THE PURCHASE OF LOUISIANA; AND BURR'S CONSPIRACY, 1803-1807.
A great and growing race may acquire vast stretches of scantily peopled
territory in any one of several ways. Often the statesman, no less than
the soldier, plays an all-important part in winning the new land;
nevertheless, it is usually true that the diplomatists who by treaty
ratify the acquisition usurp a prominence in history to which they are
in no way entitled by the real worth of their labors.
Ways in which Territorial Expansion may Take Place.
The territory may be gained by the armed forces of the nation, and
retained by treaty. It was in this way that England won the Cape of Good
Hope from Holland; it was in this way that the United States won New
Mexico. Such a conquest is due, not to the individual action of members
of the winning race, but to the nation as a whole, acting through her
soldiers and statesmen. It was the English Navy which conquered the Cape
of Good Hope for England; it was the English diplomats that secured its
retention. So it was the American Army which added New Mexico to the
United States; and its retention was due to the will of the politicians
who had set that army in motion. In neither case was there any previous
settlement of moment by the conquerors in the conquered territory. In
neither case was there much direct pressure by the people of the
conquering races upon the soil which was won for them by their soldiers
and statesmen. The acquisition of the territory must be set down to the
credit of these soldiers and statesmen, representing the nation in its
collective capacity; though in the case of New Mexico there would of
course ultimately have been a direct pressure of rifle-bearing settlers
upon the people of the ranches and the mud-walled towns.
Diplomatic Victories.
In such cases it is the government itself, rather than any individual or
aggregate of individuals, which wins the new land for the race. When it
is won without appeal to arms, the credit, which would otherwise be
divided between soldiers and statesmen, of course accrues solely to the
latter. Alaska, for instance, was acquired by mere diplomacy. No
American settlers were thronging into Alaska. The desire to acquire it
among the people at large was vague, and was fanned into sluggish
activity only by the genius of the far-seeing statesmen who purchased
it. The credit of such an acquisition really does belong to the men who
secured the adoption of the treaty by which it was acquired. The honor
of adding Alaska to the national domain belongs to the statesmen who at
the time controlled the Washington Government. They were not
figure-heads in the transaction. They were the vital, moving forces.
Victories with Which Diplomats Have no Concern.
Just the contrary is true of cases like that of the conquest of Texas.
The Government of the United States had nothing to do with winning Texas
for the English-speaking people of North America. The American
frontiersmen won Texas for themselves, unaided either by the statesmen
who controlled the politics of the Republic, or by the soldiers who took
their orders from Washington.
Victories of Mixed Nature.
In yet other cases the action is more mixed. Statesmen and diplomats
have some share in shaping the conditions under which a country is
finally taken; in the eye of history they often usurp much more than
their proper share; but in reality they are able to bring matters to a
conclusion only because adventurous settlers, in defiance or disregard
of governmental action, have pressed forward into the longed-for land.
In such cases the function of the diplomats is one of some importance,
because they lay down the conditions under which the land is taken; but
the vital question as to whether the land shall be taken at all, upon no
matter what terms, is answered not by the diplomats, but by the people
themselves.
It was in this way that the Northwest was won from the British, and the
boundaries of the Southwest established by treaty with the Spaniards.
Adams, Jay, and Pinckney deserve much credit for the way they conducted
their several negotiations; but there would have been nothing for them
to negotiate about had not the settlers already thronged into the
disputed territories or strenuously pressed forward against their
boundaries.
Louisiana Really Acquired by the Western Settlers.
So it was with the acquisition of Louisiana. Jefferson, Livingston, and
their fellow-statesmen and diplomats concluded the treaty which
determined the manner in which it came into our possession; but they did
not really have much to do with fixing the terms even of this treaty;
and the part which they played in the acquisition of Louisiana in no way
resembles, even remotely, the part which was played by Seward, for
instance, in acquiring Alaska. If it had not been for Seward, and the
political leaders who thought as he did, Alaska might never have been
acquired at all; but the Americans would have won Louisiana in any
event, even if the treaty of Livingston and Monroe had not been signed.
The real history of the acquisition must tell of the great westward
movement begun in 1769, and not merely of the feeble diplomacy of
Jefferson's administration. In 1802 American settlers were already
clustered here and there on the eastern fringe of the vast region which
then went by the name of Louisiana. All the stalwart freemen who had
made their rude clearings, and built their rude towns, on the hither
side of the mighty Mississippi, were straining with eager desire against
the forces which withheld them from seizing with strong hand the coveted
province. They did not themselves know, and far less did the public men
of the day realize, the full import and meaning of the conquest upon
which they were about to enter. For the moment the navigation of the
mouth of the Mississippi seemed to them of the first importance. Even
the frontiersmen themselves put second to this the right to people the
vast continent which lay between the Pacific and the Mississippi. The
statesmen at Washington viewed this last proposition with positive
alarm, and cared only to acquire New Orleans. The winning of Louisiana
was due to no one man, and least of all to any statesman or set of
statesmen. It followed inevitably upon the great westward thrust of the
settler-folk; a thrust which was delivered blindly, but which no rival
race could parry, until it was stopped by the ocean itself.
Pressure of the Backwoodsmen on the Spanish Dominions.
Louisiana was added to the United States because the hardy backwoods
settlers had swarmed into the valleys of the Tennessee, the Cumberland,
and the Ohio by hundreds of thousands; and had already begun to build
their raw hamlets on the banks of the Mississippi, and to cover its
waters with their flat-bottomed craft. Restless, adventurous, hardy,
they looked eagerly across the Mississippi to the fertile solitudes
where the Spaniard was the nominal, and the Indian the real, master; and
with a more immediate longing they fiercely coveted the creole province
at the mouth of the river.
The Mississippi formed no barrier whatsoever to the march of the
backwoodsmen. It could be crossed at any point; and the same rapid
current which made it a matter of extreme difficulty for any power at
the mouth of the stream to send reinforcements up against the current
would have greatly facilitated the movements of the Ohio, Kentucky, and
Tennessee levies down-stream to attack the Spanish provinces. In the
days of sails and oars a great river with rapid current might vitally
affect military operations if these depended upon sending flotillas up
or down stream. But such a river has never proved a serious barrier
against a vigorous and aggressive race, where it lies between two
peoples, so that the aggressors have merely to cross it. It offers no
such shield as is afforded by a high mountain range. The Mississippi
served as a convenient line of demarkation between the Americans and the
Spaniards; but it offered no protection whatever to the Spaniards
against the Americans.
Importance of New Orleans.
Therefore the frontiersmen found nothing serious to bar their farther
march westward; the diminutive Spanish garrisons in the little creole
towns near the Missouri were far less capable of effective resistance
than were most of the Indian tribes whom the Americans were brushing out
of their path. Towards the South the situation was different. The
Floridas were shielded by the great Indian confederacies of the Creeks
and Choctaws, whose strength was as yet unbroken. What was much more
important, the mouth of the Mississippi was commanded by the important
seaport of New Orleans, which was accessible to fleets, which could
readily be garrisoned by water, and which was the capital of a region
that by backwoods standards passed for well settled. New Orleans by its
position was absolute master of the foreign, trade of the Mississippi
valley; and any power in command of the seas could easily keep it
strongly garrisoned. The vast region that was then known as Upper
Louisiana--the territory stretching from the Mississippi to the
Pacific--was owned by the Spaniards, but only in shadowy fashion, and
could not have been held by any European power against the sturdy
westward pressure of the rifle-bearing settlers. But New Orleans and its
neighborhood were held even by the Spaniards in good earnest; while a
stronger power, once in possession, could with difficulty have been
dislodged.
Desire of the Settlers for it.
It naturally followed that for the moment the attention of the
backwoodsmen was directed much more to New Orleans than to the
trans-Mississippi territory. A few wilderness lovers like Boone, a few
reckless adventurers of the type of Philip Nolan, were settling around
and beyond the creole towns of the North, or were endeavoring to found
small buccaneering colonies in dangerous proximity to the Spanish
commanderies in the Southwest. But the bulk of the Western settlers as
yet found all the vacant territory they wished east of the Mississippi.
