The First Philippine Commission
I have elsewhere mentioned the appointment of the First Philippine
Commission.
On January 18, 1899, its civilian members met at Washington and
received the President's instructions.
We were to aid in "the most humane, pacific and effective extension
of authority throughout these islands, and to secure, with the least
possible delay, the benefits of a wise and generous protection of
life and property to the inhabitants."
We were directed to meet at the earliest possible day in the city
of Manila and to announce by a public proclamation our presence
and the mission intrusted to us, carefully setting forth that while
the established military government would be continued as long as
necessity might require, efforts would be made to alleviate the burden
of taxation, to establish industrial and commercial prosperity and
to provide for the safety of persons and property by such means as
might be found conducive to those ends.
We were to endeavour, without interfering with the military
authorities, to ascertain what amelioration in the condition of the
inhabitants and what improvements in public order were practicable,
and for this purpose were to study attentively the existing social and
political state of the several populations, particularly as regarded
the forms of local government, the administration of justice, the
collection of customs and other taxes, the means of transportation and
the need of public improvements, reporting through the Department of
State the results of our observations and reflections, and recommending
such executive action as might, from time to time, seem to us wise
and useful.
We were authorized to recommend suitable persons for appointment
to offices, made necessary by personal changes in the existing
civil administration, from among the inhabitants who had previously
acknowledged their allegiance to the American government.
We were to "ever use due respect for all the ideals, customs and
institutions of the tribes which compose the population, emphasizing
upon all occasions the just and beneficent intentions of the United
States," and were commissioned on account of our "knowledge, skill, and
integrity as bearers of the good-will, the protection and the richest
blessings of a liberating rather than a conquering nation." [439]
Nothing could be more false than Blount's insinuation that we were
sent out to help Otis run the war. [440] There was no war when
we started, and we were expressly enjoined from interfering with
the military government or its officers. We were sent to deliver a
message of good-will, to investigate, and to recommend, and there
our powers ended.
Mr. Schurman and I, with a small clerical force, sailed from Vancouver,
January 31, 1899. On our arrival at Yokohama we learned with keen
regret of the outbreak of hostilities at Manila.
Blount has incorrectly stated that President McKinley had sent the
commission out when the dogs of war were already let loose. [441] The
dogs of war had not been loosed when we started, and one of the main
purposes in sending us was to keep them in their kennels if possible.
Aguinaldo has made the following statements in his "Reseña Verídica":--
"... We, the Filipinos, would have received said commission,
as honourable agents of the great America, with demonstrations
of true kindness and entire adhesion. The commissioners would
have toured over all our provinces, seeing and observing
at close range order and tranquillity, in the whole of
our territory. They would have seen the fields tilled
and planted. They would have examined our Constitution and
public administration, in perfect peace, and they would have
experienced and enjoyed that ineffable charm of our Oriental
manner, a mixture of abandon and solicitude, of warmth and of
frigidity, of confidence and of suspiciousness, which makes
our relations with foreigners change into a thousand colours,
agreeable to the utmost.
"Ah! but this landscape suited neither General Otis nor the
Imperialists! For their criminal intention it was better that
the American commissioners should find war and desolation
in the Philippines, perceiving from the day of their arrival
the fetid stench emitted by the mingled corpses of Americans
and Filipinos. For their purposes it was better that that
gentleman, Mr. Schurman, President of the Commission, could not
leave Manila, limiting himself to listen to the few Filipinos,
who, having yielded to the reasonings of gold, were partisans
of the Imperialists. It was better that the commission should
contemplate the Philippine problem through conflagrations,
to the whiz of bullets, on the transverse light of all the
unchained passions, in order that it might not form any exact
or complete opinion of the natural and proper limits of said
problem. Ah! it was better, in short, that the commission
should leave defeated in not having secured peace, and would
blame me and the other Filipinos, when I and the whole Filipino
people anxiously desired that peace should have been secured
before rather than now, but an honourable and worthy peace
for the United States and for the Philippine Republic." [442]
These statements, made to deceive the public, make interesting reading
in the light of our present knowledge as to the purposes and plans
of Aguinaldo and his associates.
