INTRIGUES AND LAND SPECULATIONS--THE TREATIES OF JAY AND PINCKNEY,
1793-1797.
The Current of Tendency.
Throughout the history of the winning of the West what is noteworthy is
the current of tendency rather than the mere succession of individual
events. The general movement, and the general spirit behind the
movement, became evident in many different forms, and if attention is
paid only to some particular manifestation we lose sight of its true
import and of its explanation. Particular obstacles retarded or
diverted, particular causes accelerated, the current; but the set was
always in one direction. The peculiar circumstances of each case must
always be taken into account, but it is also necessary to understand
that it was but one link in the chain of causation.
The Causes of the Various Separatist and Filibustering Movements.
Such events as Burr's conspiracy or the conquest of Texas cannot be
properly understood if we fail to remember that they were but the most
spectacular or most important manifestations of what occurred many
times. The Texans won a striking victory and performed a feat of the
utmost importance in our history; and, moreover, it happened that at the
moment the accession of Texas was warmly favored by the party of the
slave-holders. Burr had been Vice-President of the United States, and
was a brilliant and able man, of imposing personality, whose intrigues
in the West attracted an attention altogether disproportionate to their
real weight. In consequence each event is often treated as if it were
isolated and stood apart from the general current of western history;
whereas in truth each was but the most striking or important among a
host or others. The feats performed by Austin and Houston and the
other founders of the Texan Republic were identical in kind with the
feats merely attempted, or but partially performed, by the men who, like
Morgan, Elijah Clark, and George Rogers Clark, at different times either
sought to found colonies in the Spanish-speaking lands under Spanish
authority, or else strove to conquer these lands outright by force of
arms. Boone settled in Missouri when it was still under the Spanish
Government, and himself accepted a Spanish commission. Whether Missouri
had or had not been ceded first by Spain to France and then by France to
the United States early in the present century, really would not have
altered its final destiny, so far at least as concerns the fact that it
would ultimately have been independent of both France and Spain, and
would have been dominated by an English-speaking people; for when once
the backwoodsmen, of whom Boone was the forerunner, became sufficiently
numerous in the land they were certain to throw off the yoke of the
foreigner; and the fact that they had voluntarily entered the land and
put themselves under this yoke would have made no more difference to
them than it afterwards made to the Texans. So it was with Aaron Burr.
His conspiracy was merely one, and by no means the most dangerous, of
the various conspiracies in which men like Wilkinson, Sebastian, and
many of the members of the early Democratic societies in Kentucky, bore
a part. It was rendered possible only by the temper of the people and by
the peculiar circumstances which also rendered the earlier conspiracies
possible; and it came to naught for the same reasons that they came to
naught, and was even more hopeless, because it was undertaken later,
when the conditions were less favorable.
Clark's Part in the Proposed French Attack on Spain.
The movement deliberately entered into by many of the Kentuckians in the
years 1793 and 1794, to conquer Louisiana on behalf of France, must be
treated in this way. The leader in this movement was George Rogers
Clark. His chance of success arose from the fact that there were on the
frontier many men of restless, adventurous, warlike type, who felt a
spirit of unruly defiance toward the home government and who greedily
eyed the rich Spanish lands. Whether they got the lands by conquest or
by colonization, and whether they warred under one flag or another, was
to them a matter of little moment. Clark's career is of itself
sufficient to prove the truth of this. He had already been at the head
of a movement to make war against the Spaniards, in defiance of the
Central Government, on behalf of the Western settlements. On another
occasion he had offered his sword to the Spanish Government, and had
requested permission to found in Spanish territory a State which should
be tributary to Spain and a barrier against the American advance. He had
thus already sought to lead the Westerners against Spain in a warfare
undertaken purely by themselves and for their own objects, and had also
offered to form by the help of some of these Westerners a State which
should be a constituent portion of the Spanish dominion. He now readily
undertook the task of raising an army of Westerners to overrun Louisiana
in the interests of the French Republic. The conditions which rendered
possible these various movements were substantially the same, although
the immediate causes, or occasions, were different. In any event the
result would ultimately have been the conquest of the Spanish dominions
by the armed frontiersmen, and the upbuilding of English-speaking States
on Spanish territory.
The American Sympathizers with the French Revolution.
The expedition which at the moment Clark proposed to head took its
peculiar shape from outside causes. At this period Genet was in the
midst of his preposterous career as Minister from the French Republic to
the United States. The various bodies of men who afterwards coalesced
into the Democratic-Republican party were frantically in favor of the
French Revolution, regarding it with a fatuous admiration quite as
foolish as the horror with which it affected most of the Federalists.
They were already looking to Jefferson as their leader, and Jefferson,
though at the time Secretary of State under Washington, was secretly
encouraging them, and was playing a very discreditable part toward his
chief. The ultra admirers of the French Revolution not only lost their
own heads, but turned Genet's as well, and persuaded him that the people
were with him and were ready to oppose Washington and the Central
Government in the interests of revolutionary France. Genet wished to
embroil America with England, and sought to fit out American privateers
on the seacoast towns to prey on the English commerce, and to organize
on the Ohio River an armed expedition to conquer Louisiana, as Spain was
then an ally of England and at war with France.
The Jeffersonians' Western Policy.
All over the country Genet's admirers formed Democratic societies on the
model of the Jacobin Clubs of France. They were of course either useless
or noxious in such a country and under such a government as that of the
United States, and exercised a very mischievous effect. Kentucky was
already under the influence of the same forces that were at work in
Virginia and elsewhere, and the classes of her people who were
politically dominant were saturated with the ideas of those doctrinaire
politicians of whom Jefferson was chief. These Jeffersonian doctrinaires
were men who at certain crises, in certain countries, might have
rendered great service to the cause of liberty and humanity; but their
influence in America was on the whole distinctly evil, save that, by a
series of accidents, they became the especial champions of the westward
extension of the nation, and in consequence were identified with a
movement which was all-essential to the national well-being.
Kentucky Ripe for Genet's Intrigues.
Kentucky was ripe for Genet's intrigues, and he found the available
leader for the movement in the person of George Rogers Clark. Clark was
deeply imbittered, not only with the United States Government but with
Virginia, for the Virginia assembly had refused to pay any of the debts
he had contracted on account of the State, and had not even reimbursed
him for what he had spent. [Footnote: Draper MSS., J. Clark to G. R.
Clark, Dec. 27, 1792.] He had a right to feel aggrieved at the State's
penuriousness and her indifference to her moral obligations; and just at
the time when he was most angered came the news that Genet was agitating
throughout the United States for a war with England, in open defiance of
Washington, and that among his plans he included a Western movement
against Louisiana. Clark at once wrote to him expressing intense
sympathy with the French objects and offering to undertake an expedition
for the conquest of St. Louis and upper Louisiana if he was provided
with the means to obtain provisions and stores. Clark further informed
Genet that his country had been utterly ungrateful to him, and that as
soon as he received Genet's approbation of what he proposed to do he
would get himself "expatriated." He asked for commissions for officers,
and stated his belief that the Creoles would rise, that the adventurous
Westerners would gladly throng to the contest, and that the army would
soon be at the gates of New Orleans. [Footnote: _Do_., Letter of George
Rogers Clark, Feb. 5, 1793; also Feb. 2d and Feb. 3d.]
