The Allied intervention in Turkey continued to be the subject of
frequent diplomatic conversations between the Powers.
Though Italy and France seemed to favour a strictly limited action,
England held quite a different opinion, and energetic measures seemed
likely to be resorted to. Lord Derby at the meeting of the Ambassadors’
Council on March 10 read a telegram from his Government stating it
intended to demand of Germany the extradition of Enver Pasha and Talaat
Pasha, who were on the list of war criminals drawn up a few weeks
before by the British Government, and who at that time were in Berlin.
As the Allies had not requested that these men should be handed over
to them at the time of the armistice, and as the war criminals whose
extradition had been previously demanded of the Central Powers did
not seem likely to be delivered up to them, this seemed rather an
idle request at a time when it was openly said the Allies wanted to
expel the Turks from Constantinople, when a deep agitation convulsed
the Moslem world and discontent was rife in it. What was the use of
this new threat to Germany if, like the previous one, it was not
to be carried into effect? What would Great Britain do if the two
“undesirables” thought of going to Holland, and why did she prepare
to punish Turkey when some of her statesmen seemed inclined to make
all sorts of concessions, instead of compelling Germany, the promoter
of the conflict, who had not yet delivered up any German subject, to
execute the treaty without any restriction whatever?
At the beginning of the armistice England had deported the members and
chief supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress, and later on
the high functionaries who had been arrested by Damad Ferid Pasha,
and were about to be court-martialled. One night fifty-four of the
latter out of about 130 were suddenly deported to Malta for fear they
should be set free by the population of Constantinople. Among them
were: Hairi Effendi, ex-Sheik-ul-Islam; the Egyptian prince, Said
Halim Pasha, ex-Grand Vizier; Ahmed Nessiny, ex-Minister of Foreign
Affairs; Halil Bey, ex-Minister of Justice; Prince Abbas Halim Pasha,
ex-Minister of Public Works; Fethy Bey, ex-Minister at Sofia; Rahmi
Bey, Governor-General of vilayet of Smyrna; Jambalat Bey, ex-Minister
of Interior; Ibrahim Bey, a former Minister; and four members of the
Committee: Midhat Shukri; Zia Geuk Alp; Kemal (Kutchuk Effendi);
and Bedreddin Bey, temporary vali of Diarbekir, who was deported as
responsible for the massacres that had taken place in that town,
though at that time he was out of office and had been discharged by
a court-martial. The British even evinced a desperate, undignified
animosity and an utter lack of generosity in regard to the Turkish
generals who had defeated them. They had, as it were, carried away the
spirit of Turkey.
Italy, who had followed a most clever, shrewd, and far-sighted policy,
and who had kept some independence within the Supreme Council, had been
very reserved in regard to the Turkish question.
In regard to Article 9 of the pact of London, which ascribed to Italy,
in case Turkey should be dismembered, a “fair part” of the province
of Adana in Asia Minor, the newspaper _Il Secolo_, in the middle of
January, 1920, expressed the opinion that Italy should give up that
acquisition.
“Notwithstanding all that has been written for the last seven
or eight years about the Adalia area, we do not think that its
possession would improve our present economic condition. It would
only estrange from us a nation from which we might perhaps derive
great advantages through an open policy of friendship and liberty.
“The most profitable scheme would have been to maintain the
national integrity of Turkey and to give Italy, not a mandate over
a reduced State, but a mere administrative control, and to assign
her a few zones of exploitation with mere economic privileges, for
instance, near Heraclea and Adalia.
“But at the present stage of the Asiatic problem, such a scheme
could hardly be carried out. We must then lay aside all selfish
purposes, and openly and tenaciously defend the integrity and
independence of the Turkish State.
“Let the Turks be driven away from the districts which are
predominantly Arabian, Greek, or Armenian. But let the Sultan
remain in Constantinople, till the League of Nations has become
stronger and able to assume control of the Straits. Let us not
forget that the Turks chiefly put their confidence in us now, and
that Germany, whose policy had never threatened Turkish territorial
integrity, had succeeded in gaining Turkish friendship and blind
devotion.
“Italy has not many friends to-day, and so she should not despise a
hand which is willingly held out to her.”
