the Rhenish provinces, and the army of British, Dutch,
Belgians, Bunswickers, and Hanoverians, occupying Belgium.
Napoleon's scheme, the best in his desperate circumstances,
was to expel the British and Prussians, who were moving west,
from Belgium, win the Rhine frontier--to arouse the enthusiasm
of all France--before the Austrians were ready, and carry the
war out of France. The Duke of Wellington proceeded to
Belgium, for the first and last time to measure his skill with
Napoleon's, and Marshal Blücher took over from Kleist the
command of the Prussians. The two armies, the Prussian and the
British, took up a line extending from Liege to the sea. The
country on this line was open along the west, affording by
nature little means of resisting an invasion, but most of the
fortresses commanding the roads had been put in a state of
moderate repair. The Prussians held the line of the Meuse and
Sambre to beyond Charleroi, the head-quarters being at Namur.
They numbered about 117,000 men ... with 312 guns. ... The
motley mass of the British and their allies numbered 106,000
men ... with 196 guns. ... So entirely ignorant were the
allies of Napoleon's movements, that on the very day on which
he burst across the frontier, Wellington wrote to the Czar,
who was at Vienna, respecting the general invasion of France.
At that time the frontier of France approached within six
miles of Charleroi (which is itself but 34 miles by the main
road from Brussels). The Charleroi road was not only the most
direct to Brussels, but was unprotected by fortresses; and the
line of the allied armies was weakest here at the point of
junction between them. ... It was against the central weak
point that Napoleon resolved to move, down the basins of the
Sambre and the Meuse. ... The mass of the troops was being
assembled within a league of the frontier, but behind some
small hills which completely screened them from the enemy's
outposts. To conceal his designs to the last moment, the line
of sentries along the frontier was tripled, and any attempt to
pass the line was forbidden under pain of death. The
arrangements were being carried out by Soult, who on the 2nd
June had been appointed chief of the staff. ... The army
concentrated on the frontier consisted (according to Colonel
Chesney) of 90,000 infantry and 22,000 cavalry--in all 112,000
men--344 guns. ... Napoleon, accompanied by his brother
Jerome, arrived in the camp, and in the evening of the 14th
his soldiers, already elated by his presence, were excited to
the highest pitch of enthusiasm by an address from Napoleon.
... A general order fixed the attack upon the allies' position
for three o'clock in the following morning (15th)." At the
appointed time "the French left was in motion, Reille
proceeding from Solre down the right bank of the Sambre. He
was soon brought into collision with the Prussian outposts
near Thuin: he drove them back and secured at ten o'clock the
bridge of Marchiennes." The movements of other corps were
delayed by various causes. Nevertheless, "of the Prussians
only Ziethen's corps, and of Wellington's army only
Perponcher's Dutch-Belgians, were as yet near the menaced
position; while 40,000 French had passed the Sambre at
Marchiennes and 70,000 more were entering Charleroi. When
Reille deployed in front of Gosselies, the Prussians called in
their detachments and retired from it, upon Fleurus, ...
leaving open the road through Quatre Bras to Brussels.
{1362}
Ney, who had just come up, then took command of the left, ...
