CHAPTER II.

MAD ANTHONY WAYNE; AND THE FIGHT OF THE FALLEN TIMBERS, 1792-1795.

Demoralization Caused by St. Clair's Defeat.

The United States Government was almost as much demoralized by St.

Clair's defeat as was St. Clair's own army. The loosely-knit nation was

very poor, and very loath to undertake any work which involved sustained

effort and pecuniary sacrifice; while each section was jealous of every

other and was unwilling to embark in any enterprise unlikely to inure to

its own immediate benefit. There was little national glory or reputation

to be won by even a successful Indian war; while another defeat might

prove a serious disaster to a government which was as yet far from firm

in its seat. The Eastern people were lukewarm about a war in which they

had no direct interest; and the foolish frontiersmen, instead of backing

up the administration, railed at it and persistently supported the party

which desired so to limit the powers and energies of the National

Government as to produce mere paralysis. Under such conditions the

national administration, instead of at once redoubling its efforts to

ensure success by shock of arms, was driven to the ignoble necessity of

yet again striving for a hopeless peace.

Reluctance of the Government to Carry on the War.

It would be impossible to paint in too vivid colors the extreme

reluctance of the Government to enter into, or to carry on, war with the

Indians. It was only after every other shift had been vainly tried that

resort was had to the edge of the sword. The United States would gladly

have made a stable peace on honorable terms, and strove with weary

patience to bring about a friendly understanding. But all such efforts

were rendered abortive partly by the treachery and truculence of the

savages, who could only be cowed by a thorough beating, and partly by

the desire of the settlers for lands which the red men claimed as their

hunting grounds.

Peace Envoys Sent to the Tries.

In pursuance of their timidly futile policy of friendliness, the

representatives of the National Government, in the spring of 1792, sent

peace envoys, with a flag of truce, to the hostile tribes. The

unfortunate ambassadors thus chosen for sacrifice were Colonel John

Hardin, the gallant but ill-starred leader of Kentucky horse, who had so

often and with such various success encountered the Indians on the field

of battle; and a Federal officer, Major Alexander Trueman. In June they

started towards the hostile towns, with one or two companions, and soon

fell in with some Indians, who on being shown the white flag, and

informed of the object of their visit, received them with every

appearance of good will. But this was merely a mask. A few hours later

the treacherous savages suddenly fell upon and slew the messengers of

peace. [Footnote: American State Papers, IV., 238, 239, etc.; also

Marshall.] It was never learned whether the deed was the mere wanton

outrage of some blood-thirsty young braves, or the result of orders

given by one of the Indian councils. At any rate, the Indians never

punished the treachery; and when the chiefs wrote to Washington they

mentioned with cool indifference that "you sent us at different times

different speeches, the bearers whereof our foolish young men killed on

their way" [Footnote: Canadian Archives, Indian affairs, M. 2, p. 224.

The Michigan and Wisconsin historical societies have performed a great

service by publishing so many of these papers.]; not even expressing

regret for the occurrence.

Treachery of the Savages.

The truculent violence and bad faith of the savages merited severe

chastisement; but the United States Government was long-suffering and of

the forbearing to a degree. There was no attempt to avenge the murder of

the flag-of-truce men. On the contrary, renewed efforts were made to

secure a peace by treaty. In the fall of 1792 Rufus Putnam, on behalf of

the United States, succeeded in concluding a treaty with the Wabash and

Illinois tribes, [Footnote: American State Papers, IV., 338.] which at

least served to keep many of their young braves out of actual

hostilities. In the following spring three commissioners--Benjamin

Lincoln, Beverly Randolph, and Timothy Pickering, all men of note,--were

sent to persuade the Miami tribes and their allies to agree to a peace.

In his letter of instructions the Secretary of War impressed upon them

the desire of the people of the United States for peace in terms that

were almost humiliating, and even directed them if necessary to cede

some of the lands already granted by the Indians at previous treaties.

Peace Commissioners Go to Niagara.

Failure of the Negotiations.

In May, 1793, the Commissioners went to Niagara, where they held

meetings with various Iroquois chiefs and exchanged friendly letters

with the British officers of the posts, who assured them that they would

help in the effort to conclude a peace. Captain Brant, the Iroquois

chief, acted as spokesman for a deputation of the hostile Indians from

the Miami, where a great council was being held, at which not only the

Northwestern tribes, but the Five Nations, were in attendance. The

commissioners then sailed to the Detroit River, having first sent home a

strong remonstrance against the activity displayed by the new commander

on the Ohio, Wayne, whose vigorous measures, they said, had angered the

Indians and were considered by the British "unfair and unwarrantable."

This was a preposterous complaint; throughout our history, whether in

dealing with Indians or with other foes, our Peace Commissioners have

invariably shown to disadvantage when compared with the military

commandants, for whom they always betray such jealously. Wayne's conduct

was eminently proper; and it is difficult to understand the mental

attitude of the commissioners who criticised it because the British

considered it "unwarrantable." However, a few weeks later they learned

to take a more just view of Wayne, and to thank him for the care with

which he had kept the peace while they were vainly trying to treat; for

at the Detroit they found they could do nothing. Brant and the Iroquois

urged the Northwestern tribes not to yield any point, and promised them

help, telling the British agent, McKee, evidently to his satisfaction,

"we came here not only to assist with our advice, but other ways, ... we

came here with arms in our hands"; and they insisted that the country

belonged to the confederated tribes in common, and so could not be

surrendered save by all. [Footnote: Draper MSS., Brant to McKee, Aug. 4,

1793.] Brant was the inveterate foe of the Americans, and the pensioner

of the British; and his advice to the tribes was sound, and was adopted

by them--though he misled them by his never-fulfilled promise of

support. They refused to consider any proposition which did not

acknowledge the Ohio as the boundary between them and the United States;

and so, towards the end of August, the commissioners returned to report

their failure. [Footnote: American State Papers, IV., 340-360.] The

final solution of the problem was thus left to the sword of Wayne.

Attitude of the British Becomes Progressively More Hostile.

The attitude of the British gradually changed from passive to active

hostility. In 1792 and 1793 they still wished the Indians to make peace

with the Americans, provided always there were no such concessions made

to the latter as would endanger the British control of the fur trade.

But by the beginning of 1794 the relations between Great Britain and the

United States had become so strained that open war was threatened; for

the advisers of the King, relying on the weakness of the young Federal

Republic, had begun to adopt that tone of brutal insolence, which

reflected well the general attitude of the British people towards the

Americans, and which finally brought on the second war between the two

nations.

Lord Dorchester's Speech.

The British officials in Canada were quick to reflect the tone of the

home government, and, as always in such cases, the more zealous and

belligerent went a little farther than they were authorized. On February

10th Lord Dorchester, Governor of Canada, in an address of welcome to

some of the chiefs from the tribes of the north and west said, speaking

of the boundary: "Children, since my return I find no appearance of a

line remains; and from the manner in which the people of the United

States push on and act and talk... I shall not be surprised if we are at

war with them in the course of the present year; and if so a line must

then be drawn by the warriors... we have acted in the most peaceable

manner and borne the language and conduct of the people of the United

States with patience; but I believe our patience is almost exhausted."

[Footnote: Rives' "Life and Times of James Madison," III., 418. A

verified copy of the speech from the archives of the London foreign

office. The authenticity of the speech was admitted at the time by the

British Minister; yet, extraordinary to say, not only British, but

American historians, have spoken of it as spurious.] Of course such a

speech, delivered to such an audience, was more than a mere incitement

to war; it was a direct appeal to arms. Nor did the encouragement given

the Indians end with words; for in April, Simcoe, the Lieutenant

Governor, himself built a fort at the Miami Rapids, in the very heart of

the hostile tribes, and garrisoned it with British regulars, infantry

and artillery; which, wrote one of the British officials to another, had

"put all the Indians here in great spirits" [Footnote: Canadian

Archives, Thomas Duggan to Joseph Chew, Detroit, April 16, 1794.] to

resist the Americans.

The British and Spaniards Join in Intriguing with the Indians.

The same official further reported that the Spaniards also were exciting

the Indians to war, and were in communication with Simcoe, their

messengers coming to him at his post on the Miami. At this time the

Spanish Governor, Carondelet, was alarmed over Clark's threatened

invasion of Louisiana on behalf of the French Republic. He wrote to

Simcoe asking for English help in the event of such invasion. Simcoe, in

return, wrote expressing his good will, and enclosing a copy of

Dorchester's speech to the Northern Indians; which, Carondelet reported

to the Court of Spain, showed that the English were following the same

system adopted by the Spaniards in reference to the Indians, whom they

were employing with great success against the Americans. [Footnote:

Draper MSS., Spanish Documents, letter of Carondelet, July 9,1794.]

