The Supreme Council, in the course of one of its last sittings,
decided in January, 1920, practically to recognise the independence of
Georgia,[44] Azerbaïjan, and Armenia.
It is deeply to be regretted that this decision came so late, for,
considering the circumstances under which it was taken, it seemed to
have been resorted to _in extremis_ and under the Bolshevist threat.
It was even announced, then denied, that the Allies were going to send
contingents to the Caucasus in order to check the Bolshevist advance
towards Armenia, Turkey, Persia, and possibly towards Mesopotamia and
India. But under the present circumstances, the Allies were not likely
now to get all the benefit they might have derived from this measure if
it had been taken long ago; and, on the other hand, this measure was
not likely to produce any effect if the new States were not recognised
definitely and could not rely on the Allies’ moral and material support.
Since Georgia, Azerbaïjan, and Armenia seemed to have been recognised
as independent States, in order to incite them to check the Reds’
advance, how was it that the Republic of Northern Caucasus had not been
treated similarly? The reason given by the Supreme Council was that, as
the greater part of this State was occupied by Denikin’s forces, it did
not think it proper to take a decision about it. The true reason was
that the Supreme Council wanted to favour the Pan-Russian general, and
it was even rumoured that Koltchak and Denikin had demanded this rich
country to be set aside for the Tsar, whom they wanted to restore to
the throne.
Out of the 25 or 30 million Moslems living in the whole of Russia, 6
or 8 millions were scattered in the region of the Volga (Orenburg,
Kazan) and in the Crimea; they were about 6 millions in Turkistan
and 7 millions in the Caucasus region; about 2 millions in Northern
Caucasus, 300,000 to 500,000 in Kuban, 600,000 in Georgia, 3,500,000 in
Azerbaïjan. Half the population is Moslem in the new Armenian State,
for only in two districts are the Armenians in a majority, the Tatars
being in a majority in the others. It should be borne in mind that all
these Moslems, after the downfall of Tsardom, had turned their hopes
towards the Allies, especially England, to safeguard their political
independence. Unfortunately neither Great Britain nor France paid any
heed to the repeated entreaties of M. Haidar Bammate, then Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Northern Caucasus, or later on to
the appeals of the Georgian statesmen.
This omission appears all the more unaccountable if we remember
that the Allies, by settling the fate of Armenia on this occasion,
encroached upon the Turkish question and confused it with the Russian
question, which was already intricate enough; and as it is clear that
another obvious reason for the Allies’ decision was to befriend the
Moslem populations of those regions, that they might not join the
Bolshevist cause, why then had Christian Armenia been included in the
aforesaid settlement, while Northern Caucasus had been excluded from
it? Of course, it is not to be regretted that Armenia benefited by the
Allies’ decision, but it is impossible logically to explain how it came
to be included in their measure on account of its close relations with
Georgia and Azerbaïjan, when, as a matter of fact, the latter republics
want to form a close union with Caucasus. It was quite as urgent,
therefore, to recognise the Republic of Northern Caucasus as the other
three countries.
Moreover, as the Allies wanted to keep Bolshevism out of Transcaucasia,
it seemed obvious that their first measure, from a military point of
view, should have been to hold a strong position in the Caucasus Range,
whose slopes were being lapped by the Red tide, and to organise its
defence.
Indeed, the key to the defence of Transcaucasia lies to the north of
the Caucasus Range. Four passes, crossing the mountains from the north
to the south, give access to it: the defile of Sukhum; the road leading
from Alatyr to Kutaris; the Georgian military road from Vladikavkaz to
Tiflis; lastly, the gates of Derbent, along the Caspian Sea. Only the
first of these defiles was held by the Georgians; the other three were
in the hands of the mountaineers, “the Gortsy”—viz., the Chechens, the
Ossetes, the Ingushes, the Kabardians, and the Daghestanians, who make
up the Republic of Northern Caucasus. It was easy for the mountaineers
to set up a first line of defence on the Rivers Terek and Malka, which
constitute a good strategic position, a second line before the defiles,
and, should some detachments venture across the latter, they would be
quickly stopped by the mountaineers. If, on the contrary, nothing was
done, the Bolshevists could easily cross the defiles and destroy the
Batum-Baku railway. These tribes, who had displayed so much energy
sixty years ago for the conquest of their liberty, had fought against
the Bolshevists from November, 1917, till February, 1919; so they had a
right to expect the Allies would support their claims.
