"Early in June [A. D. 1703], Marshal Tallard assumed the

command of the French forces in Alsace, ... took Prissac on

the 7th of September, and invested Landau on the 16th of

October. The allies, under the Prince of Hesse, attempted to

raise the siege, but were defeated with considerable loss;

and, soon after, Landau surrendered, thus terminating with

disaster the campaign on the Upper Rhine. Still more

considerable were the losses sustained in Bavaria. Marshal

Villars commanded there, and, at the head of the French and

Bavarians, defeated General Stirum, who headed the

Imperialists, on the 20th of September. In December, Marshal

Marsin, who had succeeded Villars in the command, made himself

master of the important city of Augsburg, and in January,

1704, the Bavarians got possession of Passau. Meanwhile, a

formidable insurrection had broken out in Hungary, which so

distracted the cabinet of Vienna that the capital seemed to be

threatened by the combined forces of the French and Bavarians

after the fall of Passau. ... Instead of confining the war to

one of posts and sieges in Flanders and Italy, it was resolved

[by the French] to throw the bulk of their forces at once into

Bavaria, and operate against Austria from the heart of

Germany, by pouring down the valley of the Danube.

{1492}

The advanced post held there by the Elector of Bavaria in

front, forming a salient angle, penetrating, as it were, into

the Imperial dominions, the menacing aspect of the Hungarian

insurrection in the rear, promised the most successful issue

to this decisive operation. For this purpose, Marshal Tallard,

with the French army on the Upper Rhine, received orders to

cross the Black Forest and advance into Swabia, and unite with

the Elector of Bavaria, which he accordingly did at Donawerth,

in the beginning of July. Marshal Villeroy, with forty

battalions and thirty-nine squadrons, was to break off from

the army in Flanders and support the advance by a movement on

the Moselle, so as to be in a condition to join the main army

on the Danube, of which it would form, as it were, the left

wing; while Vendôme, with the army of Italy, was to penetrate

into the Tyrol, and advance by Innspruck on Salzburg. The

united armies, which it was calculated, after deducting all

the losses of the campaign, would muster 80,000 combatants,

was then to move direct by Lintz and the valley of the Danube

on Vienna, while a large detachment penetrated into Hungary to

lend a hand to the already formidable insurrection in that

kingdom. The plan was grandly conceived. ... Marlborough, by

means of the secret information which he obtained from the

French head-quarters, had got full intelligence of it, and its

dangers to the allies, if it succeeded, struck him as much as

the chances of great advantage to them if ably thwarted. His

line was instantly taken."

_A. Alison,

Military Life of Marlborough,

chapter 2, sections 30-33._

The measures taken by Marlborough to defeat the plans of the

French in this campaign are briefly stated in the account of

his first campaigns in the Netherlands.

See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1702-1704.

ALSO IN:

H. Martin,

History of France: Age of Louis XIV.

(translated by M. L. Booth), volume 2, chapter 5.

_W. Coxe,

History of the House of Austria,

chapter 69 (volume 2)._

GERMANY: A. D. 1704.

The War of the Spanish Succession:

Marlborough and Prince Eugene on the Danube.

The Battle of Blenheim.

"Marlborough, with his motley army of English, Dutch, Danes

and Germans, concealing his main purpose, was marching south

along the Rhine, with a design to strike his critical blow, by

attacking the French armies that were forming for the campaign

of the Danube, and thus protect the Emperor and Vienna, and

punish the Elector of Bavaria, whose territories would be then

exposed. On the route, Marlborough was joined by Prince Eugene

and the Margrave of Baden: but as a new French force was

approaching, Prince Eugene was sent to keep it in check.

