"Napoleon's relations with the Court of Russia, at one time

very formal, became far more amicable, according as Spanish

affairs grew complicated. After the capitulation of Baylen

they became positively affectionate. The Czar was too

clear-sighted not to understand the meaning of this gradation.

He quickly understood that the more difficulties Napoleon

might create for himself in Spain, the more would he be forced

to make concessions to Russia. ... The Russian alliance, which

at Tilsit had only been an arrangement to flatter Napoleon's

ambition, had now become a necessity to him. Each side felt

this; hence the two sovereigns were equally impatient to meet

again; the one to strengthen an alliance so indispensable to

the success of his plans, the other to derive from it all the

promised advantages. It was settled, therefore, that the

desired interview should take place at Erfurt towards the end

of September, 1808. ... The two Emperors met on the 27th of

September, on the road between Weimar and Erfurt. They

embraced each other with that air of perfect cordiality of

which kings alone possess the secret, especially when their

intention is rather to stifle than to embrace. They made their

entry into the town on horseback together, amidst an immense

concourse of people. Napoleon had wished by its magnificence

to render the reception worthy of the illustrious guests who

had agreed to meet at Erfurt. He had sent thither from the

storehouses of the crown, bronzes, porcelain, the richest

hangings, and the most sumptuous furniture. He desired that

the Comédie-Française should heighten the brilliant effects of

these fêtes by performing the chief masterpieces of our stage,

from 'Cinna' down to 'La Mort de César,' before this royal

audience. ... All the natural adherents of Napoleon hastened

to answer his appeal by flocking to Erfurt, for he did not

lose sight of his principal object, and his desire was to

appear before Europe surrounded by a court composed of kings.

In this cortege were to be seen those of Bavaria, of

Wurtemburg, of Saxony, of Westphalia, and Prince William of

Prussia; and beside these stars of first magnitude twinkled

the obscure Pleiades of the Rhenish Confederation. The

reunion, almost exclusively German, was meant to prove to

German idealists the vanity of their dreams. Were not all

present who had any weight in Germany from their power, rank,

or riches? Was it not even hinted that the Emperor of Austria

had implored the favour, without being able to obtain it, of

admission to the conferences of Erfurt? This report was most

improbable. ... The kings of intellect came in their turn to

bow down before Cæsar. Goethe and Wieland were presented to

Napoleon; they appeared at his court, and by their glory

adorned his triumph. German patriotism was severely tried at

Erfurt; but it may be said that of all its humiliations the

one which the Germans most deeply resented was that of

beholding their greatest literary genius decking himself out

with Napoleon's favours [the decoration of the Legion of

Honour, which Goethe accepted]. ... The theatrical effect

which Napoleon had in view in this solemn show at Erfurt

having once been produced, his principal object was attained,

for the political questions which remained for settlement with

Alexander could not raise any serious difficulty. In view of

the immediate and certain session of two such important

provinces as those of Wallachia and Moldavia, the Czar,

without much trouble, renounced that division of the Ottoman

Empire with which he had been tantalised for more than a year.

... He bound himself ... by the Treaty of Erfurt to continue his

co-operation with Napoleon in the war against England (Article

2), and, should it so befall, also against Austria (Article

10); but the affairs in Spain threw every attack upon England

into the background. ... The only very distinct engagement

which the treaty imposed on Alexander was the recognition of

the new order of things established by France in Spain.'"

_P. Lanfrey,

History of Napoleon,

volume 3, chapter 10._

ALSO IN:

_Prince Talleyrand,

Memoirs,

volume 1._

FRANCE: A. D. 1808-1809.

Reverses in Portugal.

Napoleon in the field.

French victories resumed.

The check at Corunna.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1808-1809 (AUGUST-JANUARY).

FRANCE: A. D. 1809 (January-September).

Reopened war with Austria.

Napoleon's advance to Vienna.

His defeat at Aspern and victory at Wagram.

The Peace of Schönbrunn.

Fresh acquisitions of territory.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (JANUARY-JUNE),

and (JULY-SEPTEMBER).

FRANCE: A. D. 1809 (February-July).