which was now directed upon Quatre Bras; and Napoleon galloped
off to the road between Charleroi and Fleurus, where the
retiring Prussians were concentrating. ... At dark Ziethen
[with the First Prussian corps] still held Fleurus with his
advanced guard, and the wood on its south, the bulk of his
troops lay for the night upon the hill of Ligny, above the
village of Bry. His loss during the day's manœuvring has been
estimated at 2,000. On the French left, Ney... had come in
contact with the advance guard of Wellington's army, a
battalion of Nassauers and a light battery, in front of the
village of Frasnes, two miles from Quatre Bras, the name
applied to the farm-buildings at the intersection of the four
main roads,--Brussels, Nivelles, Charleroi, Namur. ... After a
few cannon-shots the outpost fell back from Frasnes to Quatre
Bras." Ney, after a reconnoissance, postponed attack until
morning. "It had been intended by Napoleon that the whole army
should have crossed the Sambre before noon; but from the
several delays ... when night fell on the 15th, half of the
cavalry of the guard, two of Grouchy's reserve divisions,
Lobau's corps, and one-half of Gérard's corps were still on
the south of the river. Apparently relying on secret
information from Paris--which contradicted the rumours that
Napoleon was about to join the army--Wellington had been
lulled into a false security, and the reports as to the
concentration had been neglected. News of the enemy's advance
across the Sambre did not reach him till three o'clock in the
afternoon of the 15th, when the Prince of Orange in person
reported the skirmish at Thuin. As he did not yet know the
point of concentration, the British general, 'never
precipitate or nervous' (Hooper), merely issued orders for all
the troops to be in readiness. ... At night intelligence was
received from Mons that the French concentration was at
Charleroi, and orders were issued for the immediate movement
of the troops. ... Wellington and the Prince of Orange, with
several of the staff' officers, went--it is said, to prevent a
panic in Brussels--to the Duchess of Richmond's ball, where
'Belgium's capital had gathered then her beauty and her
chivalry,' and, 'while all went merry as a marriage bell,' the
staff officers stole away one by one. The Duke himself,
'throwing away golden minutes' (Hamley), as if to show his
confidence in his fortunes, remained to a late hour to return
thanks after supper for the health of the Prince Regent of
Great Britain, which the Prince of Orange proposed. ...
Blücher had received, at his head-quarters at Namur, news on
the morning of the 14th of the French concentration, and he
had ordered forward the corps of Pirch and Thielemann. ...
Napoleon did not foresee Blücher's promptitude, and nothing
was done in the early morning of the 16th to proceed with the
execution of the intended surprise. . . .... No orders were
issued by the Emperor till eight, when Napoleon's resolution
was taken,--to strike at the Prussians, who would, he
believed, if defeated, retire upon their natural base of
communications, through Namur and Liege, and he would thus be
left to deal separately with the British, who could not move
from their base, the sea. The French army was to advance in
two wings, the left under Ney, the right under Grouchy, with
the reserve under the Emperor himself. Ney was to capture
Quatre Bras, reconnoitre the Brussels road, and hold himself
in readiness to march to Brussels, which Napoleon hoped to be
able to enter the following morning. ... Napoleon had 64,000
men to attack the position at Ligny; Ney on the left wing had
45,000 for Quatre Bras; Lobau had 10,000 to support either
wing of the Grand Army; 5,000 troops were in the rear; and the
victorious wing, whether Ney's or Grouchy's, was to wheel
round and manœuvre in the direction of the other. Thielemann
having come up before the French delivered their attack,
Blücher had 85,000 men on the field. Wellington arrived at
Quatre Bras (which is 20 miles from Brussels) at 11 o'clock in
the forenoon. As Marshal Ney gave no sign of an imminent
attack, Wellington galloped over, about seven miles, to confer
with Blücher. ... Wellington, after some discussion, in which
he expressed his disapproval of Blücher's position, agreed to
move to the rear of the Prussians, to act as a reserve, if his
own position at Quatre Bras were not attacked. ... He reached
Quatre Bras when his own position was being assailed, and no
help could be sent to Blücher. ... At about three o'clock,
when the heavy cannonade a few miles to the west intimated
that a desperate battle was in progress at Quatre Bras, the
signal for attack [on the Prussians, at Ligny] was given. The
French left sped forward with impetuosity; the resistance was
vigorous but futile, and the enemy streamed through the
village. Blücher immediately moved forward fresh troops and
re-took the village, but was unable to retain it. ... Thrice
the Grenadiers forced their way into and through the village,
but only to be driven back again." But "Blücher gradually
exhausted his reserves, and when, in the dusk, Napoleon saw
the last battalion moved forward and the ground behind Ligny
vacant, he exclaimed, 'they are lost!' The Guards and the
Cuirassiers were immediately ordered to attack," and the
wearied Prussian infantry were broken by their onset. "The
fugitives led precipitately over the fields and along the
roads to the east, and the order for the whole to retire was
immediately given. ... Blücher himself gathered a few of his
squadrons to check the hot pursuit near Sombreffe, and thrice
led them to the charge. His squadrons were broken, and after
the last charge his horse fell dead, and the veteran marshal
lay under it. His aid-de-camp, Nostitz, stood by him, and
covered him with a cloak; the Cuirassiers galloped past
without noticing him. ... Gneisenau, who took temporary
command from the accident to Blücher, ordered a retreat upon
Wavre, with the view of joining Bülow's corps and keeping open
the communications with Wellington. ... The loss on each side
has been very variously estimated. Napoleon put his own loss
at 7,000 men, Charras puts it at 11,000, and the loss of the
Prussians at 18,000. The retreat upon Wavre abandoned the
communications with Namur and Liege, through which the
Prussian supplies came from the lower Rhine, for a new line by
Louvain, but it kept the Prussians on a line parallel to the
road on which Wellington must retreat, and thus still enabled
the two armies to aid each other. 'This noble daring at once
snatched from Napoleon the hoped-for fruits of his victory,
and the danger Ligny had for a few hours averted was left
impending over him' (Chesney)."
