Germany. Maria Theresa was a firm, strong character, with a
clear mind and sincere desire for the people's welfare. She
found Austria in decay, and was able to introduce many
reforms. She alleviated the condition of the peasants, who
were still mostly serfs. The nobles had before lived mainly
for show, but she provided institutions for their education.
... It was a condition of the Peace of Hubertsburg that
Frederick II. should give his electoral vote for the eldest
son of Francis I. None of the other electors objected to the
choice, and on March 27, 1764, they performed the ceremony of
choosing Joseph 'King of the Romans,' but without power to
interfere with the government during his father's life.
Francis I. died August 18, 1765, and his son Joseph II.
(1765-1790) was then crowned emperor in the traditional
fashion. He was also associated with his mother in the
government of' Austria; but she retained the royal power
mainly in her own hands, assigning to her son the executive
control of military affairs. Joseph II. was an impetuous and
intellectual character, all aglow with the new ideas of
enlightenment and progress, and was perhaps more deeply
impressed by the example of Frederick II. than any other
prince of the age. ... At the same time, Joseph II. was eager
to aggrandize Austria, and at least to obtain an equivalent
for Silesia.
{1503}
For a long time Austria had been longing to acquire Bavaria,
and there now seemed to be some reason to hope for success,
The ancient line of electors of the house of Wittelsbach died
out in 1777 with Maximilian Joseph (December 30). The next
heir was the Elector Palatine, Charles Theodore, also Duke of
Jülich and Berg, who was not eager to obtain Bavaria, since,
by the Peace of Westphalia, he must then forfeit the
electorate of the Palatinate. ... Under these circumstances
Joseph II. made an unfounded claim to Lower Bavaria, under a
pretended grant of the Emperor Sigismund in 1426. A secret
treaty was made by him with Charles Theodore, by which he was
to pay that prince a large sum of money for Lower Bavaria; and
soon after Maximilian Joseph's death, Joseph II. occupied the
land with troops. Frederick II., who was ever jealous of the
growth of Austria, resolved to prevent this acquisition. ...
See BAVARIA: A. D. 1777-1779.
Thus the war of the Bavarian Succession broke out (1778-79).
... By the death of Maria Theresa, November 29, 1780, her son
Joseph II. became sole monarch of Austria. ... Joseph II. was
a man of large mind and noble aims. Like Frederick, he was
unwearying in labor, accessible to everyone, and eager to
assume his share of work or responsibility. The books and the
people's memory are full of anecdotes of him, though he was
far from popular during his life. But he lacked the strong
practical sense and calculating foresight of the veteran
Prussian king. In his zeal for reforms he hastened to heap one
upon another in confusion. Torture was abolished, and for a
time even the death penalty. Rigid equality before the law was
introduced, and slavery done away.
See SLAVERY, MEDIÆVAL: GERMANY.
His reforms in the Church were still more sweeping. He closed
more than half of the monasteries, and devoted their estates
to public instruction; he introduced German hymns of praise
and the German Bible. By his Edict of Toleration, June 22,
1781, he secured to all Protestants throughout the Austrian
states their civil rights and freedom of worship, 'in houses
of prayer without bells or towers.' ... He zealously followed
up Maria Theresa's policy of consolidating Austria into one
state; and it was this course which made him enemies. He
offended the powerful nobility of Hungary by abolishing
serfdom (November 1, 1781), and the whole people by the
measures he took to promote the use of the German language. In
the Netherlands, he alienated from him the powerful clergy by
his innovations; and they stirred up against him the people,
already aggrieved by the loss of some of their ancient
liberties. A revolution broke out among them in 1788, and was
threatening to extend to Hungary and Bohemia, when the emperor
suddenly died, still in the full vigor of manhood, at the age
of forty-nine, February 20, 1790. ... After his death, the
progress of reform was checked in Austria; but he had awakened
new and strong forces there, and a complete return to the
ancient system was impossible. ... Leopold II. (1790-1792),
who succeeded his brother Joseph II., both in Austria and as
emperor, was a self-indulgent but prudent ruler."
