THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME
July 14 to July 31
Gradual advance of First Division--Hard fighting of Thirty-third
Division at High Wood--The South Africans in Delville Wood--The great
German counter-attack--Splendid work of 26th Brigade--Capture of
Delville Wood by 99th Brigade--Indecisive fighting on the Guillemont
front.
The central fact of the situation after the battle of Bazentin was
that although the second German line had been broken, the gap made
was little more than three miles wide, and must be greatly extended
upon either flank before a general advance upon the third line could
take place. This meant that the left wing must push out in the
Pozières direction, and that the right wing must get Ginchy and
Guillemont. For the time the central British position was not an
advantageous one, as it formed a long salient bending from High Wood
through Delville Wood to Guillemont, so placed that it was open to
direct observation all along, and exposed to converging fire which
could be directed with all the more accuracy as it was upon points so
well known to the Germans, into which the guns, communications, and
reserves were now {160} crammed. Sir Douglas Haig's great
difficulties were increased by a long spell of wet and cloudy
weather, which neutralised his advantages in the air. Everything was
against the British General except the excellence of his artillery
and the spirit of his troops. The French upon the right, whose tally
of guns and prisoners were up to date higher than those of the
British, had an equally hard front to attack, including the four
strong villages of Maurepas, Le Forest, Raucourt, and Fregicourt,
with many woods and systems of trenches. Their whole work in the
battle had been worthy of their military history, and could not be
surpassed, either in the dispositions of General Foch or in the
valour of his men. Neither their infantry nor ours had ever
relinquished one square yard that they had wrenched from the tight
grip of the invader.
In each area of the battle of July 14 some pressing task was left to
be accomplished, and the fighting was very severe at certain points
for some days later. We shall first turn to the north of the line,
where new divisions had come into action. One of these already
mentioned was the First Division. It was indeed pleasing and
reassuring to observe how many of the new divisional generals were
men whose names recalled good service as regimental officers. Many
who now wore the crossed swords upon their shoulders had been
battalion commanders in 1914. It is indeed well with an army when
neither seniority nor interest but good hard service upon the field
of battle puts officers in charge of the lives of men.
The First Division had taken the place of the Twenty-third after the
fall of Contalmaison, and had pushed its way up until it was level
with the line of {161} their comrades on the right, whence in the
manner described at the end of the last chapter they drove their line
forward upon July 15. On the 20th they received a rebuff, however,
the 1st Northants being held up by a very formidable German trench
called Munster Alley. The ground already gained was consolidated,
however, and the division lay with its left touching the Australians
on the right of Gough's army, and its right connected with the
Thirty-third Division, whose doings at High Wood will presently be
considered. For the purpose of continuity of narrative it will be
best to continue with a short summary of the doings of the First
Division upon the left wing of the advance, their general task being
to hold that flank against German counter-attacks, and to push
forward wherever possible. It was continuous hard work which, like
so many of these operations, could gain little credit, since there
was no fixed point but only a maze of trenches in front of them. The
storming of a nameless ditch may well call for as high military
virtue as the taking of a historic village, and yet it seems a
slighter thing in the lines of a bulletin. Munster Alley and the
great Switch Line faced the First Division, two most formidable
obstacles. On July 23, in the early morning, the 2nd Brigade of the
First Division attacked the Switch Line, in conjunction with the
Australians, on the left, and the Nineteenth Division to the right.
The attack was held up, Colonel Bircham of the 2nd Rifles and many
officers and men being killed. Colonel Bircham was a particularly
gallant officer, who exposed himself fearlessly upon every occasion,
and it is on record that when remonstrated with by his adjutant for
his reckless disregard {162} of danger, he answered, "You know as
well as I do where a colonel of the 60th ought to be." Such lives
are an example and such deaths an inspiration. Altogether the 2nd
Rifles lost about 250 men in this night attack, and the other first
line battalions--the 2nd Sussex, 10th Gloucesters, and 1st Cameron
Highlanders--were all hard hit. The failure seems to have been
partly due to misdirection in the dark.
Upon July 25 the 1st South Wales Borderers of the 3rd Brigade
attacked Munster Alley, but were again unable to get forward on
account of the machine-guns. Nothing daunted, the 2nd Welsh had
another fling at Munster Alley next day, and actually took it, but
had not weight enough to consolidate and to hold it. On the other
hand, the British line was held inviolate, and a strong German attack
upon July 25 towards Pozières was repulsed with loss.
The Twenty-third Division relieved the First and were in turn
relieved by the Fifteenth in this sector, which faced the Switch
Trench and Martinpuich. The Switch Line was exposed to a very heavy
fire for several days, at the end of which it was attacked by this
famous division, the same in number at least as that which had left
nearly two-thirds of its rank and file upon the bloody slopes of Hill
70. On August 12 the advance was carried out with great dash: the
45th Brigade upon the left and the 46th upon the right. The attack
was only partially successful, and the 46th Brigade was held up
through the fact that the Germans had themselves been in the act of
attack, so that the trenches were very strongly held. The operations
continued, however, and the initial gains were enlarged, until {163}
upon August 20 the whole Switch Line fell and was permanently
consolidated.