Moreover, the Spaniards, besides communicating with the British, sent

messages to the Indians at the Miami, urging them to attack the

Americans, and promising help; [Footnote: Canadian Archives, letter of

McKee, May 7, 1794.] a promise which they never fulfilled, save that in

a covert way they furnished the savages with arms and munitions of war.

Effect of Dorchester's Speech.

The Indians Greatly Encouraged.

The Canadians themselves were excited and alarmed by Dorchester's

speech, [Footnote: Canadian Archives, Joseph Chew to Thomas Aston

Coffin, Montreal, February 27, 1794.] copies of which were distributed

broadcast; for the general feeling was that it meant that war was about

to be declared between Great Britain and the United States. The Indians

took the same view, as to what the speech meant; but to them it gave

unmixed pleasure and encouragement. The British officials circulated it

everywhere among the tribes, reading it aloud to the gathered chiefs and

fighting men. "His Excellency Governor Simcoe has just now left my house

on his way to Detroit with Lord Dorchester's speech to the Seven

Nations," wrote Brant the Iroquois chief to the Secretary of Indian

Affairs for Canada, "and I have every reason to believe when it is

delivered that matters will take an immediate change to the Westward, as

it will undoubtedly give those Nations high spirits and enable them by a

perfect union to check General Wayne." [Footnote: Canadian Archives,

Brant to Chew, April 21, 1794.] In April, Lieutenant Colonel John

Butler, of the British army, addressed a great council of chiefs near

Buffalo, beginning, "I have now a speech to deliver to you from your

father Lord Dorchester, which is of the utmost consequence, therefore

desire you will pay strict attention to it." [Footnote: Canadian

Archives, Butler to Chew, April 27, 1794.] He then delivered the speech,

to the delight of the Indians, and continued: "You have heard the great

talk of our going to war with the United States, and by the speech of

your Father just now delivered to you, you cannot help seeing there is a

great prospect of it, I have therefore to recommend you to be all

unanimous as one man, and to call in all your people that may be

scattered about the Territories of the United States." McKee, the

British Indian agent among the Northwestern tribes who were at war with

the Americans, reported with joy the rapid growth of warlike spirit

among the savages in consequence of Dorchester's speech, and of the

building of the British fort on the Miami. He wrote, "The face of the

Indian affairs in this country, I have the greatest satisfaction in

informing you, seems considerably altered for the better. His Excellency

Lord Dorchester's speech and the arrival here of speeches from the

Spaniards induce me to believe that a very extensive union of the Indian

Nations will be the immediate consequence. The Lieutenant Governor has

ordered a strong detachment of the 24th Regt. to take post a mile & a

half below this place, this step has given great spirits to the Indians

and impressed them with a hope of our ultimately acting with them and

affording a security for their families, should the enemy penetrate to

their villages." [Footnote: Canadian Archives, McKee to Chew, May 8,

1794.]

The British Furnish Them with Arms and Munitions.

Nor did the British confine their encouragement to words. The Canadian

authorities forwarded to the Miami tribes, through the agent McKee,

quantities of guns, rifles, and gunlocks, besides vermillion paint and

tobacco. [Footnote: Canadian Archives, Chew to Coffin, June 23, 1794.]

McKee was careful to get from the home authorities the best firearms he

could, explaining that his red protégés preferred the long to the short

rifles, and considered the common trade guns makeshifts, to be used only

until they could get better ones.

British Agents Greet the Scalping Parties.

The Indians made good use of the weapons thus furnished them by the

"neutral" British. A party of Delawares and Shawnees, after a successful

skirmish with the Americans, brought to McKee six of the scalps they had

taken; and part of the speech of presentation at the solemn council

where they were received by McKee, ran: "We had two actions with [some

of Wayne's troops who were guarding convoys] in which a great many of

our enemies were killed. Part of their flesh we have brought here with

us to convince our friend of the truth of their being now in great force

on their march against us; therefore, Father, [addressing McKee] we

desire you to be strong and bid your children make haste to our

assistance as was promised by them." The speaker, a Delaware chief,

afterwards handed the six scalps to a Huron chief, that he might

distribute them among the tribes. McKee sent to the home authorities a

full account of this council, where he had assisted at the reception and

distribution of the scalps the savages had taken from the soldiers of a

nation with which the British still pretended to be at peace; and a few

days later he reported that the Lake Indians were at last gathering, and

that when the fighting men of the various tribes joined forces, as he

had reason to believe they shortly would, the British posts would be

tolerably secure from any attacks by Wayne. [Footnote: Canadian

Archives, McKee's letters May 25 and May 30, 1794.]

Indians Serve the British as Police.

The Indians served the British, not only as a barrier, against the

Americans, but as a police for their own soldiers, to prevent their

deserting. An Englishman who visited the Lake Posts at this time

recorded with a good deal of horror the fate that befell one of a party

of deserters from the British garrison at Detroit. The commander, on

discovering that they had gone, ordered the Indians to bring them back

dead or alive. When overtaken one resisted, and was killed and scalped.

The Indians brought in his scalp and hung it outside the fort, where it

was suffered to remain, that the ominous sight might strike terror to

other discontented soldiers. [Footnote: Draper MSS. From Parliament

Library in Canada, MS. "Canadian Letters," descriptive of a tour in

Canada in 1792-93.]

Anger of the Americans over Dorchester's Speech.

The publication of Lord Dorchester's speech caused angry excitement in

the United States. Many thought it spurious; but Washington, then

President, with his usual clear-sightedness, at once recognized that it

was genuine, and accepted it as proof of Great Britain's hostile feeling

towards his country. Through the Secretary of State he wrote to the

British Minister, calling him to sharp account, not only for

Dorchester's speech but for the act of building a fort on the Miami, and

for the double-dealing of his government, which protested friendship,

with smooth duplicity, while their agents urged the savages to war. "At

the very moment when the British Ministry were forwarding assurances of

good will, does Lord Dorchester foster and encourage in the Indians

hostile dispositions towards the United States," ran the letter, "but

this speech only forebodes hostility; the intelligence which has been

received this morning is, if true, hostility itself...governor Simcoe

has gone to the foot of the Rapids of the Miami, followed by three

companies of a British regiment, in order to build a fort there." The

British Minister, Hammond, in his answer said he was "willing to admit

the authenticity of the speech," and even the building of the fort; but

sought to excuse both by recrimination, asserting that the Americans had

themselves in various ways shown hostility to Great Britain. [Footnote:

Wait's State Papers and Publick Documents, I., 449, 451. Letters of

Randolph, May 20, 1794, and Hammond, May 22, 1794.] In spite of this

explicit admission, however, the British statesmen generally, both in

the House of Lords and the House of Commons, disavowed the speech,

though in guarded terms; [Footnote: Am. State Papers, Foreign Relations,

I., Randolph to Jay, Aug. 18, 1794.] and many Americans were actually

convinced by their denials.

Severity of the Indian Ravages.

Raids and Counter-raids.

Throughout this period, whatever the negotiators might say or do, the

ravages of the Indian war parties never ceased. In the spring following

St. Clair's defeat the frontiers of Pennsylvania suffered as severely as

those of Virginia, from bands of savages who were seeking for scalps,

prisoners, and horses. Boats were way-laid and attacked as they

descended the Ohio; and the remote settlements were mercilessly

scourged. The spies or scouts, the trained Indian fighters, were out all

the while, watching for the war bands; and when they discovered one, a

strong party of rangers or militia was immediately gathered to assail

it, if it could be overtaken. Every variety of good and bad fortune

attended these expeditions. Thus, in August, 1792, the spies discovered

an Indian party in the lower settlements of Kentucky. Thirty militia

gathered, followed the trail, and overtook the marauders at Rolling

Fork, killing four, while the others scattered; of the whites one was

killed and two wounded. About the same time Kenton found a strong Indian

camp which he attacked at dawn, killing three warriors; but when they

turned out in force, and one of his own scouts was killed, he promptly

drew back out of danger. Neither the Indians nor the wild white Indian

fighters made any point of honor about retreating. They wished to do as

much damage as possible to their foes, and if the fight seemed doubtful

they at once withdrew to await a more favorable opportunity. As for the

individual adventures, their name was legion. All the old annalists, all

the old frontiersmen who in after life recorded their memories of the

Indian wars, tell with interminable repetition stories, grewsome in

their blood-thirstiness, and as monotonous in theme as they are varied

in detail:--how such and such a settler was captured by two Indians,

and, watching his chance, fell on his captors when they sat down to

dinner and slew them "with a squaw-axe"; how another man was

treacherously attacked by two Indians who had pretended to be peaceful

traders, and how, though wounded, he killed them both; how two or three

cabins were surprised by the savages and all the inhabitants slain; or

how a flotilla of flatboats was taken and destroyed while moored to the

bank of the Ohio; and so on without end. [Footnote: Draper MSS., Major

McCully to Captain Biddle, Pittsburgh, May 5, 1792; B. Netherland to

Evan Shelby, July 5, 1793, etc., etc. Also Kentucky _Gazette_, Sept. I,

1792; Charleston _Gazette_, July 22, 1791, etc.]