On our arrival at Yokohama we were promptly informed by a secretary
from the United States Legation that no less a personage than Marquis
Ito had been in frequent communication with the Filipinos since 1894,
that they had been looking to him for advice and support, and that
he had interested himself in the present situation sufficiently to
come to the American minister and offer to go to the Philippines,
not in any sense as an agent of the United States, but as a private
individual, and to use his influence in our behalf. His contention
was that the then existing conditions resulted from misunderstandings.
He said that Americans did not understand Asiatics, but he was an
Asiatic himself and did understand the Filipinos, and thought that he
could settle the whole affair. The minister had cabled to Washington
for instructions. Naturally the offer was not accepted.
I was reminded, by this extraordinary incident, of a previous
occurrence. I spent the month of March, 1893, in Tokio when returning
from my second visit to the Philippines, and was kindly invited to
inspect the zoölogical work at the Imperial University. When I visited
the institution for that purpose, I was questioned very closely on
the islands, their people and their resources. The gentlemen who
interrogated me may have been connected with the university, but I
doubt it.
We reached Hongkong on February 22. Here I had an interview with
Dr. Apacible of the junta, while Mr. Schurman visited Canton. Apacible
told me that the Filipinos wanted an independent republic under an
American protectorate. Pressed for the details of their desires, he
said that "the function of a protector is to protect." Further than
that he could not go. I tried to convince him of the hopelessness
of the course the Filipinos were then pursuing and of the kindly
intentions of my government, but felt that I made no impression on him.
We arrived at Manila on March 4, 1899, too late to land. Firebugs were
abroad. We watched a number of houses burn, and heard the occasional
crackle of rifle fire along the line of the defences around the
city. The next morning there was artillery fire for a time at San
Pedro Macáti. Everywhere were abundant evidences that the war was on.
This left little for us to do at the moment except to inform ourselves
as to conditions, especially as Colonel Denby had not yet arrived,
and General Otis was overwhelmed with work and anxiety.
I renewed my acquaintance with many old Filipino and Spanish friends
and improved the opportunity, not likely to recur in my experience,
to see as much as possible of the fighting in the field.
One day when I was at San Pedro Macáti, Captain Dyer, who commanded
a battery of 3.2-inch guns there, suggested that if I wished to
investigate the effect of shrapnel fire I could do so by visiting
a place on a neighbouring hillside which he indicated. Acting upon
his suggestion, I set out, accompanied by my private secretary, who,
like myself, was clad in white duck. The Insurgent sharpshooters on
the other side of the river devoted some attention to us, but we knew
that so long as they aimed at us we were quite safe. Few of their
bullets came within hearing distance.
We were hunting about on the hillside for the place indicated by
Captain Dyer, when suddenly we heard ourselves cursed loudly and
fluently in extremely plain American, and there emerged from a
neighbouring thicket a very angry infantry officer. On venturing to
inquire the cause of his most uncomplimentary remarks, I found that he
was in command of skirmishers who were going through the brush to see
whether there was anything left there which needed shooting up. As
many of the Insurgent soldiers dressed in white, and as American
civilians were not commonly to be met in Insurgent territory, these
men had been just about to fire on us when they discovered their
mistake. We went back to Manila and bought some khaki clothes.
At first my interest in military matters was not appreciated by my army
friends, who could not see what business I had to be wandering around
without a gun in places where guns were in use. I had, however, long
since discovered that reliable first-hand information on any subject
is likely to be useful sooner or later, and so it proved in this case.
For several weeks after we reached Manila there was no active military
movement; then came the inauguration of the short, sharp campaign
which ended for the moment with the taking of Malolos. For long,
tedious weeks our soldiers had sweltered in muddy trenches, shot at
by an always invisible foe whom they were not allowed to attack. It
was anticipated that when the forward movement began, it would be
active. Close secrecy was maintained with regard to it. Captain
Hedworth Lambton, of the British cruiser _Powerful_, then lying
in Manila Bay, exacted a promise from me that I would tell him if
I found out when the advance was to begin, so that we might go to
Caloocan together and watch the fighting from the church tower,
which commanded a magnificent view of the field of operations.
I finally heard a fairly definite statement that our troops would
move the following morning. I rushed to General Otis's office and
after some parleying had it confirmed by him. It was then too late to
advise Lambton, and in fact I could not properly have done so, as the
information had been given me under pledge of secrecy. Accompanied
by my private secretary, Dr. P. L. Sherman, I hastened to Caloocan,
where we arrived just at dusk, having had to run the gantlet of
numerous inquisitive sentries _en route_.