What they needed at the moment was, not more wild land, but an outlet
for the products yielded by the land they already possessed. The vital
importance to the Westerners of the free navigation of the Mississippi
has already been shown. Suffice it to say that the control of the mouth
of the great Father of Waters was of direct personal consequence to
almost every tree feller, every backwoods farmer, every land owner,
every townsman, who dwelt beyond the Alleghanies. These men did not
worry much over the fact that the country on the farther bank of the
Mississippi was still under the Spanish Flag. For the moment they did
not need it, and when they did, they knew they could take it without the
smallest difficulty. But the ownership of the mouth of the Mississippi
was a matter of immediate importance; and though none of the settlers
doubted that it would ultimately be theirs, it was yet a matter of much
consequence to them to get possession of it as quickly as possible, and
with as little trouble as possible, rather than to see it held, perhaps
for years, by a powerful hostile nation, and then to see it acquired
only at the cost of bloody, and perchance checkered, warfare.
Terror of the Spaniards.
This was the attitude of the backwoods people as with sinewy, strenuous
shoulder they pressed against the Spanish boundaries. The Spanish
attitude on the other hand was one of apprehension so intense that it
overcame even anger against the American nation. For mere diplomacy, the
Spaniards cared little or nothing; but they feared the Westerners. Their
surrender of Louisiana was due primarily to the steady pushing and
crowding of the frontiersmen, and the continuous growth of the Western
commonwealths. In spite of Pinckney's treaty the Spaniards did not leave
Natchez until fairly drowned out by the American settlers and soldiers.
They now felt the same pressure upon them in New Orleans; it was growing
steadily and was fast becoming intolerable. Year by year, almost month
by month, they saw the numbers of their foes increase, and saw them
settle more and more thickly in places from which it would be easy to
strike New Orleans. Year by year the offensive power of the Americans
increased in more than arithmetical ratio as against Louisiana.
Incursions of American Adventurers.
The more reckless and lawless adventurers from time to time pushed
southwest, even toward the borders of Texas and New Mexico, and strove
to form little settlements, keeping the Spanish Governors and Intendants
in a constant fume of anxiety. One of these settlements was founded by
Philip Nolan, a man whom rumor had connected with Wilkinson's intrigues,
and who, like many another lawless trader of the day, was always
dreaming of empires to be carved from, or wealth to be won in, the
golden Spanish realms. In the fall of 1800, he pushed beyond the
Mississippi with a score or so of companions, and settled on the Brazos.
The party built pens or corrals, and began to catch wild horses, for the
neighborhood swarmed not only with game but with immense droves of
mustangs. The handsomest animals they kept and trained, letting the
others loose again. The following March these tamers of wild horses were
suddenly set upon by a body of Spaniards, three hundred strong, with one
field-piece. The assailants made their attack at daybreak, slew Nolan,
and captured his comrades, who for many years afterwards lived as
prisoners in the Mexican towns. [Footnote: Pike's letter, July 22, 1807,
in Natchez _Herald_; in Col. Durrett's collection; see Coue's edition of
Pike's "Expedition," LII.; also Gayarré, III., 447.] The menace of such
buccaneering movements kept the Spaniards alive to the imminent danger
of the general American attack which they heralded.
Spain's Colonial system.
Spain watched her boundaries with the most jealous care. Her colonial
system was evil in its suspicious exclusiveness towards strangers; and
her religious system was marked by an intolerance still almost as fierce
as in the days of Torquemada. The Holy Inquisition was a recognized
feature of Spanish political life; and the rulers of the
Spanish-American colonies put the stranger and the heretic under a
common ban. The reports of the Spanish ecclesiastics of Louisiana dwelt
continually upon the dangers with which the oncoming of the backwoodsmen
threatened the Church no less than the State. [Footnote: Report of
Bishop Peñalvert, Nov. I, 1795, Gayarré.] All the men in power, civil,
military, and religious alike, showed towards strangers, and especially
towards American strangers, a spirit which was doubly unwise; for by
their jealousy they created the impression that the lands they so
carefully guarded must hold treasures of great price; and by their
severity they created an anger which when fully aroused they could not
well quell. The frontiersmen, as they tried to peer into the Spanish
dominions, were lured on by the attraction they felt for what was hidden
and forbidden; and there was enough danger in the path to madden them,
while there was no exhibition of a strength sufficient to cow them.
Spain Wishes a Barrier against American Advance.
The Spanish rulers realized fully that they were too weak effectively to
cope with the Americans, and as the pressure upon them grew ever heavier
and more menacing they began to fear not only for Louisiana but also for
Mexico. They clung tenaciously to all their possessions; but they were
willing to sacrifice a part, if by so doing they could erect a barrier
for the defence of the remainder. Such a chance was now seemingly
offered them by France.
Napoleon's Dreams of Empire.
At the beginning of the century Napoleon was First Consul; and the
France over which he ruled was already the mightiest nation in Europe,
and yet had not reached the zenith of her power. It was at this time
that the French influence over Spain was most complete. Both the Spanish
King and the Spanish people were dazzled and awed by the splendor of
Napoleon's victories. Napoleon's magnificent and wayward genius was
always striving after more than merely European empire. As throne after
throne went down before him he planned conquests which should include
the interminable wastes of snowy Russia, and the sea-girt fields of
England; and he always dreamed of yet vaster, more shadowy triumphs, won
in the realms lying eastward of the Mediterranean, or among the islands
and along the coasts of the Spanish Main. In 1800 his dream of Eastern
conquest was over, but his lofty ambition was planning for France the
re-establishment in America of that colonial empire which a generation
before had been wrested from her by England.
The Treaty of San Ildefonso.
The need of the Spaniards seemed to Napoleon his opportunity. By the
bribe of a petty Italian principality he persuaded the Bourbon King of
Spain to cede Louisiana to the French, at the treaty of San Ildefonso,
concluded in October, 1800. The cession was agreed to by the Spaniards
on the express pledge that the territory should not be transferred to
any other power; and chiefly for the purpose of erecting a barrier which
might stay the American advance, and protect the rest of the Spanish
possessions.
The Right of Deposit Annulled.
Every effort was made to keep the cession from being made public, and
owing to various political complications it was not consummated for a
couple of years; but meanwhile it was impossible to prevent rumors from
going abroad, and the mere hint of such a project was enough to throw
the West into a fever of excitement. Moreover, at this moment, before
the treaty between France and Spain had been consummated, Morales, the
Intendant of New Orleans, deliberately threw down the gage of battle to
the Westerners. [Footnote: Gayarré, III., 456.] On October 16, 1802, he
proclaimed that the Americans had forfeited their right of deposit in
New Orleans. By Pinckney's treaty this right had been granted for three
years, with the stipulation that it should then be extended for a longer
period, and that if the Spaniards chose to revoke the permit so far as
New Orleans was concerned, they should make some other spot on the river
a port of free entry. The Americans had taken for granted that the
privilege when once conferred would never be withdrawn; but Morales,
under pretence that the Americans had slept on their rights by failing
to discover some other spot as a treaty port, declared that the right of
deposit had lapsed, and would not be renewed. The Governor, Salcedo--who
had succeeded Gayoso, when the latter died of yellow fever, complicated
by a drinking-bout with Wilkinson--was not in sympathy with the
movement; but this mattered little. Under the cumbrous Spanish colonial
system, the Governor, though he disapproved of the actions of the
Intendant, could not reverse them, and Morales paid no heed to the angry
protests of the Spanish Minister at Washington, who saw that the
Americans were certain in the end to fight rather than to lose the only
outlet for the commerce of the West. [Footnote: Gayarré, III., 576. The
King of Spain, at the instigation of Godoy, disapproved the order of
Morales, but so late that the news of the disapproval reached Louisiana
only as the French were about to take possession. However, the reversal
of the order rendered the course of the further negotiations easier.] It
seems probable that the Intendant's action was due to the fact that he
deemed the days of Spanish dominion numbered, and, in his jealousy of
the Americans, wished to place the new French authorities in the
strongest possible position; but the act was not done with the knowledge
of France.
