concession; whereas our present theme is the

mode of giving satisfaction.

Sir, I think you must perceive that I am resolved this day to have

nothing at all to do with the question of the right of taxation. Some

gentlemen startle,--but it is true: I put it totally out of the

question. It is less than nothing in my consideration. I do not indeed

wonder, nor will you, Sir, that gentlemen of profound learning are fond

of displaying it on this profound subject. But my consideration is

narrow, confined, and wholly limited to the policy of the question. I do

not examine whether the giving away a man's money be a power excepted

and reserved out of the general trust of government, and how far all

mankind, in all forms of polity, are entitled to an exercise of that

right by the charter of Nature,--or whether, on the contrary, a right of

taxation is necessarily involved in the general principle of

legislation, and inseparable from the ordinary supreme power. These are

deep questions, where great names militate against each other, where

reason is perplexed, and an appeal to authorities only thickens the

confusion: for high and reverend authorities lift up their heads on both

sides, and there is no sure footing in the middle. This point is the

_great Serbonian bog, betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old, where armies

whole have sunk_. I do not intend to be overwhelmed in that bog, though

in such respectable company. The question with me is, not whether you

have a right to render your people miserable, but whether it is not your

interest to make them happy. It is not what a lawyer tells me I _may_

do, but what humanity, reason, and justice tell me I ought to do. Is a

politic act the worse for being a generous one? Is no concession proper,

but that which is made from your want of right to keep what you grant?

Or does it lessen the grace or dignity of relaxing in the exercise of an

odious claim, because you have your evidence-room full of titles, and

your magazines stuffed with arms to enforce them? What signify all those

titles and all those arms? Of what avail are they, when the reason of

the thing tells me that the assertion of my title is the loss of my

suit, and that I could do nothing but wound myself by the use of my own

weapons?

Such is steadfastly my opinion of the absolute necessity of keeping up

the concord of this empire by a unity of spirit, though in a diversity

of operations, that, if I were sure the colonists had, at their leaving

this country, sealed a regular compact of servitude, that they had

solemnly abjured all the rights of citizens, that they had made a vow to

renounce all ideas of liberty for them and their posterity to all

generations, yet I should hold myself obliged to conform to the temper I

found universally prevalent in my own day, and to govern two million of

men, impatient of servitude, on the principles of freedom. I am not

determining a point of law; I am restoring tranquillity: and the general

character and situation of a people must determine what sort of

government is fitted for them. That point nothing else can or ought to

determine.

My idea, therefore, without considering whether we yield as matter of

right or grant as matter of favor, is, _to admit the people of our

colonies into an interest in the Constitution_, and, by recording that

admission in the journals of Parliament, to give them as strong an

assurance as the nature of the thing will admit that we mean forever to

adhere to that solemn declaration of systematic indulgence.

Some years ago, the repeal of a revenue act, upon its understood

principle, might have served to show that we intended an unconditional

abatement of the exercise of a taxing power. Such a measure was then

sufficient to remove all suspicion and to give perfect content. But

unfortunate events since that time may make something further

necessary,--and not more necessary for the satisfaction of the colonies

than for the dignity and consistency of our own future proceedings.

I have taken a very incorrect measure of the disposition of the House,

if this proposal in itself would be received with dislike. I think, Sir,

we have few American financiers. But our misfortune is, we are too

acute, we are too exquisite in our conjectures of the future, for men

oppressed with such great and present evils. The more moderate among the

opposers of Parliamentary concession freely confess that they hope no

good from taxation; but they apprehend the colonists have further views,

and if this point were conceded, they would instantly attack the trade

laws. These gentlemen are convinced that this was the intention from the

beginning, and the quarrel of the Americans with taxation was no more

than a cloak and cover to this design. Such has been the language even

of a gentleman[23] of real moderation, and of a natural temper well

adjusted to fair and equal government. I am, however, Sir, not a little

surprised at this kind of discourse, whenever I hear it; and I am the

more surprised on account of the arguments which I constantly find in

company with it, and which are often urged from the same mouths and on

the same day.

For instance, when we allege that it is against reason to tax a people

under so many restraints in trade as the Americans, the noble lord[24]

in the blue riband shall tell you that the restraints on trade are

futile and useless, of no advantage to us, and of no burden to those on

whom they are imposed,--that the trade to America is not secured by the

Acts of Navigation, but by the natural and irresistible advantage of a

commercial preference.