Wellington's check to the French in Spain and Portugal.

His passage of the Douro.

Battle of Talavera.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (FEBRUARY-JULY).

FRANCE: A. D. 1809 (May).

Annexation of the States of the Church.

Removal of the Pope to Savona.

See PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1809 (December).

Withdrawal of the English from Spain into Portugal.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (AUGUST-DECEMBER).

{1352}

FRANCE: A. D. 1810 (February-December).

Annexations of territory to the empire.

Holland, the Hanse Towns, and the Valais in Switzerland.

Other reconstructions of the map of Germany.

"It was not till December 10th 1810 [after the abdication of

King Louis--see NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1806-1810] that

Holland was united to France by a formal senatus-consulte. By

the first article of the same law, the Hanse Towns [Hamburg,

Bremen, and Lubeck], the Duchy of Lauenburg, and the countries

situated between the North Sea and a line drawn from the

confluence of the Lippe with the Rhine to Halteren, from

Halteren to the Ems above Telgte, from the Ems to the

confluence of the Werra with the Weser, and from Stolzenau on

that river to the Elbe, above the confluence of the Stecknitz,

were at the same time incorporated with the French Empire. ...

The line described would include the northern part of

Westphalia and Hanover, and the duchy of Oldenburg. ... The

Duke of Oldenburg having appealed to the Emperor of Russia,

the head of his house, against this spoliation, Napoleon

offered to compensate him with the town and territory of

Erfurt and the lordship of Blankenheim, which had remained

under French administration since the Peace of Tilsit. But

this offer was at once rejected, and Alexander reserved, by a

formal protest, the rights of his relative. This annexation

was only the complement of other incorporations with the

French Empire during the year 1810. Early in the year, the

Electorate of Hanover had been annexed to the Kingdom of

Westphalia. On February 16th Napoleon had erected the Grand

Duchy of Frankfort, and presented it to the Prince Primate of

the Confederation of the Rhine, with a reversal in favour of

Eugene Beauharnais. On November 12th the Valais in Switzerland

was also annexed to France, with the view of securing the road

over the Simplon. Of all these annexations, that of the Hanse

Towns and the districts on the North Sea was the most

important, and one of the principal causes of the war that

ensued between France and Russia. These annexations were made

without the slightest negociation with any European cabinet,

and it would be superfluous to add, without even a pretext of

right, though the necessity of them from the war with England

was alleged as the motive."

_T. H. Dyer,

History of Modern Europe,

book 7, chapter 15, with foot-note (volume 4)._

"'The English,' said Napoleon, 'have torn asunder the public

rights of Europe; a new order of things governs the universe.

Fresh guarantees having become necessary to me, the annexation

of the mouths of the Scheldt, of the Meuse, of the Rhine, of

the Ems, of the Weser, and of the Elbe to the Empire appears

to me to be the first and the most important. ... The

annexation of the Valais is the anticipated result of the

immense works that I have been making for the past ten years

in that part of the Alps.' And this was all. To justify such

violence he did not condescend to allege any pretext--to urge

forward opportunities that were too long in developing, or to

make trickery subserve the use of force--he consulted nothing

but his policy; in other words, his good pleasure. To take

possession of a country, it was sufficient that the country

suited him: he said so openly, as the simplest thing in the

world, and thought proper to add that these new usurpations

were but a beginning, the first, according to his own

expression, of those which seemed to him still necessary. And

it was Europe, discontented, humbled, driven wild by the

barbarous follies of the continental system, that he thus

defied, as though he wished at any cost to convince every one

that no amicable arrangement or conciliation was possible; and

that there was but one course for governments or men of spirit

to adopt, that of fighting unto death."

_P. Lanfrey,

History of Napoleon,

volume 4, chapter 2._

FRANCE: A. D. 1810-1812.

Continued hostile attitude towards

the United States of America.

See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1810-1812.

FRANCE: A. D. 1810-1812.

The War in the Peninsula.

Wellington's Lines of Torres Vedras.

French retreat from Portugal.

English advance into Spain.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1809-1810 (OCTOBER-SEPTEMBER),

and 1810-1812.

