1. Is Materialism possible? There is no immediate
knowledge of Matter; what we know is always
Self + Matter. The idea of a Matter which can exist
by itself is an inference: is it a reasonable one?
2. No. For all that we know about Matter implies Mind.
This is obvious as to secondary qualities (colour,
sound, etc.); but it is no less true of primary
qualities (solidity, magnitude, etc.). Relations,
no less than sensations, imply Mind, . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. This is the great discovery of Berkeley, though he did
not adequately distinguish between sensations and
intellectual relations, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. But Matter certainly does not exist merely for _our_
transitory and incomplete knowledge: if it cannot exist
apart from Mind, there must be a universal Mind in which
and for which all things exist, _i.e._ God, . . . . . . . 16
5. But Theism is possible without Idealism. The
impossibility of Materialism has generally been
recognized (_e.g._ by Spinoza, Spencer, Haeckel).
If the ultimate Reality is not Matter, it must be
utterly unlike anything we know, or be Mind. The
latter view more probable, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. It is more reasonable to explain the lower by the
higher than _vice versa_, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26