CHAPTER VII

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN,--AND WHAT WAS

The Battle of Stone's River produced profound disappointment both in the

North and in the South. Claimed as a victory by both sides, the first

fruits fell to the Army of the Cumberland, which had not only held the

field but had compelled the retirement of its adversary and the

relinquishment by the latter of strategic positions and domination over

considerable areas. But as the weeks passed without developments of other

striking results, the Northern people felt that the victory had been

little more than technical, and that the battle was another of the

practically indecisive contests so frequent at that period.

On the other hand, the Southern people were mortified and chagrined at a

defeat suffered when their cause was prospering in almost all other

quarters. They were not more given to analyzing strategic and tactical

features than their Northern enemies, but they were able to realize that

their second army in size and importance had lost thousands of soldiers,

and that it has been driven out of Middle Tennessee, and away from the

vicinity of the State capital, the recovery of which had always been a

cherished object of their hearts. The opposition to Bragg, both in and out

of the Army of the Tennessee, became intensified from the time the

retirement from Murfreesboro was ordered.

It was perhaps natural that the outcome was thus viewed in the two

sections, for it is in the light of what it might have been,--rather than

what it was,--that Stone's River must be judged. Union victory upon that

field did not, it is true, reveal results of transcendent importance, but

Confederate victory,--at one time so near,--would have been followed by

the weightiest and most far-reaching consequences. Had Bragg been able to

drive his infantry across the Nashville pike on the last day of 1862, or

had he been able to crush the Union left on the second of January, 1863,

the capture or destruction,--whole or partial,--of his enemy would have

been one of the least of these consequences. For the way to the Ohio would

then have been open, and Cincinnati and other opulent Northern cities

would have been at the mercy of Confederate arms. Vicksburg would not have

been an historic name, for overwhelming forces could have been turned

against Grant to crush him, or drive him from Mississippi.

Tennessee,--second State in population below Mason and Dixon's line, and

first in such food as armies consume,--would have been held to furnish the

vital recruits and supplies to the Confederacy. East Tennessee would have

waited in vain for the relieving Northern forces. Kentucky and Missouri

might have been wrested from Union control, and Arkansas freed from the

presence of the invader. Finally, Europe's recognition, with the manifold

complexities for the North that must have ensued therefrom, could have

been no longer logically denied to the Richmond government.

After Stone's River, Bragg's battered battalions retired 30 to 40 miles

away,--to the line of Duck Diver,--and there maintained an attitude of

defiance for 6 months. It took that period for Rosecrans to restore the

ravages of battle in his army. Wheeler, Morgan, and Forrest,--the cavalry

chieftans,--meanwhile, kept up a series of raids upon Rosecrans's long

line of communications,--raids that sorely tried that commander, pestered

as he was by constant injunctions from Washington to move forward. But in

June, 1863, having at length accumulated sufficient supplies, the Army of

the Cumberland started the campaign that was to drive the Army of the

Tennessee out of the State from which it took its name. Then came another

halt; but in September the Union forces again advanced and the

Confederates again retired.

At Chickamauga the Army of the Tennessee, reinforced by Longstreet and

Buckner, turned, and, inflicting a bloody defeat upon the Army of the

Cumberland, locked it up in the fastness of Chattanooga. But Bragg was

unable to gather substantial fruits from his victory. At Missionary Ridge,

in December, the Army of the Cumberland led in the movement that broke the

battle-front of its historic adversary. Thenceforth the Army of the

Tennessee,--fighting bravely at every turn,--was obliged by the weight of

opposing numbers to retire further and further into the South. At Resaca,

at Dalton, at Kenesaw Mountain, at Atlanta, and at a score of other places

it showed the qualities of valor and endurance that had already won it

deserved renown. But it never looked to the North again until the latter

days of 1864, when Hood summoned it for its last great adventure,--that

desperate leap past Sherman, which was to end in utter rout before the

ramparts of Nashville.

The Army of the Cumberland lost in the Stone's River campaign 1,730

killed, 7,802 wounded, 3,717 captured and missing; a total of 13,249.