Leaving this left sector we must turn to the Thirty-third Division on
its right, two battalions of which had got forward on July 15, as far
as the line of the road connecting High Wood with Little Bazentin.
The right flank of the Highland Light Infantry had been held up by
fire from this wood, and in the evening the 91st Brigade of the
Seventh Division had evacuated the southern edge of the wood in order
to allow of bombardment. That was the position on the night of July
15.
The line of the road was held all night, and early next morning the
advance was ordered upon the German Switch Trench in front. It was
hoped that the wood had been cleared during the night, but in the
morning the Highlanders found themselves still galled by the
continual fire upon their right. It was clear that the attack could
not go forward with such an impediment upon the flank--one more
instance of a brigade being held up by a handful of concealed men.
It was hoped that the enemy had been silenced, and the attack was
made, but no sooner had it developed than a murderous fire burst from
the wood, making it impossible for the Highlanders to get along
farther than the road. The 1st Queen's, however, being farther from
the wood were able to get on to the Switch Trench, but found it
heavily wired and stiff with men. Such a battalion does not take
"No" easily, and their colonel, with a large proportion of their
officers and men, was stretched in front of the fatal wire before it
became evident that further perseverance would mean destruction. The
16th Rifles and half the 2nd Worcesters, the remaining {164}
battalions of the 100th Brigade, were brought up, but no further
advance was possible until the wire could be cut by the guns. About
four in the afternoon of July 16 the remains of the brigade were back
in the road from which they had started. The attack had failed,
partly from the enfilade fire of High Wood, partly from the
impassable wire.
The 98th Brigade was on the left of the 100th, filling up the gap to
Bazentin village. They had extended their right in order to help
their sorely-tried comrades, and they had themselves advanced upon
the line of the Switch Trench--the 1st Middlesex leading, with the
4th Suffolk in support. The 2nd Argyll and Sutherlands with the 4th
King's Liverpool were in reserve. They got well forward, but ceased
their advance when it was found that no progress could be made upon
the right. Thus, for the time, the division was brought to a stand.
That night the 19th Brigade relieved the 100th, which had been very
hard hit in this action. After the change the 1st Scottish Rifles
and the 20th Royal Fusiliers formed the front line of the 19th
Brigade, the Rifles in touch with the 22nd Brigade of the 7th upon
their right, while the Fusiliers were in touch with the 98th Brigade
upon their left.
The general situation did not admit of an immediate attack, and the
Germans took advantage of the pause to strengthen and slightly to
advance their position. On July 17 the hard-worked Twenty-first
Division upon the left was drawn out, and both the Thirty-third and
Seventh had to extend their fronts. On the other hand, the First
Division came in upon the left and occupied a portion of the
Bazentin-le-Petit Wood. The position at that time was {165} roughly
that the Seventh Division covered the front from High Wood to
Bazentin Grand, the Thirty-third Division from Bazentin Grand to
Bazentin Petit, and the First was from their left to Pozières.
Upon July 18 there was a very heavy German attack upon Delville Wood,
which is treated elsewhere. This was accompanied by a severe barrage
fire upon the Bazentins and upon Mametz Wood, which continued all
day. That night the Nineteenth Division came into line, taking over
Bazentin Petit, both village and wood. The Thirty-third Division
moved to the right and took some pressure off the Seventh, which had
done such long and arduous service. These incessant changes may seem
wearisome to the reader, but without a careful record of them the
operations would become chaos to any one who endeavoured to follow
them in detail. It is to be emphasised that though divisions
continually changed, the corps to which they temporarily belonged did
not change, or only at long intervals, so that when you are within
its area you can always rely upon it that in this particular case
Horne of the Fifteenth Corps is the actual brain which has the
immediate control of the battle.
As the pressure upon Congreve's Thirteenth Corps on the right at
Delville Wood and elsewhere was considerable, it was now deemed
advisable to attack strongly by the Fifteenth Corps. The units for
attack were the Thirty-third Division upon the left, and the depleted
Seventh upon their right. There was to be no attack upon the left of
the Thirty-third Division, but the 56th Brigade of the Nineteenth
Division was handed over to the 33rd Division to strengthen the
force. The objectives to {166} be attacked were once again High Wood
(Bois des Foureaux), Switch Trench, and the connecting trench between
them. The Seventh Division attacked east of the wood on the line
between it and Delville Wood.
