THE GUARANTY IN THE REVISED COVENANT
During the three weeks preceding the meeting of the Commission on the
League the work of revising the President's original draft of the
Covenant had been in progress, the President and Colonel House holding
frequent interviews with the more influential delegates, particularly
the British and French statesmen who had been charged with the duty of
studying the subject. While I cannot speak from personal knowledge, I
learned that the suggested changes in terms and language were put into
form by members of the Colonel's office staff. In addition to
modifications which were made to meet the wishes of the foreign
statesmen, especially the British, Mr. Gordon Auchincloss, the
son-in-law and secretary of Colonel House, and Mr. David Hunter Miller,
Auchincloss's law partner and one of the accredited legal advisers of
the American Commission, prepared an elaborate memorandum on the
President's draft of a Covenant which contained comments and also
suggested changes in the text. On account of the intimate relations
existing between Messrs. Miller and Auchincloss and Colonel House it
seems reasonable to assume that their comments and suggestions were
approved by, if they did not to an extent originate with, the Colonel.
The memorandum was first made public by Mr. William C. Bullitt during
his hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in
September, 1919 (Senate Doc. 106, 66th Congress, 1st Session, pages 1177
_et seq._).
The most important amendment to the Covenant suggested by these advisers
was, in my judgment, the one relating to Article III of the draft, which
became Article 10 in the Treaty. After a long criticism of the
President's proposed guaranty, in which it is declared that "such an
agreement would destroy the Monroe Doctrine," and that "any guaranty of
independence and integrity means war by the guarantor if a breach of the
independence or integrity of the guaranteed State is attempted and
persisted in," the memorandum proposed that the following be
substituted:
"Each Contracting Power severally covenants and guarantees that it
will not violate the territorial integrity or impair the political
independence of any other Contracting Power."
This proposed substitute should be compared with the language of the
"self-denying covenant" that I sent to the President on December 23,
1918, the pertinent portion of which is repeated here for the purpose of
such comparison:
"Each power signatory or adherent hereto severally covenants and
guarantees that it will not violate the territorial integrity or
impair the political sovereignty of any other power signatory or
adherent to this convention, ..."
The practical adoption of the language of my proposed substitute in the
memorandum furnishes conclusive proof that Colonel House was "entirely
converted" to my form of a guaranty as he had frankly assured me that he
was on the evening of January 6. I am convinced also that Mr. Henry
White and General Bliss held the same views on the subject. It is
obvious that President Wilson was the only one of the American
representatives at Paris who favored the affirmative guaranty, but, as
he possessed the constitutional authority to determine independently the
policy of the United States, his form of a guaranty was written into the
revised draft of a Covenant submitted to the Commission on the League of
Nations and with comparatively little change was finally adopted in the
Treaty of Peace with Germany.
The memorandum prepared by Messrs. Miller and Auchincloss was apparently
in the President's hands before the revised draft was completed, for
certain changes in the original draft were in accord with the
suggestions made in their memorandum. His failure to modify the guaranty
may be considered another rejection of the "self-denying covenant" and a
final decision to insist on the affirmative form of guaranty in spite of
the unanimous opposition of his American colleagues.
In view of what later occurred a very definite conclusion may be reached
concerning the President's rejection of the proposed substitute for his
guaranty. Article 10 was from the first the storm center of opposition
to the report of the Commission on the League of Nations and the chief
cause for refusal of consent to the ratification of the Treaty of
Versailles by the Senate of the United States. The vulnerable nature of
the provision, which had been so plainly pointed out to the President
before the Covenant was submitted to the Commission, invited attack. If
he had listened to the advice of his colleagues, in fact if he had
listened to any American who expressed an opinion on the subject, the
Treaty would probably have obtained the speedy approval of the Senate.
There would have been opposition from those inimical to the United
States entering any international organization, but it would have been
insufficient to prevent ratification of the Treaty.
As it was, the President's unalterable determination to have his form of
guaranty in the Covenant, in which he was successful, and his firm
refusal to modify it in any substantial way resulted in strengthening
the opponents to the League to such an extent that they were able to
prevent the Treaty from obtaining the necessary consent of two thirds of
the Senators.
The sincerity of Mr. Wilson's belief in the absolute necessity of the
guaranty, which he proposed, to the preservation of international peace
cannot be doubted. While his advisers were practically unanimous in the
opinion that policy, as well as principle, demanded a change in the
guaranty, he clung tenaciously to the affirmative form. The result was
that which was feared and predicted by his colleagues. The President,
and the President alone, must bear the responsibility for the result.