REPORT OF COMMISSION ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS
The Commission on the League of Nations, over which President Wilson
presided, held ten meetings between February 3 and February 14, on which
latter day it submitted a report at a plenary session of the Conference
on the Preliminaries of Peace. The report was presented by the President
in an address of exceptional excellence which made a deep impression on
his hearers. His dignity of manner, his earnestness, and his logical
presentation of the subject, clothed as it was in well-chosen phrases,
unquestionably won the admiration of all, even of those who could not
reconcile their personal views with the Covenant, as reported by the
Commission. It was a masterly effort, an example of literary rather than
emotional oratory, peculiarly fitting to the occasion and to the temper
and intellectual character of the audience.
Considering the brief time given to its discussion in the Commission and
the necessary haste required to complete the document before the
President's departure, the Covenant as reported to the Conference was a
creditable piece of work. Many of the more glaring errors of expression
and some of the especially objectionable features of the President's
revised draft were eliminated. There were others which persisted, but
the improvement was so marked that the gross defects in word and phrase
largely disappeared. If one accepted the President's theory of
organization, there was little to criticize in the report, except a
certain inexactness of expression which indicated a lack of technical
knowledge on the part of those who put the Covenant into final form. But
these crudities and ambiguities of language would, it was fair to
presume, disappear if the articles passed through the hands of
drafting experts.
Fundamentally, however, the Covenant as reported was as wrong as the
President's original draft, since it contained the affirmative guaranty
of political independence and territorial integrity, the primacy of the
Five Great Powers on the Executive Council, and the perplexing and
seemingly unsound system of mandates. In this I could not willingly
follow President Wilson, but I felt that I had done all that I could
properly do in opposition to his theory. The responsibility of decision
rested with him and he had made his decision. There was nothing more
to be said.
On the evening of the day of the plenary session, at which the report of
the League of Nations was submitted, the President left Paris for Brest
where the George Washington was waiting to convey him to the United
States. He carried with him the report of the Commission, whose
deliberations and decisions he had so manifestly dominated. He went
prepared to meet his political antagonists and the enemies of the
League, confidently believing that he could win a popular support that
would silence the opposition which had been increasingly manifest in the
Halls of Congress and in some of the Republican newspapers which
declined to follow Mr. Taft, Mr. Wickersham, Mr. Straus, and other
influential Republican members of the League to Enforce Peace.
During the ten days preceding February 14, when the Commission on the
League of Nations held daily sessions, the President had no conferences
with the American Commissioners except, of course, with Colonel House,
his American colleague on the Commission on the League. On the morning
of the 14th, however, he called a meeting of the Commissioners and
delivered to them the printed report which was to be presented that
afternoon to the plenary session. As the meetings of the Commission on
the League of Nations had been secret, the American Commissioners, other
than Colonel House, were almost entirely ignorant of the proceedings and
of the progress being made. Colonel House's office staff knew far more
about it than did Mr. White, General Bliss, or I. When the President
delivered the report to the Commissioners they were, therefore, in no
position to express an opinion concerning it. The only remarks were
expressions of congratulation that he had been able to complete the work
before his departure. They were merely complimentary. As to the merits
of the document nothing was or could be said by the three Commissioners,
since no opportunity had been given them to study it, and without a
critical examination any comment concerning its provisions would have
been worthless. I felt and I presume that my two colleagues, who had not
been consulted as to the work of the Commission on the League, felt,
that it was, in any event, too late to offer suggestions or make
criticisms. The report was in print; it was that afternoon to be laid
before the Conference; in twelve hours the President would be on his way
to the United States. Clearly it would have been useless to find fault
with the report, especially if the objections related to the fundamental
ideas of the organization which it was intended to create. The President
having in the report declared the American policy, his commissioned
representatives were bound to acquiesce in his decision whatever their
personal views were. Acquiescence or resignation was the choice, and
resignation would have undoubtedly caused an unfortunate, if not a
critical, situation. In the circumstances acquiescence seemed the only
practical and proper course.