_H. R. Clinton,
The War in the Peninsula and Wellington's Campaigns
in France and Belgium, chapter 12._
{1363}
On Wellington's return to Quatre Bras from his interview with
Blücher, he found, as stated above, that the Prince of Orange
had already became desperately engaged with the superior
forces of Ney. "The Duke's presence gave new life to the
battle, and when Picton's division, followed by the
Brunswickers and Van Merle's Belgian horse, arrived, he took
the offensive, pushing forward right up to the edge of the
farm of Gemioncourt. Ney, reinforced by the rest of Reille's
corps and part of Kellerman's cavalry, violently retorted, and
in the charge, which partially broke into spray before the
squares, Wellington ran the risk of death or capture. But he
leaped his horse over the 92d Highlanders lining the ditch on
the Namur road, while his gallant pursuers, cut up by the
infantry fire, were killed or driven off. Ney was further
reinforced by more guns and cavalry, and Wellington's brigades
continued to arrive in parcels. The Marshal was always
superior in horsemen and cannon, but after 5 o'clock his
opponent had larger numbers of foot. Holding firmly to the
cross-roads and, the highway to Namur, Wellington became the
stronger as the day waned; and when the Guards emerged from
the Nivelles road and the Allies pressed forward, Ney, who had
no fresh troops, was driven back, and his antagonist remained
at sundown master of the whole field of battle. The position
was maintained, but the cost was great, for there were no
fewer than 4,600 killed and wounded, more than half being
British soldiers. The thunder of cannon to the eastward had
also died away, but none knew as yet at Quatre Bras how
Blücher had fared at the hands of his redoubtable foe.
Wellington, who slept at his head-quarters in Genappe, was on
the field and scrutinising his outposts at daybreak an the
17th. Soon after came a report, confirmed a little later, that
the Prussians had retreated on Wavre. ... Napoleon had a
belief that Blücher would retreat upon Liège, which caused him
at a late hour in the day to despatch Grouchy to that side,
and thus touch was lost. While the French were cooking and
Napoleon was pondering, definite intelligence was brought to
Wellington, who, learning for certain that Blücher was at
Wavre, promised to stand fast himself at Mont St. Jean and
fight, if Blücher would support him with two corps. The
intrepid Marshal replied that he would came with his whole
army, and Wellington got the famous answer before night. Thus
was made, between generals who thoroughly trusted each other,
that combination which led to the Battle of Waterloo. It was
no chance combat, but the result of a deliberate design,
rendered capable of execution, even when Blücher was wounded,
by his resolve to retreat upon Wavre, and by Napoleon, who
acted on conjecture that the Prussians would hurry towards
their base at Liege. The morning at Quatre Bras was peaceful;
the Allies cooked their food before starting rearward.