Clark Commissioned as a French Major General.
Genet immediately commissioned Clark as a Major General in the service
of the French Republic, and sent out various Frenchmen--Michaux, La
Chaise, and others--with civil and military titles, to co-operate with
him, to fit out his force as well as possible, and to promise him pay
for his expenses. Brown, now one of Kentucky's representatives at
Philadelphia, gave these men letters of introduction to merchants in
Lexington and elsewhere, from whom they got some supplies; but they
found they would have to get most from Philadelphia. [Footnote: Draper
MSS., Michaux to George Rogers Clark, undated, but early in 1793.]
Michaux was the agent for the French Minister, though nominally his
visit was undertaken on purely scientific grounds. Jefferson's course in
the matter was characteristic. Openly, he was endeavoring in a
perfunctory manner to carry out Washington's policy of strict neutrality
in the contest between France and England, but secretly he was engaged
in tortuous intrigues against Washington and was thwarting his wishes,
so far as he dared, in regard to Genet.
Jefferson's Double-dealing.
It is impossible that he could have been really misled as to Michaux's
character and the object of his visits; nevertheless, he actually gave
him a letter of introduction to the Kentucky Governor, Isaac Shelby.
[Footnote: State Department MSS., Jefferson Papers, Series I., Vol. V.,
p. 163.] Shelby had shown himself a gallant and capable officer in
warfare against both the Indians and the Tories, but he possessed no
marked political ability, and was entirely lacking in the strength of
character which would have fitted him to put a stop to rebellion and
lawlessness. He hated England, sympathized with France, and did not
possess sufficient political good sense to appreciate either the
benefits of the Central Government or the need of preserving order.
Clark at once proceeded to raise what troops he could, and issued a
proclamation signed by himself as Major General of the Armies of France,
Commander in Chief of the French Revolutionary Legions on the
Mississippi. He announced that he proposed to raise volunteers for the
reduction of the Spanish posts on the Mississippi and to open the trade
of that river, and promised all who would join him from one to three
thousand acres of any unappropriated land in the conquered regions, the
officers to receive proportionately more. All lawful plunder was to be
equally divided according to the customs of war. [Footnote: Marshall,
II., page 103.] The proclamation thus frankly put the revolutionary
legions on the footing of a gang of freebooters. Each man was to receive
a commission proportioned in grade to the number of soldiers he brought
to Clark's band. In short, it was a piece of sheer filibustering, not
differing materially from one of Walker's filibustering attempts in
Central America sixty years later, save that at this time Clark had
utterly lost his splendid vigor of body and mind and was unfit for the
task he had set himself. At first, however, he met with promises of
support from various Kentuckians of prominence, including Benjamin
Logan. [Footnote: Draper MSS., Benjamin Logan to George Rogers Clark,
Dec. 31, 1793.] His agents gathered flat-boats and pirogues for the
troops and laid in stores of powder, lead, and beef. The nature of some
of the provisions shows what a characteristic backwoods expedition it
was; for Clark's agent notified him that he had ready "upwards of eleven
hundred weight of Bear Meat and about seventy or seventy-four pair of
Veneson Hams." [Footnote: Draper MSS., John Montgomery to Geo. Rogers
Clark, Jan. 12, 1794.]
The Democratic Societies Support Clark.
The Democratic Societies in Kentucky entered into Clark's plans with the
utmost enthusiasm, and issued manifestoes against the Central Government
which were, in style, of hysterical violence, and, in matter,
treasonable. The preparations were made openly, and speedily attracted
the attention of the Spanish agents, besides giving alarm to the
representatives of the Federal Government and to all sober citizens who
had sense enough to see that the proposed expedition was merely another
step toward anarchy. St. Clair, the Governor of the Northwestern
Territory, wrote to Shelby to warn him of what was being done, and
Wayne, who was a much more formidable person than Shelby or Clark or any
of their backers, took prompt steps to prevent the expedition from
starting, by building a fort near the mouth of the Ohio, and ordering
his lieutenants to hold themselves in readiness for any action he might
direct. At the same time the Administration wrote to Shelby telling him
what was on foot, and requesting him to see that no expedition of the
kind was allowed to march against the domains of a friendly power.
Shelby's Vacillation.
Shelby, in response, entered into a long argument to show that he could
not interfere with the expedition, and that he doubted his
constitutional power to do anything in the matter; his reasons being of
the familiar kind usually advanced in such cases, where a government
officer, from timidity or any other cause, refuses to do his duty. If
his contention as to his own powers and the powers of the General
Government had been sound, it would logically have followed that there
was no power anywhere to back up the law. Innes, the Federal Judge,
showed himself equally lukewarm in obeying the Federal authorities.
[Footnote: American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I., pp. 454, 460;
Marshall, II., 93.]
Blount's Decision and Patriotism.
Blount, the Governor of the Southwestern Territory, acted as vigorously
and patriotically as St. Clair and Wayne, and his conduct showed in
marked contrast to Shelby's. He possessed far too much political good
sense not to be disgusted with the conduct of Genet, which he denounced
in unmeasured terms. He expressed great pleasure when Washington
summarily rebuked the blatant French envoy. He explained to the
Tennesseeans that Genet had as his chief backers the disappointed
office-hunters and other unsavory characters in New York and in the
seacoast cities, but that the people at large were beginning to realize
what the truth was, and to show a proper feeling for the President and
his government. [Footnote: Robertson MSS., Blount's letter,
Philadelphia, Aug. 28, 1793.] Some of the Cumberland people, becoming
excited by the news of Clark's preparation, prepared to join him, or to
undertake a separate filibustering attack on their own account. Blount
immediately wrote to Robertson directing him to explain to these
"inconsiderate persons" that all they could possibly do was to attempt
the conquest of West Florida, and that they would "lay themselves liable
to heavy Pains and Penalties, both pecuniary and corporal in case they
ever returned to their injured country." He warned Robertson that it was
his duty to prevent the attempt, and that the legal officers of the
district must proceed against any of the men having French commissions,
and must do their best to stop the movement; which, he said, proceeded
"from the Machenations no doubt of that Jacobin Incendiary, Genet, which
is reason sufficient to make every honest mind revolt at the Idea."
Robertson warmly supported him, and notified the Spanish commander at
New Madrid of the steps which he was taking; at which the Spaniards
expressed great gratification. [Footnote: Robertson MSS., Blount to
Robertson, Jan. 18, 1794; letter from Portello, New Madrid, Jan. 17,
1794.]
Collapse of the Movement.