Marlborough and the Prince of Baden, with united forces of

about 60,000 men, then advanced, in rapid marches, and took,

by gallant assault, the fortifications of the Schellenberg in

Bavaria, and the old town of Donauworth, a critical and

commanding position on the Danube. The allies were now masters

of the main passages of the Danube--and had a strong place as

a basis of action. The allied leaders thereupon sent troops

into the heart of Bavaria, and devastated the country even to

the vicinity of Munich--burning and destroying as they

marched, and taking several minor fortresses. Marlborough's

forces and those of Prince Eugene were distant from each other

some forty miles, when came the news of the march of a French

army of 25,000 men under Tallard, to form a junction with the

others, to succor the Elector, and take revenge for the defeat

of the Schellenberg. Two French Marshals, Tallard and Marsin,

were now in command: their design was to attack Marlborough

and Eugene's armies in detail. By rapid marches, Marlborough

crossed the Danube and joined Prince Eugene near Donauworth,

and thereupon occurred one of the most important and decisive

contests of modern times, fought between the old town of

Hochstadt and the village of Blenheim, about fifteen miles

south of Donauworth. The skilful tactics of the allied

generals precipitated the battle. The allied French and

Bavarians numbered 60,000 [56,000; Malleson] men--the English,

Dutch and Germans and other allies, about 53,000 [52,000;

Malleson]. The allies were allowed to cross an intervening

brook without opposition, and form their lines. A great

charge, in full force, of the allies was then made; they broke

the enemy's extended line; and an ensuing charge of cavalry

scattered his forces right and left, and drove many into the

Danube. More than 14,000 French and Bavarians, who had not

struck a blow, except to defend their position, entrenched and

shut up in the village of Blenheim, waiting for orders to

move, were then surrounded by the victorious allies, and

compelled to surrender as prisoners of war. The scattered

remnants of the French and Bavarian army either disbanded, or

were driven over the Rhine. The garrison at Ulm capitulated,

and the Elector fled into France."

_J. W. Gerard,

The Peace of Utrecht,

chapter 16._

"The armies of Marchin and of Max Emanuel [of Bavaria] had

been defeated; that of Tallard had been annihilated. Whilst

the loss of the victors in killed and wounded reached 12,000

men, that of the French and Bavarians exceeded 14,000. In

addition, the latter lost 13,000 men taken prisoners, 47

pieces of cannon, 25 standards, and 90 colours. Such was the

battle of Blenheim. It was one of the decisive battles of

history, and it changed the character of the war. Up to that

moment, the action of France against. Germany had been

aggressive; thenceforward it became purely defensive.

Blenheim, in fact, dashed to the ground the hopes of Louis

XIV. and Max Emanuel of Bavaria. It saved the house of

Habsburg in Germany, and helped it greatly in Hungary. It

showed likewise that it was possible to inflict a crushing

defeat on the armies of Louis XIV."

_Colonel G. B. Malleson,

Prince Eugene of Savoy,

chapter 6._

"Marlborough [after the battle], having detached part of his

force to besiege Ulm, drew near with the bulk of his army to

the Rhine, which he passed near Philipsburg on the 6th of

September, and soon after commenced the siege of Landau, on

the French side; Prince Louis, with 20,000 men, forming the

besieging force, and Eugene and Marlborough, with 30,000, the

covering army. Villeroi, with the French army, abandoned an

intrenched camp which he had constructed to cover the town.

Marlborough followed, and made every effort to bring the

French marshal to battle, but in vain. ... Ulm surrendered on

the 16th of September, ... which gave the allies a solid

foundation on the Danube, and effectually crushed the power of

the Elector of Bavaria, who, isolated now in the midst of his

enemies, had no alternative but to abandon his dominions and

seek refuge in Brussels, where he arrived in the end of

September. ...

{1493}

The Electress of Bavaria, who had been left regent of that

state in the absence of the Elector in Flanders, had now no

resource left but submission; and a treaty was accordingly

concluded in the beginning of November, by which she agreed to

disband all her troops. Trêves and Traerbach were taken in the

end of December; the Hungarian insurrection was suppressed;

Landau capitulated in the beginning of the same month; a

diversion which the enemy attempted toward Trêves was defeated

by Marlborough's activity and vigilance, and that city put in

a sufficient posture of defense; and, the campaign being now

finished, that accomplished commander returned to the Hague

and London."