Unfortunately, French policy resorted again to the same manœuvre to
which it was indebted for its failure on the Baltic coast, and which
repeatedly deferred a solution of the Russian question. For the Allies
refused to settle the condition of the Baltic States definitely, and
even tried to restore Russia to its former state; they even urged the
Baltic States, till Yudenitch, Denikin, and Koltchak had been defeated,
to carry on the onerous struggle they had undertaken and to make all
sacrifices of men and money to capture Petrograd, which they were not
eager to do, as they would have merely paved the way to the coming of
the Pan-Russian generals.
The Allies made a similar mistake when they indirectly asked the
mountaineers of Caucasus, who wanted to be independent, to attack the
Bolshevists, but gave them no guarantee they would recognise their
independence. Of course, the mountaineers refused to play such a part,
for they risked finding themselves confronted one day or another with a
Russia that would despise their national aspirations and would oppress
them.
The situation could have been saved and the balance between the States
on the confines of the Russian Empire could have been restored only
by a close understanding of all the Caucasian peoples, after their
independence should have been recognised; the representatives of
Georgia and Azerbaïjan agreed on this point with the representatives
of Northern Caucasus, and these peoples were ready to help each other
mutually.
In the course of the last sitting of the Supreme Council to which
the delegates of Georgia and Azerbaïjan had been invited, the latter
declared “that the mountaineers were brave, that they had constituted
some of the best units of the former Russian army, and were bent upon
stopping the Bolshevists, but they lacked arms and ammunition.”
Under such circumstances it seemed the Allies could not possibly ignore
these peoples’ determination and turn a deaf ear to their earnest
request, yet they took no decision.
With regard to the Moslem question this attitude of the Conference,
which seemed bent upon ignoring Northern Caucasus, was equally
strange, for it was bound to bring about discontent among these Moslem
populations. It was the more unaccountable as the Bolshevists, who set
up as protectors of these populations, had sent many emissaries among
them, who could not but derive profit from the Allies’ attitude. The
Bolshevists had, of course, immediately recognised Daghestan a Moslem
State.
Nor had the Republic of Northern Caucasus any reason to be satisfied
with the attitude assumed by the British mission sent to Baku, for
this mission had constantly supported General Denikin, and seemed to
endeavour to destroy the economic and political Caucasian union it had
formed with Georgia and Azerbaïjan. The only theory which accounts for
the British attitude is that the English meant to remain masters of
Baku, and to leave the Russians the oil-field of Groznyi in Northern
Caucasus, the output of which was already important before the war, and
would certainly increase. But they were mistaken in thinking that the
petroleum of Groznyi, which was partly used as fuel by the Vladikavkaz
railway and partly sent to the Black Sea ports to be sold to Western
Europe, was utilised in Central Russia; it is chiefly the petroleum of
the Baku area, lying farther south, which is easily conveyed to Russia
across the Caspian Sea and up the Volga.
Again, the Allies ought to have taken into account that the troublous
state into which the Moslem world had been thrown by the settlement
of the Turkish question as it was contemplated by the Peace
Conference might have most important reactions in all directions on
the populations of the former Russian Empire which now wanted to be
independent.
Yet the claims which the delegations of the Republics of Georgia and
Azerbaïjan—together with Northern Caucasus—had set forth in January in
the course of their reception by the Supreme Council concerning the
support they might expect from the Great Powers in case they should
be attacked by the Soviets, brought forth no answer; and the Allies
adjourned both the question of the defence of the Transcaucasian
Republics and the question of their independence.
In consequence of all this, Northern Caucasus soon fell a prey to
Bolshevism, and some insurrections broke out in Georgia. The Soviet
Government sent a great many agitators to these regions. Then the Red
army advanced in two columns, one of which defeated Denikin and crossed
the Kuban to invade Caucasus, and the other spread over Kurdistan,
whence, after winning over to its cause the Tatar and pro-Russian
elements of the neighbouring regions, it extended its field of action
as far as Persia and Mesopotamia.
As early as February the Russian Bolshevists concentrated important
forces near the northern frontier of Azerbaïjan under pretence of
driving away the remnants of Denikin’s army, and after hurriedly
getting up a “Soviet Government” at Daghestan, drew near the frontier
of Azerbaïjan.
Meanwhile their agents carried on an energetic propaganda at Baku,
where the inexperienced Moslem leaders of Azerbaïjan had foolishly
left almost all the administration of the country in the hands of
functionaries of the old régime or Russian officers who thought that
Bolshevism, especially with the national character it had newly
assumed, might restore Russia to its former state.