We spent the night in the church, where General Wheaton and his staff
had their headquarters, and long before daylight were perched in
a convenient opening in its galvanized iron roof, made on a former
occasion by a shell from Dewey's fleet.
From this vantage point we could see the entire length of the line
of battle. The attack began shortly after daylight. Near Caloocan
the Insurgent works were close in, but further off toward La Loma
they were in some places distant a mile or more from the trenches of
the Americans.
The general plan of attack was that the whole American line should
rotate to the north and west on Caloocan as a pivot, driving the
Insurgents in toward Malabon if possible. The latter began to fire
as soon as the American troops showed themselves, regardless of the
fact that their enemies were quite out of range. As most of them were
using black-powder cartridges, their four or five miles of trenches
were instantly outlined. The ground was very dry so that the bullets
threw up puffs of dust where they struck, and it was possible to
judge the accuracy of the fire of each of the opposing forces.
Rather heavy resistance was encountered on the extreme right, and
the turning movement did not materialize as rapidly as had been
hoped. General Wheaton, who was in command of the forces about
the church, finally moved to the front, and as we were directly in
the rear of his line and the Insurgents, as usual, overshot badly,
we found ourselves in an uncomfortably hot corner. Bullets rattled
on the church roof like hail, and presently one passed through the
opening through which Major Bourns, Colonel Potter, of the engineer
corps, and I were sticking our heads. Immediately thereafter we
were observed by Dr. Sherman making record time on all fours along
one of the framing timbers of the church toward its tower. There we
took up our station, and thereafter observed the fighting by peeping
through windows partially closed with blocks of volcanic tuff. We
had a beautiful opportunity to see the artillery fire. The guns were
directly in front of and below us and we could watch the laying of
the several pieces and then turn our field-glasses on the particular
portions of the Insurgent trenches where the projectiles were likely to
strike. Again and again we caught bursting shells in the fields of our
glasses and could thus see their effect as accurately as if we had been
standing close by, without any danger of being perforated by shrapnel.
After the Insurgent position had been carried we walked forward
to their line of trenches and followed it east to a point beyond
the La Loma Church, counting the dead and wounded, as I had heard
wild stories of tremendous slaughter and wanted to see just how
much damage the fire of our troops had really done. On our way we
passed the Caloocan railroad station which had been converted into
a temporary field hospital. Here I saw good Father McKinnon, the
champlain of the First California Volunteers, assisting a surgeon
and soaked with the blood of wounded men. He was one chaplain in a
thousand. It was always easy to find him. One had only to look where
trouble threatened and help was needed. He was sure to be there.
On my way from the railway station to the trenches I met a very much
excited officer returning from the front. He had evidently had a long
and recent interview with Cyrus Noble, [443] and was determined to
tell me all about the fighting. I escaped from him after some delay,
and with much difficulty. Later he remembered having met me, but
made a grievous mistake as to the scene of our encounter, insisting
that we had been together in "Wheaton's Hole," an uncommonly hot
position where numerous people got hurt. He persisted in giving a
graphic account of our experiences, and in paying high tribute to
my coolness and courage under heavy fire. My efforts to persuade him
that I had not been with him there proved futile, and I finally gave
up the attempt. I wonder how many other military reputations rest
upon so slender a foundation! This experience was unique. I never
saw another officer under the influence of liquor when in the field.
At the time that we visited the Insurgent trenches, not all of our
own killed and wounded had been removed, yet every wounded Insurgent
whom we found had a United States army canteen of water at his side,
obviously left by some kindly American soldier. Not a few of the
injured had been furnished hardtack as well. All were ultimately
taken to Manila and there given the best of care by army surgeons.
Sometime later a most extraordinary account of this fight, written by a
soldier, was published in the _Springfield Republican_. It was charged
that our men had murdered prisoners in cold blood, and had committed
all manner of barbarities, the writer saying among other things:--
"We first bombarded a town called Malabon and then entered
it and killed every man, woman and child in the place."