The Frontiersmen Wish War.

The United States authorities vainly sought peace; while the British

instigated the tribes to war, and the savages themselves never thought

of ceasing their hostilities. The frontiersmen also wished war, and

regarded the British and Indians with an equal hatred. They knew that

the presence of the British in the Lake Posts meant Indian war; they

knew that the Indians would war on them, whether they behaved well or

ill, until the tribes suffered some signal overthrow; and they coveted

the Indian lands with a desire as simple as it was brutal. Nor were land

hunger and revenge the only motives that stirred them to aggression;

meaner feelings were mixed with the greed for untilled prairie and

unfelled forest, and the fierce longing for blood. Throughout our

history as a nation, as long as we had a frontier, there was always a

class of frontiersmen for whom an Indian war meant the chance to acquire

wealth at the expense of the Government: and on the Ohio in 1792 and '93

there were plenty of men who, in the event of a campaign, hoped to make

profit out of the goods, horses, and cattle they supplied the soldiers.

One of Madison's Kentucky friends wrote him with rather startling

frankness that the welfare of the new State hinged on the advent of an

army to assail the Indians, first, because of the defence it would give

the settlers, and, secondly, because it would be the chief means for

introducing into the country a sufficient quantity of money for

circulation. [Footnote: State Dep. MSS., Madison Papers, Hubbard Taylor

to Madison, Jan. 3, 1792.] Madison himself evidently saw nothing out of

the way in this twofold motive of the frontiersmen for wishing the

presence of an army. In all the border communities there was a lack of

circulating medium, and an earnest desire to obtain more by any

expedient.

Like many other frontiersmen, Madison's correspondent indulged almost

equally in complaints of the Indian ravages, and in denunciations of the

regular army which alone could put an end to them and of the national

party which sustained the army. [Footnote: _Do._, Taylor to Madison,

April 16, 1792; May 8 and 17, 1792; May 23, 1793, etc.]

Wayne Appointed to Command Western Army.

Major General Anthony Wayne, a Pennsylvanian, had been chosen to succeed

St. Clair in the command of the army; and on him devolved the task of

wresting victory from the formidable forest tribes, fighting as the

latter were in the almost impenetrable wilderness of their own country.

The tribes were aided by the support covertly, and often openly, yielded

them by the British. They had even more effective allies in the

suspicion with which the backwoodsmen regarded the regular army, and

the supine indifference of the people at large, which forced the

administration to try every means to obtain peace before adopting the

only manly and honorable course, a vigorous war.

Wayne's Character and History.

Of all men, Wayne was the best fitted for the work. In the Revolutionary

War no other general, American, British, or French, won such a

reputation for hard fighting, and for daring energy and dogged courage.

He felt very keenly that delight in the actual shock of battle which the

most famous fighting generals have possessed. He gloried in the

excitement and danger, and shone at his best when the stress was sorest;

and because of his magnificent courage his soldiers had affectionately

christened him "Mad Anthony." But his head was as cool as his heart was

stout. He was taught in a rough school; for the early campaigns in which

he took part were waged against the gallant generals and splendid

soldiery of the British King. By experience he had grown to add caution

to his dauntless energy. Once, after the battle of Brandywine, when he

had pushed close to the enemy, with his usual fearless self-confidence,

he was surprised in a night attack by the equally daring British general

Grey, and his brigade was severely punished with the bayonet. It was a

lesson he never forgot; it did not in any way abate his self-reliance or

his fiery ardor, but it taught him the necessity of forethought, of

thorough preparation, and of ceaseless watchfulness. A few days later he

led the assault at Germantown, driving the Hessians before him with the

bayonet. This was always his favorite weapon; he had the utmost faith in

coming to close quarters, and he trained his soldiers to trust the

steel. At Monmouth he turned the fortunes of the day by his stubborn and

successful resistance to the repeated bayonet charges of the Guards and

Grenadiers. His greatest stroke was the storming of Stony Point, where

in person he led the midnight rush of his troops over the walls of the

British fort. He fought with his usual hardihood against Cornwallis; and

at the close of the Revolutionary War he made a successful campaign

against the Creeks in Georgia. During this campaign the Creeks one night

tried to surprise his camp, and attacked with resolute ferocity, putting

to flight some of the troops; but Wayne rallied them and sword in hand

he led them against the savages, who were overthrown and driven from the

field. In one of the charges he cut down an Indian chief; and the dying

man, as he fell, killed Wayne's horse with a pistol shot.

Wayne Reorganizes the Army

As soon as Wayne reached the Ohio, in June, 1792, he set about

reorganizing the army. He had as a nucleus the remnant of St. Clair's

beaten forces; and to this were speedily added hundreds of recruits

enlisted under new legislation by Congress, and shipped to him as fast

as the recruiting officers could send them. The men were of precisely

the same general character as those who had failed so dismally under St.

Clair, and it was even more difficult to turn them into good soldiers,

for the repeated disasters, crowned by the final crushing horror, had

unnerved them and made them feel that their task was hopeless, and that

they were foredoomed to defeat. [Footnote: Bradley MSS. Letters and

Journal of Captain Daniel Bradley; see entry of May 7, 1793, etc.] The

mortality among the officers had been great, and the new officers,

though full of zeal, needed careful training. Among the men desertions

were very common; and on the occasion of a sudden alarm Wayne found that

many of his sentries left their posts and fled. [Footnote: "Major

General Anthony Wayne," by Charles J. Stillé, p. 323.] Only rigorous and

long continued discipline and exercise under a commander both stern and

capable, could turn such men into soldiers fit for the work Wayne had

before him. He saw this at once, and realized that a premature movement

meant nothing but another defeat; and he began by careful and patient

labor to turn his horde of raw recruits into a compact and efficient

army, which he might use with his customary energy and decision. When he

took command of the army--or "Legion," as he preferred to call it--the

one stipulation he made was that the campaign should not begin until his

ranks were full and his men thoroughly disciplined.

He Makes a Winter Camp on the Ohio.

Towards the end of the summer of '92 he established his camp on the Ohio

about twenty-seven miles below Pittsburgh. He drilled both officers and

men with unwearied patience, and gradually the officers became able to

do the drilling themselves, while the men acquired the soldierly

self-confidence of veterans. As the new recruits came in they found

themselves with an army which was rapidly learning how to manoeuvre with

precision, to obey orders unhesitatingly, and to look forward eagerly to

a battle with the foe. Throughout the winter Wayne kept at work, and by

the spring he had under him twenty-five hundred regular soldiers who

were already worthy to be trusted in a campaign. He never relaxed his

efforts to improve them; though a man of weaker stuff might well have

been discouraged by the timid and hesitating policy of the National

Government. The Secretary of War, in writing to him, laid stress chiefly

on the fact that the American people desired at every hazard to avert an

Indian war, and that on no account should offensive operations be

undertaken against the tribes. Such orders tied Wayne's hands, for

offensive operations offered the only means of ending the war; but he

patiently bided his time, and made ready his army against the day when

his superiors should allow him to use the weapon he had tempered.

In Spring He Shifts His Camp to Near Cincinnati.

His Second Winter Camp at Greeneville.

In May, '93, he brought his army down the Ohio to Fort Washington, and

near it established a camp which he christened Hobson's Choice. Here he

was forced to wait the results of the fruitless negotiations carried on

by the United States Peace Commissioners, and it was not until about the

1st of October that he was given permission to begin the campaign. Even

when he was allowed to move his army forward he was fettered by

injunctions not to run any risks--and of course a really good fighting

general ought to be prepared to run risks. The Secretary of War wrote

him that above all things he was to remember to hazard nothing, for a

defeat would be fraught with ruinous consequences to the country. Wayne

knew very well that if such was the temper of the country and the

Government, it behooved him to be cautious, and he answered that, though

he would at once advance towards the Indian towns, to threaten the

tribes, he would not run the least unnecessary risk. Accordingly he

shifted his army to a place some eighty miles north of Cincinnati,

where he encamped for the winter, building a place of strength which he

named Greeneville in honor of his old comrade in arms, General Greene.

He sent forward a strong detachment of his troops to the site of St.