Italy therefore did not warmly approve an expedition against Turkey.
Her semi-official newspapers stated it was owing to Italy that the
Allies’ policy still showed some moderation, and they hinted that the
presence of Italian troops in the contingent landed at Constantinople
was to be looked upon as the best means to prevent extreme measures.
On Tuesday, March 16, the Allied troops, consisting mostly of British
soldiers, under the command of General Milne, occupied the Ottoman
Government offices.
It might seem strange that the Allied troops in Constantinople were
commanded by a British general, when the town was the residence of
General Franchet d’Espérey, commander-in-chief of the inter-Allied
troops on the Macedonian front, who, in the decisive battle in which
he broke through the Bulgarian front, had had General Milne under him.
But, after all, it was better for France that an English general should
stand responsible for carrying out the occupation.
To the student of Eastern events this was but the logical outcome of
a patient manœuvre of England. The documents that have now been made
public plainly show how far-sighted her policy had been.
General Franchet d’Espérey’s dispositions were suddenly reversed, for
he had not advocated an important military action against Russia or
Turkey when he had taken command of the Eastern army—_i.e._, before his
expedition from Salonika towards the Danube—and at the beginning of
October, 1918, he had arranged the French and English divisions so as
to march against Budapest and Vienna, foreseeing the ultimate advance
of the Italian left wing against Munich.
On October 8, 1918, he was formally enjoined from Paris to send the
British divisions which made up his right wing against Constantinople
under the command of an English general.
Thus, after the defeat of Bulgaria in October, 1918, the British
Government required that the troops sent to the Constantinople area
should be led by a British general. In this way General Milne assumed
command of the British troops stationed round and in Constantinople
when Admiral Calthorpe had concluded the armistice with Turkey,
and as a consequence General Franchet d’Espérey, though still
commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in European Turkey, was now
under the orders of General Milne, commander of the Constantinople
garrison and the forces in Asia Minor.
Some time after receiving the aforesaid order, General Franchet
d’Espérey, on October 27, 1918, received a letter from the War
Minister, M. Clémenceau, No. 13644, B.S. 3,[21] forwarding him “copy of
a letter giving the outline of a scheme of action that was recommended
not only to carry on the war against the Central Powers in Russia, but
also to effect the economic blockade of Bolshevism, and thus bring
about its downfall.” This scheme, after being assented to by the
Allied Powers concerned in it, was to be “the natural outcome of the
operations entrusted to the Allied armies in the East.”
Finally, in a telegram, No. 14041, B.S. 3, dated November 6, containing
some very curious recommendations, it was said:
“The operations in Southern Russia should be carried on by means of
Greek elements, for instance, which it might be inexpedient to employ
in an offensive against Germany, or by means of the French army in
Palestine.”[22]
Thus all the plans of the French headquarters were altered by England,
and to her advantage; at the same time part of our endeavours was
broken up and annihilated under the pressure of the Pan-Russian circles
that urged France to intervene in Russia, and the French policy in the
East was wholly at the mercy of England. By saying this, we do not mean
at all to belittle M. Clémenceau’s work during the war, but we only
mention one of the mistakes to which he was driven, in spite of his
energy and determination, by the English and American policy, which had
dazzled some of his collaborators.
On March 16, at 9 a.m., some British _estafettes_ handed to the Sultan,
in his palace at Yildiz-Kiosk, and to the Sublime Porte a note of
General Milne, commanding the Allied troops in Asia Minor and the town
of Constantinople. It stated that at 10 a.m., with the agreement of the
Italian, French, and British High Commissioners, and according to the
orders of the British Imperial Headquarters, the Allied contingents
would occupy the offices of the Minister of War and the Minister of
Marine, the prefecture, the post and telegraph offices, the town gates,
and the new bridge of Galata. In fact, the town had been occupied at
daybreak by the Allied troops.
The note added that for a short time the political administration would
be left to the Turks, but under the control of Allied officers. Martial
law was proclaimed, and, in case of resistance, force would be resorted
to.
The Ottoman Government gave no answer, and an hour later all the
measures mentioned by General Milne were carried out. As these
operations took a whole day, all the means of transport and
communication were temporarily stopped.