The facts were briefly as follows: There was an Insurgent regiment in
and near a mangrove swamp to the right of this town. When it became
obstreperous it was shelled for a short time until it quieted down
again. None of the shells entered the town. Indeed, most of them
struck in the water. Our troops did not enter Malabon that day,
but passed to the northward, leaving behind a small guard to keep
the Insurgents from coming out of Malabon in their rear. Had they
then entered the town, they would not have found any women, children
or non-combatant men to kill for the reason that all such persons
had been sent away some time before. The town was burned, in part,
but by the Insurgents themselves. They fired the church and a great
orphan asylum, and did much other wanton damage.
Being able to speak from personal observation as to the occurrences of
that day, I sent a long cablegram direct to the _Chicago Times-Herald_
stating the facts. After my return to the United States, President
McKinley was kind enough to say to me that if there had been no
other result from the visit of the first Philippine Commission to the
islands than the sending of that cablegram, he should have considered
the expense involved more than justified. He added that the country
was being flooded at the time with false and slanderous rumours,
and people at home did not know what to believe. The statements of
army officers were discounted in advance, and other testimony from
some unprejudiced source was badly needed.
On April 2, 1899, Colonel Denby arrived, and our serious work
began. The fighting continued and there was little that we could
do save earnestly to strive to promote friendly relations with the
conservative element among the Filipinos, and to gather the information
we had been instructed to obtain.
On April 4, 1899, we issued a proclamation setting forth in clear and
simple language the purposes of the American government. [444] It was
translated into Tagálog and other dialects and widely circulated. The
Insurgent leaders were alert to keep the common people and the soldiers
from learning of the kindly purposes of the United States. They were
forbidden to read the document and we were reliably informed that
the imposition of the death penalty was threatened if this order was
violated. In Manila crowds of Filipinos gathered about copies of the
proclamation which were posted in public places. Many of them were
soon effaced by Insurgent agents or sympathizers.
This document unquestionably served a very useful purpose. [445]
For one thing, it promptly brought us into much closer touch with
the more conservative Filipinos.
We soon established relations of friendliness and confidence with men
like Arellano, Torres, Legarda and Tavera, who had left the Malolos
government when it demonstrated its futility, and were ready to turn
to the United States for help. Insurgent sympathizers also conferred
freely with us. We were invited to a beautiful function given in our
honour at the home of a wealthy family, and were impressed, as no one
can fail to be, with the dignified bearing of our Filipino hosts,
a thing which is always in evidence on such occasions. We gave a
return function which was largely attended and greatly aided in the
establishment of relations of confidence and friendship with leading
Filipino residents of Manila.
The Filipinos were much impressed with Colonel Denby. He was a handsome
man, of imposing presence, with one of the kindest hearts that ever
beat. They felt instinctively that they could have confidence in him,
and showed it on all occasions.
Meanwhile we lost no opportunity to inform ourselves as to
conditions and events, conferring with Filipinos from various parts
of the archipelago and with Chinese, Germans, Frenchmen, Belgians,
Austrians, Englishmen, Spaniards and Americans. Among the witnesses
who came before us were farmers, bankers, brokers, merchants,
lawyers, physicians, railroad men, shipowners, educators and public
officials. Certainly all classes of opinion were represented, and
when we were called upon by the President, a little later, for a
statement of the situation we felt fully prepared to make it.
Blount has charged that the commission attempted to interfere with the
conduct of the war, and cites a cablegram from General Otis stating
that conferences with Insurgents cost soldiers' lives in support of
this contention. No conference with Insurgent leaders was ever held
without the previous knowledge and approval of the general, who was
himself a member of the commission.
Late in April General Luna sent Colonel Arguelles of his staff to ask
for a fifteen days' suspension of hostilities under the pretext of
enabling the Insurgent congress to meet at San Fernando, Pampanga,
on May 1, to discuss the situation and decide what it wanted to
do. He called on the commission and urged us to ask Otis to grant
this request, but we declined to intervene, and General Otis refused
to grant it.
Mabini continued Luna's effort, sending Arguelles back with letters to
Otis and to the commission. In the latter he asked for "an armistice
and a suspension of hostilities as an indispensable means of arriving
at peace," stating explicitly that the Philippine government "does not
solicit the armistice to gain a space of time in which to reënforce
itself."
The commission again referred Arguelles to General Otis on the matter
of armistice and suspension of hostilities. We suspected that the
statement that these things were not asked for in order to gain time
was false, and this has since been definitely established.