Clair's defeat, where they built a post which was named Fort Recovery.

The discipline of the army steadily improved, though now and then a

soldier deserted, usually fleeing to Kentucky, but in one or two cases

striking through the woods to Detroit. The bands of auxiliary militia

that served now and then for short periods with the regulars, were of

course much less well trained and less dependable.

Indians Attack the Convoys.

The Indians were always lurking about the forts, and threatening the

convoys of provisions and munitions as they marched slowly from one to

the other. Any party that left a fort was in imminent danger. On one

occasion the commander of Fort Jefferson and his orderly were killed and

scalped but three hundred yards from the fort. A previous commander of

this fort while hunting in this neighborhood had been attacked in

similar fashion, and though he escaped, his son and a soldier were

slain. On another occasion a dozen men, near the same fort, were

surprised while haying; four were killed and the other eight captured,

four of whom were burned at the stake. [Footnote: Bradley MSS., Journal,

entries of Feb. 11, Feb. 24, June 24, July 12, 1792.]

Before Wayne moved down the Ohio a band of Kentucky mounted riflemen,

under major John Adair, were attacked under the walls of one of the log

forts--Fort St. Clair--as they were convoying a large number of

packhorses. The riflemen were in camp at the time, the Indians making

the assault at dawn. Most of the horses were driven off or killed, and

the men fled to the fort, which, Adair dryly remarked, proved "a place

of safety for the bashful"; but he rallied fifty, who drove off the

Indians, killing two and wounding others. Of his own men six were killed

and five wounded. [Footnote: Am. State Papers, IV., 335. Adair to

Wilkinson, Nov. 6, 1792.]

Defeat of a Detachment.

Wayne's own detachments occasionally fared as badly. In the fall of

1793, just after he had advanced to Greeneville, a party of ninety

regulars, who were escorting twenty heavily laden wagons, were surprised

and scattered, a few miles from the scene of Adair's misadventure.

[Footnote: Bradley MSS., Journal, entry of October 17, 1793.] The

lieutenant and ensign who were in command and five or six of their men

were slain, fighting bravely; half a dozen were captured; the rest were

panic struck and fled without resistance. The Indians took off about

seventy horses, leaving the wagons standing in the middle of the road,

with their contents uninjured; and a rescue party brought them safely to

Wayne. The victors were a party of Wyandots and Ottawas under the chief

Little Otter. On October 24th the British agent at the Miami towns met

in solemn council with these Indians and with another successful war

party. The Indians had with them ten scalps and two prisoners. Seven of

the scalps they sent off, by an Indian runner, a special ally friend of

the British agent, to be distributed among the different Lake Indians,

to rouse them to war. One of their prisoners, an Irishman, they refused

to surrender; but the other they gave to the agent. He proved to be a

German, a mercenary who had originally been in Burgoyne's army.

[Footnote: Canadian Archives, Duggan to Chew, February 3, 1794.

inclosing his journal for the fall of 1793. American State Papers, IV.,

361, Wayne to Knox, October 23, 1793. The Americans lost 13 men; the

Indian reports of course exaggerated this.] Later one of the remaining

captives made his escape, killing his two Indian owners, a man and a

woman, both of whom had been leaders of war parties.

Another Detachment Defeats a Body of Indians.

In the spring of 1794, as soon as the ground was dry, Wayne prepared to

advance towards the hostile towns and force a decisive battle. He was

delayed for a long time by lack of provisions, the soldiers being on

such short rations that they could not move. The mounted riflemen of

Kentucky, who had been sent home at the beginning of winter, again

joined him. Among the regulars, in the rifle company, was a young

Kentuckian, Captain William Clark, brother of George Rogers Clark, and

afterwards one of the two famous explorers who first crossed the

continent to the Pacific. In his letters home Clark dwelt much on the

laborious nature of his duties, and mentioned that he was "like to have

starved," and had to depend on his rifle for subsistence. [Footnote:

Draper MSS., William Clark to Jonathan Clark, May 25, 1794] In May he

was sent from Fort Washington with twenty dragoons and sixty infantry to

escort 700 packhorses to Greeneville. When eighteen miles from Fort

Washington Indians attacked his van, driving off a few packhorses; but

Clark brought up his men from the rear and after a smart skirmish put

the savages to flight. They left behind one of their number dead, two

wounded, and seven rifles; Clark lost two men killed and two wounded.

[Footnote: _Do_. Also Canadian Archives, Duggan to Chew, May 30, 1794.

As an instance of the utter untrustworthiness of these Indian or British

accounts of the American losses, it may be mentioned that Duggan says

the Indians brought off forty scalps, and killed an unknown number of

Americans in addition; whereas in reality only two were slain. Even

Duggan admits that the Indians were beaten off.]

A Large War Party Attacks Fort Recovery.

On the last day of June a determined assault was made by the Indians on

Fort Recovery, which was garrisoned by about two hundred men. Thanks to

the efforts of the British agents, and of the runners from the allied

tribes of the Lower Lakes, the Chippewas and all the tribes of the Upper

Lakes had taken the tomahawk, and in June they gathered at the Miami.

Over two thousand warriors, all told, [Footnote: Canadian Archives,

McKee to Chew, July 7, 1794.] assembled; a larger body than had ever

before marched against the Americans. [Footnote: Am. State Papers, IV.,

488, Wayne to the Secretary of War, 1794. He says they probably numbered

from 1500 to 2000 men, which was apparently about the truth. Throughout

this campaign the estimate of the Americans as to the Indian forces and

losses were usually close to the facts, and were often under rather than

over statements.] They were eager for war, and wished to make a stroke

of note against their foes; and they resolved to try to carry Fort

Recovery, built on the scene of their victory over St. Clair. They

streamed down through the woods in long columns, and silently neared the

fort. With them went a number of English and French rangers, most of

whom were painted and dressed like the Indians.

Repulse of the Savages.

When they reached the fort they found camped close to the walls a party

of fifty dragoons and ninety riflemen. These dragoons and riflemen had

escorted a brigade of packhorses from Greeneville the day before, and

having left the supplies in the fort were about to return with the

unladen packhorses. But soon after daybreak the Indians rushed their

camp. Against such overwhelming numbers no effective resistance could be

made. After a few moments' fight the men broke and ran to the fort. The

officers, as usual, showed no fear, and were the last to retreat, half

of them being killed or wounded,--one of the honorably noteworthy

features of all these Indian fights was the large relative loss among

the officers. Most of the dragoons and riflemen reached the fort,

including nineteen who were wounded; nineteen officers and privates were

killed, and two of the packhorsemen were killed and three captured. Two

hundred packhorses were captured. The Indians, flushed with success and

rendered over-confident by their immense superiority in numbers, made a

rush at the fort, hoping to carry it by storm. They were beaten back at

once with severe loss; for in such work they were no match for their

foes. They then surrounded the fort, kept up a harmless fire all day,

and renewed it the following morning. In the night they bore off their

dead, finding them with the help of torches; eight or ten of those

nearest the fort they could not get. They then drew off and marched back

to the Miami towns. At least twenty-five [Footnote: Canadian Archives,

G. La Mothe to Joseph Chew, Michilimackinac, July 19, 1794. McKee says,

"17 men killed"; evidently he either wilfully understated the truth, or

else referred only to the particular tribes with which he was

associated. La Mothe says, "they have lost twenty-five people amongst

different nations," but as he was only speaking of the Upper Lake

Indians, it may be that the total Indian loss was 25 plus 17, or 42.

McKee always understates the British force and loss, and greatly

overstates the loss and force of the Americans. In this letter he says

that the Americans had 50 men killed, instead of 22; and that 60

"drivers" (packhorsemen) were taken and killed; whereas in reality 3

were taken and 2 killed.] of them had been killed, and a great number

wounded; whereas they had only succeeded in killing one and wounding

eleven of the garrison. They were much disheartened at the check, and

the Upper Lake Indians began to go home. The savages were as fickle as

they were ferocious: and though terrible antagonists when fighting on

their own ground and in their own manner, they lacked the stability

necessary for undertaking a formidable offensive movement in mass. This

army of two thousand warriors, the largest they had ever assembled, was

repulsed with loss in an attack on a wooden fort with a garrison not one

sixth their strength, and then dissolved without accomplishing anything

at all.

Wayne Starts on his March.

Severity of Wayne's Discipline.

Three weeks after the successful defence of Fort Recovery, Wayne was

joined by a large force of mounted volunteers from Kentucky, under

General Scott; and on July 27th he set out towards the Miami towns. The

Indians who watched his march brought word to the British that his army

went twice as far in a day as St. Clair's, that he kept his scouts well

out and his troops always in open order and ready for battle; that he

exercised the greatest precaution to avoid an ambush or surprise, and

that every night the camps of the different regiments were surrounded by

breastworks of fallen trees so as to render a sudden assault hopeless.