FRANCE: A. D. 1810-1812.

Napoleon's divorce from Josephine and marriage to

Marie-Louise of Austria.

His rupture with the Czar and

preparations for war with Russia.

"Napoleon now revived the idea which he had often entertained

before, of allying himself with one of the great ruling

families. A compliant senate and a packed ecclesiastical

council pronounced his separation from Josephine Beauharnais,

who retired with a magnificent pension to Malmaison, where she

died. As previous marriage proposals to the Russian court had

not been cordially received, Napoleon now turned to Austria.

The matter was speedily arranged with Metternich, and in

March, 1810, the archduchess Maria Louisa arrived in France as

the emperor's wife. The great importance of the marriage was

that it broke the last links which bound Russia to France, and

thus overthrew the alliance of Tilsit. Alexander had been

exasperated by the addition of Western Galicia to the

grand-duchy of Warsaw, which he regarded as a step towards the

restoration of Poland, and therefore as a breach of the

engagement made at Tilsit. The annexation of Oldenburg, whose

duke was a relative of the Czar, was a distinct personal

insult. Alexander showed his irritation by formally deserting

the continental system, which was more ruinous to Russia than

to almost any other country, and by throwing his ports open to

British commerce (December 1810). ... The chief grievance to

Russia was the apparent intention of Napoleon to do something

for the Poles. The increase of the grand-duchy of Warsaw by

the treaty of Vienna was so annoying to Alexander, that he

began to meditate on the possibility of restoring Poland

himself, and making it a dependent kingdom for the Czar, in

the same way as Napoleon had treated Italy. He even went so

far as to sound the Poles on the subject; but he found that

they had not forgotten the three partitions of their country,

and that their sympathies were rather with France than with

Russia. At the same time Napoleon was convinced that until

Russia was subdued his empire was unsafe, and all hopes of

avenging himself upon England were at an end. All through the

year 1811 it was known that war was inevitable, but neither

power was in a hurry to take the initiative. Meanwhile the

various powers that retained nominal independence had to make

up their minds as to the policy they would pursue. For no

country was the decision harder than for Prussia. Neutrality

was out of the question, as the Prussian territories, lying

between the two combatants, must be occupied by one or the

other.

{1353}

The friends and former Colleagues of Stein were unanimous for

a Russian alliance and a desperate struggle for liberty. But

Hardenberg, who had become chancellor in 1810, was too prudent

to embark in a contest, which at the time was hopeless. The

Czar had not been so consistent in his policy as to be a very

desirable ally; and, even with Russian assistance, it was

certain that the Prussian frontiers could not be defended

against the French, who had already garrisons in the chief

fortresses. Hardenberg fully sympathised with the patriots,

but he sacrificed enthusiasm to prudence, and offered the

support of Prussia to France. The treaty was arranged on the

24th of February, 1812. Frederick William gave the French a

free passage through his territories, and undertook to furnish

20,000 men for service in the field, and as many more for

garrison duty. In return for this Napoleon guaranteed the

security of the Prussian kingdom as it stood, and held out the

prospect of additions to it. It was an unnatural and hollow

alliance, and was understood to be so by the Czar.

Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and other friends of Stein resigned

their posts, and many Prussian officers entered the service of

the Czar. Austria, actuated by similar motives, adopted the same

policy, but with less reluctance. After this example had been

set by the two great powers, none of the lesser states of

Germany dared to disobey the peremptory orders of Napoleon.

But Turkey and Sweden, both of them old allies of France, were

at this crisis in the opposition. ... The Swedes were

threatened with starvation by Napoleon's stern command to

close their ports not only against English, but against all

German vessels. Bernadotte, who had just been adopted as the

heir of the childless Charles XIII.; determined to throw in

his lot with his new country, rather than with his old

commander. He had also hopes of compensating Sweden for the

loss of Finland by wresting Norway from the Danes, and this

would never be agreed to by France. Accordingly Sweden

prepared to support the cause of Alexander."