Anger of the Westerners.
Of this, however, the Westerners were ignorant. They felt sure that any
alteration in policy so fatal to their interests must be merely a
foreshadowing of the course the French intended thereafter to follow.
They believed that their worst fears were justified. Kentucky and
Tennessee clamored for instant action, and Claiborne offered to raise in
the Mississippi territory alone a force of volunteer riflemen sufficient
to seize New Orleans before its transfer into French hands could be
effected.
Jefferson Forced into Action.
Jefferson was President, and Madison Secretary of State. Both were men
of high and fine qualities who rendered, at one time or another, real
and great service to the country. Jefferson in particular played in our
political life a part of immense importance. But the country has never
had two statesmen less capable of upholding the honor and dignity of the
nation, or even of preserving its material well-being, when menaced by
foreign foes. They were peaceful men, quite unfitted to grapple with
an enemy who expressed himself through deeds rather than words. When
stunned by the din of arms they showed themselves utterly inefficient
rulers.
It was these two timid, well-meaning statesmen who now found themselves
pitted against Napoleon, and Napoleon's Minister, Talleyrand; against
the greatest warrior and lawgiver, and against one of the greatest
diplomats, of modern times; against two men, moreover, whose sodden lack
of conscience was but heightened by the contrast with their brilliant
genius and lofty force of character; two men who were unable to so much
as appreciate that there was shame in the practice of venality,
dishonesty, mendacity, cruelty, and treachery.
Jefferson was the least warlike of presidents, and he loved the French
with a servile devotion. But his party was strongest in precisely those
parts of the country where the mouth of the Mississippi was held to be
of right the property of the United States; and the pressure of public
opinion was too strong for Jefferson to think of resisting it. The South
and the West were a unit in demanding that France should not be allowed
to establish herself on the lower Mississippi. Jefferson was forced to
tell his French friends that if their nation persisted in its purpose
America would be obliged to marry itself to the navy and army of
England. Even he could see that for the French to take Louisiana meant
war with the United States sooner or later; and as above all things else
he wished peace, he made every effort to secure the coveted territory by
purchase.
Beginning of Negotiations with France.
Chancellor Robert R. Livingston of New York represented American
interests in Paris; but at the very close of the negotiation he was
succeeded by Monroe, whom Jefferson sent over as a special envoy. The
course of the negotiations was at first most baffling to the Americans.
[Footnote: In Henry Adams' "History of the United States," the account
of the diplomatic negotiations at this period, between France, Spain,
and the United States, is the most brilliant piece of diplomatic
history, so far as the doings of the diplomats themselves are concerned,
that can be put to the credit of any American writer.] Talleyrand lied
with such unmoved calm that it was impossible to put the least weight
upon anything he said; moreover, the Americans soon found that Napoleon
was the sole and absolute master, so that it was of no use attempting to
influence any of his subordinates, save in so far as these subordinates
might in their turn influence him. For some time it appeared that
Napoleon was bent upon occupying Louisiana in force and using it as a
basis for the rebuilding of the French colonial power. The time seemed
ripe for such a project. After a decade of war with all the rest of
Europe, France in 1802 concluded the Peace of Amiens, which left her
absolutely free to do as she liked in the New World. Napoleon thoroughly
despised a republic, and especially a republic without an army or navy.
After the Peace of Amiens he began to treat the Americans with
contemptuous disregard; and he planned to throw into Louisiana one of
his generals with a force of veteran troops sufficient to hold the
country against any attack.
Illusory Nature of Napoleon's Hopes.
His hopes were in reality chimerical. At the moment France was at peace
with her European foes, and could send her ships of war and her
transports across the ocean without fear of the British navy. It would
therefore have been possible for Napoleon without molestation to throw a
large body of French soldiers into New Orleans. Had there been no
European war such an army might have held New Orleans for some years
against American attack, and might even have captured one or two of the
American posts on the Mississippi, such as Natchez; but the instant it
had landed in New Orleans the entire American people would have accepted
France as their deadliest enemy, and all American foreign policy would
have been determined by the one consideration of ousting the French from
the mouth of the Mississippi. To the United States, France was by no
means as formidable as Great Britain, because of her inferiority as a
naval power. Even if unsupported by any outside alliance the Americans
would doubtless in the end have driven a French army from New Orleans,
though very probably at the cost of one or two preliminary rebuffs. The
West was stanch in support of Jefferson and Madison; but in time of
stress it was sure to develop leaders of more congenial temper, exactly
as it actually did develop Andrew Jackson a few years later. At this
very time the French failed to conquer the negro republic which
Toussaint Louverture had founded in Hayti. What they thus failed to
accomplish in one island, against insurgent negroes, it was folly to
think they could accomplish on the American continent, against the power
of the American people. This struggle with the revolutionary slaves in
Hayti hindered Napoleon from immediately throwing an army into
Louisiana; but it did more, for it helped to teach him the folly of
trying to carry out such a plan at all.
Report of Pontaiba.
A very able and faithful French agent in the meanwhile sent a report to
Napoleon plainly pointing out the impossibility of permanently holding
Louisiana against the Americans. He showed that on the Western waters
alone it would be possible to gather armies amounting in the aggregate
to twenty or thirty thousand men, all of them inflamed with the eager
desire to take New Orleans. [Footnote: Pontalba's Memoir. He hoped that
Louisiana might, in certain contingencies, be preserved for the French,
but he insisted that it could only be by keeping peace with the American
settlers, and by bringing about an immense increase of population in the
province.] The Mississippi ran so as to facilitate the movement of any
expedition against New Orleans, while it offered formidable obstacles to
counter-expeditions from New Orleans against the American commonwealths
lying farther up stream. An expeditionary force sent from the mouth of
the Mississippi, whether to assail the towns and settlements along the
Ohio, or to defend the Creole villages near the Missouri, could at the
utmost hope for only transient success, while its ultimate failure was
certain. On the other hand, a backwoods army could move down stream with
comparative ease; and even though such an expedition were defeated, it
was certain that the attempt would be repeated again and again, until by
degrees the mob of hardy riflemen changed into a veteran army, and
brought forth some general like "Old Hickory," able to lead to victory.
Views of Barbé Marbois.
The most intelligent French agents on the ground saw this. Some of
Napoleon's Ministers were equally far-sighted. One of them, Barbé
Marbois, represented to him in the strongest terms the hopelessness of
the undertaking on which he proposed to embark. He pointed out that the
United States was sure to go to war with France if France took New
Orleans, and that in the end such a war could only result in victory for
the Americans.
We can now readily see that this victory was certain to come, even had
the Americans been left without allies. France could never have defended
the vast region known as Upper Louisiana, and sooner or later New
Orleans itself would have fallen, though it may well be only after
humiliating defeats for the Americans and much expenditure of life and
treasure. But as things actually were the Americans would have had
plenty of powerful allies. The Peace of Amiens lasted but a couple of
years before England again went to war. Napoleon knew, and the American
statesmen knew, that the British intended to attack New Orleans upon the
outbreak of hostilities, if it were in French hands. In such event
Louisiana would have soon fallen; for any French force stationed there
would have found its reinforcements cut off by the English navy, and
would have dwindled away until unable to offer resistance.
Louisiana's Destiny Really by the Backwoodsmen.