Wayne was determined to avoid the fates of Braddock and St. Clair. His

"legion" of regular troops, was over two thousand strong. His discipline

was very severe, yet he kept the loyal affection of his men. He had made

the officers devote much of their time to training the infantry in

marksmanship and the use of the bayonet and the cavalry in the use of

the sabre. He impressed upon the cavalry and infantry alike that their

safety lay in charging home with the utmost resolution. By steady drill

he had turned his force, which was originally not of a promising

character, into as fine an army, for its size, as a general could wish

to command.

Excellence of his Troops.

The perfection of fighting capacity to which he had brought his forces

caused much talk among the frontiersmen themselves. One of the

contingent of Tennessee militia wrote home in the highest praise of the

horsemanship and swordsmanship of the cavalry, who galloped their horses

at speed over any ground, and leaped them over formidable obstacles, and

of the bayonet practice, and especially of the marksmanship, of the

infantry. He remarked that hunters were apt to undervalue the soldiers

as marksmen, but that Wayne's riflemen were as good shots as any hunters

he had ever seen at any of the many matches he had attended in the

backwoods. [Footnote: _Knoxville Gazette_, August 27, 1793.]

Wayne's Scouts.

Wayne showed his capacity as a commander by the use he made of his spies

or scouts. A few of these were Chickasaw or Choctaw Indians; the rest,

twenty or thirty in number, were drawn from the ranks of the wild white

Indian-fighters, the men who plied their trade of warfare and the chase

right on the hunting grounds of the hostile tribes. They were far more

dangerous to the Indians, and far more useful to the army, than the like

number of regular soldiers or ordinary rangers.

Efficiency of the Scouts.

It was on these fierce backwoods riflemen that Wayne chiefly relied for

news of the Indians, and they served him well. In small parties, or

singly, they threaded the forest scores of miles in advance or to one

side of the marching army, and kept close watch on the Indians'

movements. As skilful and hardy as the red warriors, much better

marksmen, and even more daring, they took many scalps, harrying the

hunting parties, and hanging on the outskirts of the big wigwam

villages. They captured and brought in Indian after Indian; from whom

Wayne got valuable information. The use of scouts, and the consequent

knowledge gained by the examination of Indian prisoners, emphasized the

difference between St. Clair and Wayne. Wayne's reports are accompanied

by many examinations of Indian captives. [Footnote: American State

Papers, IV., 489, 94. Examination of two Pottawatamies captured on the

5th of June; of two Shawnees captured on the 22d of June; of a Shawnee

captured on Aug. 11th, etc., etc.]

Among these wilderness warriors who served under Wayne were some who

became known far and wide along the border for their feats of reckless

personal prowess and their strange adventures. They were of course all

men of remarkable bodily strength and agility, with almost unlimited

power of endurance, and the keenest eyesight; and they were masters in

the use of their weapons. Several had been captured by the Indians when

children, and had lived for years with them before rejoining the whites;

so that they knew well the speech and customs of the different tribes.

Feats of the Scouts.

One of these men was the captain of the spies, William Wells. When a boy

of twelve he had been captured by the Miamis, and had grown to manhood

among them, living like any other young warrior; his Indian name was

Black Snake, and he married a sister of the great war-chief, Little

Turtle. He fought with the rest of the Miamis, and by the side of Little

Turtle, in the victories the Northwestern Indians gained over Harmar and

St. Clair, and during the last battle he killed several soldiers with

his own hand. Afterwards, by some wayward freak of mind, he became

harassed by the thought that perhaps he had slain some of his own

kinsmen; dim memories of his childhood came back to him; and he resolved

to leave his Indian wife and half-breed children and rejoin the people

of his own color. Tradition relates that on the eve of his departure he

made his purpose known to Little Turtle, and added, "We have long been

friends; we are friends yet, until the sun stands so high [indicating

the place] in the heavens; from that time we are enemies and may kill

one another." Be this as it may, he came to Wayne, was taken into high

favor, and made chief of scouts, and served loyally and with signal

success until the end of the campaign. After the campaign he was joined

by his Indian wife and his children; the latter grew up and married well

in the community, so that their blood now flows in the veins of many of

the descendants of the old pioneers. Wells himself was slain by the

Indians long afterwards, in 1812, at the Chicago massacre.

Surprise of an Indian Party.

One of Wells' fellow spies was William Miller. Miller, like Wells, had

been captured by the Indians when a boy, together with his brother

Christopher. When he grew to manhood he longed to rejoin his own people,

and finally did so, but he could not persuade his brother to come with

him, for Christopher had become an Indian at heart. In June, 1794,

Wells, Miller, and a third spy, Robert McClellan, were sent out by Wayne

with special instructions to bring in a live Indian. McClellan, who a

number of years afterwards became a famous plainsman and Rocky Mountain

man, was remarkably swift of foot. Near the Glaize River they found

three Indians roasting venison by a fire, on a high open piece of

ground, clear of brushwood. By taking advantage of the cover yielded by

a fallen treetop the three scouts crawled within seventy yards of the

camp fire; and Wells and Miller agreed to fire at the two outermost

Indians, while McClellan, as soon as they had fired, was to dash in and

run down the third. As the rifles cracked the two doomed warriors fell

dead in their tracks; while McClellan bounded forward at full speed,

tomahawk in hand. The Indian had no time to pick up his gun; fleeing for

his life he reached the bank of the river, where the bluffs were twenty

feet high, and sprang over into the stream-bed. He struck a miry place,

and while he was floundering McClellan came to the top of the bluff and

instantly sprang down full on him, and overpowered him. The others came

up and secured the prisoner, whom they found to be a white man; and to

Miller's astonishment it proved to be his brother Christopher. The

scouts brought their prisoner, and the scalps of the two slain warriors,

back to Wayne. At first Christopher was sulky and refused to join the

whites; so at Greeneville he was put in the guard house. After a few

days he grew more cheerful, and said he had changed his mind. Wayne set

him at liberty, and he not only served valiantly as a scout through the

campaign, but acted as Wayne's interpreter. Early in July he showed his

good faith by assisting McClellan in the capture of a Pottawatamie

chief.

An Unexpected Act of Mercy.

On one of Wells' scouts he and his companions came across a family of

Indians in a canoe by the river bank. The white wood rangers were as

ruthless as their red foes, sparing neither sex nor age; and the scouts

were cocking rifles when Wells recognized the Indians as being the

family into which he had been adopted, and by which he had been treated

as a son and brother. Springing forward he swore immediate death to the

first man who fired; and then told his companions who the Indians were.

The scouts at once dropped their weapons, shook hands with the Miamis,

and sent them off unharmed.

Last Scouting Trip before the Battle.

Wells' last scouting trip was made just before the final battle of the

campaign. As it was the eve of the decisive struggle, Wayne was anxious

to get a prisoner. Wells went off with three companions--McClellan, a

man named Mahaffy, and a man named May. May, like Wells and Miller, had

lived long with the Indians, first as a prisoner, and afterwards as an

adopted member of their tribe, but had finally made his escape. The four

scouts succeeded in capturing an Indian man and woman, whom they bound

securely. Instead of returning at once with their captives, the

champions, in sheer dare-devil, ferocious love of adventure, determined,

as it was already nightfall, to leave the two bound Indians where they

could find them again, and go into one of the Indian camps to do some

killing. The camp they selected was but a couple of miles from the

British fort. They were dressed and painted like Indians, and spoke the

Indian tongues; so, riding boldly forward, they came right among the

warriors who stood grouped around the camp fires. They were at

arm's-length before their disguise was discovered. Immediately each of

them, choosing his man, fired into an Indian, and then they fled,

pursued by a hail of bullets. May's horse slipped and fell in the bed of

a stream, and he was captured. The other three, spurring hard and

leaning forward in their saddles to avoid the bullets, escaped, though

both Wells and McClellan were wounded; and they brought their Indian

prisoners into Wayne's camp that night. May was recognized by the

Indians as their former prisoner; and next day they tied him up, made a

mark on his breast for a target, and shot him to death. [Footnote:

McBride collects or reprints a number of narratives dealing with these

border heroes; some of them are by contemporaries who took part in their

deeds. Brickell's narrative corroborates these stories; the differences

are such as would naturally be explained by the fact that different

observers were writing of the same facts from memory after a lapse of

several years. In their essentials the narratives are undoubtedly

trustworthy. In the Draper collection there are scores of MS. narratives

of similar kind, written down from what the pioneers said in their old

age; unfortunately it is difficult to sift out the true from the false,

unless the stories are corroborated from outside sources; and most of

the tales in the Draper MSS. are evidently hopelessly distorted. Wells'

daring attack on the Indian camp is alluded to in the Bradley MSS.; the

journal, under date of August 12th, recites how four white spies went

down almost to Lake Erie, captured two Indians, and then attacked the

Indians in their tents, three of the spies being wounded.]