The assault upon High Wood was assigned to the 19th Brigade. The 2nd
Worcesters of the 98th Brigade were pushed out so as to cover the
left flank of the assaulting column. At 2 A.M. of July 20 the two
advance battalions of stormers, the 5th Scottish Rifles on the right,
the 1st Scottish Rifles upon the left, were formed up in open ground
outside the British wire. Preceded by scouts, they went silently
forward through the gloom until they approached the south-western
edge of the wood. A terrific bombardment was going on, and even
those stout northern hearts might have quailed at the unknown dangers
of that darksome wood, lit from moment to moment by the red glare of
the shells. As the barrage lifted, the wave of infantry rushed
forward, the 5th Scottish Rifles making for the eastern edge, while
the 1st Regular Battalion pushed on in the endeavour to win through
and secure the northern edge.
It was speedily found that the tenacious enemy had by no means
loosened his grip of the wood. A portion of the Switch Trench runs
through it, and this was strongly held, a line of spirting flames
amid the shadow of the shattered trees. Machine-guns and wire were
everywhere. None the less, the dour Scots stuck to their point,
though the wood was littered with their dead. Both to east and to
north they slowly pushed their way onwards to their objectives. It
was a contest of iron wills, and every yard won was paid for in
blood. By 9 o'clock the whole of the {167} southern half of the wood
had been cleared, the leading troops being helped by the 20th
Fusiliers, who followed behind them, clearing up the lurking Germans.
At that hour the northern end of the wood was still strongly held by
the enemy, while the stormers had become much disorganised through
loss of officers and through the utter confusion and disintegration
which a night attack through a wood must necessarily entail.
The remaining battalion of the 19th Brigade, the 2nd Welsh Fusiliers,
was, at this critical moment, thrown into the fight. A heavy barrage
was falling, and considerable losses were met with before the wood
was entered; but the Fusiliers went forward with splendid steadiness
and dash, their colonel taking entire local command. In the early
afternoon, having got abreast of the exhausted Scottish Rifles, who
had been under the hottest fire for nearly twelve hours, the Welsh
attacked the north end of the wood, their advance being preceded by a
continuous fire from our Stokes mortars, that portable heavy
artillery which has served us so well. The enemy was still
unabashed, but the advance was irresistible, and by 7 P.M. the
British were for a time in possession of the whole of the
blood-sodden plantation. It was a splendid passage of arms, in which
every devilry which an obstinate and ingenious defence could command
was overcome by the inexorable British infantry. The grim
pertinacity of the Scots who stood that long night of terror, and the
dash of the Welsh who carried on the wave when it was at the ebb,
were equally fine; and solid, too, was the work of the public school
lads of the 20th Fusiliers, who gleaned behind the line. So terrific
was the shell-fire of the disappointed {168} Germans upon the north
end of the wood, that it was impossible to hold it; but the southern
part was consolidated by the 18th Middlesex Pioneer Battalion and by
the 11th Company Royal Engineers.
Whilst the Thirty-third Division stormed High Wood, their neighbours
upon the right, the Seventh Division, depleted by heavy losses but
still full of spirit, had been given the arduous and important task
of capturing the roads running south-west from High Wood to
Longueval. The assaulting battalions, the 2nd Gordons on the left
and the 8th Devons on the right, Aberdeen and Plymouth in one battle
line, advanced and took their first objective through a heavy
barrage. Advancing farther, they attempted to dig in, but they had
got ahead of the attack upon the left, and all the machine-guns both
of Switch Trench and of High Wood were available to take them in
flank and rear. It was a deadly business--so deadly that out of the
two leading platoons of Gordons only one wounded officer and five men
ever got back. Finally, the whole line had to crawl back in small
groups to the first objective, which was being consolidated. That
evening, the Fifth Division took over the lines of the Seventh, who
were at last drawn out for a rest. The relief was marked by one
serious mishap, as Colonel Gordon, commanding a battalion of his
clansmen, was killed by a German shell.
It has been stated that the 56th Brigade of the Nineteenth Division
had been placed under the orders of the Thirty-third Division during
these operations. Its role was to cover the left flank of the attack
and to keep the Germans busy in the Switch Line position. With this
object the {169} 56th Brigade, with the 57th Brigade upon its left,
advanced its front line upon the night of July 22, a movement in
which the 7th South Lancashires upon the right of the 56th Brigade
were in close touch with the 2nd Worcesters upon the left of the
100th Brigade. Going forward in the darkness with German trenches in
front of them and a raking fire from High Wood beating upon their
flank the Lancashire men lost heavily and were unable to gain a
footing in the enemy's position. This brigade had already suffered
heavily from shell-fire in its advance to the front trenches. Two
deaths which occurred during this short episode may be cited as
examples of the stuff which went to the building up of Britain's new
armies. Under the shell-fire fell brave old Lieutenant Webber, a
subaltern in the field, a Master of Foxhounds at home, father of
another dead subaltern, and 64 years old. In the night operation,
gallantly leading his company, and showing his comrades in the dark
how to keep direction by astronomy, fell Captain Gerard Garvin,
student, poet, essayist, and soldier, just 20 years of age. A book
might be written which would be a national inspiration dealing with
the lives of those glorious youths who united all that is beautiful
in the mind with all that is virile in the body, giving it
unreservedly in their country's cause. They are lives which are more
reminiscent of Sydney, Spencer, and the finer of the Elizabethans
than anything we could have hoped to evolve in these later days.