Nevertheless, European wars, and the schemes and fancies of European
statesmen, could determine merely the conditions under which the
catastrophe was to take place, but not the catastrophe itself. The fate
of Louisiana was already fixed. It was not the diplomats who decided its
destiny, but the settlers of the Western states. The growth of the
teeming folk who had crossed the Alleghanies and were building their
rude, vigorous commonwealths in the northeastern portion of the
Mississippi basin, decided the destiny of all the lands that were
drained by that mighty river. The steady westward movement of the
Americans was the all-important factor in determining the ultimate
ownership of New Orleans. Livingston, the American minister, saw plainly
the inevitable outcome of the struggle. He expressed his wonder that
other Americans should be uneasy in the matter, saying that for his part
it seemed as clear as day that no matter what trouble might temporarily
be caused, in the end Louisiana was certain to fall into the grasp of
the United States. [Footnote: Livingston to Madison, Sept. 1, 1802.
Later Livingston himself became uneasy, fearing lest Napoleon's
wilfulness might plunge him into an undertaking which, though certain to
end disastrously to the French, might meanwhile cause great trouble to
the Americans.]
Tedious Course of the Negotiations.
There were many Americans and many Frenchmen of note who were less
clear-sighted. Livingston encountered rebuff after rebuff, and delay
after delay. Talleyrand met him with his usual front of impenetrable
duplicity. He calmly denied everything connected with the cession of
Louisiana until even the details became public property, and then
admitted them with unblushing equanimity. His delays were so tantalizing
that they might well have revived unpleasant memories of the famous X.
Y. Z. negotiations, in which he tried in vain to extort bribe-money from
the American negotiators [Footnote: Jefferson was guilty of much weak
and undignified conduct during these negotiations, but of nothing weaker
and more petty than his attempt to flatter Talleyrand by pretending that
the Americans disbelieved his admitted venality, and were indignant with
those who had exposed it. See Adams.]; but Livingston, and those he
represented, soon realized that it was Napoleon himself who alone
deserved serious consideration. Through Napoleon's character, and
helping to make it great, there ran an imaginative vein which at times
bordered on the fantastic; and this joined with his imperious self-will,
brutality, and energy to make him eager to embark on a scheme which,
when he had thought it over in cold blood, he was equally eager to
abandon. For some time he seemed obstinately bent on taking possession
of Louisiana, heedless of the attitude which this might cause the
Americans to assume. He designated as commander of his army of
occupation, Victor, a general as capable and brave as he was insolent,
who took no pains to conceal from the American representatives his
intention to treat their people with a high hand.
Jefferson took various means, official and unofficial, of impressing
upon Napoleon the strength of the feeling in the United States over the
matter; and his utterances came as near menace as his pacific nature
would permit. To the great French Conqueror however, accustomed to
violence and to the strife of giants, Jefferson's somewhat vacillating
attitude did not seem impressive; and the one course which would have
impressed Napoleon was not followed by the American President. Jefferson
refused to countenance any proposal to take prompt possession of
Louisiana by force or to assemble an army which could act with immediate
vigor in time of need; and as he was the idol of the Southwesterners,
who were bitterly anti-federalist in sympathy, he was able to prevent
any violent action on their part until events rendered this violence
unnecessary. At the same time, Jefferson himself never for a moment
ceased to feel the strong pressure of Southern and Western public
sentiment; and so he continued resolute in his purpose to obtain
Louisiana.
Napoleon Forced to Change his Purpose.
Louisiana Ceded to the United States.
It was no argument of Jefferson's or of the American diplomats, but the
inevitable trend of events that finally brought about a change in
Napoleon's mind. The army he sent to Hayti wasted away by disease and in
combat with the blacks, and thereby not only diminished the forces he
intended to throw into Louisiana, but also gave him a terrible object
lesson as to what the fate of these forces was certain ultimately to be.
The attitude of England and Austria grew steadily more hostile, and his
most trustworthy advisers impressed on Napoleon's mind the steady growth
of the Western-American communities, and the implacable hostility with
which they were certain to regard any power that seized or attempted to
hold New Orleans. Napoleon could not afford to hamper himself with the
difficult defence of a distant province, and to incur the hostility of a
new foe, at the very moment when he was entering on another struggle
with his old European enemies. Moreover, he needed money in order to
carry on the struggle. To be sure he had promised Spain not to turn over
Louisiana to another power; but he was quite as incapable as any Spanish
statesman, or as Talleyrand himself, of so much as considering the
question of breach of faith or loss of honor, if he could gain any
advantage by sacrificing either. Livingston was astonished to find that
Napoleon had suddenly changed front, and that there was every prospect
of gaining what for months had seemed impossible. For some time there
was haggling over the terms. Napoleon at first demanded an exorbitant
sum; but having once made up his mind to part with Louisiana his impatient
disposition made him anxious to conclude the bargain. He rapidly abated
his demands, and the cession was finally made for fifteen millions of
dollars.
The Boundaries Undecided.
The treaty was signed in May, 1805. The definition of the exact
boundaries of the ceded territory was purposely left very loose by
Napoleon. On the east, the Spanish Government of the Floridas still kept
possession of what are now several parishes in the State of Louisiana.
In the far west the boundary lines which divided upper Louisiana from
the possessions of Britain on the north and of Spain on the south led
through a wilderness where no white man had ever trod, and they were of
course unmapped, and only vaguely guessed at.
Blindness of the American Statesmen.
There was one singular feature of this bargain, which showed, as nothing
else could have shown, how little American diplomacy had to do with
obtaining Louisiana, and how impossible it was for any European power,
even the greatest, to hold the territory in the face of the steady
westward growth of the American people. Napoleon forced Livingston and
Monroe to become the reluctant purchasers not merely of New Orleans, but
of all the immense territory which stretched vaguely northwestward to
the Pacific. Jefferson at moments felt a desire to get all this western
territory; but he was too timid and too vacillating to insist
strenuously upon anything which he feared Napoleon would not grant.
Madison felt a strong disinclination to see the national domain extend
west of the Mississippi; and he so instructed Monroe and Livingston. In
their turn the American envoys, with solemn fatuity, believed it might
impress Napoleon favorably if they made much show of moderation, and
they spent no small part of their time in explaining that they only
wished a little bit of Louisiana, including New Orleans and the east
bank of the lower Mississippi. Livingston indeed went so far as to
express a very positive disinclination to take the territory west of the
Mississippi at any price, stating that he should much prefer to see it
remain in the hands of France or Spain, and suggesting, by way of
apology for its acquisition, that it might be re-sold to some European
power! But Napoleon saw clearly that if the French ceded New Orleans it
was a simple physical impossibility for them to hold the rest of the
Louisiana territory. If his fierce and irritable vanity had been touched
he might, through mere wayward anger, have dared the Americans to a
contest which, however disastrous to them, would ultimately have been
more so to him; but he was a great statesman, and a still greater
soldier, and he did not need to be told that it would be worse than
folly to try to keep a country when he had given up the key-position.
The Great West Gained against the Wishes of the American
Diplomats.
The region west of the Mississippi could become the heritage of no other
people save that which had planted its populous communities along the
eastern bank of the river, it was quite possible for a powerful European
nation to hold New Orleans for some time, even though all upper
Louisiana fell into the hands of the Americans; but it was entirely
impossible for any European nation to hold upper Louisiana if New
Orleans became a city of the United States. The Westerners, wiser than
their rulers, but no wiser than Napoleon at the last, felt this, and
were not in the least disturbed over the fate of Louisiana, provided
they were given the control of the mouth of the Mississippi. As a matter
of fact, it is improbable that the fate of the great territory lying
west of the upper Mississippi would even have been seriously delayed had
it been nominally under the control of France or Spain. With the mouth
of the Mississippi once in American hands it was a physical
impossibility in any way to retard the westward movement of the men who
were settling Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee.
Debates in Congress.
Folly of the Federalists.