Wayne Reaches the Maumee and Builds Fort Defiance.

With his advance effectually covered by his scouts, and his army guarded

by his own ceaseless vigilance, Wayne marched without opposition to the

confluence of the Glaize and the Maumee, where the hostile Indian

villages began, and whence they stretched to below the British fort. The

savages were taken by surprise and fled without offering opposition;

while Wayne halted, on August 8th, and spent a week in building a strong

log stockade, with four good blockhouses as bastions; he christened the

work Fort Defiance. [Footnote: American State Papers, IV., 490, Wayne to

Secretary of War, Aug. 14, 1794.] The Indians had cleared and tilled

immense fields, and the troops revelled in the fresh vegetables and ears

of roasted corn, and enjoyed the rest; [Footnote: Bradley MSS. Letter of

Captain Daniel Bradley to Ebenezer Banks, Grand Glaize, August 28,

1794.] for during the march the labor of cutting a road through the

thick forest had been very severe, while the water was bad and the

mosquitoes were exceedingly troublesome. At one place a tree fell on

Wayne and nearly killed him; but though somewhat crippled he continued

as active and vigilant as ever. [Footnote: American Pioneer, I., 317,

Daily Journal of Wayne's Campaign. By Lieutenant Boyer. Reprinted

separately in Cincinnati in 1866.]

The Indians Decline to Make Peace.

From Fort Defiance Wayne sent a final offer of peace to the Indians,

summoning them at once to send deputies to meet him. The letter was

carried by Christopher Miller, and a Shawnee prisoner; and in it Wayne

explained that Miller was a Shawnee by adoption, whom his soldiers had

captured "six month since," while the Shawnee warrior had been taken but

a couple of days before; and he warned the Indians that he had seven

Indian prisoners, who had been well treated, but who would be put to

death if Miller were harmed. The Indians did not molest Miller, but

sought to obtain delay, and would give no definite answer; whereupon

Wayne advanced against them, having laid waste and destroyed all their

villages and fields.

Wayne Marches Forward.

His army marched on the 15th, and on the 18th reached Roche du Bout, by

the Maumee Rapids, only a few miles from the British fort. Next day was

spent in building rough breastwork to protect the stores and baggage,

and in reconnoitring the Indian position. [Footnote: American State

Papers, 491, Wayne's Report to Secretary of War, August 28, 1794.]

The Indians--Shawnees, Delawares, Wyandots, Ottawas, Miamis,

Pottawatamies, Chippewas, and Iroquois--were camped closed to the

British. There were between fifteen hundred and two thousand warriors;

and in addition there were seventy rangers from Detroit, French,

English, and refugee Americans, under Captain Caldwell, who fought with

them in the battle. The British agent McKee was with them; and so was

Simon Girty, the "white renegade," and another partisan leader, Elliott.

But McKee, Girty, and Elliott did not actually fight in the battle.

[Footnote: Canadian Archives, McKee to Chew, August 27, 1794. McKee says

there were 1300 Indians, and omits all allusion to Caldwell's rangers.

He always underestimates the Indian numbers and loss. In the battle one

of Caldwell's rangers, Antoine Lasselle, was captured. He gave in detail

the numbers of the Indians engaged; they footed up to over 1500. A

deserter from the fort, a British drummer of the 24th Regiment, named

John Bevin, testified that he had heard both McKee and Elliott report

the number of Indians as 2000, in talking to Major Campbell, the

commandant of the fort, after the battle. He and Lasselle agree as to

Caldwell's rangers. See their depositions, American State Papers, IV.,

494.]

The Indians' Stand at the Fallen Timbers.

On August 20, 1794, Wayne marched to battle against the Indians.

[Footnote: Draper MSS., William Clark to Jonathan Clark, August 28,

1794. McBride, II., 129; "Life of Paxton." Many of the regulars and

volunteers were left in Fort Defiance and the breastworks on the Maumee

as garrisons.] They lay about six miles down the river, near the British

fort, in a place known as the Fallen Timbers, because there the thick

forest had been overturned by a whirlwind, and the dead trees lay piled

across one another in rows. All the baggage was left behind in the

breastwork, with a sufficient guard. The army numbered about three

thousand men; two thousand were regulars, and there were a thousand

mounted volunteers from Kentucky under General Scott.

March of the Army.

The army marched down the left or north branch of the Maumee. A small

force of mounted volunteers--Kentucky militia--were in front. On the

right flank the squadron of dragoons, the regular cavalry, marched next

to the river. The infantry, armed with musket and bayonet, were formed

in two long lines, the second some little distance behind the first; the

left of the first line being continued by the companies of regular

riflemen and light troops. Scott, with the body of the mounted

volunteers, was thrown out on the left with instructions to turn the

flank of the Indians, thus effectually preventing them from performing a

similar feat at the expense of the Americans. There could be no greater

contrast than that between Wayne's carefully trained troops, marching in

open order to the attack, and St. Clair's huddled mass of raw soldiers

receiving an assault they were powerless to repel.

Heavy Skirmishing,

The Indians stretched in a line nearly two miles long at right angles to

the river, and began the battle confidently enough. They attacked and

drove in the volunteers who were in advance and the firing then began

along the entire front. But their success was momentary. Wayne ordered

the first line of the infantry to advance with trailed arms, so as to

rouse the savages from their cover, then to fire into their backs at

close range, and to follow them hard with the bayonet, so as to give

them no time to load. The regular cavalry were directed to charge the

left flank of the enemy; for Wayne had determined "to put the horse hoof

on the moccasin." Both orders were executed with spirit and vigor.

Charge of the Dragoons.

It would have been difficult to find more unfavorable ground for

cavalry; nevertheless the dragoons rode against their foes at a gallop,

with broad-swords swinging, the horses dodging in and out among the

trees and jumping the fallen logs. They received a fire at close

quarters which emptied a dozen saddles, both captains being shot down.

One, the commander of the squadron, Captain Mis Campbell [Footnote: A

curious name, but so given in all the reports.], was killed; the other,

Captain Van Rensselaer, a representative of one of the old Knickerbocker

families of New York, who had joined the army from pure love of

adventure, was wounded. The command devolved on Lieutenant Covington,

who led forward the troopers, with Lieutenant Webb alongside him; and

the dragoons burst among the savages at full speed, and routed them in a

moment. Covington cut down two of the Indians with his own hand, and

Webb one.

Successful Bayonet Charge.

At the same time the first line of the infantry charged with equal

impetuosity and success. The Indians delivered one volley and were then

roused from their hiding places with the bayonet; as they fled they were

shot down, and if they attempted to halt they were at once assailed and

again driven with the bayonet. They could make no stand at all, and the

battle was won with ease. So complete was the success that only the

first line of regulars was able to take part in the fighting; the second

line, and Scott's horse-riflemen, on the left, in spite of their

exertions were unable to reach the battle-field until the Indians were

driven from it; "there not being a sufficiency of the enemy for the

Legion to play on," wrote Clark. The entire action lasted under forty

minutes. [Footnote: Bradley MSS., entry in the journal for August 20th.]

Less than a thousand of the Americans were actually engaged. They

pursued the beaten and fleeing Indians for two miles, the cavalry

halting only when under the walls of the British fort.

A Complete and Easy Victory.

Thirty-three of the Americans were killed and one hundred wounded.

[Footnote: Wayne's report; of the wounded 11 afterwards died. He gives

an itemized statement. Clark in his letter makes the dead 34 (including

8 militia instead of 7) and the wounded only 70. Wayne reports the

Indian loss as twice as great as that of the whites; and says the woods

were strewn with their dead bodies and those of their white auxiliaries.