_A. Alison,

Military Life of Marlborough,

chapter 2._

ALSO IN:

_G. B. Malleson,

Battle-fields of Germany,

chapter 10._

_W. Coxe,

Memoirs of Marlborough,

chapters 22-26 (volume 1)._

_J. H. Burton,

History of the Reign of Queen Anne,

chapter 6 (volume 1)._

_H. Martin,

History of France: Age of Louis XIV.,

volume 2, chapter 5._

GERMANY: A. D. 1705.

The Election of the Emperor Joseph I.

GERMANY: A. D. 1705.

The War of the Spanish Succession:

The dissolution of Bavaria.

"The campaign of 1705 was destitute of any important events on

the side of Germany. ... In Bavaria, the peasants, irritated

by the oppressions of the Austrian government, rose in a body

in the autumn, and, could they have been supported by France,

would have placed the Emperor in great danger; but without

that aid the insurrection only proved fatal to themselves. The

insurgents were beaten in detail, and the Emperor now resolved

on the complete dissolution of Bavaria as a state. The four

elder sons of Maximilian were carried to Klagenfurt in

Carinthia, to be there educated under the strictest inspection

as Counts of Wittelsbach, while the younger sons were

consigned to the care of a court lady at Munich, and the

daughters sent to a convent. The Electress, who had been on a

visit to Venice, was not permitted to return to her dominions,

and the Elector Maximilian, as well as the Elector of Cologne,

was, by a decree of the Electoral College, placed under the

ban of the Empire. The Upper Palatinate was restored to the

Elector Palatine. ... The remaining Bavarian territories were

confiscated, and divided among various princes."

_T. H. Dyer,

History of Modern Europe,

book 5, chapter 6 (volume 3)._

_W. Coxe,

History of the House of Austria,

chapter 72 (volume 3)._

The campaign of 1705 in the Netherlands was unimportant; but

in Spain it had brilliant results.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1705;

and NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1705.

GERMANY: A. D. 1706-1711.

The War of the Spanish Succession:

Successes of the French.

During 1706, little was attempted on either side by the forces

which watched each other along the Rhine. In 1707 Villars, the

French commander, obtained liberty to act. "The Emperor,

greatly preoccupied with Hungary, had furnished but

indifferent resources to the new general of the army of the

Rhine, Brandenburg-Baireuth; the German army was ill paid and

in bad condition in its immense lines on the right bank, which

extended along the Rhine from Philippsburg as far as

Stolhofen, then, in a square, from Stolhofen to the Black

Mountains by Bühl. May 22, the lines were attacked

simultaneously at four points. ... The success was complete;

the enemy fled into the mountains, abandoning artillery,

baggage, and munitions, and did not stop till beyond the

Neckar. The lines were razed; Swabia and a part of Franconia

were put under contribution. Villars marched on Stuttgart,

crossed the Neckar, and subjected the whole country to ransom

as far as the Danube. The enemies in vain rallied and

reinforced themselves with tardy contingents of the Empire;

they could not prevent Villars from laying under contribution

the Lower Neckar, then the country between the Danube and Lake

Constance, and from maintaining himself beyond the Rhine till

he went into winter-quarters. French parties scoured the

country as conquerors as far as the fatal field of Hochstadt."