Such is the merit of the trade laws in this posture of the debate. But

when strong internal circumstances are urged against the taxes,--when

the scheme is dissected,--when experience and the nature of things are

brought to prove, and do prove, the utter impossibility of obtaining an

effective revenue from the colonies,--when these things are pressed, or

rather press themselves, so as to drive the advocates of colony taxes to

a clear admission of the futility of the scheme,--then, Sir, the

sleeping trade laws revive from their trance, and this useless taxation

is to be kept sacred, not for its own sake, but as a counter-guard and

security of the laws of trade.

Then, Sir, you keep up revenue laws which are mischievous in order to

preserve trade laws that are useless. Such is the wisdom of our plan in

both its members. They are separately given up as of no value; and yet

one is always to be defended for the sake of the other. But I cannot

agree with the noble lord, nor with the pamphlet from whence he seems to

have borrowed these ideas concerning the inutility of the trade laws.

For, without idolizing them, I am sure they are still, in many ways, of

great use to us; and in former times they have been of the greatest.

They do confine, and they do greatly narrow, the market for the

Americans. But my perfect conviction of this does not help me in the

least to discern how the revenue laws form any security whatsoever to

the commercial regulations,--or that these commercial regulations are

the true ground of the quarrel,--or that the giving way, in any one

instance, of authority is to lose all that may remain unconceded.

One fact is clear and indisputable: the public and avowed origin of this

quarrel was on taxation. This quarrel has, indeed, brought on new

disputes on new questions, but certainly the least bitter, and the

fewest of all, on the trade laws. To judge which of the two be the real,

radical cause of quarrel, we have to see whether the commercial dispute

did, in order of time, precede the dispute on taxation. There is not a

shadow of evidence for it. Next, to enable us to judge whether at this

moment a dislike to the trade laws be the real cause of quarrel, it is

absolutely necessary to put the taxes out of the question by a repeal.

See how the Americans act in this position, and then you will be able to

discern correctly what is the true object of the controversy, or whether

any controversy at all will remain. Unless you consent to remove this

cause of difference, it is impossible, with decency, to assert that the

dispute is not upon what it is avowed to be. And I would, Sir, recommend

to your serious consideration, whether it be prudent to form a rule for

punishing people, not on their own acts, but on your conjectures. Surely

it is preposterous, at the very best. It is not justifying your anger

by their misconduct, but it is converting your ill-will into their

delinquency.

But the colonies will go further.--Alas! alas! when will this

speculating against fact and reason end? What will quiet these panic

fears which we entertain of the hostile effect of a conciliatory

conduct? Is it true that no case can exist in which it is proper for the

sovereign to accede to the desires of his discontented subjects? Is

there anything peculiar in this case, to make a rule for itself? Is all

authority of course lost, when it is not pushed to the extreme? Is it a

certain maxim, that, the fewer causes of dissatisfaction are left by

government, the more the subject will be inclined to resist and rebel?

All these objections being in fact no more than suspicions, conjectures,

divinations, formed in defiance of fact and experience, they did not,

Sir, discourage me from entertaining the idea of a conciliatory

concession, founded on the principles which I have just stated.

In forming a plan for this purpose, I endeavored to put myself in that

frame of mind which was the most natural and the most reasonable, and

which was certainly the most probable means of securing me from all

error. I set out with a perfect distrust of my own abilities, a total

renunciation of every speculation of my own, and with a profound

reverence for the wisdom of our ancestors, who have left us the

inheritance of so happy a Constitution and so flourishing an empire,

and, what is a thousand times more valuable, the treasury of the maxims

and principles which formed the one and obtained the other.

During the reigns of the kings of Spain of the Austrian family,

whenever they were at a loss in the Spanish councils, it was common for

their statesmen to say that they ought to consult the genius of Philip

the Second. The genius of Philip the Second might mislead them; and the

issue of their affairs showed that they had not chosen the most perfect

standard. But, Sir, I am sure that I shall not be misled, when, in a

case of constitutional difficulty, I consult the genius of the English

Constitution. Consulting at that oracle, (it was with all due humility

and piety,) I found four capital examples in a similar case before me:

those of Ireland, Wales, Chester, and Durham.