Clark says 100 Indians were killed. The Englishman, Thomas Duggan,

writing from Detroit to Joseph Chew, Secretary of the Indian Office,

says officially that "great numbers" of the Indians were slain. The

journal of Wayne's campaign says 40 dead were left on the field, and

that there was considerable additional, but unascertained, loss in the

rapid two miles pursuit. The member of Caldwell's company who was

captured was a French Canadian; his deposition is given by Wayne. McKee

says the Indians lost but 19 men, and that but 400 were engaged,

specifying the Wyandots and Ottawas as being those who did the fighting

and suffered the loss; and he puts the loss of the Americans, although

he admits that they won, at between 300 and 400. He was furious at the

defeat, and was endeavoring to minimize it in every way. He does not

mention the presence of Caldwell's white company; he makes the mistake

of putting the American cavalry on the wrong wing, in trying to show

that only the Ottawas and Wyandots were engaged; and if his figures, 19

dead, have any value at all, they refer only to those two tribes; above

I have repeatedly shown that he invariably underestimated the Indian

losses, usually giving the losses suffered by the band he was with as

being the entire loss. In this case he speaks of the fighting and loss

as being confined to the Ottawas and Wyandots; but Brickell, who was

with the Delawares, states that "many of the Delawares were killed and

wounded." All the Indians were engaged; and doubtless all the tribes

suffered proportionately; and much more than the Americans. Captain

Daniel Bradley in his above quoted letter of Aug. 28th to Ebenezer Banks

(Bradley MSS.) says that between 50 and 100 Indians were killed.] It was

an easy victory. The Indians suffered much more heavily than the

Americans; in killed they probably lost two or three times as many.

Among the dead were white men from Caldwell's company; and one white

ranger was captured. It was the most complete and important victory ever

gained over the Northwestern Indians, during the forty years' warfare to

which, it put an end; and it was the only considerable pitched battle in

which they lost more than their foes. They suffered heavily among their

leaders; no less than eight Wyandot chiefs were slain.

The British in the Fort.

From the fort the British had seen, with shame and anger, the rout of

their Indian allies. Their commander wrote to Wayne to demand his

intentions; Wayne responded that he thought they were made sufficiently

evident by his successful battle with the savages. The Englishman wrote

in resentment of this curt reply, complaining that Wayne's soldiers had

approached within pistol shot of the fort, and threatening to fire upon

them if the offence was repeated. Wayne responded by summoning him to

abandon the fort; a summons which he of course refused to heed. Wayne

then gave orders to destroy everything up to the very walls of the fort,

and his commands were carried out to the letter; not only were the

Indian villages burned and their crops cut down, but all the houses and

buildings of the British agents and traders, including McKee's, were

levelled to the ground. The British commander did not dare to interfere

or make good his threats: nor, on the other hand, did Wayne dare to

storm the fort, which was well built and heavily armed.

The Army Marches Back.

After completing his work of destruction Wayne marched his army back to

Fort Defiance. Here he was obliged to halt for over a fortnight while he

sent back to Fort Recovery for provisions. He employed the time in work

on the fort, which he strengthened so that it would stand an attack by a

regular army. The mounted volunteers were turned to account in a new

manner, being employed not only to escort the pack-animals but

themselves to transport the flour on their horses. There was much

sickness among the soldiers, especially from fever and ague, and but for

the corn and vegetables they obtained from the Indian towns which were

scattered thickly along the Maumee they would have suffered from hunger.

They were especially disturbed because all the whiskey was used

up. [Footnote: Daily Journal of Wayne's Campaign, "American Pioneer," I.,

351]

On September 14th the legion started westward towards the Miami Towns at

the junction of the St. Mary's and St. Joseph's rivers, the scene of

Harmar's disaster. In four days the towns were reached, the Indians

being too cowed to offer resistance. Here the army spent six weeks,

burned the towns and destroyed the fields and stores of the hostile

tribes, and built a fort which was christened Fort Wayne. British

deserters came in from time to time; some of the Canadian traders made

overtures to the army and agreed to furnish provisions at a moderate

price; and of the savages only straggling parties were seen. The mounted

volunteers grew mutinous, but were kept in order by their commander

Scott, a rough, capable backwoods soldier. Their term of service at

length expired and they were sent home; and the regulars of the Legion,

leaving a garrison at Fort Wayne, marched back to Greeneville, and

reached it on November 2d, just three months and six days after they

started from it on their memorable and successful expedition. Wayne had

shown himself the best general ever sent to war with the Northwestern

Indians; and his victorious campaign was the most noteworthy ever

carried on against them, for it brought about the first lasting peace on

the border, and put an end to the bloody turmoil of forty years'

fighting. It was one of the most striking and weighty feats in the

winning of the West.

Winter Quarters at Greeneville.

The army went into winter quarters at Greeneville. There was sickness

among the troops, and there were occasional desertions; the discipline

was severe, and the work so hard and dangerous that the men generally

refused to re-enlist. [Footnote: Draper MSS., William Clark to Jonathan

Clark, November 23, 1794.] The officers were uneasy lest there should be

need of a further campaign. But their fears were groundless. Before

winter set in heralds arrived from the hostile tribes to say that they

wished peace.

The Indians Utterly Downcast.

The Indians were utterly downcast over their defeat. [Footnote: Canadian

Archives, William Johnson Chew to Joseph Chew, December 7. 1794.] The

destruction of their crops, homes, and stores of provisions was

complete, and they were put to sore shifts to live through the winter.

Their few cattle, and many even of their dogs, died; they could not get

much food from the British; and as winter wore on they sent envoy after

envoy to the Americans, exchanged prisoners, and agreed to make a

permanent peace in the spring. They were exasperated with the British,

who, they said, had not fulfilled a single promise they had

made. [Footnote: Brickell's Narrative.]

Their Anger with the British.

The anger of the Indians against the British was as just as it was

general. They had been lured and goaded into war by direct material aid,

and by indirect promises of armed assistance; and they were abandoned as

soon as the fortune of war went against them. Brant, the Iroquois chief,

was sorely angered by the action of the British in deserting the Indians

whom they had encouraged by such delusive hopes; and in his letter to

the British officials [Footnote: Canadian Archives, Joseph Brant to

Joseph Chew, Oct. 22, 1794; William J. Chew to J. Chew, Oct. 24, 1794.]

he reminded them of the fact that but for their interference the Indians

would have concluded "an equitable and honorable peace in June

1793"--thus offering conclusive proof that the American commissioners,

in their efforts to make peace with the Indians in that year, had been

foiled by the secret machinations of the British agents, as Wayne had

always thought. Brant blamed the British agent McKee for ever having

interfered in the Indian councils, and misled the tribes to their hurt;

and in writing to the Secretary of the Indian Office for Canada he

reminded him in plain terms of the treachery with which the British had

behaved to the Indians at the close of the Revolutionary War, and

expressed the hope that it would not be repeated; saying:[Footnote:

Canadian Archives, Brant to Joseph Chew, Feb. 24, and March 17, 1795.]

"If there is a treaty between Great Britain and the Yankees I hope our

Father the King will not forget the Indians as he did in the year '83."

When his forebodings came true and the British, in assenting to Jay's

treaty, abandoned their Indian allies, Brant again wrote to the

Secretary of the Indian Office, in repressed but bitter anger at the

conduct of the King's agents in preventing the Indians from making peace

with the Americans while they could have made it on advantageous terms,

and then in deserting them. He wrote: "This is the second time the poor

Indians have been left in the lurch & I cannot avoid lamenting that they

were prevented at a time when they had it in their power to make an

Honorable and Advantageous Peace." [Footnote: _Do_., Brant to Chew, Jan.

19, 1796.]

Wrath of the British Indian Agents.

McKee, the British Indian agent, was nearly as frank as Brant in

expressing his views of the conduct of the British towards their allies;

he doubtless felt peculiar bitterness as he had been made the active

instrument in carrying out the policy of his chiefs, and had then seen

that policy abandoned and even disavowed. In fact he suffered the usual

fate of those who are chosen to do some piece of work which unscrupulous

men in power wish to have done, but wish also to avoid the

responsibility of doing. He foretold evil results from the policy

adopted, a policy under which, as he put it, "the distressed situation

of the poor Indians who have long fought for us and bled farely for us

[is] no bar to a Peaceable accommodation with America and ... they [are]

left to shift for themselves." [Footnote: Canadian Archives, McKee to

Chew, March 27, 1795.] That a sentence of this kind could be truthfully

written by one British official to another was a sufficiently biting

comment on the conduct of the British Government.

The Indians Resolve to Treat.

The battle of the Fallen Timbers opened the eyes of the Indians to more

facts than one. They saw that they could not stand against the Americans

unassisted. Furthermore, they saw that though the British would urge

them to fight, and would secretly aid them, yet that in the last resort

the King's troops would not come to their help by proceeding to actual

war. All their leaders recognized that it was time to make peace. The

Americans found an active ally in the French Canadian, Antoine Lasselle,

whom they had captured in the battle. He worked hard to bring about a

peace, inducing the Canadian traders to come over to the American side,

and making every effort to get the Indians to agree to terms. Being a

thrifty soul, he drove a good trade with the savages at the councils,

selling them quantities of liquor.

They Send Ambassadors to Wayne.

