The following day we caught the river steamer at Bassorah, and four
days later arrived at Bagdad, F---- putting up at the grim brown fort
which housed the British Consulate, post office, and telegraph
station. I saw him on and off for a week, usually at tiffins or
dinners given for him by some of his British friends. At other times
he was not to be found. “F---- _Sahib_ gone to bazaar,” his Pathan
bearer invariably answered my inquiries; and F---- himself volunteered
no more than that he was spending a good deal of time “renewing old
acquaintances.” Then, at the end of about ten days, without a good-bye
to anybody, so far as I could learn, he dropped from sight. “F---- is
off again to his Arabs,” said his friends.
“I am much relieved,” the Consul whispered to me. “They hung on him
like leeches this time, but F---- got away by togging up as an
Armenian _arabana_ driver when they were expecting him as an Arab. The
Armenian came here, F---- stained his face, got into the chap’s
clothes, and actually drove the _arabana_, with a load of passengers,
to Kerbela. The Turks nabbed the real driver when they caught him
going out on foot, but got little out of him, and I don’t think they
know yet exactly what happened. F---- is far into the desert by this
time.”
This was in 1912, and at that time no one--least of all F----, who had
the most to gain by such an event--appeared to dream that the
blood-drenched plains of Babylonia and Assyria were likely to echo ere
many years to the tramp of hostile armies. The broad scope of
Germany’s activities, extending far beyond the mere construction of
the Bagdad Railway, was evident to every one; but, this
notwithstanding, the general impression seemed to be that the
whip-hand in this region was Russia’s. This feeling was aptly
expressed by an old Turkish officer with whom I discussed Near Eastern
politics at Mosul. “The Germans may build railroads,” he said,
punctuating his measured speech with puffs from a gurgling _hookah_,
“and the British may build ships, and the Turks may build dams and
canals,”--referring to the reclamation work at Hindia on the
Euphrates,--“but in the end the Great White Bear will come down to the
Persian Gulf and have his drink of warm water.”
That the Germans had ambitious plans for controlling the commerce of
the incalculably rich Tigro-Euphrates Valley no one doubted, or even
that the Kaiser aimed at some sort of political control. But that
German influence should prevail over that of Britain and Russia in
Constantinople, to the extent of aligning the Porte on the side of the
Kaiser against the Triple Entente, was not dreamed of in Mesopotamia,
even by the Turks themselves. The price to the Entente, however, of
alienating Italy from the Triple Alliance by acquiescing in that
Power’s conquest of Tripoli, was the irretrievable loss of Turkey’s
friendship; and with the succession of Enver Pasha to the War Ministry
at the end of the first Balkan conflict, there is no doubt that the
Porte stood absolutely committed to action with Germany. After the
outbreak of the present war, Turkey’s participation on the side of the
Central Powers was only a matter of the Kaiser’s nod. Enver Pasha,
educated in Berlin and always actively anti-Russian, had spent nearly
two years in preparation for the struggle which the Germans had
doubtless assured him was inevitable; and the making ready for a fight
to the death at the Dardanelles was not allowed to interfere with a
general stiffening of the Eastern defences. This, briefly, was the way
in which it came about that Britain is facing Turkey instead of the
long-prepared-against Russia in the Mesopotamian “theatre.” But I will
let my friend F----, to whom it was given to help set and stage the
opening scenes of the play, tell something of what happened up to the
moment of his tragic exit.
Late in the fall of 1914, a hastily scribbled card reached me in
California. “Things looming large at last,” it read. “Am off for the
‘P.G.’[1] to-morrow with big work in prospect. Will write when I can
get anything of interest passed.” The card was post-marked Karachi,
and dated but a few days previous to Turkey’s official entry into the
war. I took it, therefore, that the Indian Government had discounted
this action, and that at the moment the Turks opened hostilities by
bombarding the Russian coast, F----, doubtless with considerable
forces, was on the way to his “sphere.”
[1] Persian Gulf.
The promised letter was long delayed, and when it came bore the
post-mark Bassorah, not in the pothook Turkish characters, but in
plain English letters, while the blue two-and-a-half anna stamp of
India appeared in the corner formerly sacred to the narrow, pink,
half-gummed one-piastre sticker which you had often to affix with a
pin to keep it from falling off. Thus ran the letter:--
“I am writing you this from the one-time home port of ‘Sinbad the
Sailor,’ which, I am rejoiced to say, has been under our flag for some
days. The Turks had considerable forces of seasoned troops
here,--doubtless you remember how much of the old town was taken up by
barracks,--but, evidently because they did not expect us so soon, or
in such force, had done little in the way of outpost defence. This,
coupled with the facts that our naval strength was overwhelming and
the river very ineffectively mined, made what might have been an
operation of tremendous difficulty comparatively easy. The guns of our
cruisers outranged those of the old forts at the mouth of the
Shat-el-Arab, and, with sweepers working ahead of them, the
light-draught gunboats peppered so hotly those dense palm groves which
fringe the river banks that we had little difficulty in fighting our
way through them without great loss.
“Co-operating with the advance up the river, our main force was landed
above Koweit and marched across the open desert to attack Bassorah on
the west, threatening the rear of the Turkish positions on the left
bank. Here the Turk could have made us no end of trouble had he been
in sufficient force, for the lowlands were partly inundated and a
defence of the practicable routes could have been made very effective.
“It was the weakness of the opposition met here that first led us to
hope that Bassorah was not going to be strongly defended. Although the
advance resolved itself into little more than a series of outpost
actions, the period was an anxious one for us--and especially for
me--in that it put to the acid test the result of our work, not only
in forecasting the capricious and variable overflow, but also in
conciliating the no less capricious and variable Arabs of a region
nominally subject to Turkey. I can only tell you now that things
turned out, and are continuing to turn out, even better than we had
any reason to hope they would. There was no suggestion of a menace to
our exposed left flank from the hordes of curious but in no wise
hostile Arabs who showed themselves all along the way, and the censor
will probably not allow me to tell you that our transport and
commissariat, if nothing more, will probably be much helped by active
assistance from this source. [Here several sentences, doubtless
telling something more of the attitude of the Arabs, were obscured by
the censor’s brush.] So you will see that the Turk is reaping the
harvest he deserves from his sowing of harshness and duplicity among
the Bedouins, and that the time and efforts of us ‘language students’
who have worked this sphere will not have been spent in vain.
“The Turks have undoubtedly been quite sound in deciding not to make a
stand at Bassorah. With the sea approaches in our hands, and with the
city entirely encompassed by desert and marsh, the holding of it for
any time would have hinged upon command of either the Tigris or the
Euphrates all the way to the rich agricultural region to the west of
Bagdad. As the cutting of this line by us was only a matter of time,
the city would have been isolated and forced to withstand a siege
which could only have ended in the capture of whatever forces were
locked up there. As it is, the most of these forces are now at liberty
to dispute our advance, through a very difficult country, to
Mesopotamia and Bagdad. Here it seems certain we shall have all the
fighting we care for.
“I have not mentioned the fact that I have received my captaincy and
am assigned to the general staff. In an ordinary campaign the latter
circumstance would mean a lot of dreary consultations at headquarters,
and no action. Here, Allah be praised, the case is quite different.
R----, K---- (the two chaps who have also worked this sphere), and I
are always called in, if we chance to be on hand, when the maps are
unrolled; but most of the time the whole lot of us are off on
something else. R---- has been through the Turkish lines twice, once
spending three days in Kurna, their advanced base, and I have been off
on a week’s journey to receive renewed assurances of the friendship of
my Bedouin ‘blood-brother.’ It is going to be a jolly amusing game.”