Wellington, it is said, lay down for a moment, and snatched
perhaps a little sleep. There was no stir in front or on the
exposed left flank; and, covered by a strong display of
horsemen, the Allied divisions tramped steadily towards Mont
St. Jean. ... The retreat continued all day. A thunderstorm,
so often a precursor of Wellington's battles, deluged the
fields with rain, and pursuer and pursued struggling through
the mire, were drenched to the skin by nightfall. ... The
results of two days' warfare may be thus summed up. Napoleon
had inflicted a defeat, yet not a decisive defeat, upon the
Prussians, who escaped from his ken to Wavre. He had then, at
a late hour on the 17th, detached Grouchy with 33,000 men to
follow them, and Grouchy at night from Gembloux reported that
they had retired in three directions. Moving himself in the
afternoon, Napoleon, uniting with Ney, had pursued Wellington
to Mont St. Jean, and slept in the comfortable belief that he
had separated the Allies. At that very time Wellington, who
had assembled his whole force except 17,000 men, ... was in
close communication with Blücher, and intended on the 18th to
stop Napoleon by delivering battle, and to hold him fast until
Blücher could cut in on his right flank and rear. Thus it was
the Allies who were united practically, and the French army
which was separated into two groups unable to support each
other. ... The tempest which burst over the retreating columns
on the 17th followed them to their bivouacs and raged all
night, and did not cease until late on the fateful Sunday.
Wellington, mounting his faithful Copenhagen at break of day,
rode from the village of Waterloo to the field, where the
armies on both sides, protected by watchful sentries, were
still contending with the mischiefs inflicted by the storm.
The position was the crest of a gentle slope stretching from
Smohain to the Nivelles road, having upon and in advance of
its right the château, garden, and wood of Hougoumont, and in
the centre, where the Charleroi road cut through the little
ridge, the farm of La Haye Sainte. Both these posts were
occupied, but the latter, unfortunately, not so solidly as
Hougoumont. ... The position was well filled by the 69,000 men
of all arms and 156 guns which were present that day.
Napoleon, who slept at the farm of Caillou, and who had been
out on foot to the front during the night, was also early in
the field, and glad of the gift which he thought fortune had
placed in his hands. When Reille had joined him from Genappe,
he had 72,000 men, all admirable soldiers, and 240 guns, with
which to engage in combat, and he reckoned that the chances
were ninety to ten in his favour. He mounted his charger,
reconnoitred his opponent's position, and then gave the orders
which, promptly and finely obeyed, disclosed the French array.
... It was now nearly eleven o'clock, and, although his
opponent knew it not, Wellington had got news of the march
from Wavre of Bulow, whose leading troops were actually, at
that time, close to the wood of St. Lambert on the French
right; while Grouchy was at Sart les Walhain, between Gembloux
and Wavre. It is not practicable here to give a full account of
the battle of Waterloo; we can only describe its broad
outlines. The first gun was fired about twenty or thirty
minutes past eleven, and preluded a dashing and sustained
attack an Hougoumont, which failed to carry the house, garden,
or orchard, but did gain the wood. It was probably intended to
divert attention from the attack on the left and centre, which
Ney, massing his guns opposite the British left, was preparing
to execute. Wellington watched and in some measure controlled
the fight for Hougoumont, and then rode off to the centre,
taking post at a solitary tree which grew near the Charleroi
road above La Haye Sainte.
