towards the success of the affair, and you will, on his
part, invite the Patriots to communicate to him their views,
their plans, and their discontents. You may assure them,
that the King takes a real interest in themselves, as well
as their cause, and that they may rely upon his protection.
On this they may place the greater dependence, as we do not
conceal, that if the Stadtholder resumes his former
influence, the English system will soon prevail, and our
alliance become a mere affair of the imagination. The
Patriots will readily feel, that this position would be
incompatible both with the dignity and consideration of his
Majesty. But in case the chief of the Patriots should have
to fear a division, they would have time sufficient to
reclaim those whom the Anglomaniacs had misled, and to
prepare matters in such a manner, that the question when
again agitated, might be decided according to their wishes.
In such a hypothetical case, the King authorizes you to act
in concert with them, to pursue the direction which they may
think proper to give you, and to employ every means to
augment the number of the partisans of the good cause. It
remains for me to speak of the personal security of the
Patriots. You may assure them, that under every
circumstance, the King will take them under his immediate
protection, and you will make known wherever you may judge
necessary, that his Majesty will regard, as a personal
offence, every undertaking against their libeity. It is to
be presumed that this language, energetically maintained,
may have some effect on the audacity of the Anglomaniacs,
and that the Prince de Nassau will feel that he runs some
risk in provoking the resentment of his Majesty.’]
This letter was communicated by the Patriots to me, when at Amsterdam,
in 1788, and a copy sent by me to Mr. Jay, in my letter to him of March
16, 1788.
The object of the Patriots was, to establish a representative and
republican government. The majority of the States General were with
them, but the majority of the populace of the towns was with the Prince
of Orange; and that populace was played off with great effect by the
triumvirate of * * * Harris, the English Ambassador, afterwards Lord
Malmesbury, the Prince of Orange, a stupid man, and the Princess, as
much a man as either of her colleagues, in audaciousness, in enterprise,
and in the thirst of domination. By these, the mobs of the Hague were
excited against the members of the States General; their persons were
insulted, and endangered in the streets; the sanctuary of their houses
was violated; and the Prince, whose function and duty it was to repress
and punish these violations of order, took no steps for that purpose.
The States General, for their own protection, were therefore obliged to
place their militia under the command of a Committee. The Prince filled
the courts of London and Berlin with complaints at this usurpation of
his prerogatives, and, forgetting that he was but the first servant of a
Republic, marched his regular troops against the city of Utrecht, where
the States were in session. They were repulsed by the militia. His
interests now became marshaled with those of the public enemy, and
against his own country. The States, therefore, exercising their rights
of sovereignty, deprived him of all his powers. The great Frederic
had died in August, ‘86. He had never intended to break with France in
support of the Prince of Orange. During the illness of which he died,
he had, through the Duke of Brunswick, declared to the Marquis de
la Fayette, who was then at Berlin, that he meant not to support the
English interest in Holland: that he might assure the government of
France, his only wish was, that some honorable place in the Constitution
should be reserved for the Stadtholder and his children, and that he
would take no part in the quarrel, unless an entire abolition of the
Stadtholderate should be attempted. But his place was now occupied by
Frederic William, his great nephew, a man of little understanding, much
caprice, and very inconsiderate: and the Princess, his sister, although
her husband was in arms against the legitimate authorities of the
country, attempting to go to Amsterdam, for the purpose of exciting the
mobs of that place, and being refused permission to pass a military post
on the way, he put the Duke of Brunswick at the head of twenty thousand
men, and made demonstrations of marching on Holland. The King of France
hereupon declared, by his Chargé des Affaires in Holland, that if
the Prussian troops continued to menace Holland with an invasion, his
Majesty, in quality of Ally, was determined to succor that province. In
answer to this, Eden gave official information to Count Montmorin, that
England must consider as at an end, its convention with France relative
to giving notice of its naval armaments, and that she was arming
generally. War being now imminent, Eden, since Lord Aukland, questioned
me on the effect of our treaty with France, in the case of a war,
and what might be our dispositions. I told him frankly, and without
hesitation, that our dispositions would be neutral, and that I thought
it would be the interest of both these powers that we should be so;
because, it would relieve both from all anxiety as to feeding their West
India islands; that, England, too, by suffering us to remain so, would
avoid a heavy land war on our Continent, which might very much cripple
her proceedings elsewhere; that our treaty, indeed, obliged us to
receive into our ports the armed vessels of France, with their prizes,
and to refuse admission to the prizes made on her by her enemies: that
there was a clause, also, by which we guaranteed to France her American
possessions, which might perhaps force us into the war, if these were
attacked. ‘Then it will be war,’ said he, ‘for they will assuredly
be attacked.’ Liston, at Madrid, about the same time, made the same
enquiries of Carmichael. The government of France then declared a
determination to form a camp of observation at Givet, commenced arming
her marine, and named the Bailli de Suffrein their Generalissimo on the
Ocean. She secretly engaged, also, in negotiations with Russia, Austria,
and Spain, to form a quadruple alliance. The Duke of Brunswick having
advanced to the confines of Holland, sent some of his officers to Givet,
to reconnoitre the state of things there, and report them to him. He
said afterwards, that ‘if there, had been only a few tents at that
place, he should not have advanced further, for that the king would not,
merely for the interest of his sister, engage in a war with France.’