At the War Office the soldiers on duty attempted to resist the British
forces. A skirmish ensued, in which two British soldiers were killed,
and an officer and three soldiers wounded; nine Turks, including an
officer, were killed, and a few more wounded.
At the same hour a Greek destroyer steamed into the Golden Horn, and
cast anchor opposite the Patriarch’s palace.
Before this, General Milne had had a few deputies and senators
arrested, together with a few men considered as having a share in the
Nationalist movement, such as Kutchuk Jemal Pasha, ex-War Minister
in the Ali Riza Cabinet; Jevad Pasha, formerly head of the staff;
Tchourouk Soulou Mahmoud Pasha, a senator; Dr. Essad Pasha; Galatali
Shefket Pasha, commanding the Straits forces; Reouf Bey, Kara Vassif
Bey, Shevket Bey, Hassan Tahsin Bey, Nouman Ousta Effendi, Sheref Bey,
deputies.
Reouf Bey and Kara Vassif Bey were considered as representing in the
Turkish Parliament Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the people who ensured the
transmission of his orders.
All these men were arrested illegally and brutally, with the consent
of the French Governor, though they had always evinced much sympathy
for France, under the pretext that they corresponded with the national
army; and yet their intervention might have had favourable consequences.
Among the men arrested that night, Jemal, Jevad, and Mahmoud Pasha,
all three former Ministers, were insulted and sent to prison in their
nightclothes, with their arms bound. Their doors and windows were
broken open, and their Moslem wives were threatened in the harem. Some
children of thirteen or fourteen were also arrested and thrashed. Eight
Turkish soldiers on duty at Shahzade-Bashi were killed in the morning
while they lay asleep on their camp-beds, and the censorship probably
suppressed other deeds of the same kind.
The Ottoman Government could not understand how members of Parliament
could be imprisoned, especially by the English, the founders of the
parliamentary system. The deputy Jelal Noury Bey, who is neither a
Nationalist nor a Unionist, was apprehended, merely because he opposed
Ferid Pasha’s policy.
England, to enhance her influence over public opinion, got control
over the chief newspapers which were not friendly to her. Jelal Noury
Bey, the director of the _Ileri_, a radical newspaper, and Ahmed Emin
Bey, the director of the _Vakit_, were deported. The _Alemdar_, the
_Peyam Sabah_, the _Stambul_, edited by Refi Jevad, Ali Kemal, and
Said Mollah, which, since the first days of the armistice, had praised
the English policy, fell into English hands; which accounts for the
varying attitudes successively assumed by those journals in their
comments on current events. Their editors were mostly members of the
“Club of the Friends of England,” and sought in every possible way
to increase the number of the adherents of that committee, which was
subsidised by the British High Commissioner, and whose chief aim was
that the Turkish mandate should be given to England.
On March 21, 1920, the British at Skutari requisitioned the police
courts, the law courts, the police station, the town hall, and the
prison, thus almost completely disorganising the administration of the
town.
In the note signed by the High Commissioners, this occupation was
described as a measure of guarantee, with a view to the execution
of the treaty that was going to be forced on Turkey. Yet it seemed
rather strange that such measures should be taken before the treaty
was concluded—or was it because the English, being aware the treaty
was unacceptable, thought it necessary to gag the Turks beforehand, or
even sought to exasperate them?—for if the Turks offered resistance,
then the English would have a right to intervene very sternly, and
thus could justify the most unjustifiable measures of repression.
What would England and the United States have answered if France had
proposed such coercive measures against Germany in addition to those
of the armistice? It was stated in this note that the occupation would
not last long, and was no infringement upon the Sultan’s sovereignty,
that it aimed at rallying the Turks in a common endeavour to restore
prosperity to Turkey in accordance with the Sultan’s orders; but it
also threatened that, should disorder last longer in Asia Minor, the
occupation might be extended and the provisions of the treaty might be
made harder, in which case Constantinople would be severed from Turkey.
The _Daily Telegraph_ said about that time:
“The political situation, which has evolved so rapidly, plainly
shows it is not enough for the Americans to keep aloof from the
present events. Their national honour is at stake.
“Public opinion in Great Britain would unanimously side with France
in her operations in Asia Minor, provided France declares herself
willing to accept our co-operation.