_C. T. Lewis,
History of Germany,
book 5, chapter 24, sections 8-18._
GERMANY: A. D. 1772-1773.
The first Partition of Poland.
See POLAND: A. D. 1763-1773.
GERMANY: A. D. 1787.
Prussian intervention in Holland.
Restoration of the expelled stadtholder.
See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1746-1787.
GERMANY: A. D. 1791.
The forming of the Coalition against French democracy.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1790-1791;
and 1791 (JULY-SEPTEMBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1791-1792.
The question of war with France, and the question of the
Partition of Poland.
Motives and action of Prussia and Austria.
"After the acceptance of the Constitution by Louis XVI.
[September--see FRANCE: A. D. 1791 (JULY-SEPTEMBER)], the
Emperor indulged for a time a confident hope, that the French
question was solved, and that he was relieved from all fear of
trouble from that quarter. He had cares enough upon him to
make him heartily congratulate himself on this result. ... In
foreign affairs, the Polish question--the next in importance
to the French--was still unsettled, and daily presented fresh
difficulties. ... The fact that Russia began to show the
greatest favour to the Emigrés, and to preach at Berlin and
Vienna a crusade against the wicked Jacobins, only served to
confirm the Emperor in his peaceful sentiments. He rightly
concluded that Catharine wished to entangle the German Powers
in a struggle with France, that she might have her own way in
Poland; and he was not at all inclined to be the dupe of so
shallow an artifice. ... At the same time he set about
bringing his alliance with Prussia to a definite conclusion,
in order to secure to himself a firm support for every
emergency. On the 17th of November--a week after the
enactment of the first edict against the Emigrés--Prince Reuss
made a communication on this subject to the Prussian Ministry,
and on this occasion declared himself empowered to commence at
any moment the formal draft of an alliance. ... 'We are now
convinced,' wrote the Ministers to their ambassador at Vienna,
'that Austria will undertake nothing against France.' This
persuasion was soon afterwards fully confirmed by Kaunitz, who
descanted in the severest terms on the intrigues of the
Emigrés on the Rhine, which it was not in the interest of any
Power to support. It was ridiculous, he said, in the French
Princes, and in Russia and Spain, to declare the acceptance of
the constitution by the King compulsory, and therefore void;
and still more so to dispute the right of Louis XVI. to alter
the constitution at all. He said that they would vainly
endeavour to goad Austria into a war, which could only have
the very worst consequences for Louis and the present
predominance of the moderate party in France. ... Here, again,
we see that without the machinations of the Girondists, the
revolutionary war would never have been commenced. It is true,
indeed, that at this time a very perceptible change took place
in the opinions of the second German potentate--the King of
Prussia. Immediately after the Congress of Pillnitz, great
numbers of French Emigrés, who had been driven from Vienna by
the coldness of Leopold, had betaken themselves to Berlin. At
the Prussian Court they met with a hospitable reception, and
aroused in the King, by their graphic descriptions, a warm
interest for the victims of the Revolution. ... He loaded the
Emigrés with marks of favour of every kind, and thereby
excited in them the most exaggerated hopes.
{1504}
Yet the King was far from intending to risk any important
interest of the State for the sake of his protégés; he had no
idea of pursuing an aggressive policy towards France; and the
only point in which he differed from Leopold was in the
feeling with which he regarded the development of the warlike
tendencies of the French. His Ministers, moreover, were,
without exception, possessed by the same idea as Prince
Kaunitz; that a French war would be a misfortune to all
Europe." As the year 1791 drew towards its close,
"unfavourable news arrived from Paris. The attempts of the
Feuillants had failed; Lafayette had separated himself from
them and from the Court; and the zeal and confidence of
victory among the Democrats were greater than ever. The
Emigrés in Berlin were jubilant; they had always declared that
no impression was to be made upon the Jacobins except by the
edge of the sword, and that all hopes founded on the stability
of a moderate middle party were futile. The King of Prussia
agreed with them, and determined to begin the unavoidable
struggle as quickly as possible. He told his Ministers that
war was certain, and that Bischoffswerder ought to go once
more to the Emperor. ... Bischoffswerder, having received
instructions from the King himself, left Berlin, and arrived
in Vienna, after a speedy journey, on the 28th of February.
