domains; but it is not to be denied that ... he aided to carry
out the edict [of Restitution] in the most barbarous and
relentless manner. It would be as tedious as painful to dwell
upon all the cruelties which were committed, and the
oppression that was exercised, by the imperial commissioners;
but a spirit of resistance was aroused in the hearts of the
German people, which only waited for opportunity to display
itself. Nor was it alone against the emperor that wrath and
indignation was excited. Wallenstein drew down upon his head
even more dangerous enmity than that which sprung up against
Ferdinand. He ruled in Germany with almost despotic sway; for
the emperor himself seemed at this time little more than a
tool in his hands. His manners were unpopular, stern,
reserved, and gloomy. . . . Princes were kept waiting in his
ante-chamber; and all petitions and remonstrances against his
stern decrees were treated with the mortifying scorn which
adds insult to injury. The magnificence of his train, the
splendor of his household, the luxury and profusion that
spread every where around him, afforded continual sources of
envy and jealous hate to the ancient nobility of the empire.
The Protestants throughout the land were his avowed and
implacable enemies; and the Roman Catholic princes viewed him
with fear and suspicion. Maximilian of Bavaria, whose star had
waned under the growing luster of Wallenstein's renown, who
had lost that authority in the empire which he knew to be due
to his services and his genius, solely by the rise and
influence of Wallenstein, and whose ambitious designs of
ruling Germany through an emperor dependent upon him for
power, had been frustrated entirely by the genius which placed
the imperial throne upon a firm and independent basis, took no
pains to conceal his hostility to the Duke of Friedland. ...
{1474}
Though the soldiery still generally loved him, their officers
hated the hand that put a limit to the oppression by which
they throve, and would fain have resisted its power. ... While
these feelings were gathering strength in Germany; while
Wallenstein, with no friends, though many supporters, saw
himself an object of jealousy or hatred to the leaders of
every party throughout the empire; and while the suppressed
but cherished indignation of all Protestant Germany was
preparing for the emperor a dreadful day of reckoning, events
were taking place in other countries which hurried on rapidly
the dangers that Wallenstein had foreseen. In France, a weak
king, and a powerful, politic, and relentless minister,
appeared in undissembled hostility to the house of Austria;
and the famous Cardinal de Richelieu busied himself,
successfully, to raise up enemies to the German branch of that
family. ... In Poland, Sigismund, after vainly contending with
Gustavus Adolphus, and receiving an inefficient aid from
Germany, was anxious to conclude the disastrous war with
Sweden. Richelieu interfered; Oxenstiern negotiated on the
part of Gustavus; and a truce of six years was concluded in
August, 1629, by which the veteran and victorious Swedish
troops were set free to act in any other direction. A great
part of Livonia was virtually ceded to Gustavus, together with
the towns and territories of Memel, Braunsberg and Elbingen,
and the strong fortress of Pillau. At the same time, Richelieu
impressed upon the mind of Gustavus the honor, the advantage,
and the necessity of reducing the immense power of the
emperor, and delivering the Protestant states of Germany from
the oppression under which they groaned. ... Confident in his
own powers of mind and warlike skill, supported by the love
and admiration of his people, relying on the valor and
discipline of' his troops, and foreseeing all the mighty
combinations which were certain to take place in his favor,
Gustavus hesitated but little. He consulted with his
ministers, indeed heard and answered every objection that
could be raised; and then applied to the Senate at Stockholm
to insure that his plans were approved, and that his efforts
would be seconded by his people. His enterprise met with the
most enthusiastic approbation; and then succeeded all the
bustle of active preparation. ... While this storm was
gathering in the North, while the towns of Sweden were
bristling with arms, and her ports filled with ships,
Ferdinand was driven or persuaded to an act the most fatal to
himself, and the most favorable to the King of Sweden. A Diet
was summoned to meet at Ratisbon early in the year 1630; and
the chief object of the emperor in taking a step so dangerous
to the power he had really acquired, and to the projects so
boldly put forth in his name, seems to have been to cause his
son to be elected King of the Romans. ... The name of the
archduke, King of Hungary, is proposed to the Diet for
election as King of the Romans, and a scene of indescribable
confusion and murmuring takes place: A voice demands that,
before any such election is considered, the complaints of the
people of Germany against the imperial armies shall be heard;