The fact that in ten meetings and in a week and a half a Commission
composed of fifteen members, ten of whom represented the Five Great
Powers and five of whom represented the lesser powers (to which were
later added four others), completed the drafting of a detailed plan of a
League of Nations, is sufficient in itself to raise doubts as to the
thoroughness with which the work was done and as to the care with which
the various plans and numerous provisions proposed were studied,
compared, and discussed. It gives the impression that many clauses were
accepted under the pressing necessity of ending the Commission's labors
within a fixed time. The document itself bears evidence of the haste
with which it was prepared, and is almost conclusive proof in itself
that it was adopted through personal influence rather than because of
belief in the wisdom of all its provisions.
The Covenant of the League of Nations was intended to be the greatest
international compact that had ever been written. It was to be the
_Maxima Charta_ of mankind securing to the nations their rights and
liberties and uniting them for the preservation of universal peace. To
harmonize the conflicting views of the members of the Commission--and it
was well known that they were conflicting--and to produce in eleven days
a world charter, which would contain the elements of greatness or even
of perpetuity, was on the face of it an undertaking impossible of
accomplishment. The document which was produced sufficiently establishes
the truth of this assertion.
It required a dominant personality on the Commission to force through a
detailed plan of a League in so short a time. President Wilson was such
a personality. By adopting the scheme of an oligarchy of the Great
Powers he silenced the dangerous opposition of the French and British
members of the Commission who willingly passed over minor defects in the
plan provided this Concert of Powers, this Quintuple Alliance, was
incorporated in the Covenant. And for the same reason it may be assumed
the Japanese and Italians found the President's plan acceptable. Mr.
Wilson won a great personal triumph, but he did so by surrendering the
fundamental principle of the equality of nations. In his eagerness to
"make the world safe for democracy" he abandoned international democracy
and became the advocate of international autocracy.
It is not my purpose to analyze the provisions of the Covenant which was
submitted to the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace on February
14, 1919. My objections to it have been sufficiently discussed in the
preceding pages. It would be superfluous to repeat them. The innumerable
published articles and the endless debates on the Covenant have brought
out its good features as well as its defects. Unfortunately for the
opponents and defenders of the document alike some of the objections
urged have been flagrantly unjustifiable and based on false premises and
misstatements of fact and of law, which seem to show political motives
and not infrequently personal animosity toward Mr. Wilson. The
exaggerated statements and unfair arguments of some of the Senators,
larded, as they often were, with caustic sarcasm and vindictive
personalities, did much to prevent an honest and useful discussion of
the merits and demerits of the Covenant.
The effect upon President Wilson of this campaign against him
personally--and it seems to me that it would have had the same effect
upon any man of spirit--was to arouse his indignation. Possibly a less
stubborn man would not have assumed so uncompromising an attitude as he
did or have permitted his ire to find expression in threats, but it
cannot be denied that there was provocation for the resentment which he
exhibited. The President has been blamed for not having sought more
constantly to placate the opponents of the Covenant and to meet them on
a common ground of compromise, especially during his visit to the United
States in February, 1919. From the point of view of policy there is
justice in blaming him, but, when one considers the personal animus
shown and the insolent tone assumed by some of his critics, his conduct
was very human; not wise, but human. Mr. Wilson had never shown a spirit
of conciliation in dealing with those who opposed him. Even in the case
of a purely political question he appeared to consider opposition to be
a personal affront and he was disposed to retaliate in a personal way.
In a measure this explains the personal enmity of many of his political
foes. I think that it is not unjust to say that President Wilson was
stronger in his hatreds than in his friendships. He seemed to lack the
ability to forgive one who had in any way offended him or opposed him.
Believing that much of the criticism of the Covenant was in reality
criticism of him as its author, a belief that was in a measure
justified, the President made it a personal matter. He threatened, in a
public address delivered in the New York Opera House on the eve of his
departure for France, to force the Republican majority to accept the
Covenant by interweaving the League of Nations into the terms of peace
to such an extent that they could not be separated, so that, if they
rejected the League, they would be responsible for defeating the Treaty
and preventing a restoration of peace. With the general demand for peace
this seemed no empty threat, although the propriety of making it may be
questioned. It had, however, exactly the opposite effect from that which
the President intended. Its utterance proved to be as unwise as it was
ineffective. The opposition Senators resented the idea of being coerced.