However, the whole movement collapsed when Genet was recalled early in
1794, Clark being forced at once to abandon his expedition. [Footnote:
Blount MSS., Blount to Smith, April 3, 1794.] Clark found himself out of
pocket as the result of what he had done; and as there was no hope of
reimbursing himself by Spanish plunder, he sought to obtain from the
French Government reimbursement for the expenses, forwarding to the
French Assembly, through an agent in France, his bill for the "Expenses
of Expedition ordered by Citizen Genet." The agent answered that he
would try to secure the payment; and after he got to Paris he first
announced himself as hopeful; but later he wrote that he had discovered
that the French agents were really engaged in a dangerous conspiracy
against the Western country, and he finally had to admit that the claim
was disallowed. [Footnote: Draper MSS., Clark's accounts, Aug. 23, 1794;
Fulton to Clark, Nantes, Nov. 16, 1794; _Do.,_ Paris, April 9 and 12,
1795.] With this squabble between the French and Americans the history
of the abortive expedition ends.
Tortuous Diplomacy of the Spaniards.
The attempt, of course, excited and alarmed the Spaniards, and gave a
new turn to their tortuous diplomacy. In reading the correspondence of
the Spanish Governor, Baron Carondelet, both with his subordinates and
with his superiors, it is almost amusing to note the frankness with
which he avows his treachery. It evidently did not occur to him that
there was such a thing as national good faith, or that there was the
slightest impropriety in any form of mendacity when exercised in dealing
with the ministers or inhabitants of a foreign State. In this he was a
faithful reflex of his superiors at the Spanish Court. At the same time
that they were solemnly covenanting for a definite treaty of peace with
the United States they were secretly intriguing to bring about a
rebellion in the western States; and while they were assuring the
Americans that they were trying their best to keep the Indians peaceful,
they were urging the savages to war.
Their Alarm at Clark's Movements.
As for any gratitude to the National Government for stopping the
piratical expeditions of the Westerners, the Spaniards did not feel a
trace. They had early received news of Clark's projected expedition
through a Frenchman who came to the Spanish agents at Philadelphia;
[Footnote: Draper MSS., Spanish Documents, Carondelet to Alcudia, March
20, 1794.] and when the army began to gather they received from time to
time from their agents in Kentucky reports which, though exaggerated,
gave them a fairly accurate view of what was happening. No overt act of
hostility was committed by Clark's people, except by some of those who
started to join him from the Cumberland district, under the lead of a
man named Montgomery. These men built a wooden fort at the mouth of the
Cumberland River, and held the boats that passed to trade with Spain;
one of the boats that they took being a scow loaded with flour and
biscuit sent up stream by the Spanish Government itself.
Good Conduct of the United States Government.
When Wayne heard of the founding of this fort he acted with his usual
promptness, and sent an expedition which broke it up and released the
various boats. Then, to stop any repetition of the offence, and more
effectually to curb the overbearing truculence of the frontiersmen, he
himself built, as already mentioned, a fort at Massac, not far from the
Mississippi. All this of course was done in the interests of the
Spaniards themselves and in accordance with the earnest desire of the
United States authorities to prevent any unlawful attack on Louisiana;
yet Carondelet actually sent word to Gayoso de Lemos, the Governor of
Natchez and the upper part of the river, to persuade the Chickasaws
secretly to attack this fort and destroy it.
Ingratitude of the Spaniards.
Carondelet always had an exaggerated idea of the warlike capacity of the
Indian nations, and never understood the power of the Americans, nor
appreciated the desire of their Government to act in good faith. Gayoso
was in this respect a much more intelligent man, and he positively
refused to carry out the orders of his superior, remonstrating directly
to the Court of Spain, by which he was sustained. He pointed out that
the destruction of the fort would merely encourage the worst enemies of
the Spaniards, even if accomplished; and he further pointed out that it
was quite impossible to destroy it; for he understood fully the
difference between a fort garrisoned by Wayne's regulars and one held by
a mob of buccaneering militia. [Footnote: Draper MSS., Spanish
Documents, Manuel Gayoso de Lemos to the Duke de Alcudia, Natchez, Sept.
19, 1794.]
Gayoso and Carondelet.
It was not the first time that Gayoso's superior knowledge of the
Indians and of their American foes had prevented his carrying out the
orders of his superior officer. On one occasion Carondelet had directed
Gayoso to convene the Southern Indians, and to persuade them to send
deputies to the United States authorities with proposals to settle the
boundaries in accordance with the wishes of Spain, and to threaten open
war as an alternative. Gayoso refused to adopt this policy, and
persuaded Carondelet to alter it, showing that it was necessary above
all things to temporize, that such a course as the one proposed would
provoke immediate hostilities, and that the worst possible line for the
Spaniards to follow would be one of open war with the entire power of
the United States. [Footnote: _Do.,_ De Leraos to Carondelet, Dec. 6,
1793.]
Pressure of the Westerners on the Spanish Domain.
Of course the action of the American Government in procuring the recall
of Genet and putting a stop to Clark's operations lightened for a moment
the pressure of the backwoodsmen upon the Spanish dominions; but it was
only for a moment. The Westerners were bent on seizing the Spanish
territory; and they were certain to persist in their efforts until they
were either successful or were definitely beaten in actual war. The acts
of aggression were sure to recur; it was only the form that varied. When
the chance of armed conquest under the banner of the French Republic
vanished, there was an immediate revival of plans for getting possession
of some part of the Spanish domain through the instrumentality of the
great land companies.
The Land Companies.
These land companies possessed on paper a weight which they did not have
in actual history. They occasionally enriched, and more often
impoverished, the individual speculators; but in the actual peopling of
the waste lands they counted for little in comparison with the steady
stream of pioneer farmers who poured in, each to hold and till the
ground he in fact occupied. However, the contemporary documents of the
day were full of details concerning the companies; and they did possess
considerable importance at certain times in the settlement of the West,
both because they in places stimulated that settlement, and because in
other places they retarded it, inasmuch as they kept out actual
settlers, who could not pre-empt land which had been purchased at low
rates from some legislative body by the speculators. The companies were
sometimes formed by men who wished themselves to lead emigrants into the
longed-for region, but more often they were purely speculative in
character, and those who founded them wished only to dispose of them at
an advantage to third parties. Their history is inextricably mixed with
the history of the intrigues with and against the Spaniards and British
in the West. The men who organized them wished to make money. Their
object was to obtain title to or possession of the lands, and it was
quite a secondary matter with them whether their title came from the
United States, England, or Spain. They were willing to form colonies on
Spanish or British territory, and they were even willing to work for the
dismemberment of the Western Territory from the Union, if by so doing
they could increase the value of the lands which they sought to acquire.
American adventurers had been in correspondence with Lord Dorchester,
the Governor General of Canada, looking to the possibility of securing
British aid for those desirous of embarking in great land speculations
in the West. These men proposed to try to get the Westerners to join
with the British in an attack upon Louisiana, or even to conduct this
attack themselves in the British interests, believing that with New
Orleans in British hands the entire province would be thrown open to
trade with the outside world and to settlement; with the result that the
lands would increase enormously in value, and the speculators and
organizers of the companies, and of the movements generally, grow rich
in consequence. [Footnote: Canadian Archives, Dorchester to Sydney, June
7, 1789; Grenville to Dorchester, May 6, 1790; Dorchester to Beckwith,
June 17, 1790; Dorchester to Grenville, Sept. 25, 1790. See Brown's
"Political Beginnings," 187.] They assured the British agents that the
Western country would speedily separate from the eastern States, and
would have to put itself under the protection of some foreign state.