In November the Wyandots from Sandusky sent ambassadors to Wayne at

Greeneville. Wayne spoke to them with his usual force and frankness. He

told them he pitied them for their folly in listening to the British,

who were very glad to urge them to fight and to give them ammunition,

but who had neither the power nor the inclination to help them when the

time of trial came; that hitherto the Indians had felt only the weight

of his little finger, but that he would surely destroy all the tribes in

the near future if they did not make peace. [Footnote: Canadian

Archives, Geo. Ironside to McKee, Dec. 13, 1794.]

The Hurons went away much surprised, and resolved on peace; and the

other tribes followed their example. In January, 1795, the Miamis,

Chippewas, Sacs, Delawares, Pottawatomies, and Ottawas sent ambassadors

to Greeneville and agreed to treat. [Footnote: _Do_., Antoine Lasselle

to Jacques Lasselle, Jan. 31, 1795.] The Shawnees were bent on

continuing the war; but when their allies deserted them they too sent to

Greeneville and asked to be included in the peace. [Footnote: _Do_.,

Letter of Lt.-Col. England, Jan. 30, 1795; also copy of treaty of peace

of Feb. 11th.] On February 11th the Shawnees, Delawares, and Miamis

formally entered into a preliminary treaty.

Treaty of Greeneville.

This was followed in the summer of 1795 by the formal Treaty of

Greeneville, at which Wayne, on behalf of the United States, made a

definite peace with all the Northwestern tribes. The sachems, war

chiefs, and warriors of the different tribes began to gather early in

June; and formal proceedings for a treaty were opened on June 17th. But

many of the tribes were slow in coming to the treaty ground, others

vacillated in their course, and unforeseen delays arose; so that it was

not until August 7th that it was possible to come to a unanimous

agreement and ratify the treaty. No less than eleven hundred and thirty

Indians were present at the treaty grounds, including a full delegation

from every hostile tribe. All solemnly covenanted to keep the peace; and

they agreed to surrender to the whites all of what is now southern Ohio

and south eastern Indiana, and various reservations elsewhere, as at

Fort Wayne, Fort Defiance, Detroit, and Michilimackinac, the lands

around the French towns, and the hundred and fifty thousand acres near

the Falls of the Ohio which had been allotted to Clark and his soldiers.

The Government, in its turn, acknowledged the Indian title to the

remaining territory, and agreed to pay the tribes annuities aggregating

nine thousand five hundred dollars. All prisoners on both sides were

restored. There were interminable harangues and councils while the

treaty was pending, the Indians invariably addressing Wayne as Elder

Brother, and Wayne in response styling them Younger Brothers. In one

speech a Chippewa chief put into terse form the reasons for making the

treaty, and for giving the Americans title to the land, saying, "Elder

Brother, you asked who were the true owners of the land now ceded to the

United States. In answer I tell you, if any nations should call

themselves the owners of it they would be guilty of falsehood; our claim

to it is equal; our Elder Brother has conquered it." [Footnote: American

State Papers, IV., 562-583.]

Wayne's Great Achievement.

Wayne had brought peace by the sword. It was the first time the border

had been quiet for over a generation; and for fifteen years the quiet

lasted unbroken. The credit belongs to Wayne and his army, and to the

Government which stood behind both. Because it thus finally stood behind

them we can forgive its manifold shortcomings and vacillations, its

futile efforts to beg a peace, and its reluctance to go to war. We can

forgive all this; but we should not forget it. Americans need to keep in

mind the fact that as a nation they have erred far more often in not

being willing enough to fight than in being too willing. Once roused,

they have always been dangerous and hard-fighting foes; but they have

been over-difficult to rouse. Their educated classes, in particular,

need to be perpetually reminded that, though it is an evil thing to

brave a conflict needlessly, or to bully and bluster, it is an even

worse thing to flinch from a fight for which there is legitimate

provocation, or to live in supine, slothful, unprepared ease, helpless

to avenge an injury.

The Misconduct of the British.

The conduct of the Americans in the years which closed with Wayne's

treaty did not shine very brightly; but the conduct of the British was

black, indeed. On the Northwestern frontier they behaved in a way which

can scarcely be too harshly stigmatized. This does not apply to the

British civil and military officers at the Lake Posts; for they were

merely doing their duty as they saw it, and were fronting their foes

bravely, while with loyal zeal they strove to carry out what they

understood to be the policy of their superiors. The ultimate

responsibility rested with these superiors, the Crown's high advisers,

and the King and Parliament they represented. Their treatment both of

the Indians, whom they professed to protect, and of the Americans, with

whom they professed to be friendly, forms one of the darkest pages in

the annals of the British in America. Yet they have been much less

severely blamed for their behaviour in this matter, than for far more

excusable offences. American historians, for example, usually condemn

them without stint because in 1814 the army of Ross and Cockburn burned

and looted the public buildings of Washington; but by rights they should

keep all their condemnation for their own country, so far as the taking

of Washington is concerned; for the sin of burning a few public

buildings is as nothing compared with the cowardly infamy of which the

politicians of the stripe of Jefferson and Madison, and the people whom

they represented, were guilty in not making ready, by sea and land, to

protect their Capital and in not exacting full revenge for its

destruction. These facts may with advantage be pondered by those men of

the present day who are either so ignorant or of such lukewarm

patriotism that they do not wish to see the United States keep prepared

for war and show herself willing and able to adopt a vigorous foreign

policy whenever there is need of furthering American interests or

upholding the honor of the American flag. America is bound scrupulously

to respect the rights of the weak; but she is no less bound to make

stalwart insistance on her own rights as against the strong.

Their Treachery towards Both the Indians and the Americans.

The count against the British on the Northwestern frontier is, not that

they insisted on their rights, but that they were guilty of treachery to

both friend and foe. The success of the British was incompatible with

the good of mankind in general, and of the English-speaking races in

particular; for they strove to prop up savagery, and to bar the westward

march of the settler-folk whose destiny it was to make ready the

continent for civilization. But the British cannot be seriously blamed

because they failed to see this. Their fault lay in their aiding and

encouraging savages in a warfare which was necessarily horrible; and

still more in their repeated breaches of faith. The horror and the

treachery were the inevitable outcome of the policy on which they had

embarked; it can never be otherwise when a civilized government

endeavors to use, as allies in war, savages whose acts it cannot control

and for whose welfare it has no real concern.

Doubtless the statesmen who shaped the policy of Great Britain never

deliberately intended to break faith, and never fully realized the awful

nature of the Indian warfare for which they were in part responsible;

they thought very little of the matter at all in the years which saw the

beginning of their stupendous struggle with France. But the acts of

their obscure agents on the far interior frontier were rendered

necessary and inevitable by their policy. To encourage the Indians to

hold their own against the Americans, and to keep back the settlers,

meant to encourage a war of savagery against the border vanguard of

white civilization; and such a war was sure to teem with fearful deeds.

Moreover, where the interests of the British Crown were so manifold it

was idle to expect that the Crown's advisers would treat as of much

weight the welfare of the scarcely-known tribes whom their agents had

urged to enter a contest which was hopeless except for British

assistance. The British statesmen were engaged in gigantic schemes of

warfare and diplomacy; and to them the Indians and the frontiersmen

alike were pawns on a great chessboard, to be sacrificed whenever

necessary. When the British authorities deemed it likely that there

would be war with America, the tribes were incited to take up the

hatchet; when there seemed a chance of peace with America the deeds of

the tribes were disowned; and peace was finally assured by a cynical

abandonment of their red allies. In short, the British, while professing

peace with the Americans, treacherously incited the Indians to war

against them; and, when it suited their own interests, they

treacherously abandoned their Indian allies to the impending ruin.

[Footnote: The ordinary American histories, often so absurdly unjust to

England, are right in their treatment of the British actions on the

frontier in 1793-94. The ordinary British historians simply ignore the

whole affair. As a type of their class, Mr. Percy Gregg may be

instanced. His "History of the United States" is a silly book; he is

often intentionally untruthful, but his chief fault is his complete

ignorance of the facts about which he is writing. It is, of course,

needless to criticise such writers as Mr. Gregg and his fellows. But it

is worth while calling attention to Mr. Goldwin Smith's "The United

States," for Mr. Goldwin Smith is a student, and must be taken

seriously. He says: "That the British government or anybody by its

authority was intriguing with the Indians against the Americans is an

assertion of which there seems to be no proof." If he will examine the

Canadian Archives, from which I have quoted, and the authorities which I

cite, he will find the proof ready to hand. Prof. A. C. McLaughlin has

made a capital study of this question in his pamphlet on "The Western

Posts and the British Debts." What he says cannot well be controverted.]