But, finding that there was not a single company there, he boldly
entered the country, took their towns as fast as he presented himself
before them, and advanced on Utrecht. The States had appointed the
Rhingrave of Salm their Commander in chief; a Prince without talents,
without courage, and without principle. He might have held out in
Utrecht, for a considerable time, but he surrendered the place without
firing a gun, literally ran away and hid himself, so that for months it
was not known what was become of him. Amsterdam was then attacked,
and capitulated. In the mean time, the negotiations for the quadruple
alliance were proceeding favorably; but the secrecy with which they were
attempted to be conducted, was penetrated by Fraser, Chargé des Affaires
of England at St. Petersburg, who instantly notified his court, and gave
the alarm to Prussia. The King saw at once what would be his situation,
between the jaws of France, Austria, and Russia. In great dismay, he
besought the court of London not to abandon him, sent Alvensleben to
Paris to explain and soothe; and England, through the Duke of Dorset
and Eden, renewed her conferences for accommodation. The Archbishop,
who shuddered at the idea of war, and preferred a peaceful surrender
of right, to an armed vindication of it, received them with open
arms, entered into cordial conferences, and a declaration, and
counter-declaration, were cooked up at Versailles, and sent to London
for approbation. They were approved there, reached Paris at one o’clock
of the 27th, and were signed that night at Versailles. It was said and
believed at Paris, that M. de Montrnorin, literally ‘pleuroit cotnrae
un enfant,’ when obliged to sign this counter-declaration; so distressed
was he by the dishonor of sacrificing the Patriots, after assurances so
solemn of protection, and absolute encouragement to proceed. The Prince
of Orange was reinstated in all his powers, now become regal. A great
emigration of the Patriots took place; all were deprived of office, many
exiled, and their property confiscated. They were received in France,
and subsisted, for some time, on her bounty. Thus fell Holland, by the
treachery of her Chief, from her honorable independence, to become
a province of England; and so, also, her Stadtholder, from the high
station of the first citizen of a free Republic, to be the servile
Viceroy of a foreign Sovereign. And this was effected by a mere scene of
bullying and demonstration; not one of the parties, France, England,
or Prussia, having ever really meant to encounter actual war for the
interest of the Prince of Orange. But it had all the effect of a real
and decisive war.
Our first essay, in America, to establish a federative government
had fallen, on trial, very short of its object. During the war of
Independence, while the pressure of an external enemy hooped us
together, and their enterprises kept us necessarily on the alert,
the spirit of the people, excited by danger, was a supplement to the
Confederation, and urged them to zealous exertions, whether claimed by
that instrument or not; but, when peace and safety were restored, and
every man became engaged in useful and profitable occupation, less
attention was paid to the calls of Congress. The fundamental defect
of the Confederation was, that Congress was not authorized to act
immediately on the people, and by its own officers. Their power was
only requisitory, and these requisitions were addressed to the several
Legislatures, to be by them carried into execution, without other
coercion than the moral principle of duty. This allowed, in fact, a
negative to every legislature, on every measure proposed by Congress; a
negative so frequently exercised in practice, as to benumb the action
of the Federal government, and to render it inefficient in its general
objects, and more especially in pecuniary and foreign concerns. The
want, too, of a separation of the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary
functions, worked disadvantageously in practice. Yet this state of
things afforded a happy augury of the future march of our Confederacy,
when it was seen that the good sense and good dispositions of the
people, as soon as they perceived the incompetence of their first
compact, instead of leaving its correction to insurrection and civil
war, agreed, with one voice, to elect deputies to a general Convention,
who should peaceably meet and agree on such a Constitution as ‘would
ensure peace, justice, liberty, the common defence, and general
welfare.’
This Convention met at Philadelphia on the 25th of May, ‘87. It sat with
closed doors, and kept all its proceedings secret, until its dissolution
on the 17th of September, when the results of its labors were published
all together. I received a copy, early in November, and read and
contemplated its provisions with great satisfaction. As not a member of
the Convention, however, nor probably a single citizen of the Union, had
approved it in all its parts, so I, too, found articles which I thought
objectionable. The absence of express declarations ensuring freedom
of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of the person under the
uninterrupted protection of the _habeas corpus_ and trial by jury
in civil, as well as in criminal cases, excited my jealousy; and
the re-eligibility of the President for life, I quite disapproved. I
expressed freely, in letters to my friends, and most particularly to Mr.
