THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
A PERSONAL NARRATIVE
BY ROBERT LANSING
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS
CONTENTS
I. REASONS FOR WRITING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE
II. MR. WILSON'S PRESENCE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE
III. GENERAL PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS
IV. SUBSTITUTE ARTICLES PROPOSED
V. THE AFFIRMATIVE GUARANTY AND BALANCE OF POWER
VI. THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN AND THE CECIL PLAN
VII. SELF-DETERMINATION
VIII. THE CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 10, 1919
IX. A RESOLUTION INSTEAD OF THE COVENANT
X. THE GUARANTY IN THE REVISED COVENANT
XI. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
XII. REPORT OF COMMISSION ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS
XIII. THE SYSTEM OF MANDATES
XIV. DIFFERENCES AS TO THE LEAGUE RECAPITULATED
XV. THE PROPOSED TREATY WITH FRANCE
XVI. LACK OF AN AMERICAN PROGRAMME
XVII. SECRET DIPLOMACY
XVIII. THE SHANTUNG SETTLEMENT
XIX. THE BULLITT AFFAIR
CONCLUSION
APPENDICES
I. THE PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE COVENANT OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, LAID BEFORE THE AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON JANUARY 10, 1919
II. LEAGUE OF NATIONS PLAN OF LORD ROBERT CECIL
III. THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THE TREATY OF
VERSAILLES
IV. THE FOURTEEN POINTS
V. PRINCIPLES DECLARED BY PRESIDENT WILSON IN HIS ADDRESS OF
FEBRUARY 11, 1918
VI. THE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES RELATING TO SHANTUNG
INDEX
ILLUSTRATIONS
THE AMERICAN PEACE DELEGATION AT PARIS
Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A.
FACSIMILE OF MR. LANSING'S COMMISSION AS A COMMISSIONER PLENIPOTENTIARY
TO NEGOTIATE PEACE
THE RUE ROYALE ON THE ARRIVAL OF PRESIDENT WILSON ON DECEMBER 14, 1918
Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A.
THE AMERICAN PEACE DELEGATION AND STAFF
Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A.
A MEETING AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY AFTER PRESIDENT WILSON'S
DEPARTURE FROM PARIS
FACSIMILE OF MR. LANSING'S "FULL POWERS" TO NEGOTIATE A TREATY OF
ASSISTANCE TO FRANCE
THE DAILY CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION
Photograph by Isabey, Paris
CHRONOLOGY
The Declaration of the Fourteen Points January 18, 1918
Declaration of Four Additional Bases of Peace February 11, 1918
Departure of Colonel House for Paris to represent the
President on Supreme War Council October 17, 1918
Signature of Armistice, 5 A.M.; effective, 11 A.M.
November 11, 1918
Departure of President and American Commission
for France December 4, 1918
Arrival of President and American Commission in
Paris December 14, 1918
Meeting of Supreme War Council January 12, 1919
First Plenary Session of Peace Conference January 25, 1919
Plenary Session at which Report on the League of Nations
was Submitted February 14, 1919
Departure of President from Paris for United States
February 14, 1919
President lands at Boston February 24, 1919
Departure of President from New York for France March 5, 1919
President arrives in Paris March 14, 1919
Organization of Council of Four About March 24, 1919
President's public statement in regard to Fiume April 23, 1919
Adoption of Commission's Report on League of Nations
by the Conference April 28, 1919
The Shantung Settlement April 30, 1919
Delivery of the Peace Treaty to the German
Plenipotentiaries May 7, 1919
Signing of Treaty of Versailles June 28, 1919
Signing of Treaty of Assistance with France June 28, 1919
Departure of President for the United States June 28, 1919
Departure of Mr. Lansing from Paris for United
States July 12, 1919
Hearing of Mr. Lansing before Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations August 6, 1919
Conference of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
with the President at the White House August 19, 1919
Hearing of Mr. Bullitt before Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations September 12, 1919
Return of President to Washington from tour
of West September 28, 1919
Resignation of Mr. Lansing as Secretary
of State February 13, 1920
CHAPTER I
REASONS FOR WRITING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE
"While we were still in Paris, I felt, and have felt increasingly ever
since, that you accepted my guidance and direction on questions with
regard to which I had to instruct you only with increasing
reluctance....