Raymond Asquith, Rupert Brooke, Charles Lister, Gerard Garvin, Julian
Grenfell, Donald Hankey, Francis Ledwidge, Neil Primrose, these are
some at least of this finest flower of British culture and valour,
men who sacrificed to the need of the {170} present their inheritance
as the natural leaders of the future.
Though the Nineteenth Division was able to make no progress upon the
night of July 22, upon the next night one of their brigades, the
58th, reinforced by two other battalions, made a strong movement
forward, capturing the strong point upon the edge of the wood which
had wrought the mischief the night before, and also through the fine
work of the 10th Warwicks and 7th King's Own carrying the whole
British line permanently forward upon the right, though they could
make no headway upon the left. Some conception of the services of
the Nineteenth Division may be gathered from the fact that during the
month of July it had lost 6500 casualties.
The Thirty-third Division was given a well-deserved rest after their
fine exploit in High Wood. During seven days' fighting it had lost
heavily in officers and men. Of individual battalions the heaviest
sufferers had been the two Scottish Rifle battalions, the 20th Royal
Fusiliers, the 1st Queen's Surrey, 9th Highland Light Infantry, and
very specially the 16th King's Royal Rifles.
Whilst this very severe fighting had been going on upon the left
centre of the British advance, an even more arduous struggle had
engaged our troops upon the right, where the Germans had a
considerable advantage, since the whole of Delville Wood and
Longueval formed the apex of a salient which jutted out into their
position, and was open to a converging artillery fire from several
directions. This terrible fight, which reduced the Ninth Scottish
Division to about the strength of a brigade, and which caused heavy
losses also to the Third Division, who struck {171} in from the left
flank in order to help their comrades, was carried on from the time
when the Highland Brigade captured the greater part of the village of
Longueval, as already described in the general attack upon July 14.
On the morning after the village was taken, the South African Brigade
had been ordered to attack Delville Wood. This fine brigade, under a
South African veteran, was composed of four battalions, the first
representing the Cape Colony, the second Natal and the Orange River,
the third the Transvaal, and the fourth the South African Scotsmen.
If South Africa could only give battalions where others gave brigades
or divisions, it is to be remembered that she had campaigns upon her
own frontiers in which her manhood was deeply engaged. The European
contingent was mostly British, but it contained an appreciable
proportion of Boers, who fought with all the stubborn gallantry which
we have good reason to associate with the name. Apart from the
infantry, it should be mentioned that South Africa had sent six heavy
batteries, a fine hospital, and many labour detachments and special
services, including a signalling company which had the reputation of
being the very best in the army, every man having been a civilian
expert.
The South Africans advanced at dawn, and their broad line of
skirmishers pushed its way rapidly through the wood, sweeping all
opposition before it. By noon they occupied the whole tract with the
exception of the north-west corner. This was the corner which
abutted upon the houses north of Longueval, and the murderous
machine-guns in these buildings held the Africans off. By night, the
{172} whole perimeter of the wood had been occupied, and the brigade
was stretched round the edges of the trees and undergrowth. Already
they were suffering heavily, not only from the Longueval guns upon
their left, but from the heavy German artillery which had their range
to a nicety and against which there was no defence. With patient
valour they held their line, and endured the long horror of the
shell-fall during the night.
Whilst the South Africans were occupying Delville Wood, the 27th
Brigade had a task which was as arduous, and met in as heroic a mood,
as that of their comrades on the day before. Their attack was upon
the orchards and houses to the north and east of Longueval, which had
been organised into formidable strong points and garrisoned by
desperate men. These strong points were especially dangerous on
account of the support which they could give to a counter-attack, and
it was thus that they did us great mischief. The Scottish Borderers,
Scots Fusiliers, and Royal Scots worked slowly forward during the
day, at considerable cost to themselves. Every house was a fortress
mutually supporting every other one, and each had to be taken by
assault. "I saw one party of half-a-dozen Royal Scots rush headlong
into a house with a yell, though there were Germans at every window.
Three minutes later one of the six came out again, but no more shots
ever came from that house." Such episodes, with ever-varying
results, made up that long day of desperate fighting, which was
rendered more difficult by the heavy German bombardment. The enemy
appeared to be resigned to the loss of the Bazentins, but all their
energy and guns were concentrated upon the reconquest {173} of
Longueval and Delville Wood. Through the whole of the 16th the
shelling was terribly severe, the missiles pitching from three
separate directions into the projecting salient. Furious assaults
and heavy shell-falls alternated for several days, while clouds of
bombers faced each other in a deadly and never-ending pelting match.
It was observed as typical of the methods of each nation that while
the Germans all threw together with mechanical and effective
precision, the British opened out and fought as each man judged best.