Dorchester considered these plans of sufficient weight to warrant
inquiry by his agents, but nothing ever came of them.
The Yazoo Land Companies.
Much the most famous, or, it would be more correct to say, infamous, of
these companies were those organized in connection with the Yazoo
lands. [Footnote: The best and most thorough account of these is to be
found in Charles H. Haskin's "The Yazoo Land Companies."] The country in
what is now northern Mississippi and Alabama possessed, from its great
fertility, peculiar fascinations in the eyes of the adventurous land
speculators. It was unoccupied by settlers, because as a matter of fact
it was held in adverse possession by the Indians, under Spanish
protection. It was claimed by the Georgians, and its cession was sought
by the United States Government, so that there was much uncertainty as
to the title, which could in consequence be cheaply secured. Wilkinson,
Brown, Innes, and other Kentuckians, had applied to the Spaniards to be
allowed to take these lauds and hold them, in their own interests, but
on behalf of Spain, and against the United States. The application had
not been granted, and the next effort was of a directly opposite
character, the adventurers this time proposing, as they could not hold
the territory as armed subjects of Spain, to wrest it from Spain by
armed entry after getting title from Georgia. In other words, they were
going to carry on war as a syndicate, the military operations for the
occupation of the ceded territory being part of the business for which
the company was organized. Their relations with the Union were doubtless
to be determined by the course of events.
The South Carolina Yazoo Company.
This company was the South Carolina Yazoo Company. In 1789 several
companies were formed to obtain from the Georgia Legislature grants of
the western territory which Georgia asserted to be hers. One, the
Virginia Company, had among its incorporators Patrick Henry, and
received a grant of nearly 20,000 square miles, but accomplished
nothing. Another, the Tennessee Company, received a grant of what is now
most of northern Alabama, and organized a body of men under the
leadership of an adventurer named Zachariah Cox, who drifted down the
Tennessee in flat-boats to take possession, and repeated the attempt
more than once. They were, however, stopped, partly by Blount, and
partly by the Indians. The South Carolina Yazoo Company made the most
serious effort to get possession of the coveted territory. Its grant
included about 15,000 square miles in what is now middle Mississippi and
Alabama; the nominal price being 67,000 dollars. One of the prime movers
in this company was a man named Walsh, who called himself Washington, a
person of unsavory character, who, a couple of years later, was hung at
Charleston for passing forged paper money in South Carolina. All these
companies had hoped to pay the very small prices they were asked for the
lands in the depreciated currency of Georgia; but they never did make
the full payments or comply with the conditions of the grants, which
therefore lapsed.
Its Abortive Efforts in Kentucky.
Before this occurred the South Carolina Yazoo Company had striven to
take possession of its purchase by organizing a military expedition to
go down the Mississippi from Kentucky. For commander of this expedition
choice was made of a Revolutionary soldier named James O'Fallon, who
went to Kentucky, where he married Clark's sister. He entered into
relations with Wilkinson, who drew him into the tangled web of Spanish
intrigue. He raised soldiers, and drew up a formal contract, entered
into between the South Carolina Yazoo Company and their troops of the
Yazoo Battalion--over five hundred men in all, cavalry, artillery and
infantry. Each private was to receive two hundred and fifty acres of
"stipendiary" lands and the officers in proportion, up to the Lieutenant
Colonel, who was to receive six thousand. Commissions were formally
issued, and the positions of all the regular officers were filled, so
that the invasion was on the point of taking place. [Footnote: American
State Papers, Indian Affairs, I., James O'Fallon to the President of the
United States, Lexington, Sept. 25, 1790, etc., etc.] However, the
Spanish authorities called the matter to the attention of the United
States, and the Federal Government put a prompt stop to the
movement. [Footnote: Draper MSS., Spanish Documents, Carondelet to
Alcudia, Jan. 1, 1794, and May 31, 1794.] O'Fallon was himself
threatened with arrest by the Federal officers, and had to abandon his
project. [Footnote: Draper MSS., Clark and O'Fallon Papers, anonymous
letter to James O'Fallon, Lexington, March 30, 1791, etc., etc.] He
afterwards re-established his relations with the Government, and became
one of Wayne's correspondents; [Footnote: Draper MSS., Wayne to O'Fallon,
Sept. 16, 1793.] but he entered heartily into Clark's plans for the
expedition under Genet, and, like all the other participators in that
wretched affair, became involved in broils with Clark and every one
else. [Footnote: Draper MSS., De Lemos to Carondelet, Dec. 23, 1793.]
Revival of the Companies.
In 1795 the land companies, encouraged by the certainty that the United
States would speedily take possession of the Yazoo territory,
again sprang into life. In that year four, the Georgia, the
Georgia-Mississippi, the Tennessee, and the Upper Mississippi, companies
obtained grants from the Georgia Legislature to a territory of over
thirty millions of acres, for which they paid but five hundred thousand
dollars, or less than two cents an acre. Among the grantees were many
men of note, congressmen, senators, even judges. The grants were secured
by the grossest corruption, every member of the Legislature who voted
for them, with one exception, being a stockholder in some one of the
companies, while the procuring of the cessions was undertaken by James
Gunn, one of the two Georgia Senators. The outcry against the
transaction was so universal throughout the State that at the next
session of the Legislature, in 1796, the acts were repealed and the
grants rescinded. This caused great confusion, as most of the original
grantees had hastily sold out to third parties; the purchases being
largely made in South Carolina and Massachusetts. Efforts were made by
the original South Carolina Yazoo Company to sue Georgia in the Federal
Courts, which led to the adoption of the Constitutional provision
forbidding such action.
Their Failure.
When in 1802, Georgia ceded the territory in question, including all of
what is now middle and northern Alabama and Mississippi, to the United
States for the sum of twelve hundred and fifty thousand dollars, the
National Government became heir to these Yazoo difficulties. It was not
until 1814 that the matter was settled by a compromise, after
interminable litigation and legislation. [Footnote: American State
Papers, Public Lands, I., pp. 99, 101, 111, 165, 172, 178; Haskin's
"Yazoo Land Companies." In Congress, Randolph, on behalf of the ultra
states'-rights people led the opposition to the claimants, whose special
champions were Madison and the northern democrats. Chief Justice
Marshall in the case of Fletcher _vs._ Peck, decided that the rescinding
act impaired the obligation of contracts, and was therefore in violation
of the Constitution of the United States; a decision further amplified
in the Dartmouth case, which has determined the national policy in
regard to public contracts. This decision was followed by the passage of
the Compromise Act by Congress in 1814, which distributed a large sum of
money obtained from the land sales in the territory, in specified
proportions among the various claimants.] The land companies were more
important to the speculators than to the actual settlers of the
Mississippi; nevertheless, they did stimulate settlement, in certain
regions, and therefore increased by just so much the western pressure
upon Spain.
Georgian Filibusterers.