Madison and General Washington, my approbations and objections. How
the good should be secured, and the ill brought to rights, was the
difficulty. To refer it back to a new Convention, might endanger the
loss of the whole. My first idea was, that the nine states first acting,
should accept it unconditionally, and thus secure what in it was good,
and that the four last should accept on the previous condition, that
certain amendments should be agreed to; but a better course was devised,
of accepting the whole, and trusting that the good sense and honest
intentions of our citizens would make the alterations which should be
deemed necessary. Accordingly, all accepted, six without objection, and
seven with recommendations of specified amendments. Those respecting the
press, religion, and juries, with several others, of great value, were
accordingly made; but the _habeas corpus_ was left to the discretion of
Congress, and the amendment against the re-eligibility of the President
was not proposed. My fears of that feature were founded on the
importance of the office, on the fierce contentions it might
excite among ourselves, if continuable for life, and the dangers of
interference, either with money or arms, by foreign nations, to whom the
choice of an American President might become interesting. Examples
of this abounded in history; in the case of the Roman Emperors, for
instance; of the Popes, while of any significance; of the German
Emperors; the Kings of Poland, and the Deys of Barbary. I had observed,
too, in the feudal history, and in the recent instance, particularly,
of the Stadtholder of Holland, how easily offices, or tenures for life,
slide into inheritances. My wish, therefore, was that the President
should be elected for seven years, and be ineligible afterwards. This
term I thought sufficient to enable him, with the concurrence of the
Legislature, to carry though and establish any system of improvement he
should propose for the general good. But the practice adopted, I think,
is better, allowing his continuance for eight years, with a liability to
be dropped at half way of the term, making that a period of probation.
That his continuance should be restrained to seven years, was the
opinion of the Convention at an earlier stage of its session, when it
voted that term, by a majority of eight against two, and by a simple
majority, that he should be ineligible a second time. This opinion was
confirmed by the House so late as July 26, referred to the Committee of
detail, reported favorably by them, and changed to the present form by
final vote, on the last day, but one only, of their session. Of this
change, three states expressed their disapprobation; New York, by
recommending an amendment, that the President should not be eligible
a third time, and Virginia and North Carolina, that he should not be
capable of serving more than eight, in any term of sixteen years; and
although this amendment has not been made in form, yet practice seems
to have established it. The example of four Presidents, voluntarily
retiring at the end of their eighth year, and the progress of public
opinion, that the principle is salutary, have given it in practice the
force of precedent and usage; insomuch, that should a President consent
to be a candidate for a third election, I trust he would be rejected, on
this demonstration of ambitious views.
But there was another amendment, of which none of us thought at the
time, and in the omission of which, lurks the germ that is to destroy
this happy combination of National powers, in the general government,
for matters of National concern, and independent powers in the States,
for what concerns the States severally. In England, it was a great point
gained at the Revolution, that the commissions of the Judges, which had
hitherto been during pleasure, should thenceforth be made during good
behavior. A Judiciary, dependant on the will of the King, had proved
itself the most oppressive of all tools in the hands of that magistrate.
Nothing, then, could be more salutary, than a change there, to the
tenure of good behavior; and the question of good behavior, left to the
vote of a simple majority in the two Houses of Parliament. Before
the Revolution, we were all good English Whigs, cordial in their free
principles, and in their jealousies of their Executive magistrate. These
jealousies are very apparent, in all our state Constitutions; and, in
the General government in this instance, we have gone even beyond
the English caution, by requiring a vote of two thirds, in one of the
Houses, for removing a Judge; a vote so impossible, where * any defence
is made, before men of ordinary prejudices and passions, that our Judges
are effectually independent of the nation. But this ought not to be. I
would not, indeed, make them dependant on the Executive authority,
as they formerly were in England; but I deem it indispensable to the
continuance of this government, that they should be submitted to some
practical and impartial control; and that this, to be impartial, must
be compounded of a mixture of State and Federal authorities. It is not
enough, that honest men are appointed Judges. All know the influence
of interest on the mind of man, and how unconsciously his judgment
is warped by that influence. To this bias add that of the _esprit de
corps_, of their peculiar maxim and creed, that ‘it is the office of
a good Judge to enlarge his jurisdiction,’ and the absence of
responsibility; and how can we expect impartial decision between the
General government, of which they are themselves so eminent a part, and
an individual state, from which they have nothing to hope or fear? We
have seen, too, that, contrary to all correct example, they are in
the habit of going out of the question before them, to throw an anchor
ahead, and grapple further hold for future advances of power. They are
then, in fact, the corps of sappers and miners, steadily working to
undermine the independent rights of the states, and to consolidate all
power in the hands of that government, in which they have so important a
freehold estate. But it is not by the consolidation, or concentration
of powers, but by their distribution, that good government is effected.