But he was not destined again to discuss the fate of Europe
with his Imperial patron; for on the 29th the smallpox showed
itself, of which Leopold died after three days sickness. The
greatest consternation and confusion reigned in Vienna. ... No
one knew to whom the young King Francis--he was as yet only
king of Hungary and Bohemia--would give his confidence, or
what course he would take; nay, his weakly and nervous
constitution rendered it doubtful whether he could bear--even
for a short period--the burdens of his office. For the present
he confirmed the Ministers in their places, and expressed to them
his wish to adhere to the political system of his father. ...
He ... ordered one of his most experienced Generals, Prince
Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, to be summoned to Vienna, that he might
take council with Bischoffswerder respecting the warlike
measures to be adopted by both Powers, in case of a French
attack. At the same time, however, the Polish question was, if
possible, to be brought to a decision, and Leopold's plan in
all its details was to be categorically recommended for
adoption, both in Berlin and Petersburg. ... The Austrian
Minister, Spielmann, had prepared the memorial on Poland,
which Prince Reuss presented at Berlin, on the 10th of March.
It represented that Austria and Prussia had the same interest
in stopping a source of eternal embarrassment and discussion,
by strengthening the cause of peace and order in Poland. That
herein lay an especially powerful motive to make the crown of
that country hereditary; that for both Powers the Elector of
Saxony would be the most acceptable wearer of that crown. ...
The important point, the memorial went on to say, was this,
that Poland should no longer be dependent on the predominant
influence of any one neighbouring Power. ... When the King had
read this memorial, in which the Saxon-Polish union was
brought forward, not as an idea of the feeble Elector, but as
a proposal of powerful Austria; he cried out, 'We must never
give our consent to this.' He agreed with his Ministers in the
conclusion that nothing would be more dangerous to Prussia,
than the formation of such a Power as would result from the
proposed lasting union of Poland and Saxony--a Power, which,
in alliance with Austria, could immediately overrun Silesia,
and in alliance with Russia, might be fatal to East Prussia.
... In the midst of this angry and anxious excitement, which
for a moment alienated his heart from Austria, the King
received a fresh and no less important despatch from
Petersburg. Count Golz announced the first direct
communication of Russia respecting Poland. 'Should Poland'
[wrote the Russian Vice Chancellor] 'be firmly and lastingly
united to Saxony, a Power of the first rank will arise, and
one which will be able to exercise the most sensible pressure
upon each of its neighbours. We are greatly concerned in this,
in consequence of the extension of our Polish frontier; and
Prussia is no less so, from the inevitable increase which
would ensue of Saxon influence in the German Empire. We
therefore suggest, that Prussia, Austria, and Russia, should
come to an intimate understanding with one another on this
most important subject.' ... This communication sounded
differently in the ears of the King from that which he had
received from Austria. The fears which agitated his own mind
and those of the Russian chancellor were identical. While
Austria called upon him to commit a political suicide, Russia
offered her aid in averting the most harassing danger, and
even opened a prospect of a considerable territorial increase.
The King had no doubt to which of the two Powers he ought to
incline. He would have come to terms with Russia on the spot,
had not an insurmountable obstacle existed in the new path
which was opened to the aggrandizement of Prussia,--viz., the
Polish treaty of 1790; in which Prussia had expressly bound
herself to protect the independence and integrity of Poland.