Some of the aggressive movements undertaken by the Americans were of so
loose a nature that it is hard to know what to call them. This was true
of Elijah dark's company of Georgia freebooters in 1794. Accompanied by
large bodies of armed men, he on several occasions penetrated into the
territory southwest of the Oconee. He asserted at one time that he was
acting for Georgia and in defence of her rights to the lands which the
Georgians claimed under the various State treaties with the Indians, but
which by the treaty of New York had been confirmed to the Creeks by the
United States. On another occasion he entitled his motley force the Sans
Culottes, and masqueraded as a major general of the French army, though
the French Consul denied having any connection with him. He established
for the time being a little independent government, with blockhouses and
small wooden towns, in the middle of the unceded hunting grounds, and
caused great alarm to the Spaniards. The frontiersmen sympathized with
him, and when he was arrested in Wilkes County the Grand Jury of the
county ordered his discharge, and solemnly declared that the treaty of
New York was inoperative and the proclamation of the Governor of Georgia
against Clark, illegal. This was too much for the patience of the
Governor. He ordered out the State troops to co-operate with the small
Federal force, and Clark and his men were ignominiously expelled from
their new government and forced to return to Georgia. [Footnote: Steven's
"Georgia," II., 401.]
Benefit of Washington's Administration to the West.
In such a welter of intrigue, of land speculation, and of more or less
piratical aggression, there was immanent danger that the West would
relapse into anarchy unless a firm government were established, and
unless the boundaries with England and Spain were definitely
established. As Washington's administration grew steadily in strength
and in the confidence of the people the first condition was met. The
necessary fixity of boundary was finally obtained by the treaties
negotiated through John Jay with England, and through Thomas Pinckney
with Spain.
Jay's Treaty.
Jay's treaty aroused a perfect torrent of wrath throughout the country,
and nowhere more than in the West. A few of the coolest and most
intelligent men approved it, and rugged old Humphrey Marshall, the
Federalist Senator from Kentucky, voted for its ratification; but the
general feeling against it was intense. Even Blount, who by this time
was pretty well disgusted with the way he had been treated by the
Central Government, denounced it, and expressed his belief that
Washington would have hard work to explain his conduct in procuring its
ratification. [Footnote: Blount MSS., Blount to Smith, Aug. 24, 1795.]
Folly of the Westerners.
Yet the Westerners were the very people who had no cause whatever to
complain of the treaty. It was not an entirely satisfactory treaty;
perhaps a man like Hamilton might have procured rather better terms;
but, taken as a whole, it worked an immense improvement upon the
condition of things already existing. Washington's position was
undoubtedly right. He would have preferred a better treaty, but he
regarded the Jay treaty as very much better than none at all. Moreover,
the last people who had a right to complain of it were those who were
most vociferous in their opposition. The anti-Federalist party was on
the whole the party of weakness and disorder, the party that was
clamorous and unruly, but ineffective in carrying out a sustained
policy, whether of offense or of defence, in foreign affairs. The people
who afterwards became known as Jeffersonian Republicans numbered in
their ranks the extremists who had been active as the founders of
Democratic societies in the French interest, and they were ferocious in
their wordy hostility to Great Britain; but they were not dangerous foes
to any foreign government which did not fear words. Had they possessed
the foresight and intelligence to strengthen the Federal Government the
Jay treaty would not have been necessary.
Futility of the State's-Rights Men in Foreign Affairs.
Only a strong, efficient central government, backed by a good fleet and
a well organized army, could hope to wring from England what the French
party, the forerunners of the Jeffersonian Democracy, demanded. But the
Jeffersonians were separatists and State's-rights men. They believed in
a government so weak as to be ineffective, and showed a folly literally
astounding in their unwillingness to provide for the wars which they
were ready to provoke. They resolutely refused to provide an army or a
navy, or to give the Central Government the power necessary for waging
war. They were quite right in their feeling of hostility to England, and
one of the fundamental and fatal weaknesses of the Federalists was the
Federalist willingness to submit to England's aggressions without
retaliation; but the Jeffersonians had no gift for government, and were
singularly deficient in masterful statesmen of the kind imperatively
needed by any nation which wishes to hold an honorable place among other
nations. They showed their governmental ineptitude clearly enough later
on when they came into power, for they at once stopped building the
fleet which the Federalists had begun, and allowed the military forces
of the nation to fall into utter disorganization, with, as a
consequence, the shameful humiliations of the War of 1812. This war was
in itself eminently necessary and proper, and was excellent in its
results, but it was attended by incidents of shame and disgrace to
America for which Jefferson and Madison and their political friends and
supporters among the politicians and the people have never received a
sufficiently severe condemnation.
Benefits of Jay's Treaty to the West.
Jay's treaty was signed late in 1794 and was ratified in 1795.
[Footnote: American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I., pp. 479, 484,
489, 502, 519, etc.] The indignation of the Kentuckians almost amounted
to mania. They denounced the treaty with frantic intemperance, and even
threatened violence to those of their own number, headed by Humphrey
Marshall, who supported it; yet they benefited much by it, for it got
them what they would have been absolutely powerless to obtain for
themselves, that is, the possession of the British posts on the Lakes.
In 1796 the Americans took formal possession of these posts, and the
boundary line in the Northwest as nominally established by the treaty
of Versailles became in fact the actual line of demarcation between
the American and the British possessions. The work of Jay capped the
work of Wayne. Federal garrisons were established at Detroit and
elsewhere, and the Indians, who had already entered into the treaty of
Greeneville, were prevented from breaking it by this intervention of the
American military posts between themselves and their British allies.
Peace was firmly established for the time being in the Northwest, and our
boundaries in that direction took the fixed form they still retain.
[Footnote: American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I., p. 573; Foreign
Relations, I., _passim_, etc., etc.]
Systematic Treachery of the Spaniards.
In dealing with the British the Americans sometimes had to encounter bad
faith, but more often a mere rough disregard for the rights of others,
of which they could themselves scarcely complain with a good grace, as
they showed precisely the same quality in their own actions. In dealing
with the Spaniards, on the other hand, they had to encounter deliberate
and systematic treachery and intrigue. The open negotiations between the
two governments over the boundary ran side by side with a current of
muddy intrigue between the Spanish Government on the one hand, and
certain traitorous Americans on the other; the leader of these traitors
being, as usual, the arch scoundrel, Wilkinson.
Their Intrigues with the Indians.
The Spaniards trusted almost as much to Indian intrigue as to bribery of
American leaders; indeed they trusted to it more for momentary effect,
though the far-sighted among them realized that in the long run the
safety of the Spanish possessions depended upon the growth of divisional
jealousies among the Americans themselves. The Spanish forts were built
as much to keep the Indians under command as to check the Americans. The
Governor of Natchez, De Lemos, had already established a fort at the
Chickasaw Bluffs, where there was danger of armed collision between the
Spaniards and either the Cumberland settlers under Robertson or the
Federal troops. Among the latter, by the way, the officer for whose
ability the Spaniards seemed to feel an especial respect was Lieutenant
William Clark. [Footnote: Draper MSS., Spanish Documents, Carondelet to
Don Louis de Las Casas, June 13, 1795; De Lemos to Carondelet, July 25,
1793.]
The Chickasaws Befriend the Americans.