At the beginning of the campaign of 1708, it was the plan of

the allies to make their chief attack on France "by the way of

the Rhine and the Moselle, with two armies of 60,000 men each,

under the command of the Elector of Hanover and Eugene, whilst

Marlborough occupied the great French army in Flanders." But

this plan was changed. "Eugene left the Elector of Hanover in

the north of Swabia, behind the lines of Etlingen, which the

allies had raised during the winter to replace the lines of

Bühl at Stolhofen, and, with 24,000 soldiers collected on the

Moselle, he marched by the way of Coblentz towards Belgium

(June 30). The French forces of the Rhine and the Moselle

followed this movement." The campaign then ensuing in the

Netherlands was that which was signalized by Marlborough and

Eugene's victory at Oudenarde and the siege of Lille. In 1709,

"the attention of Europe, as in 1708, was chiefly directed to

Flanders; but it was not only on that side that France was

menaced. France was to be encroached upon at once on the north

and the east. Whilst the great allied army penetrated into

Artois, the army of the Rhine and the army of the Alps were to

penetrate, the latter into Bresse by the way of Savoy, the

former into Franche-Comté by the way of Alsace, and to combine

their operations. ... The Germans had not taken the offensive

in Alsace till in the month of August. Marshal Harcourt, with

over 20,000 men, had covered himself with the lines of the

Lauter: the Elector of Hanover, who had crossed the Rhine at

Philippsburg with superior forces, did not attack Harcourt,

and strove to amuse him whilst 8,000 or 9,000 Germans, left in

Swabia with General Merci, moved rapidly on Neuberg ... and

established there a tête-du-pont in order to enter Upper

Alsace." By swiftly sending a sufficient force to attack and

defeat Merci at Neuberg, August 26, Harcourt completely

frustrated these plans. "The Elector of Hanover recrossed the

river and retired behind the lines of Etlingen." During the

two following years the French and German forces on the side

of the Rhine did little more than observe one another.

_H. Martin,

History of France: Age of Louis XIV:,

volume 2, chapters 5-6._

Meantime, Ramillies, Oudenarde and Malplaquet had been fought

in the Netherlands; Prince Eugene had won his victory at

Turin, and the contest had been practically decided in Spain,

at Almanza.

See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1706-1707,

1708-1709, 1710-1712;

ITALY: A. D. 1701-1713;

SPAIN: A. D. 1706, 1707, and 1707-1710;

and ENGLAND: A. D. 1710-1712.

ALSO IN:

_W. Coxe,

History of the House of Austria,

chapters 75-79 (volume 3)._

_F. P. Guizot,

Popular History of France,

chapter 45 (volume 5)._

GERMANY: A. D. 1711.

Election of the Emperor Charles VI.

{1494}

GERMANY: A. D. 1711.

The War of the Spanish Succession:

Change in the circumstances of the war.

See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1711.

GERMANY: A. D. 1713-1719.

The Emperor's continued differences with the King of Spain.

The Triple Alliance.

The Quadruple Alliance.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1725.

GERMANY: A. D. 1714.

Ending of the War of the Spanish Succession:

The Peace of Utrecht and the Treaty of Rastadt.

See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.

GERMANY: A. D. 1732-1733.

Interference in the election of the King of Poland.

See POLAND: A. D. 1732-1733.

GERMANY: A. D. 1733-1735.

The War of the Polish Succession.

Cession of Lorraine to France.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1733-1735.

GERMANY: A. D. 1740.

The question of the Austrian Succession.

The Pragmatic Sanction.

See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1718-1738, and 1740.

GERMANY: A. D. 1740-1756.

Early years of the reign of Frederick the Great in Prussia.

The War of the Austrian Succession.

When Frederick II., known as Frederick the Great, succeeded

his father, in 1740, "nobody had the least suspicion that a

tyrant of extraordinary military and political talents, of

industry more extraordinary still, without fear, without

faith, and without mercy, had ascended the throne."

_Lord Macaulay,

Frederic the Great (Essays)._

The reign of Frederick II. "was expected to be an effeminate

one; but when at the age of twenty-nine he became king, he

forgot his pleasures, thought of nothing but glory, and no

longer employed himself but in attention to his finances, his

army, his policy, and his laws. His provinces were scattered,

his resources weak, his power precarious; his army of seventy

thousand soldiers was more remarkable for handsomeness of the

men, and the elegance of their appearance, than for their

discipline. He augmented it, instructed it, exercised it, and

fortune began to open the field of glory to him at the moment

he was fully prepared to enjoy her favours. Charles XII. was

dead, and his station filled by a king without authority.

Russia, deprived of Peter the Great, who had only rough-hewn

her civilization, languished under the feeble government of

the Empress Anne, and of a cruel and ignorant minister.

Augustus III. King of Poland and Elector of Saxony, a Prince

devoid of character, could not inspire him with any dread.