The ratification of the treaty brought on some sharp debates in
Congress. Jefferson had led his party into power as the special champion
of States' Rights and the special opponent of national sovereignty. He
and they rendered a very great service to the nation by acquiring
Louisiana; but it was at the cost of violating every precept which they
had professed to hold dear, and of showing that their warfare on the
Federalists had been waged on behalf of principles which they were
obliged to confess were shams the moment they were put to the test. But
the Federalists of the Northeast, both in the Middle States and in New
England, at this juncture behaved far worse than the Jeffersonian
Republicans. These Jeffersonian Republicans did indeed by their
performance give the lie to their past promise, and thereby emphasize
the unworthiness of their conduct in years gone by; nevertheless, at
this juncture they were right, which was far more important than being
logical or consistent. But the Northeastern Federalists, though with
many exceptions, did as a whole stand as the opponents of national
growth. They had very properly, though vainly, urged Jefferson to take
prompt and effective steps to sustain the national honor, when it seemed
probable that the country could be won from France only at the cost of
war; but when the time actually came to incorporate Louisiana into the
national domain, they showed that jealous fear of Western growth which
was the most marked defect in Northeastern public sentiment until past
the middle of the present century. It proved that the Federalists were
rightly distrusted by the West; and it proved that at this crisis, the
Jeffersonian Republicans, in spite of their follies, weaknesses, and
crimes, were the safest guardians of the country, because they believed
in its future, and strove to make it greater.
The Jeremiads of the Federalist leaders in Congress were the same in
kind as those in which many cultivated men of the East always indulged
whenever we enlarged our territory, and in which many persons like them
would now indulge were we at the present day to make a similar
extension. The people of the United States were warned that they were
incorporating into their number men who were wholly alien in every
respect, and who could never be assimilated. They were warned that when
they thus added to their empire, they merely rendered it unwieldy and
assured its being split into two or more confederacies at no distant
day. Some of the extremists, under the lead of Quincy, went so far as to
threaten dissolution of the Union because of what was done, insisting
that the Northeast ought by rights to secede because of the injury done
it by adding strength to the South and West. Fortunately, however, talk
of this kind did not affect the majority; the treaty was ratified and
Louisiana became part of the United States.
The French Prefect Laussat.
Meanwhile the Creoles themselves accepted their very rapidly changing
fates with something much like apathy. In March, 1803, the French
Prefect Laussat arrived to make preparations to take possession of the
country. He had no idea that Napoleon intended to cede it to the United
States. On the contrary, he showed that he regarded the French as the
heirs, not only to the Spanish territory, but of the Spanish hostility
to the Americans. He openly regretted that the Spanish Government had
reversed Morales' act taking away from the Americans the right of
deposit; and he made all his preparations as if on the theory that New
Orleans was to become the centre of an aggressive military government.
Corruption of the Spanish Government.
His dislikes, however, were broad, and included the Spaniards as well as
the Americans. There was much friction between him and the Spanish
officials; he complained bitterly to the home government of the
insolence and intrigues of the Spanish party. He also portrayed in
scathing terms the gross corruption of the Spanish authorities. As to
this corruption he was borne out by the American observers. Almost every
high Spanish official was guilty of peculation at the expense of the
government, and of bribe-taking at the expense of the citizens.
The Creoles not Ill-Satisfied with it.
Nevertheless the Creoles were far from ill-satisfied with Spanish rule.
They were not accustomed to self-government, and did not demand it; and
they cared very little for the fact that their superiors made money
improperly. If they paid due deference to their lay and clerical rulers
they were little interfered with; and they were in full accord with the
governing classes concerning most questions, both of principle or lack of
principle, and of prejudice. The Creoles felt that they were protected,
rather than oppressed, by people who shared their tastes, and who did
not interfere with the things they held dear. On the whole they showed
only a tepid joy at the prospect of again becoming French citizens.
Preparations to Turn the Country Over to the United States.
Laussat soon discovered that they were to remain French citizens for a
very short time indeed; and he prepared faithfully to carry out his
instructions, and to turn the country over to the Americans. The change
in the French attitude greatly increased the friction with the
Spaniards. The Spanish home government was furious with indignation at
Napoleon for having violated his word, and only the weakness of Spain
prevented war between it and France. The Spanish party in New Orleans
muttered its discontent so loud that Laussat grew alarmed. He feared
some outbreak on the part of the Spanish sympathizers, and, to prevent
such a mischance, he not only embodied the comparatively small portion
of the Creole militia whom he could trust, but also a number of American
volunteers, concerning whose fidelity in such a crisis as that he
anticipated there could be no question. It was not until December first,
1803, that he took final possession of the provinces. Twenty days
afterwards he turned it over to the American authorities.
Claiborne Made Governor.
Wilkinson, now commander of the American army,--the most disgraceful
head it has ever had--was entrusted with the governorship of all of
Upper Louisiana. Claiborne was made governor of Lower Louisiana,
officially styled the Territory of Orleans. He was an honest man, loyal
to the Union, but had no special qualifications for getting on well with
the Creoles. He could not speak French, and he regarded the people whom
he governed with a kindly contempt which they bitterly resented. The
Americans, pushing and masterful, were inclined to look down on their
neighbours, and to treat them overbearingly; while the Creoles in their
turn disliked the Americans as rude and uncultivated barbarians. For
some time they felt much discontent with the United States; nor was this
discontent allayed when in 1804 the territory of Orleans was reorganized
with a government much less liberal than that enjoyed by Indiana or
Mississippi; nor even when in 1805 an ordinary territorial government
was provided. A number of years were to pass before Louisiana felt
itself, in fact no less than in name, part of the Union.
New Orleans Offers a Field For Sedition.
Naturally there was a fertile field for seditious agitation in New
Orleans, a city of mixed population, where the numerically predominant
race felt a puzzled distrust for the nation of which it suddenly found
itself an integral part, and from past experience firmly believed in the
evanescent nature of any political connection it might have, whether
with Spain, France, or the United States. The Creoles murmured because
they were not given the same privileges as American citizens in the old
States, and yet showed themselves indifferent to such privileges as they
were given. They were indignant because the National Government
prohibited the importation of slaves into Louisiana, and for the moment
even the transfer thither of slaves from the old States--a circumstance,
by the way, which curiously illustrated the general dislike and
disapproval of slavery then felt, even by an administration under
Southern control. The Creoles further complained of Claiborne's
indifference to their wishes; and as he possessed little tact he also
became embroiled with the American inhabitants, who were men of
adventurous and often lawless temper, impatient of restraint.
Representatives of the French and Spanish governments still remained in
Louisiana, and by their presence and their words tended to keep alive a
disaffection for the United States Government. It followed from these
various causes that among all classes there was a willingness to talk
freely of their wrongs and to hint at righting them by methods outlined
with such looseness as to make it uncertain whether they did or did not
comport with entire loyalty to the United States Government.
The Filibusters.
Furthermore, there already existed in New Orleans a very peculiar class,
representatives of which are still to be found in almost every Gulf city
of importance. There were in the city a number of men ready at any time
to enter into any plot for armed conquest of one of the Spanish American
countries. [Footnote: Wilkinson's "Memoirs," II., 284.] Spanish America
was feeling the stir of unrest that preceded the revolutionary outbreak
against Spain. Already insurrectionary leaders like Miranda were seeking
assistance from the Americans. There were in New Orleans a number of
exiled Mexicans who were very anxious to raise some force with which to
invade Mexico, and there erect the banner of an independent sovereignty.
The bolder spirits among the Creoles found much that was attractive in
such a prospect; and reckless American adventurers by the score and the
hundred were anxious to join in any filibustering expedition of the
kind. They did not care in the least what form the expedition took. They
were willing to join the Mexican exiles in an effort to rouse Mexico to
throw off the yoke of Spain, or to aid any province of Mexico to revolt
from the rest, or to help the leaders of any defeated faction who wished
to try an appeal to arms, in which they should receive aid from the
sword of the stranger. Incidentally they were even more willing to
attempt the conquest on their own account; but they did not find it
necessary to dwell on this aspect of the case when nominally supporting
some faction which chose to make use of such watchwords as liberty and
independence.
Burr's Conspiracy.