and then a perfect storm of accusations pours down. Every sort
of tyranny and oppression, every sort of cruelty and exaction,
every sort of licentiousness and vice is attributed to the
emperor's troops; but the hatred and the charges all
concentrate themselves upon the head of the great commander of
the imperial forces; and there is a shout for his instant
dismissal. ... Ferdinand hesitated, and affected much surprise
at the charges brought against his general and his armies. He
yielded in the end, however; and it is said, upon very good
authority, that his ruinous decision was brought about by the
arts of the same skillful politician who had conjured up the
storm which now menaced the empire from the north. Richelieu
had sent an embassador to Ratisbon. ... In the train of the
embassador came the well-known intriguing friar, Father
Joseph, the most unscrupulous and cunning of the cardinal's
emissaries; and he, we are assured, found means to persuade
the emperor that, by yielding to the demand of the electors
and removing Wallenstein for a time, he might obtain the
election of the King of Hungary, and then reinstate the Duke
of Friedland in his command as soon as popular anger had
subsided. However that might be, Ferdinand, as I have said,
yielded, openly expressing his regret at the step he was about
to take, and the apprehensions which he entertained for the
consequences. Count Questenberg and another nobleman, who had
been long on intimate terms with Wallenstein, were sent to the
camp to notify to him his removal from command, and to soften
the disgrace by assuring him of the emperor's gratitude and
affection."
_G. P. R. James,
Dark Scenes of History: Wallenstein,
chapters 3-4._
ALSO IN:
_S. R. Gardiner,
The Thirty Years' War,
chapter 7, section 3._
_A. Gindely,
History of the Thirty Years' War,
volume 2, chapter 1._
GERMANY: A. D. 1630-1631.
The Thirty Years War:
The Coming of Gustavus Adolphus.
His occupation of Pomerania and Brandenburg.
The horrible fate of Magdeburg at the hands of Tilly's
ruffians.
"On June 24, 1630, one hundred years, to a day, after the
Augsburg Confession was promulgated, Gustavus Adolphus landed
on the coast of Pomerania, near the mouth of the river Peene,
with 13,000 men, veteran troops, whose rigid discipline was
sustained by their piety, and who were simple-minded, noble,
and glowing with the spirit of the battle. He had reasons
enough for declaring war against Ferdinand, even if 10,000 of
Wallenstein's troops had not been sent to aid Sigismund
against him. But the controlling motive, in his own mind, was
to succor the imperiled cause of religious freedom in Germany.
Coming as the protector of the evangelic Church, he expected
to be joined by the Protestant princes. But he was
disappointed. Only the trampled and tortured people of North
Germany, who in their despair were ready for revolts and
conspiracies of their own, welcomed him as their deliverer
from the bandits of Wallenstein and the League. Gustavus
Adolphus appeared before Stettin, and by threats compelled the
old duke, Bogislaw XIV., to open to him his capital city, He
then took measures to secure possession of Pomerania. His army
grew rapidly, while that of the emperor was widely dispersed,
so that he now advanced into Brandenburg. George William, the
elector, was a weak prince, though a Protestant, and a brother
of the Queen of Sweden; he was guided by his Catholic
chancellor, Schwarzenberg, and had painfully striven to keep
neutral throughout the war, neither side, however, respecting
his neutrality.
{1475}
In dread of the plans of Gustavus Adolphus concerning
Pomerania and Prussia, he held aloof from him. Meanwhile
Tilly, general-in-chief of the troops of the emperor and the
League, drew near, but suddenly turned aside to New
Brandenburg, in the Mecklenburg territory, now occupied by the
Swedes, captured it after three assaults, and put the garrison
to the sword (1631). He then laid siege to Magdeburg. Gustavus
Adolphus took Frankfort-on-the-Oder, where there was an
imperial garrison, and treated it, in retaliation, with the
same severity. Thence, in the spring of 1631, he set out for
Berlin. ... In Potsdam he heard of the fall of Magdeburg. He
then marched with flying banners into Berlin, and compelled
the elector to become his ally. Magdeburg was the strong
refuge of Protestantism, and the most important trading centre
in North Germany. It had resisted the Augsburg Interim of
1548, and now resisted the Edict of Restitution, rejected the
newly appointed prince bishop, Leopold William, son of the
emperor himself, and refused to receive the emperor's
garrison. The city was therefore banned by the emperor, and
was besieged for many weeks by Pappenheim, a general of the
League, who was then reinforced by Tilly himself with his
army. Gustavus Adolphus was unable to make an advance, in view
of the equivocal attitude of the two great Protestant electors,
without exposing his rear to garrisoned fortresses. From
Brandenburg as well as Saxony he asked in vain for help to
save the Protestant city. Thus Magdeburg fell, May 10, 1631.