Were not this great country already divided into states, that division
must be made, that each might do for itself what concerns itself
directly, and what it can so much better do than a distant authority.
Every state again is divided into counties, each to take care of what
lies within its local bounds; each county again into townships or wards,
to manage minuter details; and every ward into farms, to be governed
each by its individual proprietor. Were we directed from Washington
when to sow, and when to reap, we should soon want bread. It is by this
partition of cares, descending in gradation from general to particular,
that the mass of human affairs may be best managed, for the good and
prosperity of all. I repeat, that I do not charge the judges with wilful
and ill-intentioned error; but honest error must be arrested, where
its toleration leads to public ruin. As, for the safety of society,
we commit honest maniacs to Bedlam, so judges should be withdrawn from
their bench, whose erroneous biases are leading us to dissolution.
It may, indeed, injure them in fame or in fortune; but it saves the
Republic, which is the first and supreme law.
* In the impeachment of Judge Pickering, of New Hampshire, a
habitual and maniac drunkard, no defence was made. Had there
been, the party vote of more than one third of the Senate
would have acquitted him.
Among the debilities of the government of the Confederation, no one was
more distinguished or more distressing, than the utter impossibility
of obtaining, from the States, the monies necessary for the payment
of debts, or even for the ordinary expenses of the government. Some
contributed a little, some less, and some nothing; and the last,
furnished at length an excuse for the first, to do nothing also. Mr.
Adams, while residing at the Hague, had a general authority to borrow
what sums might be requisite, for ordinary and necessary expenses.
Interest on the public debt, and the maintenance of the diplomatic
establishment in Europe, had been habitually provided in this way. He
was now elected Vice-President of the United States, was soon to return
to America, and had referred our bankers to me for future counsel, on
our affairs in their hands. But I had no powers, no instructions,
no means, and no familiarity with the subject. It had always been
exclusively under his management, except as to occasional and partial
deposites in the hands of Mr. Grand, banker in Paris, for special and
local purposes. These last had been exhausted for some time, and I
had fervently pressed the Treasury board to replenish this particular
deposite, as Mr. Grand now refused to make further advances. They
answered candidly, that no funds could be obtained until the
new government should get into action, and have time to make its
arrangements. Mr. Adams had received his appointment to the court of
London, while engaged at Paris, with Dr. Franklin and myself, in the
negotiations under our joint commissions. He had repaired thence
to London, without returning to the Hague, to take leave of that
government. He thought it necessary, however, to do so now, before he
should leave Europe, and accordingly went there. I learned his departure
from London, by a letter from Mrs. Adams, received on the very day on
which he would arrive at the Hague. A consultation with him, and some
provision for the future, was indispensable, while we could yet avail
ourselves of his powers; for when they would be gone, we should be
without resource. I was daily dunned by a Company who had formerly made
a small loan to the United States, the principal of which was now become
due; and our bankers in Amsterdam had notified me, that the interest on
our general debt would be expected in June; that if we failed to pay it,
it would be deemed an act of bankruptcy, and would effectually destroy
the credit of the Upited States, and all future prospects of obtaining
money there; that the loan they had been authorized to open, of which
a third only was filled, had now ceased to get forward, and rendered
desperate that hope of resource. I saw that there was not a moment to
lose, and set out for the Hague on the 2nd morning after receiving the
information of Mr. Adams’s journey. I went the direct road by Louvres,
Senlis, Roye, Pont St. Maxence, Bois le Due, Gournay, Peronne, Cambray,
Bouchain, Valenciennes, Mons, Bruxelles, Malines, Antwerp, Mordick, and
Rotterdam, to the Hague, where I happily found Mr. Adams. He concurred
with me at once in opinion, that something must be done, and that we
ought to risk ourselves on doing it without instructions, to save the
credit of the United States. We foresaw, that before the new government
could be adopted, assembled, establish its financial system, get the
money into the Treasury, and place it in Europe, considerable time would
elapse; that, therefore, we had better provide at once for the years
‘88, ‘89, and ‘90, in order to place our government at its ease, and our
credit in security, during that trying interval. We set out, therefore,
by the way of Leyden, for Amsterdam, where we arrived on the 10th, I had
prepared an estimate, showing, that
[Illustration: Financial Projection, American Embassy Paris, page068]
Florins.
There would be necessary for the year ‘88--531,937-10 ‘89--538,540
‘90--473,540 -------------------- Total, 1,544,017-10
Florins.
To meet this, the bankers had in hand, 79,268-2-8 and the unsold bonds
would yield, 542,800
622,068-2-8
Leaving a deficit of 921,949-7-4
We proposed then to borrow a million, yielding 920,000
Which would leave a small deficiency of 1,949-7-4