_R. Lodge,

History of Modern Europe,

chapter 24, sections 88 and 41._

"Napoleon's Russian expedition should not be regarded as an

isolated freak of insane pride. He himself regarded it as the

unfortunate effect of a fatality, and he betrayed throughout

an unwonted reluctance and perplexity. 'The war must take

place,' he said, 'it lies in the nature of things.' That is,

it arose naturally, like the other Napoleonic wars, out of the

quarrel with England. Upon the Continental system he had

staked everything. He had united all Europe in the crusade

against England, and no state, least of all such a state as

Russia, could withdraw from the system without practically

joining England. Nevertheless, we may wonder that, if he felt

obliged to make war on Russia, he should have chosen to wage

it in the manner he did, by an overwhelming invasion. For an

ordinary war his resources were greatly superior to those of

Russia. A campaign on the Lithuanian frontier would no doubt

have been unfavourable to Alexander, and might have forced him

to concede the points at issue. Napoleon had already

experienced in Spain the danger of rousing national spirit. It

seems, however, that this lesson had been lost on him."

_J. R. Seeley,

Short History of Napoleon,

chapter 5, section 3._

"Warnings and cautions were not ... wanting to him. He had

been at several different times informed of the desperate

plans of Russia and her savage resolve to destroy all around

him, provided he could be involved in the destruction of the

Empire. He was cautioned, with even more earnestness, of the

German conspiracies. Alquier transmitted to him from Stockholm

a significant remark of Alexander's: 'If the Emperor Napoleon

should experience a reverse, the whole of Germany will rise to

oppose his retreat, or to prevent the arrival of his

reinforcements.' His brother Jerome, who was still better

situated for knowing what was going on in Germany, informed

him, in the month of January, 1811, of the proposal that had

been made to him to enter into a secret league against France,

but the only thanks he received from Napoleon was reproach for

having encouraged such overtures by his equivocal conduct. ...

Marshal Davout and General Rapp transmitted him identically

the same information from Hamburg and Dantzig. But far from

encouraging such confidential communications, Napoleon was

irritated by them. ... 'I do not know why Rapp meddles in what

does not concern him [he wrote]. ... I beg you will not place

such rhapsodies under my eyes. My time is too precious to

waste on such twaddle.' ... In presence of such hallucination,

caused by pride and infatuation, we seem to hear Macbeth in

his delirium insulting the messengers who announced to him the

approach· of the enemy's armies."

_P. Lanfrey,

History of Napoleon,

volume 4, chapter 6._

"That period ought to have been esteemed the happiest of

Napoleon's life. What more could the wildest ambition desire?

... All obeyed him. Nothing was wanting to make him happy!

Nothing, if he could be happy who possessed not a love of

justice. ... The being never existed who possessed ampler

means for promoting the happiness of mankind. Nothing was

required but justice and prudence. The nation expected these

from him, and granted him that unlimited confidence which he

afterwards so cruelly abused. ... Instead of considering with

calmness and moderation how he might best employ his vast

resources, he ruminated on projects beyond the power of man to

execute; forgetting what innumerable victims must be

sacrificed in the vain attempt. ... He aspired at universal

despotism, for no other reason than because a nation, isolated

from the continent and profiting by its happy situation, had

refused to submit to his intolerable·yoke. ... In the hope of

conquering that invincible enemy, he vainly endeavoured to

grasp the extremities of Europe. ... Misled by his rash and

hasty temper, he adopted a false line of politics, and

converted in the north, as he had done before in the south,

the most useful and powerful of his allies into a dangerous

enemy."

_E. Labaume,

Circumstantial Narrative of the Campaign in Russia,

part 1, book 1._

ALSO IN:

_C. Joyneville,

Life and Times of Alexander I.,

volume 2, chapter 3._

_Imbert de Saint Amand,

Memoirs of the Empress Marie Louise._

FRANCE: A. D. 1812 (June).

The captive Pope brought to Fontainebleau.

See PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1812 (June-August).

Defeat by the English in Spain at Salamanca.

Abandonment of Madrid by King Joseph.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1812 (JUNE-AUGUST).

{1354}

FRANCE: A. D. 1812 (June-December).

Napoleon's Russian campaign.

The advance to Moscow.