The Chickasaws were nearly drawn into a war with the Spaniards, who were
intensely irritated over their antagonism to the Creeks, for which the
Spaniards insisted that the Americans were responsible. [Footnote:
American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I., p. 305, etc.] The
Americans, however, were able to prove conclusively that the struggle
was due, not to their advice, but to the outrages of marauders from the
villages of the Muscogee confederacy. They showed by the letter of the
Chickasaw chief, James Colbert, that the Creeks had themselves begun
hostilities early in 1792 by killing a Chickasaw, and that the
Chickasaws, because of this spilling of blood, made war on the Creeks,
and sent word to the Americans to join in the war. The letter ran: "I
hope you will exert yourselves and join us so that we might give the
lads a Drubbeen for they have encroached on us this great while not us
alone you likewise for you have suffered a good dale by them I hope you
will think of your wounds." [Footnote: Blount MSS., James Colbert to
Robertson, Feb. 10, 1792.] The Americans had "thought of their wounds"
and had aided the Chickasaws in every way, as was proper; but the
original aggressors were the Creeks. The Chickasaws had entered into
what was a mere war of retaliation; though when once in they had fought
hard, under the lead of Opiamingo, their most noted war chief, who was
always friendly to the Americans and hostile to the Spaniards.
The Situation at Natchez.
At the Chickasaw Bluffs, and at Natchez, there was always danger of a
clash; for at these places the Spanish soldiers were in direct contact
with the foremost of the restless backwoods host, and with the Indians
who were most friendly or hostile to them. Open collision was averted,
but the Spaniards were kept uneasy and alert. There were plenty of
American settlers around Natchez, who were naturally friendly to the
American Government; and an agent from the State of Georgia, to the
horror of the Spaniards, came out to the country with the especial
purpose of looking over the Yazoo lands, at the time when Georgia was
about to grant them to the various land companies. What with the land
speculators, the frontiersmen, and the Federal troops, the situation
grew steadily more harassing for the Spaniards; and Carondolet kept the
advisors of the Spanish Crown well informed of the growing stress.
The Separatists Play into the Hands of the Spaniards.
The Spanish Government knew it would be beaten if the issue once came to
open war, and, true to the instincts of a weak and corrupt power, it
chose as its weapons delay, treachery, and intrigue. To individual
Americans the Spaniards often behaved with arrogance and brutality; but
they feared to give too serious offence to the American people as a
whole. Like all other enemies of the American Republic, from the days of
the Revolution to those of the Civil War, they saw clearly that their
best allies were the separatists, the disunionists, and they sought to
encourage in every way the party which, in a spirit of sectionalism,
wished to bring about a secession of one part of the country and the
erection of a separate government. The secessionists then, as always,
played into the hands of the men who wished the new republic ill. In the
last decade of the eighteenth century the acute friction was not between
North and South, but between East and West. The men who, from various
motives, wished to see a new republic created, hoped that this republic
would take in all the people of the western waters. These men never
actually succeeded in carrying the West with them. At the pinch the
majority of the Westerners remained loyal to the idea of national unity;
but there was a very strong separatist party, and there were very many
men who, though not separatists, were disposed to grumble loudly about
the shortcomings of the Federal government.
Their Influence in Kentucky.
Their Fatuity.
These men were especially numerous and powerful in Kentucky, and they
had as their organ the sole newspaper of the State, the _Kentucky
Gazette_. It was filled with fierce attacks, not only upon the General
Government, but upon Washington himself. Sometimes these attacks were
made on the authority of the _Gazette_; at other times they appeared in
the form of letters from outsiders, or of resolutions by the various
Democratic societies and political clubs. They were written with a
violence which, in striving after forcefulness, became feeble. They
described the people of Kentucky as having been "degraded and insulted,"
and as having borne these insults with "submissive patience." The
writers insisted that Kentucky had nothing to hope from the Federal
Government, and that it was nonsense to chatter about the infraction of
treaties, for it was necessary, at any cost, to take Louisiana, which
was "groaning under tyranny." They threatened the United States with
what the Kentuckians would do if their wishes were not granted, announcing
that they would make the conquest of Louisiana an ultimatum, and warning
the Government that they owed no eternal allegiance to it and might have
to separate, and that if they did there would be small reason to deplore
the separation. The separatist agitators failed to see that they could
obtain the objects they sought, the opening of the Mississippi and the
acquisition of Louisiana, only through the Federal Government, and only
by giving that Government full powers. Standing alone the Kentuckians
would have been laughed to scorn not only by England and France, but
even by Spain. Yet with silly fatuity they vigorously opposed every
effort to make the Government stronger or to increase national feeling,
railing even at the attempt to erect a great Federal city as "unwise,
impolitic, unjust," and "a monument to American folly." [Footnote:
_Kentucky Gazette_, Feb. 8, 1794; Sept. 16, 1797, etc., etc.] The men
who wrote these articles, and the leaders of the societies and clubs
which inspired them, certainly made a pitiable showing; they proved
that they themselves were only learning, and had not yet completely
mastered, the difficult art of self government.
Negotiations of the Spanish and American Governments.
Wilkinson's Ineffectual Treason.
It was the existence of these Western separatists, nominally the
fiercest foes of Spain, that in reality gave Spain the one real hope of
staying the western advance. In 1794 the American agents in Spain were
carrying on an interminable correspondence with the Spanish Court in the
effort to come to some understanding about the boundaries. [Footnote:
American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I., p. 443, etc.; letters of
Carmichael and Short to Gardoqui, Oct. 1, 1793; to Alcudia, Jan. 7,
1794, etc., etc.] The Spanish authorities were solemnly corresponding
with the American envoys, as if they meant peace; yet at the same time
they had authorized Carondelet to do his best to treat directly with the
American States of the West so as to bring about their separation from
the Union. In 1794 Wilkinson, who was quite incapable of understanding
that his infamy was heightened by the fact that he wore the uniform of
a Brigadier General of the United States, entered into negotiations for
a treaty, the base of which should be the separation of the Western
States from the Atlantic States. [Footnote: Draper MSS., Spanish
Documents, Carondelet to Alcudia, July 30, 1794.] He had sent two
confidential envoys to Carondelet. Carondelet jumped at the chance of
once more trying to separate the west from the east; and under Wilkinson's
directions he renewed his efforts to try by purchase and pension to
attach some of the leading Kentuckians to Spain. As a beginning he decided
to grant Wilkinson's request and send him twelve thousand dollars for
himself. [Footnote: _Do_., De Lemos to Alcudia, Sept. 19, 1794.] De Lemos
was sent to New Madrid in October to begin the direct negotiations with
Wilkinson and his allies. The funds to further the treasonable conspiracy
were also forwarded, as the need arose.
Failure of the American Government to Act with Proper Decision.
Carondelet was much encouraged as to the outcome by the fact that De
Lemos had not been dispossessed by force from the Chickasaw Bluffs. This
shows conclusively that Washington's administration was in error in not
acting with greater decision about the Spanish posts. Wayne should have
been ordered to use the sword, and to dispossess the Spaniards from the
east bank of the Mississippi. As so often in our history, we erred, not
through a spirit of over-aggressiveness, but through a willingness to
trust to peaceful measures instead of proceeding to assert our rights by
force.