“We easily understand that the occupation of Constantinople came
rather as a surprise to France and Italy, especially if we take
into account that this action closely followed another measure of a
similar kind taken by England within the last fortnight.
“It seems that this time our Allies have assumed a slightly
different attitude: official France is still hesitating; public
opinion has changed completely, and the pro-Turkish feeling is on
the wane. If France wants to maintain her prestige in the East
unimpaired, she must associate with any political, naval, or
military measure taken by England.
“The Italian standpoint and interests do not differ much from ours,
or from those of France, but Italian circles plainly advocate a
policy of non-intervention, or an intervention restricted to a
diplomatic action.”
If such proceedings emanating from some American or English circles
were hardly a matter of surprise, the attitude of some Frenchmen of
note was not so easily accounted for.
M. Hanotaux[23] was led by a strange political aberration and a curious
oblivion of all the traditional policy of France—unless he deliberately
meant to break off with it, or was blinded by prejudice—when he
assigned Constantinople to Greece, because, according to him, to
give Constantinople to Greece was “to give it to Europe, and to her
worthiest, noblest offspring.”
Now Hellenism owes nothing to Byzantium, and Byzantinism, imbued
with Christianity, is but remotely and indirectly connected with the
magnificent pagan bloom of Hellenism. Byzantium, as has been shown, was
not only the continuation of Rome in its decay: it had also a character
of its own. Neither was Byzantinism a mere continuation of Hellenism.
It was rather the propagator of Orthodoxy, so that when the Greeks
claimed Byzantium, they could not do so on behalf of Hellenism, but
merely on behalf of Christianity. There is a confusion here that many
people have sought to perpetuate because it serves numerous interests,
those of the Greeks, and also those of the Slavs, who owe their culture
to Byzantium. But whereas Byzantium chiefly taught barbarous Russia
a religion together with the rudiments of knowledge, and opened for
her a door to the Old World, she imparted to Arabian civilisation
knowledge of the works and traditions of antiquity. Russia, who only
borrowed the rites of the Byzantine Church and exaggerated them, did
not derive much profit from that initiation; the Turks and Arabs, on
the contrary, thanks to their own culture, were able to imbibe the old
knowledge bequeathed and handed down to them by Byzantium—leaving aside
the religious bequest. Thus they were enabled to exercise a wholesome
influence, driving out of Constantinople both Orthodoxy and the Slavs
who aimed at the possession of that town.
As to the so-called Hellenism of Asia Minor, it is true that the
civilisation of ancient Greece spread over several districts on the
coast; but it should be borne in mind that, long before the Greeks,
the Egyptians and various Semitic peoples had settled on the coast of
Lydia—which up to the seventh century B.C. bore the name of
Meonia—and fought there for a long time; and that the Lydians, a hybrid
race akin to the Thracians and Pelasgi commingled with ethnic elements
coming from Syria and Cappadocia, kept up an intercourse between the
Greeks of the coast and Asia[24] till the Cimmerian invasion convulsed
Asia Minor in the eighth century. Lastly, the Medes, against whom the
Greeks waged three wars, are considered by Oppert,[25] owing to the
etymology of the name, to be of Turanian descent.
In fact, the relations between the Turks and the Greeks and the
Byzantians are really most involved. We know to-day that some Turkish
elements, who were converted to the Greek Church long before the
Ottoman Turks embraced Islam, and whose origin is anterior by far to
the establishment of the Seljukian Empire and the Ottoman Empire,
faithfully served the Byzantine Empire from the fifth century
onwards, and were utilised by Justinian for the defence of the
Asiatic boundaries of the Empire—which were also the boundaries of
Christianity—against the attacks of Eastern nations.
It is difficult to account for the sudden fervid enthusiasm of the
Allies for Greece. For two years she adhered to Constantine’s policy,
perpetrating many an act of treachery against both the Hellenic people
and the Allies, repeatedly violating the Constitution guaranteed by the
Powers that had protected her, and slaughtering many French sailors;
and then, after her unfriendly conduct towards the Allies under cover
of a pro-German neutrality, she had very tardily sided with them.