The burning of the city.

The retreat and its horrors.

See RUSSIA: A. D. 1812.

FRANCE: A. D. 1812-1813 (December-March)

Napoleon's return from Russia.

His measures for creating a new army.

"Whilst Europe, agitated at once by hope, by fear, and by

hatred, was inquiring what had become of Napoleon, whether he

had perished or had been saved, he was crossing in a

sledge--accompanied by the Duke of Vicenza, the Grand Marshal

Duroc, Count Lobau, General Lefevre-Desnouettes, and the

Mameluke Rustan--the vast, plains of Lithuania, of Poland, and

of Saxony, concealed by thick furs; for if his name had been

imprudently uttered, or his countenance recognised, a tragical

catastrophe would have instantly ensued. The man who had so

greatly excited the admiration of nations, who was the object

of their ... superstition, would not at that moment have

escaped their fury. In two places only did he allow himself to

be known, Warsaw and Dresden. ... That he might not occasion

too great surprise, he caused himself to be preceded by an

officer with a few lines for the 'Moniteur,' saying that on

December 5 he had assembled his generals at Smorgoni, had

delegated the command to King Murat, only so long as military

operations were interrupted by the cold, that he had traversed

Warsaw and Dresden, and that he was about to arrive in Paris

to take in hand the affairs of the Empire. ... Napoleon

followed close on the steps of the officer who was to announce

his arrival. On December 18, at half-past 11 P. M., he entered

the Tuileries. ... On the next morning, the 19th, he received

the ministers and grandees of the court ... with extreme

hauteur, maintaining a tranquil but severe aspect, appearing

to expect explanations instead of affording them himself,

treating foreign affairs as of minor consequence, and those of

a domestic nature as of principal import, demanding some light

upon these last,--in short, questioning others in order to

avoid being questioned himself. ... On Sunday, the 20th of

December, the second day after his arrival, Napoleon received

the Senate, the Council of State, and the principal branches

of the administration," which severally addressed to him the

most fulsome flatteries and assurances of support. "After an

infuriated populace basely outraging vanquished princes,

nothing can be seen more melancholy than these great bodies

prostrating themselves at the feet of a power, bestowing upon

it a degree of admiration which increases with its errors,

speaking with ardour of their fidelity, already about to

expire, and swearing to die in its cause when they are on the

eve of hailing the accession of another. Happy are those

countries whose established Constitutions spare them these

humiliating spectacles!" As speedily as possible, Napoleon

applied himself to the recreation of his lost army, by

anticipating the conscription for 1814, and by making new

calls upon the classes which had already furnished their

contingents. All his measures were submissively sanctioned by

the obsequious Senate; but many murmurs of discontent were

heard among the people, and some movements of resistance

needed to be put down. "However, when the enlightened classes

of a country approve a measure, their support is extremely

efficacious. In France, all those classes perceiving that it

was necessary energetically to defend the country against a

foreign enemy, though the Government had been still more in

the wrong than they were, the levies were effected, and the

high functionaries, sustained by a moral acquiescence which

they had not always obtained, fulfilled their duty, though in

heart full of sad and sinister forebodings."

_A. Thiers,

History of the Consulate and the Empire,

book 47 (volume 4)._

ALSO IN:

_Duchess d'Abrantes, Memoirs of Napoleon,

volume 2, chapter 43._

FRANCE: A. D. 1812-1813.

Germanic rising against Napoleon.

War of Liberation.

Lützen.

Bautzen.

Dresden.

Leipsic.

The retreat of the French from beyond the Rhine.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1812-1813,

to 1813 (OCTOBER-DECEMBER).

FRANCE: A. D. 1813 (February-March).

The new Concordat signed and retracted by the Pope.

See PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1813 (June-November).

Defeat at Vittoria and in the Pyrenees.

Retreat from Spain.

See SPAIN: A. D. 1812-1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1813 (November-December).

Dutch independence regained.

See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1813.

FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (January).

The Pope set free to return to Rome.

See PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814.

FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (January-March).

The allied invasion.

Napoleon's campaign of defense.

His cause lost.

Surrender of Paris.

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