Murder of the Messengers to Wilkinson.
The Murderers Shielded.
The first active step taken by Carondelet and De Lemos was to send the
twelve thousand dollars to Wilkinson, as the foundation and earnest of
the bribery fund. But the effort miscarried. The money was sent by two
men, Collins Owen, each of whom bore cipher letters to Wilkinson,
including some that were sewed into the collars of their coats. Collins
reached Wilkinson in safety, but Owen was murdered, for the sake of the
money he bore, by his boat's crew while on the Ohio river. [Footnote:
_Do._, letters of Carondelet to Alcudia, Oct. 4, 1794, and of De Lemos
to Carondelet, Aug. 28, 1795.] The murderers were arrested and were
brought before the Federal judge, Harry Innes. Owen was a friend of
Innes, and had been by him recommended to Wilkinson as a trustworthy man
for any secret and perilous service. Nevertheless, although it was his
own friend who had been murdered, Innes refused to try the murderers, on
the ground that they were Spanish subjects; a reason which was simply
nonsensical. He forwarded them to Wilkinson at Fort Warren. The latter
sent them back to New Madrid. On their way they were stopped by the
officer at Fort Massac, a thoroughly loyal man, who had not been engaged
in the intrigues of Wilkinson and Innes. He sent to the Spanish
commander at New Madrid for an interpreter to interrogate the men. Of
course the Spaniards were as reluctant as Wilkinson and Innes that the
facts as to the relations between Carondelet and Wilkinson should be
developed, and, like Wilkinson and Innes, they preferred that the
murderers should escape rather than that these facts should come to
light. Accordingly the interpreter did not divulge the confession of the
villains, all evidence as to their guilt was withheld, and they were
finally discharged. The Spaniards were very nervous about the affair,
and were even afraid lest travellers might dig up Owen's body and find
the dispatches hidden in his collar; which, said De Lemos, they might
send to the President of the United States, who would of course take
measures to find out what the money and the ciphers meant. [Footnote:
_Do._, letter of De Lemos.]
Wilkinson's motives in acting as he did were of course simple. He could
not afford to have the murderers of his friend and agent tried lest they
should disclose his own black infamy. The conduct of Judge Innes is
difficult to explain on any ground consistent with his integrity and
with the official propriety of his actions. He may not have been a party
to Wilkinson's conspiracy, but he must certainly have known that
Wilkinson was engaged in negotiations with the Spaniards so corrupt that
they would not bear the light of exposure, or else he would never have
behaved toward the murderers in the way that he did behave. [Footnote:
Marshall, II., 155; Green, p. 328. Even recently defenders of Wilkinson
and Innes have asserted, in accordance with Wilkinson's explanations,
that the money forwarded him was due him from tobacco contracts entered
into some years previously with Miro. Carondelet in his letters above
quoted, however, declares outright that the money was advanced to begin
negotiations in Kentucky, through Wilkinson and others, for the
pensioning of Kentuckians in the interests of Spain and the severance of
the Western States from the Union.]
Carondelet Refuses to Give up the Posts.
Carondelet, through De Lemos, entered into correspondence with Wayne
about the fort built by his orders at the Chickasaw Bluffs. He refused
to give up this fort; and as Wayne became more urgent in his demands, he
continually responded with new excuses for delay. He was enabled to tell
exactly what Wayne was doing, as Wilkinson, who was serving under Wayne,
punctually informed the Spaniard of all that took place in the American
army. [Footnote: Draper MSS., Spanish Documents, Carondelet to Alcudia,
Nov. 1, 1793.] Carondelet saw that the fate of the Spanish-American
province which he ruled, hung on the separation of the Western States
from the Union. [Footnote: _Do._, Carondelet to Alcudia, Sept. 25,
1795.] As long as he thought it possible to bring about the separation,
he refused to pay heed even to the orders of the Court of Spain, or to
the treaty engagements by which he was nominally bound. He was forced to
make constant demands upon the Spanish Court for money to be used in the
negotiations; that is, to bribe Wilkinson and his fellows in Kentucky.
He succeeded in placating the Chickasaws, and got from them a formal
cession of the Chickasaw Bluffs, which was a direct blow at the American
pretensions. As with all Indian tribes, the Chickasaws were not capable
of any settled policy, and were not under any responsible authority.
While some of them were in close alliance with the Americans and were
warring on the Creeks, the others formed a treaty with the Spaniards and
gave them the territory they so earnestly wished. [Footnote: _Do._, De
Lemos to Carondelet, enclosed in Carondelet's letter of Sept. 26, 1795.]
Pinckney Sent as Minister to Spain.
However, neither Carondelet's energy and devotion to the Spanish
government nor his unscrupulous intrigues were able for long; to defer
the fate which hung over the Spanish possessions. In 1795 Washington
nominated as Minister to Spain Thomas Pinckney, a member of a
distinguished family of South Carolina statesmen, and a man of the
utmost energy and intelligence. Pinckney finally wrung from the
Spaniards a treaty which was as beneficial to the West as Jay's treaty,
and was attended by none of the drawbacks which marred Jay's work. The
Spaniards at the outset met his demands by a policy of delay and
evasion. Finally, he determined to stand this no longer, and, on October
24, 1795, demanded his passports, in a letter to Godoy, the "Prince of
Peace." The demand came at an opportune moment; for Godoy had just heard
of Jay's treaty. He misunderstood the way in which this was looked at in
the United States, and feared lest, if not counteracted, it might throw
the Americans into the arms of Great Britain, with which country Spain
was on the verge of war. It is not a little singular that Jay should
have thus rendered an involuntary but important additional service to
the Westerners who so hated him.
He Negotiates a treaty.
The Spaniards now promptly came to terms. They were in no condition to
fight the Americans; they knew that war would be the result if the
conflicting claims of the two peoples were not at once definitely
settled, one way or the other; and they concluded the treaty forthwith.
[Footnote: Pinckney receives justice from Lodge, in his "Washington,"
II., 160. For Pinckney's life, see the biography by Rev. C. C. Pinckney,
p. 129, etc.] Its two most important provisions were the settlement of
the southern boundary on the lines claimed by the United States, and the
granting of the right of deposit to the Westerners. The boundary
followed the thirty-first degree of latitude from the Mississippi to the
Chattahoochee, down it to the Flint, thence to the head of the St.
Mary's, and down it to the ocean. The Spanish troops were to be
withdrawn from this territory within the space of six months. The
Westerners were granted for three years the right of deposit at New
Orleans; after three years, either the right was to be continued, or
another equivalent port of deposit was to be granted somewhere on the
banks of the Mississippi. The right of deposit carried with it the right
to export goods from the place of deposit free from any but an
inconsiderable duty. [Footnote: American State Papers, Foreign
Relations, I., p. 533, etc.; Pinckney to Secretary of State, Aug. 11,
1795; to Godoy (Alcudia), Oct. 24, 1795; copy of treaty, Oct. 27th,
etc.]
The Spaniards Delay the Execution of the Treaty.
They Again Try to Intrigue with the Westerners.