... He decided that there was no middle course between the
Russian and Austrian plans. On the one side was his Polish
treaty of 1790, the immediate consequence of which would be a
new breach, and perhaps a war, with Russia, and the final
result such a strengthening of Poland, as would throw back the
Prussian State into that subordinate position, both in Germany
and Europe, which it had occupied in the seventeenth century.
On the other side there was, indeed, a manifest breach of
faith, but also the salvation of Prussia from a perilous
dilemma, and perhaps the extension of her boundaries by a
goodly Polish Province. If he wavered at all in this conflict
of feeling, the Parisian complications soon put an end to his
doubts. In quick succession came the announcements that
Delessart's peaceful Ministry had fallen; that King Louis had
suffered the deepest humiliation; and that the helm of the
State had passed into the hands of the Girondist war party. A
declaration of war on the part of France against Francis· II.
might be daily expected, and the Russian-Polish contest would
then only form the less important moiety of the European
catastrophe. Austria would now be occupied for a long time in
the West; there could be no more question of the formation of
a Polish-Saxon State; and Austria could no longer be reckoned
upon to protect the constitution of 1791, or even to repel a
Russian invasion of Poland. Prussia was bound to aid the
Austrians against France, and for many months the King had
cherished no more ardent wish than to fulfil this obligation
with all his power.
{1505}
Simultaneously to oppose the Empress Catharine, was out of the
question. ... The King wrote on the 12th of March to his
Ministers as follows: ... 'Russia is not far removed from
thoughts of a new partition; and this would indeed be the most
effectual means of limiting the power of a Polish King,
whether hereditary or elective. I doubt, however, whether in
this case a suitable compensation could be found for Austria;
and whether, after such a curtailment of the power of Poland,
the Elector of Saxony would accept the crown. Yet if Austria
could be compensated, the Russian plan would be the most
advantageous for Prussia,--always provided that Prussia
received the whole left bank of the Vistula, by the
acquisition of which that distant frontier--so hard to be
defended--would be well rounded off. This is my judgment
respecting Polish affairs.' This was Poland's sentence of
death. It was not, as we have seen, the result of a
long-existing greed, but a suddenly seized expedient, which
seemed to be accompanied with the least evil, in the midst of
an unexampled European crisis. ... On the 20th of April the
French National Assembly proclaimed war against the King of
Hungary and Bohemia. A fortnight later the Prince of
Hohenlohe-Kirchberg appeared in Berlin to settle some common
plan for the campaign; and at the same time Kaunitz directed
Prince Reuss to enter into negociations on the political
question of expenditure and compensation. Count Schulenburg
... immediately sent a reply to the Prince, to the effect that
Prussia--as it had uniformly declared since the previous
summer--could only engage in the war on condition of receiving
an adequate compensation. ... Both statesmen well knew with
what secret mistrust each of these Powers contemplated the
aggrandizement of the other; their deliberations were
therefore conducted with slow and anxious caution, and months
passed by before their respective demands were reduced to any
definite shape."
_H. von Sybel,
History of the French Revolution,
book 4, chapter 1 (volume 2)._
GERMANY: A. D. 1792.
Accession of the Emperor Francis II.
GERMANY: A. D. 1792-1793.
War with Revolutionary France.
The Coalition.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1791-1792; 1792 (APRIL-.JULY),
and (SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER);
1792-1793 (DECEMBER-FEBRUARY);
1793 (FEBRUARY-APRIL), (MARCH-SEPTEMBER),
and (JULY-DECEMBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1192-1796.
The second and third Partitions of Poland.
See POLAND: A. D. 1791-1792; and 1793-1796.
GERMANY: A. D. 1794.
Withdrawal of Prussia from the Coalition.
French conquest of the Austrian Netherlands and successes on
the Rhine.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1794 (MARCH-JULY).
GERMANY: A. D. 1795.
Treaty of Basle between Prussia and France.
Crumbling of the Coalition.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1794-1795 (OCTOBER-MAY).
GERMANY: A. D. 1796-1797.
Expulsion of Austria from Italy.