Louis XV., a weak and peaceable king, was governed by Cardinal

Fleuri, who loved peace, but always by his weakness suffered

himself to be drawn into war. He presented to Frederic rather

a support than an obstacle. The court of France had espoused

the cause of Charles VII. against Francis I. Maria Theresa,

wife of Francis, and Queen of Hungary, saw herself threatened

by England, Holland, and France; and whilst she had but little

reason to hope the preservation of her hereditary dominions,

that arrogant princess wished to place her husband on the

Imperial Throne. This quarrel kindled the flames of war in

Europe; the genius of Frederic saw by a single glance that the

moment was arrived for elevating Prussia to the second order of

powers; he made an offer to Maria Theresa to defend her, if

she would cede Silesia to him, and threatened her with war in

case of refusal. The Empress, whose firmness nothing could

shake, impoliticly refused that proposition; war was declared,

and Frederic entered Silesia at the head of eighty thousand

men. This first war lasted eighteen months.

See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1740 to 1741.

Frederic, by gaining five battles, shewed that Europe would

recognize one great man more in her bloody annals. He had

begun the war from ambition, and contrary to strict justice;

he concluded it with ability, but by the abandonment of France

his ally, without giving her information of it, and he thus

put in practice, when he was seated on the throne, the

principles of Machiavel, whom he had refuted before he

ascended it. Men judge according to the event. The hero was

absolved by victory from the wrongs with which justice

reproached him; and this brilliant example serves to confirm

men in that error, too generally and too lightly adopted, that

ability in politics is incompatible with the strict rule of

morality. Four years after, in [1744], Frederic again took up

arms.

See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1743-1744 to 1744-1745.

He invaded Bohemia, Upper Silesia, and Moravia. Vienna thought

him at her gates; but the defection of the Bavarians, the

retreat of the French, and the return of Prince Charles into

Bohemia, rapidly changed the face of affairs. The position of

Frederic became as dangerous as it had been menacing; he was

on the point of being lost, and he saw himself compelled to

retire with as much precipitation, as he had advanced with

boldness. The gaining the battle of Hohen-Friedberg saved him.

That retreat and that victory fixed the seal to his

reputation. It was after this action that he wrote to Louis

XV. 'I have just discharged in Silesia the bill of exchange

which your majesty drew on me at Fontenoy.' A letter so much

the more modest, as Frederic had conquered, and Louis had only

been witness to a victory. He displayed the same genius and the

same activity in the campaign of 1745, and once more abandoned

France in making his separate peace at Dresden. By this treaty

Francis was peaceably assured of the empire, and the cession

of Silesia was confirmed to Frederic. France during this war

committed some wrongs, which might palliate the abandonment of

Prussia. The French did not keep Prince Charles within bounds,

they made no diversion into Germany, and fought no where but

in Flanders. ... In 1756, Europe was again in a flame. France

and England declared war against each other, and both sought

alliances; Frederic ranged himself on the side of England, and

by that became the object of the unreflecting vengeance of the

French, and of the alliance of that power with Austria;

Austria also formed an alliance with the Court of Petersburg

by means of a Saxon secretary; Frederic discovered the project

of the Courts of Petersburg, Dresden, and Vienna, to invade

the Prussian dominions. He was before-hand with them, and

began the war by some conquests."

_L. P. Ségur, the elder,

History of the Principal Events of the Reign of Frederic

William II., King of Prussia,

volume 1, pages 2-6._

GERMANY: A. D. 1742.

The Elector of Bavaria crowned Emperor (Charles VII.).

See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1741 (OCTOBER).

GERMANY: A. D. 1745.

The consort of Maria Theresa elected Emperor (Francis I.).

Rise of the imperial house of Hapsburg-Lorraine.

See AUSTRIA: A. D.1745 (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER);

also, 1744-1745.

GERMANY: A. D. 1748.

End and results of the War of the Austrian Succession.

See AIX-LA-CHAPELLE. THE CONGRESS.

{1495}

GERMANY: A. D. 1755-1756.

The Seven Years War:

Its causes and provocations.

"The great national quarrel between England and the powers

which restrained her free movements on the sea and her

extension of colonies, had never ceased. England would have

the freedom of the sea: and on land she pushed population and

ploughs where France paraded soldiers. In such a struggle war

must come, but, by laws invariable as the laws of nature, the

population will win in the end. After much bickering, blows

began in 1754, and at the beginning of 1755 England despatched

the ill-fated Braddock with a small force, which was destroyed

in July. ... As yet, however, the quarrel was only colonial.