{1364}
Ney at half past one sent forward the whole of D'Erlon's
corps, and although some of them pushed close up to and over
the Wavre road, stormed the orchard of La Haye Sainte and took
the Pappelotte farm, yet at the critical moment Sir William
Ponsonby's Union Brigade of horse charged into the French
infantry, already shattered by the fire of Picton's troops,
and the net result of the combined operation was that two
eagles and 3,000 prisoners were captured, while nearly that
number of killed and wounded remained on the ground. On the
other side of La Haye Sainte the Household Brigade, led by
Lord Anglesea in person, charged in upon and routed a large
body of French cuirassiers. The grand attack thus completely
failed, and the centre, like the right, remained intact. It
was just before this combat began that Napoleon saw something
like troops towards St. Lambert and despatched two brigades of
light cavalry to reconnoitre. A Prussian staff officer was
caught beyond Planchenoit, and from him came the unexpected
and unwelcome information that the whole Prussian army was
approaching. ... The signs of danger on his right flank, the
punishment of D'Erlon's corps, the ineffectual attempt upon
the British Guards in and about Hougoumont, were followed by a
kind of pause and the combat reverted to cannonading and
skirmishing. But towards four o'clock Napoleon, increasing the
fire of his artillery, threw forward a mass of cavalry, forty
squadrons, and then began that series of reiterated onsets of
horse which lasted for two hours. ... Twice they were driven
down the slope, and the third time, when they came on, they
were strengthened by Kellerman and Guyot until they reached a
force of 77 squadrons, or 12,000 men; but these also were
repulsed, the British horse, what remained of them, charging
when the French were entangled among the squares and
disordered by the musketry and guns. Four times these fine
troopers charged, yet utterly failed to penetrate or move a
single foot battalion. But some time before the final effort,
Ney by a fierce attack got possession of La Haye Sainte, and
thus, just as the cavalry were exhausted, the French infantry
were established within sixty yards of the Allied centre. And
although the Emperor was obliged to detach one-half of his
Guard to the right, because Blucher had brought into play
beyond Planchenoit against Lobau nearly 80,000 men, still the
capture of La Haye Sainte was justly regarded as a grave
event. Wellington during the cavalry fight had moved three
brigades on his right nearer to Hougoumont, and had called up
Chassé and his Belgians to support them; and it was a little
before this time that he cried out to Brigadier-General Adam,
'By G--, Adam, I think we shall beat them yet! ... The crisis
of the battle had come for Napoleon. Unable after eight hours'
conflict to do more than capture La Haye Sainte; hardly
pressed by the Prussians, now strong and aggressive; owing
such success as he had obtained to the valour and discipline
of his soldiers--the Emperor delivered his last stroke, not
for victory--he could no longer hope to win--but for safety.
He sent forward the last ten battalions of his Guard to assail
the British right, and directed the whole remaining infantry
force available to attack all along the line. The Guard
marched onward in two columns, which came successively in
contact with their opponents. Napier's guns and the British
Guards, who rising from the ground showed across the head of
the first column, fired heavily and charging drove them in
confusion back towards La Belle Alliance; and the second
column, struck in flank by the musketry of the 52nd and 95th
was next broken by a bayonet charge and pursued by Colonel
Colborne to and beyond the Charleroi road. As Ziethen's
Prussians were falling upon the French near Pappelotte, and
Pirch and Bulow wrestling with the Imperial Guard in
Planchenoit, Wellington ordered the whole of the British line
to advance. The cheers arising on the right where he was,
extended along the front and gave new strength to the wearied
soldiers. He led the way. As he neared the Charleroi road, the
riflemen, full of Peninsular memories, began to cheer him as
he galloped up, but he called out, 'No cheering, my lads;
forward and complete your victory.' He found that good
soldier, Colborne, halted for a moment before three squares of
the rallied Imperial Guard. 'Go on, Colborne,' he said;
'better attack them, they won't stand.' Nor did they.
Wellington then turned to the right, where Vivian's Light
Cavalry were active in the gloom, and we next find him once
more with the 52nd near Rossomme, the farthest point of the
advance, where that regiment halted after its grand march over
the battlefield. Somewhere on the highway he met Blucher, who had
so nobly kept his word, and it was then that Gneisenau
undertook to chase the fugitives over the frontier. The
French, or perhaps we should say the Napoleonic army, was
destroyed, and the power which its mighty leader had built up
on the basis of its astonishing successes was gone for ever."
_G. Hooper,
Wellington,
chapter 9._
ALSO IN:
_D. Gardner,
Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo._
_Lieutenant Colonel C. C. Chesney,
Waterloo Lectures._
_W. Siborne,
History of the War in France and Belgium in 1819._
_General Sir J. S. Kennedy,
Notes on the Battle of Waterloo._
_W. H. Maxwell,
Life of Wellington,
volume 8, chapters 28-32._
_G. R. Gleig,
Story of the Battle of Waterloo._
_W. O'C. Morris,
Great Commanders of Modern Times,
and the Campaign of 1815._
FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (June-August).