Taylor says:--
"On April 11 Mabini wrote to General Luna (Exhibit 719) that
Aguinaldo's council was of the opinion that no negotiations
for the release of the Spanish prisoners should be considered
unless the American Commission agreed to a suspension of
hostilities for the purpose of treating, not only in regard
to the prisoners, but for the purpose of opening negotiations
between Aguinaldo's government and the American authorities.
"'In arriving at this decision we have been actuated by the
desire to gain time for our arsenals to produce sufficient
cartridges, if, as would seem to be probable, they persist in
not even recognizing our belligerency, as means for furthering
the recognition of our independence.'" [446]
Arguelles, on his return, was instructed to ask Otis for a--
"general armistice and suspension of hostilities in all the
archipelago for the short space of three months, in order to
enable it to consult the opinion of the people concerning
the government which would be the most advantageous,
and the intervention in it which should be given to the
North American Government, and to appoint an extraordinary
commission with full powers, to act in the name of the
Philippine people." [447]
General Otis naturally again declined to grant the request for a
suspension of hostilities.
Little came of the conference between Arguelles and the commission,
except that we really succeeded in convincing him of the good
intentions of our government, and this promptly got him into very
serious trouble, as we shall soon see. I took him to a tent hospital
on the First Reserve Hospital grounds where wounded Insurgents were
receiving the best of treatment at the hands of American surgeons,
and he was amazed. He had been taught to believe that the Americans
murdered prisoners, raped women, and committed similar barbarities
whenever they got a chance. As we have seen, stories of this sort
were industriously spread by many of the Insurgent leaders among
their soldiers, and among the common people as well. They served
to arouse the passions of the former, and stirred them up to acts
of devilish brutality which they might perhaps not otherwise have
perpetrated. Arguelles told the truth upon his return, and this,
together with his suggestion that it might be well to consider the
acceptance of the form of government offered by the United States,
nearly cost him his life. Relative to this matter Taylor says:--
"When Arguelles returned to the insurgent lines, it must have
been considered that he had said too much in Manila. While he
had been sent there to persuade the Americans to agree to a
suspension of hostilities to be consumed in endless discussion
under cover of which Luna's army could be reorganized, he had
not only failed to secure the desired armistice, but had come
back with the opinion that it might after all be advisable
to accept the government proposed by the United States. On
May 22 General Luna ordered his arrest and trial for being in
favour of the autonomy of the United States in the Philippine
Islands. He was tried promptly, the prosecuting witness
being another officer of Luna's staff who had accompanied
him to Manila and acted as a spy upon his movements (P.I.R.,
285. 2). The court sentenced him to dismissal and confinement
at hard labor for twelve years. This did not satisfy Luna's
thirst for vengeance, and he was imprisoned in Bautista on the
first floor of a building whose second story was occupied by
that officer. One night Luna came alone into the room where
he was confined and told him that although he was a traitor,
yet he had done good service to the cause; and it was not
proper that a man who had been a colonel in the army should
be seen working on the roads under a guard. He told him that
the proper thing for him to do was to blow his brains out,
and that if he did not do it within a reasonable time the
sentinel at his door would shoot him. He gave him a pistol
and left the room. Arguelles decided not to kill himself,
but fully expected that the guard would kill him. Shortly
afterwards Luna was summoned to meet Aguinaldo, and never
returned. On September 29, 1899, his sentence was declared
null and void and he was reinstated in his former rank (P.I.R.,
285. 3, and 2030. 2)." [448]
Colonel Arguelles has told me exactly the same story. For a time it
seemed as if the views expressed by him might prevail.