Within the country an economic crisis on the one hand, and on the
other hand the Armenians’ aggressions, in the course of which they
had massacred many Mussulmans, especially at Karabagh, had raised a
widespread discontent against the Cabinet.
Emboldened by the success of the Bolshevists, who benefited by these
disturbances, their local accomplices, some Russian workmen supported
by about a hundred Moslem workmen, helped to organise a series of
raids. During the night of April 26-27 the northern frontier of
Azerbaïjan was crossed at the railway station of Jalama by a Bolshevist
armoured train, for the main body of the army of Azerbaïjan had been
dispatched to Karabagh and Kasakg to repel an Armenian attack, so that
only one armoured train and a few hundred soldiers had been left on the
northern frontier. This small detachment could not prevent the advance
of the Red forces which followed the train, though it did its duty
bravely and destroyed the railway track. On April 27 the Bolshevist
forces reached the station of Khatchmaz, where they were greeted by a
group of local communists.
At Baku, where the population lived in a state of indifference and
passivity, the local communists, encouraged by the advance of the
Russian Bolshevists, addressed an ultimatum to the Government, which
had declared itself in favour of armed resistance, demanding the
resignation of the Cabinet and the handing over of the Government to
the revolutionary committee which had just been formed. This ultimatum
was enforced by the threat of the bombardment of the town by the fleet
of the Caspian Sea.
The Government, which had vainly asked Georgia for assistance, and had
proposed to Armenia, before the common danger, to put an end to the
hostilities at Karabagh in order to withdraw its troops and dispatch
them to the northern frontier, was compelled on April 28 to hand over
the power to the people’s commissioners. The members of the Cabinet,
against whom the Bolshevists had issued a writ of arrest, hurried away
and the communists immediately resorted to their usual methods of
terrorism and plunder.
Instead of the “Moslem Brethren” the Bolshevist emissaries had spoken
of, the inhabitants of Baku saw some Russian Bolshevists, accompanied
by Armenians who had been expelled by the former Government, take
possession of the town. As soon as they arrived, the latter arrested
all the foreign missions, except the Persian mission. As the national
army was detained on the southern frontier by constant Armenian
attacks, the invaders dispatched Russian detachments in all directions,
to take possession of the entire country. They addressed an ultimatum
to Armenia, demanding the evacuation of Karabagh. At the same time
Russian forces were sent via Zakatali towards the Georgian frontier.
At Baku the Moslem militia was replaced by Russian workmen, and at
the same time orders were given immediately to disarm the population
of Ganjha (Elisavetpol), where the governor and some notables were
arrested and incarcerated.
It is reported that at Ganjha 15,000 Moslems were slaughtered by the
Reds.
A correspondent of _Il Secolo_, on coming back from Caucasus, wrote an
article entitled “The East on Fire” on May 25, 1920:
“The information that we have just received from Constantinople,
Anatolia, Caucasus, and Persia could not possibly be worse.
Bolshevism has won over Caucasus to its policy, and from Baku it
is carrying on a more and more energetic propaganda in Persia and
Turkistan. The British are already fighting in the latter country
with Bolshevism. All this might have been foreseen.
“As it is cut off from Europe and encircled by hostile bayonets,
Bolshevism, which originated in Asia, is now spreading over Asia.
This does not mean that Caucasus and Asia are ripe for a revolution
of the poor against the rich. It would be a foolish thing to say
this. In Asia everybody is poor, but nobody starves. In Asia
there is no industry, there are no organisations; therefore,
there is no socialist movement on the whole. But anybody who has
been to Caucasus lately must necessarily have noticed, to his
great surprise, evidences of a Moslem Bolshevism headed by Enver
Pasha and his brother Noury. The Republic of the mountaineers of
Daghestan, the first that joined the Bolshevist movement and made
easier the advance of the Reds towards the south, is headed by
Enver Pasha. In Azerbaïjan many fanatic admirers of Russia are to
be met with.
“And what are the reasons for this? They are many. First, the
desperate condition of the new States which came into being
immediately after the Brest-Litovsk peace. In Paris the Conference
laid down frontiers, but never thought the first thing to do was to
put an end to the economic crisis prevailing in those countries.
And so an absurd thing happened—wealthy countries living in
frightful misery, and issuing paper currency which was of no value
on the world’s markets. Typical is the case of Azerbaïjan, which
had millions of tons of petroleum at Baku, but did not know where
or how to export them.”