This fighting in the wood was very desperate and swayed back and
forwards. "It was desperate hand-to-hand work. The enemy had no
thought of giving in. Each man took advantage of the protection
offered by the trees, and fought until he was knocked out. The wood
seemed swarming with demons, who fought us tooth and nail." The
British and Africans were driven deeper into the wood. Then again
they would win their way forwards until they could see the open
country through the broken trunks of the lacerated trees. Then the
fulness of their tide would be reached, no fresh wave would come to
carry them forwards, and slowly the ebb drew them back once more into
the village and the forest. In this mixed fighting the Transvaal
battalion took 3 officers and 130 men prisoners, but their losses,
and those of the other African units, were very heavy. The senior
officer in the firing line behaved with great gallantry, rallying his
ever-dwindling forces again and again. A joint attack on the evening
of July 16 by the Cape men, the South African Scots, and the 11th
Royal Scots upon the north-west of the wood and the north of the
village was held up by wire and machine-guns, but the German {174}
counter-attacks had no better fate. During the whole of the 17th the
situation remained unchanged, but the strain upon the men was very
severe, and they were faced by fresh divisions coming up from
Bapaume. The Brigadier himself made his way into the wood, and
reported to the Divisional Commander the extremely critical state of
affairs.
On the morning of July 18 the Third Division were able to give some
very valuable help to the hard-pressed Ninth. At the break of day
the 1st Gordons, supported by the 8th King's Liverpools, both from
the 76th Brigade, made a sudden and furious attack upon those German
strong points to the north of the village which were an ever-present
source of loss and of danger. "Now and again," says a remarkable
anonymous account of the incident, "during a lull in the roar of
battle, you could hear a strong Northern voice call out: 'On,
Gor-r-r-dons, on!' thrilling out the r's as only Scotsmen can. The
men seldom answered save by increasing their speed towards the goal.
Occasionally some of them called out the battle-cry heard so often
from the throats of the Gordons: 'Scotland for ever!' ... They were
out of sight over the parapet for a long time, but we could hear at
intervals that cry of 'On, Gor-r-r-dons, on!' varied with yells of
'Scotland for ever!' and the strains of the pipes. Then we saw
Highlanders reappear over the parapet. With them were groups of
German prisoners."
The assault won a great deal of ground down the north-west edge of
Delville Wood and in the north of the village; but there were heavy
losses, and two of the strong points were still intact. All day the
bombardment was continuous and deadly, until {175} 4.30 in the
afternoon, when a great German infantry attack came sweeping from the
east, driving down through the wood and pushing before it with an
irresistible momentum the scattered bodies of Scottish and African
infantry, worn out by losses and fatigue. For a time it submerged
both wood and village, and the foremost grey waves emerged even to
the west of the village, where they were beaten down by the Lewis
guns of the defenders. The southern edge of the wood was still held
by the British, however, and here the gallant 26th Brigade threw
itself desperately upon the victorious enemy, and stormed forward
with all the impetuosity of their original attack. The Germans were
first checked and then thrown back, and the south end of the wood
remained in British hands. A finer or more successful local
counter-attack has seldom been delivered, and it was by a brigade
which had already endured losses which made it more fit for a
rest-camp than for a battle line. After this second exploit the four
splendid battalions were but remnants, the Black Watch having lost
very heavily, while the Argylls, the Seaforths, and the Camerons were
in no better case. Truly it can never be said that the grand records
of the historic regular regiments have had anything but renewed
lustre from the deeds of those civilian soldiers who, for a time,
were privileged to bear their names.
Whilst this severe battle had been in progress, the losses of the
South Africans in Delville Wood had been terrible, and they had
fought with the energy of desperate men for every yard of ground.
Stands were made in the successive rides of the wood by the colonel
and his men. During the whole of the 19th these fine soldiers held
on against heavy pressure. {176} The colonel was the only officer of
his regiment to return. Even the Newfoundlanders had hardly a more
bloody baptism of fire than the South Africans, or emerged from it
with more glory.
The situation now was that the south of the wood was held by the
British, but the north, including the greater part of the village,
was still held by the Germans. The worn-out Ninth Division, still
full of spirit, but lacking sadly in numbers, was brought out of line
upon July 19, and the Eighteenth English Division, fresh from its own
great ordeal in Trones Wood, came forward to take its place. At
seven in the morning of the 19th the 53rd Brigade attacked from the
south, the situation being so pressing that there was no time for
artillery preparation. The infantry went forward without it, and no
higher ordeal could be demanded of them. It was evident that there
was great danger of the strong German column breaking through to
westward and so outflanking the whole British line. Only a British
attack from north and from south could prevent its progress, so that
the Third Division were called upon for the one, and the Eighteenth
for the other. This wood of infamous memory is cut in two by one
broad ride, named Princes Street, dividing it into two halves, north
and south (_vide_ p. 181). The southern half was now attacked by the
8th Norfolks, who worked their way steadily forward in a long fringe
of bombers and riflemen. The Brigade-Major, Markes, and many
officers and men fell in the advance. After a pause, with the help
of their Lewis guns, the Norfolks pushed forward again, and by 2
o'clock had made their way up to Princes Street along most of the
line, pushing the enemy down into the south-eastern corner. The
{177} remaining battalions of the brigade, the 10th Essex on the
right and the 6th Berkshires on the left, tried to fight their way
through the northern portion, while the 8th Suffolk attacked the
village. Half of the village up to the cross-roads in the centre was
taken by the Suffolk, but their comrades on the right were held up by
the heavy machine-gun fire, and at 5 P.M. were compelled to dig
themselves in. They maintained their new positions, under a terrific
shell-fire, for three weary and tragic days, at the end of which they
were relieved by the 4th Royal Fusiliers, a veteran battalion which
had fired some of the first shots of the War.