Under such conditions New Orleans, even more than the rest of the West,
seemed to offer an inviting field for adventurers whose aim was both
revolutionary and piratical. A particularly spectacular adventurer of
this type now appeared in the person of Aaron Burr. Burr's conspiracy
attracted an amount of attention, both at home and in the pages of
history, altogether disproportioned to its real consequence. His career
had been striking. He had been Vice-President of the United States. He
had lacked but one vote of being made President, when the election of
1800 was thrown into the House of Representatives. As friend or as enemy
he had been thrown intimately and on equal terms with the greatest
political leaders of the day. He had supplied almost the only feeling
which Jefferson, the chief of the Democratic party, and Hamilton, the
greatest Federalist, ever possessed in common; for bitterly though
Hamilton and Jefferson had hated each other, there was one man whom each
of them had hated more, and that was Aaron Burr. There was not a man in
the country who did not know about the brilliant and unscrupulous party
leader who had killed Hamilton in the most famous duel that ever took
place on American soil, and who by a nearly successful intrigue had come
within one vote of supplanting Jefferson in the presidency.
Burr's Previous Career in New York.
In New York Aaron Burr had led a political career as stormy and
chequered as the careers of New York politicians have generally been. He
had shown himself as adroit as he was unscrupulous in the use of all the
arts of the machine manager. The fitful and gusty breath of popular
favor made him at one time the most prominent and successful politician
in the State, and one of the two or three most prominent and successful
in the nation. In the State he was the leader of the Democratic party,
which under his lead crushed the Federalists; and as a reward he was
given the second highest office in the nation. Then his open enemies and
secret rivals all combined against him. The other Democratic leaders in
New York, and in the nation as well, turned upon the man whose brilliant
abilities made them afraid, and whose utter untrustworthiness forbade
their entering into alliance with him. Shifty and fertile in expedients,
Burr made an obstinate fight to hold his own. Without hesitation, he
turned for support to his old enemies, the Federalists; but he was
hopelessly beaten. Both his fortune and his local political prestige
were ruined; he realized that his chance for a career in New York was
over.
When Beaten in New York he Turned to the West.
He was no mere New York politician, however. He was a statesman of
national reputation; and he turned his restless eyes toward the West,
which for a score of years had seethed in a turmoil out of which it
seemed that a bold spirit might make its own profit. He had already been
obscurely connected with separatist intrigues in the Northeast; and he
determined to embark in similar intrigues on an infinitely grander scale
in the West and Southwest. He was a cultivated man, of polished manners
and pleasing address, and of great audacity and physical courage; and he
had shown himself skilled in all the baser arts of political management.
It is small wonder that the conspiracy of which such a man was head
should make a noise out of all proportion to its real weight. The
conditions were such that if Burr journied West he was certain to
attract universal attention, and to be received with marked enthusiasm.
No man of his prominence in national affairs had ever travelled through
the wild new commonwealths on the Mississippi. The men who were founding
states and building towns on the wreck of the conquered wilderness were
sure to be flattered by the appearance of so notable a man among them,
and to be impressed not only by his reputation, but by his charm of
manner and brilliancy of intellect. Moreover they were quite ready to
talk vaguely of all kinds of dubious plans for increasing the importance
of the West. Very many, perhaps most, of them had dabbled at one time or
another in the various separatist schemes of the preceding two decades;
and they felt strongly that much of the Spanish domain would and should
ultimately fall into their hands--and the sooner the better.
He Misunderstands the Western Situation.
There was thus every chance that Burr would be favorably received by the
West, and would find plenty of men of high standing who would profess
friendship for him and would show a cordial interest in his plans so
long as he refrained from making them too definite; but there was in
reality no chance whatever for anything more than this to happen. In
spite of Burr's personal courage he lacked entirely the great military
qualities necessary to successful revolutionary leadership of the kind
to which he aspired. Though in some ways the most practical of
politicians he had a strong element of the visionary in his character;
it was perhaps this, joined to his striking moral defects, which brought
about and made complete his downfall in New York. Great political and
revolutionary leaders may, and often must, have in them something of the
visionary; but it must never cause them to get out of touch with the
practical. Burr was capable of conceiving revolutionary plans on so vast
a scale as to be fairly appalling, not only from their daring but from
their magnitude. But when he tried to put his plans into practice, it at
once became evident that they were even more unsubstantial than they
were audacious. His wild schemes had in them too strong an element of
the unreal and the grotesque to be in very fact dangerous.
The West Had Grown Loyal.
Besides, the time for separatist movements in the West had passed, while
the time for arousing the West to the conquest of part of
Spanish-America had hardly yet come. A man of Burr's character might
perhaps have accomplished something mischievous in Kentucky when
Wilkinson was in the first flush of his Spanish intrigues; or when the
political societies were raving over Jay's treaty; or when the Kentucky
legislature was passing its nullification resolutions. But the West had
grown loyal as the Nineteenth Century came in. The Westerners were
hearty supporters of the Jeffersonian democratic-republican party;
Jefferson was their idol; they were strongly attached to the Washington
administration, and strongly opposed to the chief opponents of that
administration, the Northeastern Federalists. With the purchase of
Louisiana all deep-lying causes of Western discontent had vanished. The
West was prosperous, and was attached to the National Government. Its
leaders might still enjoy a discussion with Burr or among themselves
concerning separatist principles in the abstract, but such a discussion
was at this time purely academic. Nobody of any weight in the community
would allow such plans as those of Burr to be put into effect. There
was, it is true, a strong buccaneering spirit, and there were plenty of
men ready to enlist in an invasion of the Spanish dominions under no
matter what pretext; but even those men of note who were willing to lead
such a movement, were not willing to enter into it if it was complicated
with open disloyalty to the United States.
Burr Begins his Treasonable Plotting.
Burr began his treasonable scheming before he ceased to be
Vice-President. He was an old friend and crony of Wilkinson; and he knew
much about the disloyal agitations which had convulsed the West during
the previous two decades. These agitations always took one or the other
of two forms that at first sight would seem diametrically opposed. Their
end was always either to bring about a secession of the West from the
East by the aid of Spain or some other foreign power; or else a conquest
of the Spanish dominions by the West, in defiance of the wishes of the
East and of the Central Government. Burr proposed to carry out both of
these plans.
He Endeavors to Enlist the Foreign Powers.
The exact shape which his proposals took would be difficult to tell.
Seemingly they remained nebulous even in his own mind. They certainly so
remained in the minds of those to whom he confided them. At any rate his
scheme, though in reality less dangerous than those of his predecessors
in Western treason, were in theory much more comprehensive. He planned
the seizure of Washington, the kidnapping of the President, and the
corruption of the United States Navy. He also endeavored to enlist
foreign Powers on his side. His first advances were made to the British.
He proposed to put the new empire, no matter what shape it might assume,
under British protection, in return for the assistance of the British
fleet in taking New Orleans. He gave to the British ministers full--and
false--accounts of the intended uprising, and besought the aid of the
British Government on the ground that the secession of the West would so
cripple the Union as to make it no longer a formidable enemy of Great
Britain. Burr's audacity and plausibility were such that he quite
dazzled the British minister, who detailed the plans at length to his
home government, putting them in as favorable a light as he could. The
statesmen at London, however, although at this time almost inconceivably
stupid in their dealings with America, were not sunk in such abject
folly as to think Burr's schemes practicable, and they refused to have
anything to do with them.
He Starts West and Stays with Blennerhassett.
In April, 1805, Burr started on his tour to the West. One of his first
stoppages was at an island on the Ohio near Parkersburg, where an Irish
gentleman named Blennerhassett had built what was, for the West, an
unusually fine house. Only Mrs. Blennerhassett was at home at the time;
but Blennerhassett later became a mainstay of the "conspiracy." He was a
warm-hearted man, with no judgment and a natural tendency toward
sedition, who speedily fell under Burr's influence, and entered into his
plans with eager zeal. With him Burr did not have to be on his guard,
and to him he confided freely his plans; but elsewhere, and in dealing
with less emotional people, he had to be more guarded.
