On the 11th of June the case of Sally Miller _versus_ Louis Belmonti was
called up again and the report of the medical experts received. Could
anything be offered by Mr. Grymes and his associates to offset that? Yes;
they had one last strong card, and now they played it.
It was, first, a certificate of baptism of a certain Mary's child John,
offered in evidence to prove that this child was born at a time when
Salome Müller, according to the testimony of her own kindred, was too
young by a year or two to become a mother; and secondly, the testimony of
a free woman of color, that to her knowledge that Mary was this Bridget or
Sally, and the child John this woman's eldest son Lafayette. And hereupon
the court announced that on the morrow it would hear the argument of
counsel.
Salome's counsel besought the court for a temporary postponement on two
accounts: first, that her age might be known beyond a peradventure by
procuring a copy of her own birth record from the official register of her
native Langensoultz, and also to procure in New Orleans the testimony of
one who was professionally present at the birth of her son, and who would
swear that it occurred some years later than the date of the baptismal
record just accepted as evidence.
"We are taken by surprise," exclaimed in effect Roselius and his
coadjutors, "in the production of testimony by the opposing counsel openly
at variance with earlier evidence accepted from them and on record. The
act of the sale of this woman and her children from Sarah Canby to John
Fitz Miller in 1835, her son Lafayette being therein described as but five
years of age, fixes his birth by irresistible inference in 1830, in which
year by the recorded testimony of her kindred Salome Müller was fifteen
years old."
But the combined efforts of Roselius, Upton, and others were unavailing,
and the newspapers of the following day reported: "This cause, continued
from yesterday, came on again to-day, when, after hearing arguments of
counsel, the court took the same under consideration."
It must be a dull fancy that will not draw for itself the picture, when a
fortnight later the frequenters of the court-room hear the word of
judgment. It is near the end of the hot far-southern June. The judge
begins to read aloud. His hearers wait languidly through the prolonged
recital of the history of the case. It is as we have given it here: no use
has been made here of any testimony discredited in the judge's reasons for
his decision. At length the evidence is summed up and every one attends to
catch the next word. The judge reads:
"The supposed identity is based upon two circumstances: first, a striking
resemblance of plaintiff to the child above mentioned and to the family of
that child. Second, two certain marks or moles on the inside of the thighs
[one on each thigh], which marks are similar in the child and in the
woman. This resemblance and these marks are proved by several witnesses.
Are they sufficient to justify me in declaring the plaintiff to be
identical with the German child in question? I answer this question in the
negative."
What stir there was in the room when these words were heard the silent
records lying before me do not tell, or whether all was silent while the
judge read on; but by and by his words were these:
"I must admit that the relatives of the said family of redemptioners seem
to be very firmly convinced of the identity which the plaintiff claims....
As, however, it is quite out of the question to take away a man's property
upon grounds of this sort, I would suggest that the friends of the
plaintiff, if honestly convinced of the justice of her pretensions, should
make some effort to settle _à l'aimable_ with the defendant, who has
honestly and fairly paid his money for her. They would doubtless find him
well disposed to part on reasonable terms with a slave from whom he can
scarcely expect any service after what has passed. Judgment dismissing the
suit with costs."
The white slave was still a slave. We are left to imagine the quiet air of
dispatch with which as many of the counsel as were present gathered up any
papers they may have had, exchanged a few murmurous words with their
clients, and, hats in hand, hurried off and out to other business. Also
the silent, slow dejection of Salome, Eva, Frank, and their neighbors and
kin--if so be, that they were there--as they rose and left the hall where
a man's property was more sacred than a woman's freedom. But the attorney
had given them ground of hope. Application would be made for a new trial;
and if this was refused, as it probably would be, then appeal would be
made to the Supreme Court of the State.
So it happened. Only two days later the plaintiff, through one of her
counsel, the brother of Frank Upton, applied for a new trial. She stated
that important evidence not earlier obtainable had come to light; that she
could produce a witness to prove that John F. Miller had repeatedly said
she was white; and that one of Miller's own late witnesses, his own
brother-in-law, would make deposition of the fact, recollected only since
he gave testimony, that the girl Bridget brought into Miller's household
in 1822 was much darker than the plaintiff and died a few years
afterwards. And this witness did actually make such deposition. In the six
months through which the suit had dragged since Salome had made her first
petition to the court and signed it with her mark she had learned to
write. The application for a new trial is signed--
[Illustration: signature]
The new trial was refused. Roselius took an appeal. The judge "allowed"
it, fixing the amount of Salome's bond at $2000. Frank Schuber gave the
bond and the case went up to the Supreme Court.
In that court no witnesses were likely to be examined. New testimony was
not admissible; all testimony taken in the inferior courts "went up" by
the request of either party as part of the record, and to it no addition
could ordinarily be made. The case would be ready for argument almost at
once.