"... I must say that it would relieve me of embarrassment, Mr.
Secretary, the embarrassment of feeling your reluctance and divergence
of judgment, if you would give your present office up and afford me an
opportunity to select some one whose mind would more willingly go along
with mine."
These words are taken from the letter which President Wilson wrote to me
on February 11, 1920. On the following day I tendered my resignation as
Secretary of State by a letter, in which I said:
"Ever since January, 1919, I have been conscious of the fact that you
no longer were disposed to welcome my advice in matters pertaining to
the negotiations in Paris, to our foreign service, or to
international affairs in general. Holding these views I would, if I
had consulted my personal inclination alone, have resigned as
Secretary of State and as a Commissioner to Negotiate Peace. I felt,
however, that such a step might have been misinterpreted both at home
and abroad, and that it was my duty to cause you no embarrassment in
carrying forward the great task in which you were then engaged."
The President was right in his impression that, "while we were still in
Paris," I had accepted his guidance and direction with reluctance. It
was as correct as my statement that, as early as January, 1919, I was
conscious that he was no longer disposed to welcome my advice in matters
pertaining to the peace negotiations at Paris.
There have been obvious reasons of propriety for my silence until now as
to the divergence of judgment, the differences of opinion and the
consequent breach in the relations between President Wilson and myself.
They have been the subject of speculation and inference which have left
uncertain the true record. The time has come when a frank account of our
differences can be given publicity without a charge being made of
disloyalty to the Administration in power.
The President, in his letter of February 11, 1920, from which the
quotation is made, indicated my unwillingness to follow him in the
course which he adopted at Paris, but he does not specifically point out
the particular subjects as to which we were not in accord. It is
unsatisfactory, if not criticizable, to leave the American people in
doubt as to a disagreement between two of their official representatives
upon a matter of so grave importance to the country as the negotiation
of the Treaty of Versailles. They are entitled to know the truth in
order that they may pass judgment upon the merits of the differences
which existed. I am not willing that the present uncertainty as to the
facts should continue. Possibly some may think that I have remained
silent too long. If I have, it has been only from a sense of obligation
to an Administration of which I was so long a member. It has not been
through lack of desire to lay the record before the public.
The statements which will be made in the succeeding pages will not be
entirely approved by some of my readers. In the circumstances it is far
too much to expect to escape criticism. The review of facts and the
comments upon them may be characterized in certain quarters as disloyal
to a superior and as violative of the seal of silence which is
considered generally to apply to the intercourse and communications
between the President and his official advisers. Under normal conditions
such a characterization would not be unjustified. But the present case
is different from the usual one in which a disagreement arises between a
President and a high official of his Administration.
Mr. Wilson made our differences at Paris one of the chief grounds for
stating that he would be pleased to take advantage of my expressed
willingness to resign. The manifest imputation was that I had advised
him wrongly and that, after he had decided to adopt a course contrary to
my advice, I had continued to oppose his views and had with reluctance
obeyed his instructions. Certainly no American official is in honor
bound to remain silent under such an imputation which approaches a
charge of faithlessness and of a secret, if not open, avoidance of duty.
He has, in my judgment, the right to present the case to the American
people in order that they may decide whether the imputation was
justified by the facts, and whether his conduct was or was not in the
circumstances in accord with the best traditions of the public service
of the United States.
A review of this sort becomes necessarily a personal narrative, which,
because of its intimate nature, is embarrassing to the writer, since he
must record his own acts, words, desires, and purposes, his own views as
to a course of action, and his own doubts, fears, and speculations as to
the future. If there were another method of treatment which would retain
the authoritative character of a personal statement, it would be a
satisfaction to adopt it. But I know of none. The true story can only be
told from the intimate and personal point of view. As I intend to tell
the true story I offer no further apology for its personal character.