Napoleon's return to Paris.
His final abdication.
His surrender of himself to the English.
His captivity at St. Helena.
"The vanquished army had lost 200 pieces of ordnance, and
80,000 men hors de combat or prisoners; as many more remained,
independently of Grouchy's 85,000 men; but the difficulty was
to rally them in presence of an enemy, that had taken lessons
in audacity and activity from Napoleon himself. The loss of
the allies was not less considerable, but there remained to
them 150,000 men, the confidence of victory, and the certainty
of being seconded by 300,000 allies, who were crossing the
Rhine from Mentz to Bäle. Such was the issue of this struggle,
commenced under such happy auspices, and which resulted more
fatal to France than the battles of Poitiers and Azincourt. It
must be admitted, that this disaster was the work of a
multitude of unheard-of circumstances: if Napoleon can be
reproached for certain faults, it must be allowed that fortune
dealt cruelly with him in the lesser details, and that his
enemies, in return, were as fortunate as they showed
themselves skillful.
{1365}
However unjust be the spirit of party, we are forced to render
homage to the merits of two generals, who, unexpectedly
attacked in their cantonments extending from Dinant and Liège
to Renaix, near Tournay, had taken such wise measures as to be
in condition next morning for giving battle to equal forces,
and for afterwards conquering by an able concentration of the
two armies. ... In the very battle of Waterloo, the French
might be censured for having attempted the first attack in
masses too deep. This system was never successful against the
murderous fire of English infantry and artillery. ... There
were likewise extraordinary charges of cavalry, which, being
devoid of support, became heroic but useless struggles.
Notwithstanding all this, it is almost certain that Napoleon
would have remained master of the field of battle, but for the
arrival of 65,000 Prussians on his rear; a decisive and
disastrous circumstance, that to prevent was not entirely in
his power. As soon as the enemy led 130,000 men on the
battle-field, with scarcely 50,000 to oppose them, all was
lost. ... Napoleon had but one course left him, which was to
direct Grouchy through the Ardennes on Laon; to collect at
this point all that could be drawn from the interior, from
Metz and from Rapp's corps, leaving but garrisons in Lorraine
and Alsace. The imperial cause was very much shaken, put not
entirely lost; should all Frenchmen determine on opposing
Europe with the courage of the Spartans of Leonidas, the
energy of the Russians in 1812, or of the Spaniards of
Palafox. Unfortunately for them, as·for Napoleon, opinion was
very much divided on this subject, and the majority still
believing that the struggle interested only the power of the
emperor and his family, the fate of the country seemed of
little consequence. Prince Jerome had collected 25,000 men in
rear of Avesnes: he was ordered to lead them to Laon; there
remained 200 pieces of artillery, beside those of Grouchy. ...
Reaching Loon on the 19th, where he had at first resolved to
await the junction of Grouchy and Jerome, the emperor
discussed, with the small number of the trustworthy who had
followed him, the course he should adopt after this frightful
disaster. Should he repair to Paris, and concert with the
chambers and his ministers, or else remain with the army,
demanding of the chambers to invest him with dictatorial power
and an unlimited confidence, under the conviction that he
would obtain from them the most energetic measures, for saving
France and conquering her independence, on heaps of ruins? As
it always happens, his generals were divided in opinion; some
wished him to proceed to Paris, and deposit the crown into the
hands of the nation's delegates, or receive it from them a
second time, with the means of defending it. Others, with a
better appreciation of the views of the deputies, affirmed,
that far from sympathizing with Napoleon, and seconding him,
they would accuse him of having lost France, and would
endeavor to save the country by losing the emperor. ...
Lastly, the most prudent thought that Napoleon should not go
to Paris, but remain at the head of the army, in order to
treat with the sovereigns himself, by offering to abdicate in
favor of his son. It is said, that Napoleon inclined to the
idea of remaining at Laon with the army; but the advice of the
greatest number determined him, and he departed for Paris."
_Baron de Jomini,
History of the Campaign of Waterloo,
pages 184-189._