It was surprising, therefore, that Greece, who had displayed her
pro-German feelings during a great part of the war, would probably
receive some of the most thoroughly Turkish territories of the Ottoman
Empire, though she never fought against that Empire even after she
had deposed King Alexander’s father, in spite of the deplorable
complaisance of some of the Allies.
Finally, the very day after the occupation of Constantinople, General
Milne, who commanded the British troops of occupation, enjoined the
Salih Pasha Cabinet to resign under pretence that it no longer enjoyed
the Sovereign’s confidence. The Grand Vizier refused to comply with
the English general’s request, as the Government had the confidence of
the Chamber and the Sovereign need not apply to the commander of the
forces of occupation for permission to communicate with his Ministers.
After incarcerating a good many deputies, senators, and political men,
as has just been seen, the general gave the Grand Vizier to understand
that orders had been given for the arrest of the Ministers in case
they should attempt to go to their departments. In order to spare his
country another humiliation, Salih Pasha handed in his resignation to
the Sultan, who, following the advice of England, charged Damad Ferid
to form another Cabinet.
It requires all the reasons that have been previously given to enable
us to understand why England threatened and humbled Turkey to such
an extent—the only Power left in the East that could be a factor for
moderation and peace.
Mustafa Kemal never recognised the Damad Ferid Cabinet, and only
after the latter had resigned and Ali Riza Pasha had been appointed
Grand Vizier did he consent, in order to avoid another conflict
with the Sultan, to enter into negotiations with the Constantinople
Government. Salih Pasha was charged by the Minister to carry on the
negotiations with the Nationalists, and repaired to Amasia. There it
was agreed—first, that the National Organisation should be officially
recognised as a lawful power which was necessary to the defence of the
rights of the country, and should have full liberty of action side
by side with the Government; secondly, that the Cabinet should avoid
taking any decision sealing the fate of the country before Parliament
met; thirdly, that some appointments should be made in agreement with
the National Organisation, after which the latter should not interfere
in the administration of the country.
Besides, as Mustafa Kemal said later on in a speech made before the
Angora Assembly, though the Sultan had been represented by some as
lacking energy, not maintaining the dignity of the Imperial throne, and
not being a patriot, yet the reason why he had fallen under English
tutelage was that he had seen no other means to save both the existence
of Turkey and his throne.
The question whether Parliament should meet at Constantinople or in
a province brought on a first disagreement between the Government and
Mustafa Kemal, who finally yielded. But, owing to the occupation of
Constantinople, Parliament soon found itself in a precarious condition,
and the National Organisation decided to hold its sittings at Angora.
After all these events a deputy, Riza Nour, at the sitting of March 18,
1920, raised a protest against the occupation of Constantinople and
the incarceration of some members of Parliament by the Allies, which
measures were an insult to the dignity of the Turkish Parliament, and
a contravention of the constitutional laws and the law of nations.
This motion, carried unanimously by the Ottoman Chamber and signed
by the Vice-President, M. Hussein Kiazim—the President, for fear of
being prosecuted by the British authorities, having left his official
residence—was forwarded to the Allied and neutral Parliaments, and
the Ottoman Chamber adjourned _sine die_ till it was possible for the
deputies to carry out their mandate safely.
Ahmed Riza, former President of the Chamber and Senate of the Ottoman
Empire—who, after the failure of Damad Ferid’s mission to Paris, had
addressed an open letter to M. Clémenceau on July 17, 1919, almost
the anniversary day of the Constitution—joined in that protest and
commented upon the treatment some members of Parliament had undergone,
as follows:
“It is contrary to all parliamentary rights and principles
throughout the world and to the legal dispositions that guarantee
the inviolability and immunity of all members of the Turkish
Parliament to arrest representatives of the nation while they
are carrying out their mandate. So the armed Interference of
the foreigner with our Chamber cannot be in any way excused or
accounted for.
“Such an arbitrary intrusion, especially on the part of England,
that is looked upon as the founder of the parliamentary system,
will bring everlasting shame to British civilisation.
“After the illegal arrest of several of its members, the Turkish
Parliament adjourned _sine die_, as a token of protest, till the
deputies are able to carry out their mandate freely and safely.
“A note communicated to the Press makes out that some deputies had
been returned under the pressure of the Nationalists and that,
as the Christian elements had had no share in the elections, the
session was illegal.