Bonaparte's first campaigns.
Advance of Moreau and Jourdan beyond the Rhine.
Their retreat.
Peace preliminaries of Leoben.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1796 (APRIL-OCTOBER);
and 1796-1797 (OCTOBER-APRIL).
GERMANY: A. D. 1797 (October).
The Treaty of Campo Formio between Austria and France.
Austrian cession of the Netherlands and Lombardy and
acquisition of Venice.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (MAY-OCTOBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1798.
The second Coalition against Revolutionary France.
Prussia and the Empire withheld from it.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799 (AUGUST-APRIL).
GERMANY: A. D. 1799.
The Congress at Rastadt.
Murder of French envoys.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (APRIL-SEPTEMBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1800 (May-December).
The disastrous campaigns of Marengo and Hohenlinden.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1800-1801 (MAY-FEBRUARY).
GERMANY: A. D. 1801-1803.
The Peace of Luneville.
Territorial cessions and changes.
The settlement of indemnities in the Empire.
Confiscation and secularization of the ecclesiastical
principalities.
Absorption of Free Cities.
Re-constitution of the Electoral College.
"By the treaty of Luneville, which the Emperor Francis was
obliged to subscribe, 'not only as Emperor of Austria, but in
the name of the German empire,' Belgium and all the left bank
of the Rhine were again formally ceded to France; Lombardy was
erected into an independent state, and the Adige declared the
boundary betwixt it and the dominions of Austria; Venice, with
all its territorial possessions as far as the Adige, was
guaranteed to Austria; the Duke of Modena received the Brisgau
in exchange for his duchy, which was annexed to the Cisalpine
republic; the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the Emperor's brother,
gave up his dominions to the infant Duke of Parma, a branch of
the Spanish family [who was thereupon raised to royal rank by the
fiat of Bonaparte, who transformed the grand-duchy of Tuscany
into the kingdom of Etruria], on the promise of an indemnity
in Germany; France abandoned Kehl, Cassel, and
Ehrenbreitstein, on condition that these forts should remain
in the situation in which they were when given up; the princes
dispossessed by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine were
promised an indemnity in the bosom of the Empire; the
independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine and Ligurian
republics was guaranteed, and their inhabitants declared 'to
have the power of choosing whatever form of government they
preferred.' These conditions did not differ materially from
those contained in the treaty of Campo Formio, or from those
offered by Napoleon previous to the renewal of the war. ...
The article which compelled the Emperor to subscribe this
treaty as head of the empire, as well as Emperor of Austria,
gave rise in the sequel ... to the most painful internal
divisions in Germany. By a fundamental law of the empire, the
Emperor could not bind the electors and states of which he was
the head, without either their concurrence or express powers
to that effect previously conferred. ... The emperor hesitated
long before he subscribed such a condition, which left the
seeds of interminable discord in the Germanic body; but the
conqueror was inexorable, and no means of evasion could be
found. He vindicated himself to the electors in a dignified
letter, dated 8th February 1801, the day before that when the
treaty was signed. ... The electors and princes of the empire
felt the force of this touching appeal; they commiserated the
situation of the first monarch in Christendom, compelled to
throw himself on his subjects for forgiveness of a step which
he could not avoid; and one of the first steps of the Diet of
the empire, assembled after the treaty of Luneville was
signed, was to give it their solemn ratification, grounded on
the extraordinary situation in which the Emperor was then
placed.
{1506}
But the question of indemnities to the dispossessed princes
was long and warmly agitated. It continued for above two years
to distract the Germanic body; the intervention both of France
and Russia was required to prevent the sword being drawn in
these internal disputes; and by the magnitude of the changes
which were ultimately made, and the habit of looking to
foreign protection which was acquired, the foundation was laid
of that league to support separate interests which afterwards,
under the name of the Confederation of the Rhine, so well
served the purposes of French ambition, and broke up the
venerable fabric of the German empire."
_Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 32 (volume 7)._