These Fusiliers belonged to the Third Division which had, as already
said, been attacking from the north side of the wood, while the
Eighteenth were on the south side. On July 19 this attack had been
developed by the 2nd Suffolk and the 10th Welsh Fusiliers, the two
remaining battalions of the 76th Brigade. The advance was made at
early dawn, and the Welsh Fusiliers were at once attacked by German
infantry, whom they repulsed. The attack was unfortunate from the
start, and half of the Suffolks who penetrated the village were never
able to extricate themselves again. The Welsh Fusiliers carried on,
but its wing was now in the air, and the machine-guns were very
deadly. The advance was held up and had to be withdrawn. In this
affair fell one of the most promising of the younger officers of the
British army, a man who would have attained the very highest had he
lived, Brigade-Major Congreve, of the 76th Brigade, whose father
commanded the adjacent Thirteenth Corps. His death arose from one of
his many acts of rash and yet purposeful {178} valour, for he pushed
forward alone to find out what had become of the missing Suffolks,
and so met his end from some lurking sniper.
On July 20 matters had come to a temporary equilibrium in Delville
Wood, where amid the litter of corpses which were strewn from end to
end of that dreadful grove, lines of British and German infantry held
each other in check, neither able to advance, because to do so was to
come under the murderous fire of the other. The Third Division, worn
as it was, was still hard at work, for to the south-west of Longueval
a long line of hostile trenches connected up with Guillemont, the
fortified farm of Waterlot in the middle of them. It was to these
lines that these battle-weary men were now turned. An attack was
pending upon Guillemont by the Thirtieth Division, and the object of
the Third Division was to cut the trench line to the east of the
village, and so help the attack. The advance was carried out with
great spirit upon July 22 by the 2nd Royal Scots, and though they
were unable to attain their full objective, they seized and
consolidated a post midway between Waterlot Farm and the railway,
driving back a German battalion which endeavoured to thrust them out.
On July 23 Guillemont was attacked by the 21st Brigade of the
Thirtieth Division. The right of the attack consisting of the 19th
Manchesters got into the village, but few got out again; and the left
made no progress, the 2nd Yorkshires losing direction to the east and
sweeping in upon the ground already held by the 2nd Royal Scots and
other battalions of the 8th Brigade. The resistance shown by
Guillemont proved that the siege of that village would be a serious
operation and that it was not to be carried {179} by the
_coup-de-main_ of a tired division, however valiantly urged. The
successive attempts to occupy it, culminating in complete success,
will be recorded at a later stage.
On the same date, July 23, another attempt was made by mixed
battalions of the Third Division upon Longueval. This was carried
out with the co-operation of the 95th Brigade, Fifth Division, upon
the left. The attack on the village itself from the south was held
up, and the battalions engaged, including the 1st Northumberland
Fusiliers, 12th West Yorkshires, and 13th King's Liverpools, all
endured considerable losses. Two battalions of the Thirty-fifth
Division (Bantams), the 17th Royal Scots and 17th West Yorks, took
part in this attack. There had been some movement all along the line
during that day from High Wood in the north-east to Guillemont in the
south-west; but nowhere was there any substantial progress. It was
clear that the enemy was holding hard to his present line, and that
very careful observation and renewed bombardment would be required
before the infantry could be expected to move him. Thus, the advance
of July 14, brilliant as it had been, had given less durable results
than had been hoped, for no further ground had been gained in a
week's fighting, while Longueval, which had been ours, had for a time
passed back to the enemy. No one, however, who had studied General
Haig's methods during the 1914 fighting at Ypres could, for a moment,
believe that he would be balked of his aims, and the sequel was to
show that he had lost none of the audacious tenacity which he had
shown on those fateful days, nor had his well-tried instrument of war
lost its power of fighting its way through a difficult {180}
position. The struggle at Longueval had been a desperate one, and
the German return upon July 18 was undoubtedly the most severe
reaction encountered by us during the whole of the Somme fighting;
and yet after the fluctuations which have been described it finished
with the position entirely in the hands of the British. On the days
which followed the attack of July 23 the Thirteenth Brigade of the
Fifth Division pushed its way gradually through the north end of the
village, the 1st Norfolks bearing the brunt of the fighting. They
were relieved on the 27th by the 95th Brigade, who took the final
posts on the north and east of the houses, the 1st East Surreys
holding the northern front. The 12th Gloucesters particularly
distinguished themselves on this occasion, holding on to three
outlying captured posts under a very heavy fire. The three isolated
platoons maintained themselves with great constancy, and were all
retrieved, though two out of three officers and the greater part of
the men were casualties. This battalion lost 320 men in these
operations, which were made more costly and difficult by the fact
that Longueval was so exaggerated a salient that it might more
properly be called a corner, the Germans directing their very
accurate fire from the intact tower of Ginchy Church.