They became more than ever determined to defeat a President whom they
charged with attempting to disregard and nullify the right of the Senate
to exercise independently its constitutional share in the treaty-making
power. Thus at the very outset of the struggle between the President and
the Senate a feeling of hostility was engendered which continued with
increasing bitterness on both sides and prevented any compromise or
concession in regard to the Covenant as it finally appeared in the
Treaty of Versailles.
When President Wilson returned to Paris after the adjournment of the
Sixty-Fifth Congress on March 4, 1919, he left behind him opponents who
were stronger and more confident than they were when he landed ten days
before. While his appeal to public opinion in favor of the League of
Nations had been to an extent successful, there was a general feeling
that the Covenant as then drafted required amendment so that the
sovereign rights and the traditional policies of the United States
should be safeguarded. Until the document was amended it seemed that the
opposition had the better of the argument with the people. Furthermore,
when the new Congress met, the Republicans would have a majority in the
Senate which was of special importance in the matter of the Treaty which
would contain the Covenant, because it would, when sent to the Senate,
be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations to report on its
ratification and a majority of that Committee, under a Republican
organization, would presumably be hostile to the plan for a League
advocated by the President. The Committee could hinder and possibly
prevent the acceptance of the Covenant, while it would have the
opportunity to place the opposition's case in a favorable light before
the American people and to attack the President's conduct of the
negotiations at Paris.
I believe that the President realized the loss of strategic position
which he had sustained by the Democratic defeat at the polls in
November, 1918, but was persuaded that, by making certain alterations in
the Covenant suggested by Republicans favorable to the formation of a
League, and especially those advocating a League to Enforce Peace, he
would be able to win sufficient support in the Senate and from the
people to deprive his antagonists of the advantage which they had gained
by the elections. This he sought to do on his return to Paris about the
middle of March. If the same spirit of compromise had been shown while
he was in America it would doubtless have gone far to weaken hostility
to the Covenant. Unfortunately for his purpose he assumed a contrary
attitude, and in consequence the sentiment against the League was
crystallized and less responsive to the concessions which the President
appeared willing to make when the Commission on the League of Nations
resumed its sittings, especially as the obnoxious Article 10
remained intact.
In the formulation of the amendments to the Covenant, which were
incorporated in it after the President's return from the United States
and before its final adoption by the Conference, I had no part and I
have no reason to think that Mr. White or General Bliss shared in the
work. As these amendments or modifications did not affect the theory of
organization or the fundamental principles of the League, they in no way
changed my views or lessened the differences between the President's
judgment and mine. Our differences were as to the bases and not as to
the details of the Covenant. Since there was no disposition to change
the former we were no nearer an agreement than we were in January.
The President's visit to the United States had been disappointing to the
friends of a League in that he had failed to rally to the support of the
Covenant an overwhelming popular sentiment in its favor which the
opposition in the Senate could not resist. The natural reaction was that
the peoples of Europe and their statesmen lost a measure of their
enthusiasm and faith in the project. Except in the case of a few
idealists, there was a growing disposition to view it from the purely
practical point of view and to speculate on its efficacy as an
instrument to interpret and carry out the international will. Among the
leaders of political thought in the principal Allied countries, the
reports of the President's reception in the United States were
sufficiently conflicting to arouse doubt as to whether the American
people were actually behind him in his plan for a League, and this doubt
was not diminished by his proposed changes in the Covenant, which
indicated that he was not in full control of the situation at home.
Two weeks after the President had resumed his duties as a negotiator and
had begun the work of revising the Covenant, I made a memorandum of my
views as to the situation that then existed. The memorandum is
as follows:
"_March_ 25, 1919
"With the increasing military preparations and operations throughout
Eastern Europe and the evident purpose of all these quarreling
nations to ignore any idea of disarmament and to rely upon force to
obtain and retain territory and rights, the League of Nations is
being discussed with something like contempt by the cynical,
hard-headed statesmen of those countries which are being put on a
war-footing. They are cautious and courteous out of regard for the
President. I doubt if the truth reaches him, but it comes to me from
various sources.