The citizens were deceived by a pretended withdrawal of the
enemy. But suddenly, at early dawn, the badly guarded
fortifications were stormed."
_C. T. Lewis,
History of Germany,
chapter 18, sections 3-4._
Two gates of the city having been opened by the storming
party, "Tilly marched in with part of his infantry.
Immediately occupying the principal streets, he drove the
citizens with pointed cannon into their dwellings, there to
await their destiny. They were not long held in suspense; a
word from Tilly decided the fate of Magdeburg. Even a more
humane general would in vain have recommended mercy to such
soldiers; but Tilly never made the attempt. Left by their
general's silence masters of the lives of all the citizens,
the soldiery broke into the houses to satiate their most
brutal appetites. The prayers of innocence excited some
compassion in the hearts of the Germans, but none in the rude
breasts of Pappenheim's Walloons. Scarcely had the savage
cruelty commenced, when the other gates were thrown open, and
the cavalry, with the fearful hordes of the Croats, poured in
upon the devoted inhabitants. Here commenced a scene of
horrors for which history has no language--poetry no pencil.
Neither innocent childhood, nor helpless old age; neither
youth, sex, rank, nor beauty, could disarm the fury of the
conquerors. Wives were abused in the arms of their husbands,
daughters at the feet of their parents; and the defenceless
sex exposed to the double sacrifice of virtue and life. No
situation, however obscure, or however sacred, escaped the
rapacity of the enemy. In a single church fifty-three women
were found beheaded. The Croats amused themselves with
throwing children into the flames; Pappenheim's Walloons with
stabbing infants at the mother's breast. Some officers of the
League, horror-struck at this dreadful scene, ventured to
remind Tilly that he had it in his power to stop the carnage.
'Return in an hour,' was his answer; 'I will see what I can
do; the soldier must have some reward for his danger and
toils.' These horrors lasted with unabated fury, till at last
the smoke and flames proved a check to the plunderers. To
augment the confusion and to divert the resistance of the
inhabitants, the Imperialists had, in the commencement of the
assault, fired the town in several places. The wind rising
rapidly, spread the flames, till the blaze became universal.
Fearful, indeed, was the tumult amid clouds of smoke, heaps of
dead bodies, the clash of swords, the crash of falling ruins,
and streams of blood. The atmosphere glowed; and the
intolerable heat forced at last even the murderers to take
refuge in their camp. In less than twelve hours, this strong,
populous, and flourishing city, one of the finest in Germany,
was reduced to ashes, with the exception of two churches and a
few houses. ... The avarice of the officers had saved 400 of
the richest citizens, in the hope of extorting from them an
exorbitant ransom. But this humanity was confined to the
officers of the League, whom the ruthless barbarity of the
Imperialists caused to be regarded as guardian angels.
Scarcely had the fury of the flames abated, when the
Imperialists returned to renew the pillage amid the ruins and
ashes of the town. Many were suffocated by the smoke; many
found rich booty in the cellars, where the citizens had
concealed their more valuable effects. On the 13th of May,
Tilly himself appeared in the town, after the streets had been
cleared of ashes and dead bodies. Horrible and revolting to
humanity was the scene that presented itself. The living
crawling from under the dead, children wandering about with
heart-rending cries, calling for their parents; and infants
still sucking the breasts of their lifeless mothers. More than
6,000 bodies were thrown into the Elbe to clear the streets; a
much greater number had been consumed by the flames. The whole
number of the slain was reckoned at not less than 30,000. The
entrance of the general, which took place on the 14th, put a
stop to the plunder, and saved the few who had hitherto
contrived to escape. About a thousand people were taken out of
the cathedral, where they had remained three days and two
nights, without food, and in momentary fear of death."