The treaty was ratified in 1796, but with astonishing bad faith the
Spaniards refused to carry out its provisions. At this time Carondelet
was in the midst of his negotiations with Wilkinson for the secession of
the West, and had high hopes that he could bring it about. He had chosen
as his agent an Englishman, named Thomas Power, who was a naturalized
Spanish subject, and very zealous in the service of Spain. [Footnote:
Gayarre, III., 34;. Wilkinson's Memoirs, II., 225.] Power went to
Kentucky, where he communicated with Wilkinson, Sebastian, Innes, and
one or two others, and submitted to them a letter from Carondelet. This
letter proposed a treaty, of which the first article was that Wilkinson
and his associates should exert themselves to bring about a separation
of the Western country and its formation into an independent government
wholly unconnected with that of the Atlantic States; and Carondelet in
letter assured the men to whom he was writing, that, because of what had
occurred in Europe since Spain had ratified the treaty of October 27th,
the treaty would not be executed by his Catholic Majesty. Promises of
favor to the Western people were held out, and Wilkinson was given a
more substantial bribe, in the shape of ten thousand dollars, by Power.
Sebastian, Innes, and their friends were also promised a hundred
thousand dollars for their good offices; and Carondelet, who had no more
hesitation in betraying red men than white, also offered to help the
Westerners subdue their Indian foes; these Indian foes being at the
moment the devoted allies of Spain.
Failure of their Efforts.
The time had gone by, however, when it was possible to hope for success
in such an intrigue. The treaty with Spain had caused much satisfaction
in the West, and the Kentuckians generally were growing more and more
loyal to the Central Government. Innes and his friends, in a written
communication, rejected the offer of Carondelet. They declared that they
were devoted to the Union and would not consent to break it up; but they
betrayed curiously little surprise or indignation at the offer, nor did
they in rejecting it use the vigorous language which beseemed men who,
while holding the commissions of a government, were proffered a hundred
thousand dollars to betray that government. [Footnote: American State
Papers, Miscellaneous, I., 928; deposition of Harry Innes, etc.] Power,
at the close of 1797, reported to his superiors that nothing could be
done.
Confusion at Natchez.
The Posts Surrendered
Meanwhile Carondelet and De Lemos had persisted in declining to
surrender the posts at the Chickasaw Bluffs and Natchez, on pretexts
which were utterly frivolous. [Footnote: American State Papers, Foreign
Relations, II., pp. 20, 70, 78, 79; report of Timothy Pickering, January
22, 1798, etc.] At this time the Spanish Court was completely
subservient to France, which was hostile to the United States; and the
Spaniards would not carry out the treaty they had made until they had
exhausted every device of delay and evasion. Andrew Ellicott was
appointed by Washington Surveyor-General to run the boundary; but when,
early in 1797, he reached Natchez, the Spanish representative refused
point blank to run the boundary or evacuate the territory. Meanwhile the
Spanish Minister at Philadelphia, Yrujo, in his correspondence with the
Secretary of State, was pursuing precisely the same course of subterfuge
and delay. But these tactics could only avail for a time. Neither the
Government of the United States, nor the Western people would consent to
be balked much longer. The negotiations with Wilkinson and his
associates had come to nothing. A detachment of American regular
soldiers came down the river to support Ellicott. The settlers around
Natchez arose in revolt against the Spaniards and established a
Committee of Safety, under protection of the Americans. The population
of Mississippi was very mixed, including criminals fleeing from justice,
land speculators, old settlers, well-to-do planters, small pioneer
farmers, and adventurers of every kind; and, thanks to the large tory
element, there was a British, and a smaller Spanish party; but the
general feeling was overwhelmingly for the United States. The Spanish
Government made a virtue of necessity and withdrew its garrison, after
for some time preserving a kind of joint occupancy with the Americans.
[Footnote: B. A. Hinsdale: "The Establishment of the First Southern
Boundary of the United States." Largely based upon Ellicott's Journal.
Both Ellicott, and the leaders among the settlers, were warned of
Blount's scheme of conquest and land speculation, and were hostile to
it.] Captain Isaac Guyon, with a body of United States troops, took
formal possession of both the Chickasaw Bluffs and Natchez in 1797. In
1798 the Spaniards finally evacuated the country, [Footnote: Claiborne's
"Mississippi," p. 176. He is a writer of poor judgment; his verdicts on
Ellicott and Wilkinson are astounding.] their course being due neither
to the wisdom nor the good faith of their rulers, but to the fear and
worry caused by the unceasing pressure of the Americans. Spain yielded,
because she felt that not to do so would involve the loss of all
Louisiana. [Footnote: Gayarré, 413, 418; Pontalba's Memoir, Sept. 15,
1800.] The country was organized as the Mississippi Territory in June,
1798. [Footnote: American State Papers, Public Lands, I., p. 209.]
Blount's Extraordinary Scheme.
There was one incident, curious rather than important, but
characteristic in its way, which marked the close of the transactions of
the Western Americans with Spain at this time. During the very years
when Carondelet, under the orders of his Government, was seeking to
delay the execution of the boundary treaty, and to seduce the Westerners
from their allegiance to the United States, a Senator of the United
States, entirely without the knowledge of his Government, was engaged in
an intrigue for the conquest of a part of the Spanish dominion. This
Senator was no less a person than William Blount. Enterprising and
ambitious, he was even more deeply engaged in land speculations than
were the other prominent men of his time. [Footnote: Clay MSS., Blount
to Hart, March 13, 1799, etc., etc.] He felt that he had not been well
treated by the United States authorities, and, like all other
Westerners, he also felt that the misconduct of the Spaniards had been
so great that they were not entitled to the slightest consideration.
Moreover, he feared lest the territory should be transferred to France,
which would be a much more dangerous neighbor than Spain; and he had a
strong liking for Great Britain. If he could not see the territory taken
by the Americans under the flag of the United States, then he wished to
see them enter into possession of it under the standard of the British
King.
In 1797 he entered into a scheme which was in part one of land
speculation and in part one of armed aggression against Spain. He tried
to organize an association with the purpose of seizing the Spanish
territory west of the Mississippi, and putting it under the control of
Great Britain, in the interests of the seizers. The scheme came to
nothing. No definite steps were taken, and the British Government
refused to take any share in the movement. Finally the plot was
discovered by the President, who brought it to the attention of the
Senate, and Blount was properly expelled from the Upper House for
entering into a conspiracy to conquer the lands of one neighboring power
in the interest of another. The Tennesseeans, however, who cared little
for the niceties of international law, and sympathized warmly with any
act of territorial aggression against the Spaniards, were not in the
least affected by his expulsion. They greeted him with enthusiasm, and
elected him to high office, and he lived among them the remainder of his
days, honored and respected. [Footnote: Blount MSS., letter of Hugh
Williamson, March 3, 1808, etc., etc.] Nevertheless, his conduct in this
instance was indefensible. It was an unfortunate interlude in an
otherwise honorable and useful public career. [Footnote: General Marcus
J. Wright, in his "Life and Services of William Blount," gives the most
favorable view possible of Blount's conduct.]