The Army of the Tennessee lost 1,294 killed, 7,945 wounded, 1,027 captured

or missing; a total of 10,266.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

"In the second half of this year (1862) the Confederates failed to gain

control of Maryland and Kentucky, but made head strongly and at the end of

it were at the height of their power, with the North badly defeated at all

points save one. The writer considers that the battle of Stone's River, or

Murfreesboro, on December 31st, was the military turning-point of the war,

though the Confederates made various strokes at different times for

political purposes, which, had they succeeded, might have attained their

end, the chief of which was the campaign of Gettysburg. From a purely

military point of view, however, nothing could save the Confederacy unless

the results of Stone's River were undone. The year 1863 opened with the

Confederates fought out; they had made their effort but could not maintain

it, and had failed to secure the centre of the strategical line which was

vital for both sides."--"The American Civil War," Formby; London, John

Murray, 1910.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II.

"... That my opinion was founded upon a false estimate of the facts was

the very least part of my fault. I did not perceive the gross impropriety

of such an utterance from a cabinet minister, of a power united in blood

and language, and bound to loyal neutrality; the case being further

exaggerated by the fact that we were already, so to speak, under

indictment before the world, for not--as was alleged--having strictly

enforced the laws of neutrality in the matter of the cruisers. My offence

was indeed only a mistake, but one of incredible grossness, and with such

consequences of offence and alarm attached to it, that my failing to

perceive them justly exposed me to very severe blame...."--Gladstonian

fragment, "Life of Gladstone," Morley; New York. The Macmillan Company,

1911.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III.

"Further to mislead the enemy as to the point from which the attack was to

be made, long lines of camp-fires were started on McCook's right and

commands given by staff-officers to imaginary regiments in tones loud

enough to be heard by the enemy's skirmishers, to induce the Confederates

to think that our line extended much further to the right than it actually

did. I have always doubted whether Bragg was misled or deceived by this

subterfuge; and not unlikely he considered it a confession of weakness on

our right and formed his own plans accordingly."--"The Murfreesboro

Campaign," Otis; Boston. Papers of the Military Historical Society of

Massachusetts, Vol. VII, 1908.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI.

"At this juncture, Colonel John F. Miller, followed by a portion of

Stanley's brigade, charged with his brigade across the river.

Disregarding an order from a general officer, not his immediate commander,

to desist from so hazardous an adventure, he dashed over and fell

furiously upon the foe, already in rapid retreat. The right of Miller's

line was supported by the Eighteenth Ohio, and portions of the

Thirty-seventh Indiana and Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania, of Stanley's

Brigade. Moving on the opposite bank, his left, was Grose's brigade, which

had changed front and resisted the enemy, when Price and Grider gave

ground, and in his rear were Hazen's brigade and portions of Beatly's

division. Miller reached a battery in position and, charging with the

Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania, Sixty-ninth and Seventy-fourth Ohio, and

Nineteenth Illinois, the Twenty-first Ohio, striking opportunely on the

left, captured four guns and the colors of the Twenty-sixth Tennessee

Regiment...."--"History of the Army of the Cumberland," Van Home;

Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co., 1875.

"Miller sent his staff officers and orderlies, Lieutenant (afterward

Brigadier-General) Henry Chiney, Lieutenant Ayers, and Major A. B.

Bonnaffin (I repeat that I am writing now what I saw with my own eyes and

heard with my own ears) to scour the field and ask permission to cross the

stream to Van Cleve's relief. Only one such officer could be found,

General John M. Palmer (of Illinois) and from him came instead of the

desired permission a positive prohibition--an order not to cross. The

other two brigade commanders, belonging to the division, General Spear of

Tennessee and Colonel T. R. Stanley, of the Eighteenth Ohio, were not

present. General Negley, the division commander, was not to be found....

"Miller found himself the ranking officer present with the division and

realized that the decision fraught with so much importance lay with him.

He was surrounded by a group of regimental commanders who alternately

studied the field and his face.... He turned to the officers around him

saying quietly:

"'I will charge them.'

"'And I'll follow you,' exclaimed the gallant Scott, wheeling and plunging

his spurs into his steed to hasten back to his regiment (the Nineteenth

Illinois). Colonel Stoughton of the Eleventh Michigan and other regimental

commanders belonging to the Twenty-ninth brigade echoed Scott's

enthusiastic adherence and they, too, started for their troops."--"God's

War," Vance. London, New York. F. Tennyson Neely, 1899.

Transcriber's Notes:

Passages in italics are indicated by _underscore_.

The following misprints have been corrected:

"Crittendon's" corrected to "Crittenden's" (page 44)

"Rosecran's" corrected to "Rosecrans's" (page 53)

Other than the corrections listed above, printer's spelling

inconsistencies have been retained.

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