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{181}
[Illustration: DELVILLE WOOD MAP]
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The Second Division had now been brought down to the Somme
battle-front, and upon July 26 they took over from the Third Division
in the area of Delville Wood. So complicated was the position at the
point occupied, that one officer has described his company as being
under fire from the north, south, east, and west, the latter being
presumably due to the fact that the distant fire of the {182} British
heavies fell occasionally among the front line infantry. At seven in
the morning of July 27 the 99th Brigade, now attached to the Second
Division, was ordered to improve our position in the wood, and made a
determined advance with the 1st Rifles upon the right, and the 23rd
Fusiliers upon the left, the 1st Berkshires and 22nd Royal Fusiliers
being in support. Moving forward behind a strong barrage, the two
battalions were able with moderate loss to force their way up to the
line of Princes Street, and to make good this advanced position. A
trench full of dead or wounded Germans with two splintered
machine-guns showed that the artillery had found its mark, and many
more were shot down as they retired to their further trenches. The
1st Berkshires held a defensive flank upon the right, but German
bombers swarmed in between them and the Rifles, developing a
dangerous counter-attack, which was finally beaten off after a sharp
fight, in which Captain Howell of the latter battalion was mortally
wounded after organising a splendid defence, in which he was greatly
helped by a sergeant. At 11 o'clock the left flank of the advance
was also very heavily attacked at short range, and the two companies
of the Rifles on that side were in sore straits until reinforced by
bombers from the 23rd Fusiliers, and also by the whole of the 22nd
Fusiliers. The German barrage fell thickly behind the British
advance, and it was a difficult and costly matter to send forward the
necessary supports, but before evening part of the 17th Fusiliers and
of the 17th Middlesex from the 5th Brigade had pushed forward and
relieved the exhausted front line. It was a most notable advance and
a heroic subsequent defence, with some of the {183} stiffest fighting
that even Delville Wood had ever witnessed. The East Anglian Field
Company Royal Engineers consolidated the line taken. The 1st Rifles,
upon whom the greater part of the pressure had fallen, lost 14
officers, including their excellent adjutant, Captain Brocklehurst,
and more than 300 men. The immediate conduct of the local operations
depended upon the colonel of this battalion. The great result of the
fight was that Delville Wood was now in British hands, from which it
never again reverted. It is a name which will ever remain as a
symbol of tragic glory in the records of the Ninth, the Third, the
Eighteenth, and finally of the Second Divisions. Nowhere in all this
desperate war did the British bulldog and the German wolf-hound meet
in a more prolonged and fearful grapple. It should not be forgotten
in our military annals that though the 99th Brigade actually captured
the wood, their work would have been impossible had it not been for
the fine advance of the 95th Brigade of the Fifth Division already
recorded upon their Longueval flank.
We shall now turn our attention to what had been going on in the
extreme right-hand part of the line, where in conjunction with the
French three of our divisions, the 55th Lancashire Territorials, the
35th Bantams, and the hard-worked 30th, had been attacking with no
great success the strong German line which lay in front of us after
the capture of Trones Wood. The centre of this defence was the
village of Guillemont, which, as already mentioned, had been
unsuccessfully attacked by the 21st Brigade upon July 23. About this
date the Thirty-sixth Bantam Division had a repulse at the Malzhorn
Farm {184} to the south of Guillemont, both the 104th and 105th
Brigades being hard hit, and many of the brave little men being left
in front of the German machine-guns. A week later a much more
elaborate attack was made upon it by the rest of the Thirtieth
Division, strengthened by one brigade (the 106th) of the Thirty-fifth
Division. This attack was carried out in co-operation with an
advance of the Second Division upon Guillemont Station to the left of
the village, and an advance of the French upon the right at Falfemont
and Malzhorn.
The frontal advance upon Guillemont from the Trones Wood direction
appears to have been about as difficult an operation as could be
conceived in modern warfare. Everything helped the defence and
nothing the attack. The approach was a glacis 700 yards in width,
which was absolutely commanded by the guns in the village, and also
by those placed obliquely to north and south. There was no cover of
any kind. Prudence would no doubt have suggested that we should make
good in the north at Longueval and thus outflank the whole German
line of defence. It was essential, however, to fit our plans in with
those of the French, and it was understood that those were such as to
demand a very special, and if needs be, a self-immolating effort upon
the right of the line.