How Far Burr's Allies were Privy to his Treason.
It is always difficult to find out exactly what a conspirator of Burr's
type really intended, and exactly how guilty his various temporary
friends and allies were. Part of the conspirator's business is to
dissemble the truth, and in after-time it is nearly impossible to
differentiate it from the false, even by the most elaborate sifting of
the various untruths he has uttered. Burr told every kind of story, at
one time or another, and to different classes of auditors. It would be
unsafe to deny his having told a particular falsehood in any given case
or to any given man. On the other hand when once the plot was unmasked
those persons to whom he had confided his plans were certain to insist
that he had really kept them in ignorance of his true intention. In
consequence it is quite impossible to say exactly how much guilty
knowledge his various companions possessed. When it comes to treating of
his relationship with Wilkinson all that can be said is that no single
statement ever made by either man, whether during the conspiracy or
after it, whether to the other or to an outsider, can be considered as
either presumptively true or presumptively false.
It is therefore impossible to say exactly how far the Westerners with
whom Burr was intimate were privy to his plans. It is certain that the
great mass of the Westerners never seriously considered entering into
any seditious movement under him. It is equally certain that a number of
their leaders were more or less compromised by their associations with
him. It seems probable that to each of these leaders he revealed what he
thought would most attract him in the scheme; but that to very few did
he reveal an outright proposition to break up the Union. Many of them
were very willing to hear the distinguished Easterner make vague
proposals for increasing the power of the West by means which were
hinted at with sinister elusiveness; and many others were delighted to
go into any movement which promised an attack upon the Spanish
territory; but it seems likely that there were only a few
men--Wilkinson, for instance, and Adair of Kentucky--who were willing to
discuss a proposition to commit downright treason.
Burr and Andrew Jackson.
Burr stopped at Cincinnati, in Ohio, and at one or two places in
Kentucky. In both States many prominent politicians, even United States
Senators, received him with enthusiasm. He then visited Nashville where
he became the guest of Andrew Jackson. Jackson was now Major General of
the Tennessee militia; and the possibility of war, especially of war
with the Spaniards, roused his hot nature to uncontrollable eagerness.
[Footnote: Adams, III., 221.] Burr probably saw through Jackson's
character at once, and realized that with him it was important to dwell
solely upon that part of the plan which contemplated an attack upon the
Spaniards.
Threatened Hostilities with Spain.
Jackson's Eagerness to Assail Spain.
The United States was at this time on the verge of war with Spain. The
Spanish Governor and Intendant remained in New Orleans after the
cession, and by their conduct gave such offence that it finally became
necessary to order them to leave. Jefferson claimed, as part of
Louisiana, portions of both West Florida and Texas. The Spaniards
refused to admit the justice of the claim and gathered in the disputed
territories armies which, though small, outnumbered the few regular
troops that Wilkinson had at his disposal. More than once a collision
seemed imminent. The Westerners clamored for war, desiring above all
things to drive the Spaniards by force from the debatable lands. For
some time Jefferson showed symptoms of yielding to their wishes; but he
was too timid and irresolute to play a high part, and in the end he
simply did nothing. However, though he declined to make actual war on
the Spaniards, he also refused to recognize their claims as just, and
his peculiar, hesitating course, tended to inflame the Westerners, and
to make them believe that their government would not call them to
account for acts of aggression. To Jackson doubtless Burr's proposals
seemed quite in keeping with what he hoped from the United States
Government. He readily fell in with views so like his own, and began
to make preparations for an expedition against the Spanish dominions;
an expedition which in fact would not have differed essentially from the
expeditions he actually did make into the Spanish Floridas six or eight
years afterward, or from the movement which still later his fellow
Tennessean, Houston, headed in Texas.
Burr and Wilkinson.
From Nashville Burr drifted down the Cumberland, and at Fort Massac, on
the Ohio, he met Wilkinson, a kindred spirit, who possessed neither
honor nor conscience, and could not be shocked by any proposal.
Moreover, Wilkinson much enjoyed the early stages of a seditious
agitation, when the risk to himself seemed slight; and as he was at this
time both the highest military officer of the United States, and also
secretly in the pay of Spain, the chance to commit a double treachery
gave an added zest to his action. He entered cordially into Burr's
plans, and as soon as he returned to his headquarters, at St. Louis, he
set about trying to corrupt his subordinates, and seduce them from their
allegiance.
Burr Visits New Orleans.
Meanwhile Burr passed down the Mississippi to New Orleans, where he
found himself in the society of persons who seemed more willing than any
others he had encountered to fall in with his plans. Even here he did
not clearly specify his purposes, but he did say enough to show that
they bordered on the treasonable; and he was much gratified at the
acquiescence of his listeners. His gratification, however, was
over-hasty. The Creoles, and some of the Americans, were delighted to
talk of their wrongs and to threaten any course of action which they
thought might yield vengeance; but they had little intention of
proceeding from words to deeds. Claiborne, a straightforward and honest
man, set his face like a flint against all of Burr's doings.
From New Orleans Burr retraced his steps and visited Wilkinson at St.
Louis. But Wilkinson was no longer in the same frame of mind as at Fort
Massac. He had tested his officers, to see if they could be drawn into
any disloyal movement, and had found that they were honorable men, firm
in their attachment to the Union; and he was beginning to perceive that
the people generally were quite unmoved by Burr's intrigues.
Accordingly, when Burr reached him he threw cold water on his plans, and
though he did not denounce or oppose them, he refrained from taking
further active part in the seditious propaganda.
Burr Returns to Washington.
After visiting Harrison, the Governor of the Indiana territory, Burr
returned to Washington. If he had possessed the type of character which
would have made him really dangerous as a revolutionist, he would have
seen how slight was his hope of stirring up revolt in the West; but he
would not face facts, and he still believed he could bring about an
uprising against the Union in the Mississippi Valley. His immediate need
was money. This he hoped to obtain from some foreign government. He
found that nothing could be done with Great Britain; and then,
incredible though it may seem, he turned to Spain, and sought to obtain
from the Spaniards themselves the funds with which to conquer their own
territories.
His Burlesque Proposals to Spain.
This was the last touch necessary to complete the grotesque fantasy
which his brain had evolved. He approached the Spanish Minister first
through one of his fellow conspirators and then in his own person. At
one time he made his request on the pretence that he wished to desert
the other filibusterers, and save Spain by committing a double
treachery, and betraying the treasonable movement into which he had
entered; and again he asked funds on the ground that all he wished to do
was to establish a separate government in the West, and thus destroy the
power of the United States to molest Spain. However, his efforts came to
naught, and he was obliged to try what he could do unaided in the West.
His Second Trip to the West.
In August, 1806, he again crossed the Alleghenies. His first stop of
importance was at Blennerhassett's. Blennerhassett was the one person of
any importance who took his schemes so seriously as to be willing to
stake his fortune on their success. Burr took with him to
Blennerhassett's his daughter, Theodosia, a charming woman, the wife of
a South Carolinian, Allston. The attractions of the daughter, and Burr's
own address and magnetism, completely overcame both Blennerhassett and
his wife. They gave the adventurer all the money they could raise, with
the understanding that they would receive it back a hundred-fold as the
result of a land speculation which was to go hand in hand with the
expected revolution. Then Blennerhassett began, in a very noisy and
ineffective way, to make what preparations were possible in the way of
rousing the Ohio settlers, and of gathering a body of armed men to serve
under Burr when the time came. It was all done in a way that savored of
farce rather than of treason.
Again Visits Jackson.
There was much less comedy however in what went on in Kentucky and
Tennessee where Burr next went. At Nashville he was received with open
arms by Jackson and Jackson's friends. This was not much to Jackson's
credit, for by this time he should have known Burr's character; but the
temptation of an attack on the Spaniards proved irresistible. As Major
General, he called out the militia of West Tennessee, and began to make
ready in good earnest to invade Florida or Mexico. At public dinners he
and his friends and Burr made speeches in which they threatened
immediate war against Spain, with which country the United States was at
peace; but they did not threaten any attack on the Union, and indeed
Jackson exacted from Burr a guarantee of his loyalty to the Union.