"These men say that in theory the idea is all right and is an ideal
to work toward, but that under present conditions it is not practical
in preventing war. They ask, what nation is going to rely on the
guaranty in the Covenant if a jealous or hostile neighbor maintains a
large army. They want to know whether it would be wise or not to
disarm under such conditions. Of course the answers are obvious. But,
if the guaranty is not sufficient, or accepted as sufficient,
protection, what becomes of the central purpose of the League and the
chief reason for creating it?
"I believe that the President and Colonel House see this, though they
do not admit it, and that to save the League from being cast into the
discard they will attempt to make of it a sort of international
agency to do certain things which would normally be done by
independent international commissions. Such a course would save the
League from being still-born and would so interweave it with the
terms of peace that to eliminate it would be to open up some
difficult questions.
"Of course the League of Nations as originally planned had one
supreme object and that was to prevent future wars. That was
substantially all that it purposed to do. Since then new functions
have been gradually added until the chief argument for the League's
existence has been almost lost to sight. The League has been made a
convenient 'catch-all' for all sorts of international actions. At
first this was undoubtedly done to give the League something to do,
and now it is being done to save it from extinction or from
being ignored.
"I am not denying that a common international agent may be a good
thing. In fact the plan has decided merit. But the organization of
the League does not seem to me suitable to perform efficiently and
properly these new functions.
"However, giving this character to the League may save it from being
merely an agreeable dream. As the repository of international
controversies requiring long and careful consideration it may live
and be useful.
"My impression is that the principal sponsors for the League are
searching through the numerous disputes which are clogging the wheels
of the Conference, seizing upon every one which can possibly be
referred, and heaping them on the League of Nations to give it
standing as a useful and necessary adjunct to the Treaty.
"At least that is an interesting view of what is taking place and
opens a wide field for speculation as to the future of the League and
the verdict which history will render as to its origin, its nature,
and its real value."
I quote this memorandum because it gives my thoughts at the time
concerning the process of weaving the League into the terms of peace as
the President had threatened to do. I thought then that it had a double
purpose, to give a practical reason for the existence of the League and
to make certain the ratification of the Covenant by the Senate. No fact
has since developed which has induced me to change my opinion.
In consequence of the functions which were added to the League, the
character of the League itself underwent a change. Instead of an agency
created solely for the prevention of international wars, it was
converted into an agency to carry out the terms of peace. Its idealistic
conception was subordinated to the materialistic purpose of confirming
to the victorious nations the rewards of victory. It is true that during
the long struggle between the President and the Senate on the question
of ratification there was in the debates a general return to the
original purpose of the League by both the proponents and opponents of
the Covenant, but that fact in no way affects the truth of the assertion
that, in order to save the League of Nations, its character was changed
by extending its powers and duties as a common agent of the nations
which had triumphed over the Central Alliance.
The day before the Treaty of Peace was delivered to the German
plenipotentiaries (May 6) its terms induced me to write a note entitled
"The Greatest Loss Caused by the War," referring to the loss of idealism
to the world. In that note I wrote of the League of Nations as follows:
"Even the measure of idealism, with which the League of Nations was
at the first impregnated, has, under the influence and intrigue of
ambitious statesmen of the Old World, been supplanted by an open
recognition that force and selfishness are primary elements in
international co-operation. The League has succumbed to this
reversion to a cynical materialism. It is no longer a creature of
idealism. Its very source and reason have been dried up and have
almost disappeared. The danger is that it will become a bulwark of
the old order, a check upon all efforts to bring man again under the
influence which he has lost."
The President, in the addresses which he afterward made in advocacy of
the Covenant and of ratification of the Treaty, indicated clearly the
wide divergence of opinion between us as to the character of the League
provided for in the Treaty. I do not remember that the subject was
directly discussed by us, but I certainly took no pains to hide my
misgivings as to the place it would have in the international relations
of the future. However, as Mr. Wilson knew that I disapproved of the
theory and basic principles of the organization, especially the
recognition of the oligarchy of the Five Powers, he could not but
realize that I considered that idealism had given place to political
expediency in order to secure for the Covenant the support of the
powerful nations represented at the Conference. This was my belief as to
our relations when the Treaty of Peace containing the Covenant was laid
before the Germans at the Hôtel des Reservoirs in Versailles.