_F. Schiller,
History of the Thirty Years' War,
book 2._
ALSO IN:
_Sir E. Cust,
Lives of the Warriors of the
Thirty Years' War, part 1._
GERMANY: A. D. 1631 (January).
The Thirty Years War:
The Treaty of Bärwalde between Gustavus Adolphus and the king
of France.
"On the 13th of January, 1631, the Treaty of Barwalde was
concluded between France and Sweden. Hard cash had been the
principal subject of the negotiation, and Louis XIII. had
agreed to pay Gustavus a lump sum of $120,000 in consideration
of his recent expenditure,--a further sum of $400,000 a year
for six years to come. Until that time, or until a general
peace, if such should supervene earlier, Sweden was to keep in
the field an army of 30,000 foot and 6, 000 horse. The object
of the alliance was declared to be 'the protection of their
common friends, the security of the Baltic, the freedom of
commerce, the restitution of the oppressed members of the
Empire, the destruction of the newly erected fortresses in the
Baltic, the North Sea, and in the Grisons territory, so that
all should be left in the state in which it was before the
German war had begun.'
{1476}
Sweden was not to 'violate the Imperial constitution' where
she conquered; she was to leave the Catholic religion
undisturbed in all districts where she found it existing. She
was to observe towards Bavaria and the League--the spoilt
darlings of Richelieu's anti-Austrian policy--friendship or
neutrality, so far as they would observe it towards her. If,
at the end of six years, the objects were not accomplished,
the treaty was to be renewed."
_C. R. L. Fletcher,
Gustavus Adolphus and the Struggle
of Protestantism for Existence,
chapter 9._
GERMANY: A. D. 1631.
The Thirty Years War:
The elector of Brandenburg brought to terms by the king of
Sweden.
The elector of Saxony frightened into line.
Defeat of Tilly at Leipsig (Breitenfeld).
Effects of the great victory.
"Loud were the cries against Gustavus for not having relieved
Magdeburg. To answer them he felt himself bound to publish a
careful apology. In this document he declared, among other
things, that if he could have obtained from the Elector of
Brandenburg the passage of Küstrin he might not only have
raised the siege of Magdeburg but have destroyed the whole of
the Imperial army. The passage, however, had been denied him;
and though the preservation of Magdeburg so much concerned the
Elector of Saxony, he could obtain from him a passage toward
it neither by Wittemberg, nor the Bridge of Dessau, nor such
assistance in provision and shipping as was necessary for the
success of the enterprise. ... Something more than mere
persuasion had induced the Elector of Brandenburg, after the
capture of Francfort, to grant Gustavus possession of Spandau
for a month. The month expired on the 8th of June; and the
elector demanded back his stronghold. The king, fettered by
his promise, surrendered it; but the next day, having marched
to Berlin and pointed his guns against the palace, the ladies
came forth as mediators, and the elector consented both to
surrender Spandau again and to pay, for the maintenance of the
Swedish troops, a monthly subsidy of 30,000 rix-dollars. At
the end of May Tilly removed from Magdeburg and the Elbe to
Ascherleben. This enabled the king to take Werben, on the
confluence of the Elbe and Havel, where, after the reduction
of Tangermünde and Havelberg, he established his celebrated
camp." In the latter part of July, Tilly made two attacks on
the king's camp at Werben, and was repulsed on both occasions
with heavy loss. "In the middle of August, Gustavus broke up
his camp. His force at that time, according to the
muster-rolls, amounted to 13,000 foot, and 8,850 cavalry. He
drew towards Leipsig, then threatened by Tilly, who, having
been joined at Eisleben by 15,000 men under Fürstenburg, now
possessed an army 40,000 strong to enforce the emperor's ban
against the Leipsig decrees [or resolutions of a congress of
Protestant princes which had assembled at Leipsig in February,
1631, moved to some organized common action by the Edict of
Restitution] within the limits of the electorate. The Elector
of Saxony was almost frightened out of his wits by the
impending danger. ... His grief and rage at the fall of
Magdeburg had been so great that, for two days after receiving
the news, he would admit no one into his presence. But that
dire event only added to his perplexity; he could resolve
neither upon submission, nor upon vengeance. In May, indeed,
terrified by the threats of Ferdinand, he discontinued his
levies, and disbanded a part of his troops already enlisted:
but in June he sent Arnim to Gustavus with such overtures that
the king drank his health, and seemed to have grown sanguine
in the hope of his alliance. In July, his courage still
rising, he permitted Gustavus to recruit in his dominions. In
August, his courage falling again at the approach of
Fürstenburg, he gave him and his troops a free passage through
Thuringia." But now, later in the same month, he sent word to
Gustavus Adolphus "that not only Wittemberg but the whole
electorate was open to him; that not only his son, but
himself, would serve under the king; that he would advance one
month's payment for the Swedish troops immediately, and give
security for two monthly payments more. ... Gustavus rejoiced
to find the Duke of Saxony in this temper, and, in pursuance
of a league now entered into with him, and the Elector of
Brandenburg, crossed the Elbe at Wittemberg on the 4th of
September. The Saxons, from 16,000 to 20,000 strong, moving
simultaneously from Torgau, the confederated armies met at
Düben on the Mulda, three leagues from Leipsig. At a
conference held there, it was debated whether it would be
better to protract the war or to hazard a battle. The king
took the former side, but yielded to the strong
representations of the Duke of Saxony. ... On the 6th of
September the allies came within six or eight miles of the
enemy, where they halted for the night. ... Breitenfeld, the
place at which Tilly, urged by the importunity of Pappenheim,
had chosen to offer battle, was an extensive plain, in part
recently ploughed, about a mile from Leipsig and near the
cemetery of that city. Leipsig had surrendered to Tilly two
days before. The Imperial army, estimated at 44,000 men,
occupied a rising ground on the plain. ... The army was drawn
up in one line of great depth, having the infantry in the
centre, the cavalry on the wings, according to the Spanish
order of battle, The king subdivided his army, about 20,000
strong, into centre and wings, each of which consisted of two
lines and a reserve. ... To this disposition is attributed, in
a great degree, the success of the day. ... The files being so
comparatively shallow, artillery made less havoc among them.
Then, again, the division of the army into small maniples,
with considerable intervals between each, gave space for
evolutions, and the power of throwing the troops with rapidity
wherever their services or support might be found requisite.
... The battle began at 12 o'clock." It only ended with the
setting of the sun; but long before that time the great army
of Tilly was substantially destroyed. It had scattered the
Saxons easily enough, and sent them flying, with their
worthless elector; but Gustavus and his disciplined, brave,
powerfully handled Swedes had broken and ruined the stout but
clumsy imperial lines. "It is scarcely possible to exaggerate
the importance of this success. On the event of that day, as
Gustavus himself said, the whole (Protestant) cause, 'summa
rei,' depended. The success was great in itself. The numbers
engaged on either side had been nearly equal. Not so their
loss. The Imperial loss in killed and wounded, according to
Swedish computation, was from 8,000 to 10,000; according to
the enemy's own account, between 6,000 and 7,000; while all
seem to agree that the loss on the side of the allies was only
2,700, of which 2,000 were Saxon, 700 Swedes. Besides,
Gustavus won the whole of the enemy's artillery, and more than
100 standards. Then the army of Tilly being annihilated left
him free to choose his next point of attack, almost his next
victory."
_B. Chapman,
History of Gustavus Adolphus,
chapter 8._
{1477}
"The battle of Breitenfeld was an epoch in war, and it was an
epoch in history. It was an epoch in war, because first in it
was displayed on a great scale the superiority of mobility
over weight. It was an epoch in history, because it broke the
force upon which the revived Catholicism had relied for the
extension of its empire over Europe. ... 'Germany might tear
herself and be torn to pieces for yet another half-generation,
but the actual result of the Thirty-Years' War was as good as
achieved.'"
_C. R. L. Fletcher,
Gustavus Adolphus and the Struggle
of Protestantism for Existence,
chapter 11._
ALSO IN:
_G. B. Malleson,
The Battle-fields of Germany,
chapter 1._
GERMANY: A. D. 1631-1632.
The Thirty Years War:
Movements and plans of the Swedish king in southern Germany.
Temporary recovery of the Palatinate.
Occupation of Bavaria.
The Saxons in Bohemia.
Battle of the Lech.
Death of Tilly.
Wallenstein's recall.
Siege and relief of Nuremberg.
Battle of Lützen, and death of Gustavus Adolphus.