Ireland, before the English conquest, though never governed by a

despotic power, had no Parliament. How far the English Parliament itself

was at that time modelled according to the present form is disputed

among antiquarians. But we have all the reason in the world to be

assured, that a form of Parliament, such as England then enjoyed, she

instantly communicated to Ireland; and we are equally sure that almost

every successive improvement in constitutional liberty, as fast as it

was made here, was transmitted thither. The feudal baronage, and the

feudal knighthood, the roots of our primitive Constitution, were early

transplanted into that soil, and grew and flourished there. Magna

Charta, if it did not give us originally the House of Commons, gave us

at least an House of Commons of weight and consequence. But your

ancestors did not churlishly sit down alone to the feast of Magna

Charta. Ireland was made immediately a partaker. This benefit of English

laws and liberties, I confess, was not at first extended to _all_

Ireland. Mark the consequence. English authority and English liberty had

exactly the same boundaries. Your standard could never be advanced an

inch before your privileges. Sir John Davies shows beyond a doubt, that

the refusal of a general communication of these rights was the true

cause why Ireland was five hundred years in subduing; and after the vain

projects of a military government, attempted in the reign of Queen

Elizabeth, it was soon discovered that nothing could make that country

English, in civility and allegiance, but your laws and your forms of

legislature. It was not English arms, but the English Constitution, that

conquered Ireland. From that time, Ireland has ever had a general

Parliament, as she had before a partial Parliament. You changed the

people, you altered the religion, but you never touched the form or the

vital substance of free government in that kingdom. You deposed kings;

you restored them; you altered the succession to theirs, as well as to

your own crown; but you never altered their Constitution, the principle

of which was respected by usurpation, restored with the restoration of

monarchy, and established, I trust, forever by the glorious Revolution.

This has made Ireland the great and flourishing kingdom that it is, and,

from a disgrace and a burden intolerable to this nation, has rendered

her a principal part of our strength and ornament. This country cannot

be said to have ever formally taxed her. The irregular things done in

the confusion of mighty troubles, and on the hinge of great revolutions,

even if all were done that is said to have been done, form no example.

If they have any effect in argument, they make an exception to prove the

rule. None of your own liberties could stand a moment, if the casual

deviations from them, at such times, were suffered to be used as proofs

of their nullity. By the lucrative amount of such casual breaches in

the Constitution, judge what the stated and fixed rule of supply has

been in that kingdom. Your Irish pensioners would starve, if they had no

other fund to live on than taxes granted by English authority. Turn your

eyes to those popular grants from whence all your great supplies are

come, and learn to respect that only source of public wealth in the

British empire.

My next example is Wales. This country was said to be reduced by Henry

the Third. It was said more truly to be so by Edward the First. But

though then conquered, it was not looked upon as any part of the realm

of England. Its old Constitution, whatever that might have been, was

destroyed; and no good one was substituted in its place. The care of

that tract was put into the hands of Lords Marchers: a form of

government of a very singular kind; a strange, heterogeneous monster,

something between hostility and government: perhaps it has a sort of

resemblance, according to the modes of those times, to that of

commander-in-chief at present, to whom all civil power is granted as

secondary. The manners of the Welsh nation followed the genius of the

government: the people were ferocious, restive, savage, and

uncultivated; sometimes composed, never pacified. Wales, within itself,

was in perpetual disorder; and it kept the frontier of England in

perpetual alarm. Benefits from it to the state there were none. Wales

was only known to England by incursion and invasion.

Sir, during that state of things, Parliament was not idle. They

attempted to subdue the fierce spirit of the Welsh by all sorts of

rigorous laws. They prohibited by statute the sending all sorts of arms

into Wales, as you prohibit by proclamation (with something more of

doubt on the legality) the sending arms to America. They disarmed the

Welsh by statute, as you attempted (but still with more question on the

legality) to disarm New England by an instruction. They made an act to

drag offenders from Wales into England for trial, as you have done (but

with more hardship) with regard to America. By another act, where one of

the parties was an Englishman, they ordained that his trial should be

always by English. They made acts to restrain trade, as you do; and they

prevented the Welsh from the use of fairs and markets, as you do the

Americans from fisheries and foreign ports. In short, when the

statute-book was not quite so much swelled as it is now, you find no

less than fifteen acts of penal regulation on the subject of Wales.