England embittered it by seizing French ships without any

declaration of war. But why did Frederick [of Prussia] strike

in, if indeed he desired peace? In truth there was no choice

for him. As early as 1752-53 his secret agents had discovered

that Austria, Russia and Saxony were hatching a plot for the

destruction of Prussia, and such a partition as afterwards

befell unhappy Poland. In 1753 a Saxon official, Mentzel by

name, began to supply the Prussian agents with copies of

secret documents from the archives at Dresden, which proved

that, during the whole of the peace, negotiations had been

proceeding for a simultaneous attack on Frederick, though the

astute Brühl [Saxon minister], mindful of former defeats,

objected to playing the part of jackal to the neighbouring

lions. In short, by the end of 1755 the king knew that

preparations were already on foot in Austria and Russia, and

that he would probably be attacked next year certainly, or, at

latest, the year after. A great war was coming between England

and France, in which the continental power would attack

Hanover, and tread closely on the skirts of Prussia. The

situation was dangerous, and became terribly menacing when

England bargained with Russia to subsidise a Muscovite army of

55,000 men for defence of Hanover. Russia consented with

alacrity. Money was all that the czarina needed for her

preparations against Frederick, and in the autumn of 1755 she

assembled, not 55,000, but 70,000 men on the Prussian

frontier, nominally for the use of England. But throughout the

winter all the talk at St. Petersburg was of Frederick's

destruction in the coming spring. It was time for him to stir.

His first move was one of policy. He offered England a

'neutrality convention' by which the two powers jointly should

guarantee the German Reich against all foreign intervention

during the coming war. On the 16th of January, 1756, the

convention was signed in London, and the Russian agreement

thrown over, as it could well be, since it had not been

ratified. Europe was now ranking herself for the struggle. In

preceding years, the Austrian diplomatist, Kaunitz, had so

managed the French court, especially through the medium of

Madame de Pompadour, that Louis XV. was now on the side of

Maria Theresa, who had bowed her neck so far as to write to

the French king's mistress as 'Ma Cousine,' while Frederick

forgot policy, and spoke of the Pompadour in slighting terms.

'Je ne la connais pas,' said he once, and was never forgiven.

... The agreement with Russia to partition Prussia had already

been made, and Frederick's sharp tongue had betrayed him into

calling the czarina that 'Infame catin du nord.' Saxony waited

for the appearance of her stronger neighbours in order to join

them. England alone was Frederick's ally."

_Colonel C. B. Brackenbury,

Frederick the Great,

chapter 9._

"The secret sources of the Third Silesian War, since called

'Seven-Years War,' go back to 1745; nay, we may say, to the

First Invasion of Silesia in 1740. For it was in Maria

Theresa's incurable sorrow at loss of Silesia, and her

inextinguishable hope to reconquer it, that this and all

Friedrich's other Wars had their origin. ... Traitor Menzel

the Saxon Kanzellist ... has been busy for Prussia ever since

'the end of 1752.' Got admittance to the Presses; sent his

first Excerpt 'about the time of Easter-Fair 1753,'--time of

Voltaire's taking wing. And has been at work ever since.

Copying Despatches from the most secret Saxon Repositories;

ready always on Excellency Maltzahn's indicating the Piece

wanted [Maltzahn being the Prussian Minister at Dresden]. ...

Menzel ... lasted in free activity till 1757; and was then put

under lock and key. Was not hanged: sat prisoner for

twenty-seven years after; over-grown with hair, legs and arms

chained together, heavy iron-bar uniting both ankles; diet

bread-and-water;--for the rest, healthy; and died, not very

miserable it is said, in 1784."

_T. Carlyle,

History of Friedrich II. of Prussia,

book 17, chapter 1 (volume 7)._

ALSO IN:

_Duc de Broglie,

The King's Secret,

chapters 1-2 (volume 1)._

_Frederick II.,

History of the Seven Years War

(Posthumous Works, volume 2), chapter 3._

_H. Tuttle,

History of Prussia, 1745-1756

(volume 3), chapters 6-9._

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