His Experience in Kentucky.
From Nashville the restless conspirator returned to Kentucky to see if
he could persuade the most powerful of the Western States to take some
decided step in his favor. Senator John Adair, former companion-in-arms
of Wilkinson in the wars against the Northwestern Indians, enlisted in
support of Burr with heart and soul. Kentucky society generally received
him with enthusiasm. But there was in the State a remnant of the old
Federalist party, which although not formidable in numbers, possessed
weight because of the vigor and ability of its leaders. The chief among
them were Humphrey Marshall, former United States Senator, and Joseph H.
Daveiss, who was still District Attorney, not having, as yet, been
turned out by Jefferson. [Footnote: For the Kentucky episode, see
Marshall and Greene. Gayarré is the authority for what occurred in New
Orleans. For the whole conspiracy, see Adams.] These men saw--what
Eastern politicians could not see--the connection between Burr's
conspiracy and the former Spanish intrigues of men like Wilkinson,
Sabastian, and Innes. They were loyal to the Union; and they felt a
bitter factional hatred for their victorious foes in whose ranks were to
be found all the old time offenders; so they attacked the new conspiracy
with a double zest. They not only began a violent newspaper war upon
Burr and all the former conspirators, but also proceeded to invoke the
aid of the courts and the legislature against them. Their exposure of
the former Spanish intrigues, as well as of Burr's plots, attracted
widespread attention in the West, even at New Orleans [Footnote:
Gayarré, IV., 180.]; but the Kentuckians, though angry and ashamed, were
at first reluctant to be convinced. Twice Daveiss presented Burr for
treason before the Grand Jury; twice the Grand Jury declared in his
favor; and the leaders of the Kentucky Democracy gave him their
countenance, while Henry Clay acted as his counsel. Daveiss, by a
constant succession of letters, kept Jefferson fully informed of all
that was done. Though his attacks on Burr for the moment seemed
failures, they really accomplished their object. They created such
uneasiness that the prominent Kentuckians made haste to clear themselves
of all possible connection with any treasonable scheme. Henry Clay
demanded and received from Burr a formal pledge that his plans were in
no wise hostile to the Union; and the other people upon whom Burr
counted most, both in Ohio and Kentucky, hastily followed this example.
This immediate defection showed how hopeless Burr's plans were. The
moment he attempted to put them into execution, their utter futility was
certain to be exposed.
Friction with the Spaniards.
Meanwhile Jefferson's policy with the Spaniards, which neither secured
peace nor made ready for war, kept up constant irritation on the border.
Both the Spanish Governor Folch, in West Florida, and the Spanish
General Herrera, in Texas, menaced the Americans. [Footnote: Gayarré,
IV., 137, 151, etc.] Wilkinson hurried with his little army towards
Herrera, until the two stood face to face, each asserting that the other
was on ground that belonged to his own nation. Just at this time Burr's
envoys, containing his final propositions, reached Wilkinson. But
Wilkinson now saw as cleanly as any one that Burr's scheme was
foredoomed to fail; and he at once determined to make use of the only
weapon in which he was skilled,--treachery. At this very time he, the
commander of the United States Army, was in the pay of Spain, and was in
secret negotiation with the Spanish officials against whom he was
supposed to be acting; he had striven to corrupt his own army and had
failed; he had found out that the people of the West were not disloyal.
He saw that there was no hope of success for the conspirators; and he
resolved to play the part of defender of the nation, and to act with
vigor against Burr. Having warned Jefferson, in language of violent
alarm, about Burr's plans, he prepared to prevent their execution. He
first made a truce with Herrera in accordance with which each was to
retire to his former position, and then he started for the Mississippi.
Burr Flees Down the Mississippi.
When Burr found that he could do nothing in Kentucky and Tennessee, he
prepared to go to New Orleans. The few boats that Blennerhassett had
been able to gather were sent hurriedly down stream lest they should be
interfered with by the Ohio authorities. Burr had made another visit to
Nashville. Slipping down the Cumberland, he joined his little flotilla,
passed Fort Massac, and began the descent of the Mississippi.
The plot was probably most dangerous at New Orleans, if it could be said
to be dangerous anywhere. Claiborne grew very much alarmed about it,
chiefly because of the elusive mystery in which it was shrouded. But
when the pinch came it proved as unsubstantial there as elsewhere. The
leaders who had talked most loosely about revolutionary proceedings grew
alarmed, as the crisis approached, lest they might be called on to make
good their words; and they hastened to repudiate all connection with
Burr, and to avow themselves loyal to the Union. Even the
Creole militia,--a body which Claiborne regarded with just
suspicion,--volunteered to come to the defence of the Government when it
was thought that Burr might actually attack the city.
Collapse of the Conspiracy.
But Burr's career was already ruined. Jefferson, goaded into action, had
issued a proclamation for his arrest; and even before this proclamation
was issued, the fabric of the conspiracy had crumbled into shifting
dust. The Ohio Legislature passed resolutions demanding prompt action
against the conspirators; and the other Western communities followed
suit. There was no real support for Burr anywhere. All his plot had been
but a dream; at the last he could not do anything which justified, in
even the smallest degree, the alarm and curiosity he had excited. The
men of keenest insight and best judgment feared his unmasked efforts
less than they feared Wilkinson's dark and tortuous treachery.
[Footnote: E. G. Cowles Meade; see Gayarré, IV., 169.] As he drifted
down the Mississippi with his little flotilla, he was overtaken by
Jefferson's proclamation, which was sent from one to another of the
small Federal garrisons. Near Natchez, in January, 1807, he surrendered
his flotilla, without resistance, to the Acting-Governor of Mississippi
Territory. He himself escaped into the land of the Choctaws and Creeks,
disguised as a Mississippi boatman; but a month later he was arrested
near the Spanish border, and sent back to Washington.
Thus ended ingloriously the wildest, most spectacular, and least
dangerous, of all the intrigues for Western disunion. It never contained
within itself the least hope of success. It was never a serious menace
to the National government. It was not by any means even a good example
of Western particularistic feeling. It was simply a sporadic
illustration of the looseness of national sentiment, here and there,
throughout the country; but of no great significance, because it was in
no sense a popular movement, and had its origin in the fantastic
imagination of a single man.
After-Effects in the West.
It left scarcely a ripple in the West. When the danger was over
Wilkinson appeared in New Orleans, where he strutted to the front for a
little while, playing the part of a fussy dictator and arresting, among
others, Adair of Kentucky. As the panic subsided, they were released. No
Louisianian suffered in person or property from any retaliatory action
of the Government; but lasting good was done by the abject failure of
the plot and by the exhibition of unused strength by the American
people. The Creoles ceased to mutter discontent, and all thought of
sedition died away in the province.
Sufferers from the Conspiracy.
The chief sufferers, aside from Blennerhassett, were Sebastian and
Innes, of Kentucky. The former resigned from the bench, and the latter
lost a prestige he never regained. A few of their intimate friends also
suffered. But their opponents did not fare much better. Daveiss and
Marshall were the only men in the West whose action toward Burr had been
thoroughly creditable, showing alike vigor, intelligence, and loyalty.
To both of them the country was under an obligation. Jefferson showed
his sense of this obligation in a not uncharacteristic way by removing
Daveiss from office; Marshall was already in private life, and all that
could be done was to neglect him.
The Trial of Burr.
As for Burr, he was put on trial for high treason, with Wilkinson as
state's evidence. Jefferson made himself the especial champion of
Wilkinson; nevertheless the General cut a contemptible figure at the
trial, for no explanation could make his course square with honorable
dealing. Burr was acquitted on a technicality. Wilkinson, the double
traitor, the bribe-taker, the corrupt servant of a foreign government,
remained at the head of the American Army.