The attack had been arranged for the morning of July 30, and it was
carried out in spite of the fact that during the first few hours the
fog was so dense that it was hard to see more than a few yards. This
made the keeping of direction across so broad a space as 700 yards
very difficult; while on the right, where the advance was for more
than a mile and had to be co-ordinated with the troops of our Allies,
it was so {185} complex a matter that there was considerable danger
at one time that the fight in this quarter would resolve itself into
a duel between the right of the British Thirtieth and the left of the
French Thirty-ninth Division.
The 89th Brigade advanced upon the right and the 90th upon the left,
the latter being directed straight for the village. The two leading
battalions, the 2nd Scots Fusiliers and the 18th Manchesters, reached
it and established themselves firmly in its western suburbs; but the
German barrage fell so thickly behind them that neither help nor
munitions could reach them. Lieutenant Murray, who was sent back to
report their critical situation, found Germans wandering about behind
the line, and was compelled to shoot several in making his way
through. He carried the news that the attack of the Second Division
upon the station had apparently failed, that the machine-gun fire
from the north was deadly, and that both battalions were in peril.
The Scots had captured 50 and the Manchesters 100 prisoners, but they
were penned in and unable to get on. Two companies of the 17th
Manchesters made their way with heavy loss through the fatal barrage,
but failed to alleviate the situation. It would appear that in the
fog the Scots were entirely surrounded, and that they fought, as is
their wont, while a cartridge lasted. Their last message was, that
their ranks and munition supply were both thin, their front line
broken, the shelling hard, and the situation critical. None of these
men ever returned, and the only survivors of this battalion of
splendid memories were the wounded in No Man's Land and the
Headquarter Staff. It was the second time that the 2nd Royal Scots
Fusiliers {186} had fought to the last man in this war. Of the 18th
Manchesters few returned, and two companies of the 16th Manchesters
were not more fortunate. They got into the village on the extreme
north, and found themselves in touch with the 17th Royal Fusiliers of
the Second Division; but neither battalion could make good its
position. It was one of the tragic episodes of the great Somme
battle.
The 89th Brigade upon their right had troubles of their own, but they
were less formidable than those of their comrades. As already
described, they had the greatest difficulty in finding their true
position amid the fog. Their action began successfully by a company
of the 2nd Bedfords, together with a French company, rushing an
isolated German trench and killing 70 men who occupied it. This was
a small detached operation, for the front line of the advancing
brigade was formed by the 19th Manchesters on the left, and by the
20th on the right, the latter in touch with the French 153rd of the
line. The 19th reached the south-eastern corner of Guillemont,
failed to get in touch with the Scots Fusiliers, and found both its
flanks in the air. It had eventually to fall back, having lost Major
Rolls, its commander, and many officers and men. The 20th
Manchesters advanced upon the German Malzhorn Trenches and carried
the front one, killing many of the occupants. In going forward from
this point they lost 200 of their number while passing down a
bullet-swept slope. Three out of four company commanders had fallen.
Beyond the slope was a sunken road, and at this point a young
lieutenant, Musker, found himself in command with mixed men from
three battalions under his orders. Twelve runners sent back with
messages were all shot, {187} which will give some idea of the
severity of the barrage. Musker showed good powers of leadership,
and consolidated his position in the road, but was unfortunately
killed, the command then devolving upon a sub-lieutenant. The
Bedfords came up to reinforce, and some permanent advance was
established in this quarter--all that was gained by this very
sanguinary engagement, which cost about 3000 men. The Bantams lost
heavily also in this action though they only played the humble role
of carriers to the storming brigades.
The whole of the fighting chronicled in this chapter may be taken as
an aftermath of the action of July 14, and as an endeavour upon our
part to enlarge our gains and upon the part of the Germans to push us
out from what we had won. The encroachment upon High Wood upon the
left, the desperate defence and final clearing of Delville Wood in
the centre, and the attempt to drive the Germans from Guillemont upon
the right--an attempt which was brought later to a successful
conclusion--are all part of one system of operations designed for the
one end.
It should be remarked that during all this fighting upon the Somme
continual demonstrations, amounting in some cases to small battles,
occurred along the northern line to keep the Germans employed. The
most serious of these occurred in the Eleventh Corps district near
Fromelles, opposite the Aubers Ridge. Here the Second Australians
upon the left, and the Sixty-first British Division upon the right, a
unit of second-line Territorial battalions, largely from the West
country, made a most gallant attack and carried the German line for a
time, but were compelled, upon July 20, the day following the attack,
{188} to fall back once more, as the gun positions upon the Aubers
Ridge commanded the newly-taken trenches. It was particularly hard
upon the Australians, whose grip upon the German position was firm,
while the two brigades of the Sixty-first, though they behaved with
great gallantry, had been less successful in the assault.
{189}