Before beginning a recital of the relations existing between President
Wilson and myself during the Paris Conference, I wish to state, and to
emphasize the statement, that I was never for a moment unmindful that
the Constitution of the United States confides to the President the
absolute right of conducting the foreign relations of the Republic, and
that it is the duty of a Commissioner to follow the President's
instructions in the negotiation of a treaty. Many Americans, some of
whom are national legislators and solicitous about the Constitution,
seem to have ignored or to have forgotten this delegation of exclusive
authority, with the result that they have condemned the President in
intemperate language for exercising this executive right. As to the
wisdom of the way in which Mr. Wilson exercised it in directing the
negotiations at Paris individual opinions may differ, but as to the
legality of his conduct there ought to be but one mind. From first to
last he acted entirely within his constitutional powers as President of
the United States.
The duties of a diplomatic representative commissioned by the President
and given full powers to negotiate a treaty are, in addition to the
formal carrying out of his instructions, twofold, namely, to advise the
President during the negotiation of his views as to the wise course to
be adopted, and to prevent the President, in so far as possible, from
taking any step in the proceedings which may impair the rights of his
country or may be injurious to its interests. These duties, in my
opinion, are equally imperative whether the President directs the
negotiations through written instructions issuing from the White House
or conducts them in person. For an American plenipotentiary to remain
silent, and by his silence to give the impression that he approves a
course of action which he in fact believes to be wrong in principle or
contrary to good policy, constitutes a failure to perform his full duty
to the President and to the country. It is his duty to speak and to
speak frankly and plainly.
With this conception of the obligations of a Commissioner to Negotiate
Peace, obligations which were the more compelling in my case because of
my official position as Secretary of State, I felt it incumbent upon me
to offer advice to the President whenever it seemed necessary to me to
consider the adoption of a line of action in regard to the negotiations,
and particularly so when the indications were that the President
purposed to reach a decision which seemed to me unwise or impolitic.
Though from the first I felt that my suggestions were received with
coldness and my criticisms with disfavor, because they did not conform
to the President's wishes and intentions, I persevered in my efforts to
induce him to abandon in some cases or to modify in others a course
which would in my judgment be a violation of principle or a mistake in
policy. It seemed to me that duty demanded this, and that, whatever the
consequences might be, I ought not to give tacit assent to that which I
believed wrong or even injudicious.
The principal subjects, concerning which President Wilson and I were in
marked disagreement, were the following: His presence in Paris during
the peace negotiations and especially his presence there as a delegate
to the Peace Conference; the fundamental principles of the constitution
and functions of a League of Nations as proposed or advocated by him;
the form of the organic act, known as the "Covenant," its elaborate
character and its inclusion in the treaty restoring a state of peace;
the treaty of defensive alliance with France; the necessity for a
definite programme which the American Commissioners could follow in
carrying on the negotiations; the employment of private interviews and
confidential agreements in reaching settlements, a practice which gave
color to the charge of "secret diplomacy"; and, lastly, the admission of
the Japanese claims to possession of German treaty rights at Kiao-Chau
and in the Province of Shantung.
Of these seven subjects of difference the most important were those
relating to the League of Nations and the Covenant, though our opposite
views as to Shantung were more generally known and more frequently the
subject of public comment. While chief consideration will be given to
the differences regarding the League and the Covenant, the record would
be incomplete if the other subjects were omitted. In fact nearly all of
these matters of difference are more or less interwoven and have a
collateral, if not a direct, bearing upon one another. They all
contributed in affecting the attitude of President Wilson toward the
advice that I felt it my duty to volunteer, an attitude which was
increasingly impatient of unsolicited criticism and suggestion and which
resulted at last in the correspondence of February, 1920, that ended
with the acceptance of my resignation as Secretary of State.
The review of these subjects will be, so far as it is possible, treated
in chronological order, because, as the matters of difference increased
in number, they gave emphasis to the divergence of judgment which
existed between the President and myself. The effect was cumulative, and
tended not only to widen the breach, but to make less and less possible
a restoration of our former relations. It was my personal desire to
support the President's views concerning the negotiations at Paris, but,
when in order to do so it became necessary to deny a settled conviction
and to suppress a conception of the true principle or the wise policy to
be followed, I could not do it and feel that to give support under such
conditions accorded with true loyalty to the President of the
United States.