"According to Felipe Buencamino and some others, the
majority of the members of congress had been in favour of
absolute independence until they saw the demoralization of
the officers and soldiers which resulted in the American
occupation of Malolos. In the middle of April, 1899, they
remembered Arellano's advice, and all of the intelligent
men in Aguinaldo's government, except Antonio Luna and the
officers who had no desire to lay down their military rank,
decided to accept the sovereignty of the United States. At
about the same time copies of the proclamation issued by the
American Commission in Manila reached them and still further
influenced them toward the adoption of this purpose. By the
time congress met in San Isidro on May 1, 1899, all of the
members had accepted it except a few partisans of Mabini,
then president of the council of government. At its first
meeting the congress resolved to change the policy of war with
the United States to one of peace, and this change of policy
in congress led to the fall of Mabini and his succession by
Paterno. The first act of the new council was the appointment
of a commission headed by Felipe Buencamino which was to go
to Manila and there negotiate with the American authorities
for an honourable surrender." [449]
"Although Mabini had fallen from power, Luna and his powerful
faction had still to be reckoned with. He was less moderate
than Mabini, and had armed adherents, which Mabini did not, and
when Paterno declared his policy of moderation and diplomacy
he answered it on the day the new council of government was
proclaimed by an order that all foreigners living in the
Philippines except Chinese and Spaniards, should leave for
Manila within forty-eight hours." [450]
Unfortunately Luna intercepted the Buencamino commission. Its head
he kicked, cuffed and threatened with a revolver. One of its members
was General Gregorio del Pilar. He was allowed to proceed, as he
commanded a brigade of troops which might have deserted had he been
badly treated, but Luna named three other men to go with him in place
of those who had been originally appointed. [451] They were Gracio
Gonzaga, Captain Zialcita, and Alberto Baretto. They reached Manila
on May 19, 1899, and during their stay there had two long interviews
with the commission.
They said that they had come, with larger powers than had been
conferred on Arguelles, to discuss the possibility of peace, the
form of ultimate government which might be proposed in future, and
the attitude of the United States government toward needed reforms.
Meanwhile, on May 4, we had laid before the President a plan of
government informally discussed with Arguelles, and had received the
following reply, authorizing, in substance, what we had suggested:--
"Washington, May 5, 1899, 10.20 P.M.
"Schurman, Manila:
"Yours 4th received. You are authorized to propose that
under the military power of the President, pending action of
Congress, government of the Philippine Islands shall consist
of a governor-general, appointed by the President; cabinet,
appointed by the governor-general; a general advisory council
elected by the people; the qualifications of electors to be
carefully considered and determined; the governor-general
to have absolute veto. Judiciary strong and independent;
principal judges appointed by the President. The cabinet
and judges to be chosen from natives or Americans, or both,
having regard to fitness. The President earnestly desires the
cessation of bloodshed, and that the people of the Philippine
Islands at an early date shall have the largest measure of
local self-government consistent with peace and good order.
"_Hay_." [452]
Our proclamation of April 4, 1899, was also taken up at their request
and was gone over minutely, sentence by sentence. We were asked to
explain certain expressions which they did not fully understand.
They told us that it would be hard for their army to lay down its
arms when it had accomplished nothing, and asked if it could be taken
into the service of the United States. We answered that some of the
regiments might be taken over and employment on public works be found
for the soldiers of others.
We endeavoured to arrange for an interview with Aguinaldo, either
going to meet him or assuring him safe conduct should he desire to
confer with us at Manila.
They left, promising to return in three weeks when they had had time
to consider the matters under discussion, but they never came back.
Shortly thereafter there was an odd occurrence. Soon after our
arrival we had learned that Mr. Schurman was a man of very variable
opinions. He was rather readily convinced by plausible arguments,
but sometimes very suddenly reversed his views on an important subject.
At the outset Archbishop Nozaleda made a great impression upon
him. The Archbishop was a thoroughgoing Spaniard of the old school,
and entertained somewhat radical opinions as to what should be done
to end the distressing situation which existed. After talking with
him Mr. Schurman seemed to be convinced that we ought to adopt a
stern and bloody policy, a conclusion to which Colonel Denby and I
decidedly objected.
A little later he made a trip up the Pasig River with Admiral Dewey
and others and had a chance to see something of the aftermath of
war. It was not at all pretty. It never is. I was waiting for him
with a carriage at the river landing on his return and had hard work
to keep him away from the cable office. His feelings had undergone a
complete revulsion. He insisted that if the American people knew what
we were doing they would demand that the war be terminated immediately
at any cost and by whatsoever means, and he wanted to tell them all
about it at once. By the next morning, however, things fortunately
looked rather differently to him.
Mr. Schurman acquired a working knowledge of the Spanish language
with extraordinary promptness. Shortly thereafter Colonel Denby and
I discovered that when Filipinos came to see the commission in order
to impart information or to seek it, he was conferring with them
privately and sending them away without our seeing them at all.