“Now, it should be noticed that these elements abstained from
voting at the last elections of their own free will, and that since
the armistice no representative of the Christian communities has
taken an official part in the public functions in the Imperial
Palace. The Nationalist forces cannot be held responsible for this.
“Neither is it the Nationalists’ fault if the French authorities in
Cilicia arbitrarily prevented the inhabitants of that district from
holding the parliamentary election, thus depriving the people of
their most sacred rights, and violating the terms of the armistice.
“The acknowledgment of the validity of the mandates of the new
members by the unanimity of their colleagues, the official opening
of Parliament by the speech from the throne, the good wishes and
greetings of the Sultan to the deputies, bear witness that the
assembly legally represented the wishes of the nation and had the
Sovereign’s approbation.
“Besides, these are strictly internal questions in which the
Allies’ interests are not at all concerned, and with which
foreigners have no right to interfere.
“At such a solemn hour it would be an utter denial of justice if
the Ottoman deputies were not able to discuss the fundamental
stipulations of the intended Peace Treaty which is to seal the
future fate of their country.
“Who is to examine the Peace Treaty to-day, and who is to
give its assent to it now the nation has been deprived of its
representatives?
“Of what value will be a treaty thus worked out secretly, behind
closed doors, and concluded in such conditions? How can the
signature of the members of the Government be considered as binding
the nation? For the new Ministry does not yet represent the Ottoman
nation, since no motion of confidence has hitherto been carried by
a chamber which does not sit; and so it cannot be looked upon as
being legally constituted.
“Whatever may happen, the nation alone can decide its own fate. If,
at such a serious juncture, when its very existence is at stake,
it were not able to defend its own cause and its own rights freely
through the peaceful vote of its own mandatories, it would be
looked upon by the whole of mankind as the victim of most unfair
treatment, the responsibility of which will one day be determined
by history.”
During Abdul Hamid’s reign Ahmed Riza had of his own will gone into
exile, and from Paris he had wielded great influence over the movement
that led to the revolution of 1908. But when the Young Turk Government
had practically become dictatorial and had yielded to the pressure
that drove it towards Germany, he realised that policy was a failure
and was leading the Empire to ruin; then, though he had been one of
the promoters of the movement, he protested repeatedly in the Senate,
of which he was a member, against the illegal doings of the Government
and its foolhardy policy. As President of the “National Block”—which,
though not a political party properly speaking, aimed at grouping all
the conservative constitutional elements friendly to the Entente—he
seemed likely to play an important part in public life again when,
about the middle of August, 1919, it was rumoured that the Damad Ferid
Government was about to take action against him and his political
friends; and soon after it was made known that he intended to go to
Italy or France till the reopening of the Ottoman Parliament. After
staying in Rome, where he had conversations with some political men of
note in order to establish an intellectual entente between Italians and
Turks, he settled in Paris.
The English censorship, which gagged the Turkish newspapers, went so
far as to prevent them from reprinting extracts from French newspapers
that were favourable to the Ottoman cause. It brought ridicule
upon itself by censuring the Bible; in an article in the _Univers
Israélite_, reprinted by the _Aurore_, which quoted and commented on
three verses of chapter xix. of Isaiah, the censor cut off the first
of these verses, which may be interpreted as foreshadowing a League of
Nations, but in which he was afraid the reader might find a hint at a
connection between Egypt and Asia and at the claims of the Turkish and
Egyptian Nationalists. This is the verse, which any reader could easily
restore: “In that day shall there be a highway out of Egypt to Assyria,
and the Assyrian shall come into Egypt and the Egyptian into Assyria,
and the Egyptians shall serve with the Assyrians.”
Footnotes:
21: Cf. the _Matin_, June 17, 1920, an interview of M. Paul
Benazet, ex-chairman of the Committee of War Estimates; and the
_Œuvre_, July 8, 1920.
22: Cf. the _Matin_, June 21, 1920, and M. Fribourg’s speech in the
second sitting of June 25, 1920.
23: _Figaro_, March 18, 1920.
24: Radet, _La Lydie et le monde grec au temps des Mermnades_
(Paris, 1893).
25: Oppert, _Le Peuple des Mèdes_.