It was in this spirit that my advice was given and my suggestions were
made, though in doing so I believed it justifiable to conform as far as
it was possible to the expressed views of Mr. Wilson, or to what seemed
to be his views, concerning less important matters and to concentrate on
those which seemed vital. I went in fact as far as I could in adopting
his views in the hope that my advice would be less unpalatable and
would, as a consequence, receive more sympathetic consideration.
Believing that I understood the President's temperament, success in an
attempt to change his views seemed to lie in moderation and in partial
approval of his purpose rather than in bluntly arguing that it was
wholly wrong and should be abandoned. This method of approach, which
seemed the expedient one at the time, weakened, in some instances at
least, the criticisms and objections which I made. It is very possible
that even in this diluted form my views were credited with wrong motives
by the President so that he suspected my purpose. It is to be hoped that
this was the true explanation of Mr. Wilson's attitude of mind, for the
alternative forces a conclusion as to the cause for his resentful
reception of honest differences of opinion, which no one, who admires
his many sterling qualities and great attainments, will
willingly accept.
Whatever the cause of the President's attitude toward the opinions which
I expressed on the subjects concerning which our views were at
variance--and I prefer to assume that the cause was a misapprehension of
my reasons for giving them--the result was that he was disposed to give
them little weight. The impression made was that he was irritated by
opposition to his views, however moderately urged, and that he did not
like to have his judgment questioned even in a friendly way. It is, of
course, possible that this is not a true estimate of the President's
feelings. It may do him an injustice. But his manner of meeting
criticism and his disposition to ignore opposition can hardly be
interpreted in any other way.
There is the alternative possibility that Mr. Wilson was convinced that,
after he had given a subject mature consideration and reached a
decision, his judgment was right or at least better than that of any
adviser. A conviction of this nature, if it existed, would naturally
have caused him to feel impatient with any one who attempted to
controvert his decisions and would tend to make him believe that
improper motives induced the opposition or criticism. This alternative,
which is based of necessity on a presumption as to the temperament of
Mr. Wilson that an unprejudiced and cautious student of personality
would hesitate to adopt, I mention only because there were many who
believed it to be the correct explanation of his attitude. In view of my
intimate relations with the President prior to the Paris Conference I
feel that in justice to him I should say that he did not, except on rare
occasions, resent criticism of a proposed course of action, and, while
he seemed in a measure changed after departing from the United States in
December, 1918, I do not think that the change was sufficient to justify
the presumption of self-assurance which it would be necessary to adopt
if the alternative possibility is considered to furnish the better
explanation.
It is, however, natural, considering what occurred at Paris, to search
out the reason or reasons for the President's evident unwillingness to
listen to advice when he did not solicit it, and for his failure to take
all the American Commissioners into his confidence. But to attempt to
dissect the mentality and to analyze the intellectual processes of
Woodrow Wilson is not my purpose. It would only invite discussion and
controversy as to the truth of the premises and the accuracy of the
deductions reached. The facts will be presented and to an extent the
impressions made upon me at the time will be reviewed, but impressions
of that character which are not the result of comparison with subsequent
events and of mature deliberation are not always justified. They may
later prove to be partially or wholly wrong. They have the value,
nevertheless, of explaining in many cases why I did or did not do
certain things, and of disclosing the state of mind that in a measure
determined my conduct which without this recital of contemporaneous
impressions might mystify one familiar with what afterwards took place.
The notes, letters, and memoranda which are quoted in the succeeding
pages, as well as the opinions and beliefs held at the time (of which,
in accordance with a practice of years, I kept a record supplementing my
daily journal of events), should be weighed and measured by the
situation which existed when they were written and not alone in the
light of the complete review of the proceedings. In forming an opinion
as to my differences with the President it should be the reader's
endeavor to place himself in my position at the time and not judge them
solely by the results of the negotiations at Paris. It comes to this:
Was I justified then? Am I justified now? If those questions are
answered impartially and without prejudice, there is nothing further
that I would ask of the reader.