Here we rub our hands,--A fine body of precedents for the authority of

Parliament and the use of it!--I admit it fully; and pray add likewise

to these precedents, that all the while Wales rid this kingdom like an

_incubus_; that it was an unprofitable and oppressive burden; and that

an Englishman travelling in that country could not go six yards from the

highroad without being murdered.

The march of the human mind is slow. Sir, it was not until after two

hundred years discovered, that, by an eternal law, Providence had

decreed vexation to violence, and poverty to rapine. Your ancestors did,

however, at length open their eyes to the ill husbandry of injustice.

They found that the tyranny of a free people could of all tyrannies the

least be endured, and that laws made against an whole nation were not

the most effectual methods for securing its obedience. Accordingly, in

the twenty-seventh year of Henry the Eighth the course was entirely

altered. With a preamble stating the entire and perfect rights of the

crown of England, it gave to the Welsh all the rights and privileges of

English subjects. A political order was established; the military power

gave way to the civil; the marches were turned into counties. But that a

nation should have a right to English liberties, and yet no share at all

in the fundamental security of these liberties,--the grant of their own

property,--seemed a thing so incongruous, that eight years after, that

is, in the thirty-fifth of that reign, a complete and not

ill-proportioned representation by counties and boroughs was bestowed

upon Wales by act of Parliament. From that moment, as by a charm, the

tumults subsided; obedience was restored; peace, order, and civilization

followed in the train of liberty. When the day-star of the English

Constitution had arisen in their hearts, all was harmony within and

without:--

Simul alba nautis

Stella refulsit,

Defluit saxis agitatus humor,

Concidunt venti, fugiuntque nubes,

Et minax (quod sic voluere) ponto

Unda recumbit.

The very same year the County Palatine of Chester received the same

relief from its oppressions, and the same remedy to its disorders.

Before this time Chester was little less distempered than Wales. The

inhabitants, without rights themselves, were the fittest to destroy the

rights of others; and from thence Richard the Second drew the standing

army of archers with which for a time he oppressed England. The people

of Chester applied to Parliament in a petition penned as I shall read to

you.

"To the king our sovereign lord, in most humble wise shown unto your

most excellent Majesty, the inhabitants of your Grace's County Palatine

of Chester: That where the said County Palatine of Chester is and hath

been alway hitherto exempt, excluded, and separated out and from your

high court of Parliament, to have any knights and burgesses within the

said court; by reason whereof the said inhabitants have hitherto

sustained manifold disherisons, losses, and damages, as well in their

lands, goods, and bodies, as in the good, civil, and politic governance

and maintenance of the common wealth of their said country: And

forasmuch as the said inhabitants have always hitherto been bound by the

acts and statutes made and ordained by your said Highness, and your most

noble progenitors, by authority of the said court, as far forth as other

counties, cities, and boroughs have been, that have had their knights

and burgesses within your said court of Parliament, and yet have had

neither knight no burgess there for the said County Palatine; the said

inhabitants, for lack thereof, have been oftentimes touched and grieved

with acts and statutes made within the said court, as well derogatory

unto the most ancient jurisdictions, liberties, and privileges of your

said County Palatine, as prejudicial unto the common wealth, quietness,

rest, and peace of your Grace's most bounden subjects inhabiting within

the same."

What did Parliament with this audacious address?--Reject it as a libel?

Treat it as an affront to government? Spurn it as a derogation from the

rights of legislature? Did they toss it over the table? Did they burn

it by the hands of the common hangman?--They took the petition of

grievance, all rugged as it was, without softening or temperament,

unpurged of the original bitterness and indignation of complaint; they

made it the very preamble to their act of redress, and consecrated its

principle to all ages in the sanctuary of legislation.

Here is my third example. It was attended with the success of the two

former. Chester, civilized as well as Wales, has demonstrated that

freedom, and not servitude, is the cure of anarchy; as religion, and not

atheism, is the true remedy for superstition. Sir, this pattern of

Chester was followed in the reign of Charles the Second with regard to

the County Palatine of Durham, which is my fourth example. This county

had long lain out of the pale of free legislation. So scrupulously was

the example of Chester followed, that the style of the preamble is

nearly the came with that of the Chester act; and, without affecting the

abstract extent of the authority of Parliament, it recognizes the equity

of not suffering any considerable district, in which the British

subjects may act as a body, to be taxed without their own voice in the

grant.

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