THE UNIVERSAL CAUSE, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

1. We have been led by the idealistic argument to

recognize the necessity of a Mind which _thinks_ the

world. Insufficiency of this view.

{xiii}

2. In our experiences of external Nature we meet with

nothing but succession, never with Causality. The

Uniformity of Nature is a postulate of Physical

Science, not a necessity of thought. The idea of

Causality derived from our consciousness of Volition.

Causality=Activity, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3. If events must have a cause, and we know of no cause

but Will, it is reasonable to infer that the events

which _we_ do not cause must be caused by some other

Will; and the systematic unity of Nature implies that

this cause must be _One_ Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

4. Moreover, the analogy of the human mind suggests the

probability that, if God is Mind, there must be in

Him, as in us, the three activities of Thought,

Feeling, and Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

5. The above line of argument can be used by the Realist

who believes matter to be a thing-in-itself; but it

fits in much better with the Idealistic view of the

relations between mind and matter, and with the

tendency of modern physics to resolve matter into Force, . 48

6. Testimony of Spencer and Kant to the theory that the

Ultimate Reality is Will, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Philosophy and Religion Six Lectures Delivered at Cambridge · 第 12 / 44 题