In July it was announced that the situation of the Moslems in Armenia
had become critical, as for the last two months the Erivan Government
and the “Tashnak” party had been carrying on a policy of violence and
massacres against them. What remained of the Moslem populations had
been compelled to leave their homes and property and flee to Persia.
The Armenian Government had even appointed a Commission especially
to draw up a list of the crops left by the Moslems and the Greeks in
the district. At the end of June, in the district of Zanguibazar,
about twenty Moslem villages had been destroyed by bombardments and
their inhabitants put to death. By that time the Moslem population
of Transcaucasia was being attacked both by the Armenians and the
Bolshevists.
M. Khan-Khoiski, ex-Prime Minister, and Dr. H. Aghaef, former
Vice-President of the Parliament of Azerbaïjan, were assassinated at
Tiflis, where they had sought refuge, the former on June 19 and the
latter on July 19, by Armenians belonging to the “Tashnak” party, of
which the leader of the Armenian Government and most Ministers are
members.
This murder of the leaders of Azerbaïjan, who carried on the war
against the invaders of their country, served the Bolshevist cause, but
aroused much resentment among the Moslems of Azerbaïjan and Georgia,
who were exasperated by the Bolshevists’ frightful tyranny and now
hated Bolshevism as much as they had formerly hated Tsardom.
The delegation of Azerbaïjan handed to the Spa Conference a note in
which they drew its attention to the condition of their country. On the
other hand, the members of the former Cabinet made energetic efforts
to rid their country of the Bolshevist invasion. For this purpose they
sent delegates to Daghestan and Northern Caucasus to plan a common
resistance, as Daghestan, the tribes of the mountains of Northern
Caucasus, and Azerbaïjan were on friendly terms and shared the same
views. By this time a small part of the Red armies still occupied
the Baku area, whence the Bolshevists sent reinforcements to the
detachments fighting in Persia.
About the same time it was announced that Enver Pasha had been
appointed commander-in-chief of the Bolshevist forces advancing towards
India, and the Bolshevist troops in Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan,
and Turkistan had been put under his command. In this way the Soviets
probably sought to compel England to make peace with Russia at once.
At Tabriz a separatist movement was beginning to make itself felt with
a view to bringing about the union of Persian Azerbaïjan, of which this
town is the centre, with the Republic of Azerbaïjan, the capital of
which is Baku.
All this Bolshevist activity naturally caused much anxiety among those
who closely watched the development of Eastern events, for Soviet
Russia in another way and with different aims merely carried on the
work of Russian imperialism both in order to hold Great Britain in
check in the East and to give the whole world the benefit of the Soviet
paradise. As the Allied policy with regard to Turkey had roused the
whole of Islam, the union of the Bolshevist elements and the Turkish
Nationalists seemed inevitable when the question of the future fate of
Caucasus should be settled. It was only too much to be feared, after
what had just taken place in Azerbaïjan, that Soviet Russia, feeling
it necessary to get the start of the Turkish Nationalists, would try
to take possession of Georgia now she held Azerbaïjan, as a guarantee
both against the hostility of England and against the opposition that
might sooner or later arise on the Turkish side. It then appeared that
the Turkish Nationalists had come to a merely provisional agreement
with the Russian Bolshevists to disengage themselves on the Russian
side, and secure their help against Europe, which threatened Turkey;
and that, on the contrary, the Angora Government, some members of
which are Chechens and Ossetes, when brought face to face with the old
historical necessities, would be one day compelled to resort to the old
policy of defending the Moslem world against the Slavonic world. For
notwithstanding the inherent incompatibility between the minds of these
two peoples, the Allied policy, through its blunders, had achieved
the paradoxical result of making a Russo-Turkish alliance temporarily
possible, and to bring together the Moslems—so unresponsive as a rule
to the idle verbiage and subversive tendencies of revolutionists—and
the Bolshevist Slavs, who were still their political enemies. And so it
turned out that the attitude assumed by the various European Powers in
regard to the Turkish problem and the solution that was to eventuate
were prominent factors in the future relations between each of those
Powers and Asia. Now the Turks, who alone are able to bring about an
understanding between the Moslems of Caucasus and those of Asia, are
also the only people who can bring about a lasting peace in that part
of the confines of Europe and Asia, and settle the relations between
those Moslem populations and the West.
Footnote:
44: Since the French edition of this book was published, Georgia
was recognised, _de jure_, by the Supreme Council in January, 1921.