Soon after we had made our formal statement of the situation to the
President, Mr. Schurman had an interview with an Englishman who had
been living in Insurgent territory north of Manila, from which he had
just been ejected, in accordance with Luna's order. This man told
him all about the mistakes of the Americans and evidently greatly
impressed him, for shortly thereafter he read to us at a commission
meeting a draft of a proposed cablegram which he said he hoped we would
approve. It would have stultified us, had we signed it, as it involved
in effect the abandonment of the position we had so recently taken
and a radical change in the policy we had recommended. Mr. Schurman
told us that if we did not care to sign it, he would send it as an
expression of his personal opinion. Colonel Denby asked him if his
personal opinion differed from his official opinion, and received an
affirmative reply. We declined to approve the proposed cablegram,
whereupon he informed us that if his policy were adopted, he and
General Aguinaldo would settle things without assistance from us,
and that otherwise he would resign. He inquired whether we, too,
would send a cable, and we told him certainly not, unless further
information from us was requested. He sent his proposed message,
in somewhat modified form, and received a prompt reply instructing
him to submit it to the full commission and cable their views.
He did submit it to Colonel Denby and myself at a regularly called
commission meeting, argued that in doing this he had obeyed the
President's instructions, and vowed that he would not show it to
General Otis. I showed it to the General myself, allowing him to
believe that I did so with Mr. Schurman's approval, and thus avoided
serious trouble, as he had been personally advised from Washington
of the instructions to Mr. Schurman. The General then joined with
Colonel Denby and myself in a cablegram setting forth our views,
and so this incident ended.
Mr. Schurman did not resign, but thereafter we saw very little of
him. He made a hasty trip to the Visayas and the Southern Islands
and sailed for the United States shortly after his return to Manila,
being anxious to get back in time for the opening of the college year
at Cornell.
Colonel Denby and I were instructed to remain at Manila, where we
rendered such assistance as we could give, and continued to gather
information relative to the situation, the country and the people. In
this latter work we were given invaluable help by Jesuit priests,
who prepared for us a comprehensive monograph embodying a very large
amount of valuable information, and furnished us a series of new maps
as well. The latter were subsequently published by the United States
Coast and Geodetic Survey in the form of an Atlas of the Philippines.
Early in September we had a most interesting interview with Sr. José de
Luzuriaga, a distinguished and patriotic Filipino from western Negros,
where American sovereignty had been accepted without resistance. Up
to that time it had been possible for the people of Negros to keep
out Tagálog invaders. Sr. Luzuriaga assured us that so long as this
condition continued, there would be no trouble, and he was quite right.
Aguinaldo's agents eventually gained a foothold there for a short time,
and did some mischief, but it did not result very seriously.
We felt an especial interest in this island, as General Otis had
asked us carefully to study and to criticise a scheme for its
government which had been drafted by General James F. Smith, who
afterward became justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines,
secretary of public instruction and governor-general of the islands,
and was then in command of the troops in Negros.
General Lawton arrived in the Philippines during our stay. His
coming had been eagerly looked forward to by the army. He had sailed
with the understanding that he was to be put in charge of field
operations. While he was at sea, influences were brought to bear
which changed this plan.
It is my firm conviction that if Lawton had been put in command, the
war would have ended promptly. He was a wonderful man in the field. He
possessed the faculty of instilling his own tremendous energy into
his officers and men, whose privations and dangers he shared, thereby
arousing an unfaltering loyalty which stood him in good stead in time
of need. If there was fighting to be done, he promptly and thoroughly
whipped everything in sight. He punished looting and disorder with
a heavy hand, treated prisoners and noncombatants with the utmost
kindness, and won the good-will of all Filipinos with whom he came
in contact.
General MacArthur was always declaring that the Filipinos were a unit
against us and that he could never get information from them. General
Lawton never lacked for such information as he needed, and constantly
and successfully used the Filipinos themselves as messengers and for
other purposes. I came to know him intimately, and learned to admire
and love him as did all those who had that great privilege.
For some time I had charge of his spies. Never have men taken longer
chances than did the faithful few who at this time furnished us with
information as to events in Insurgent territory. Discovery meant prompt
and cruel death. For a long time Major F. S. Bourns had performed the
uncongenial task of directing the spies. He was then the chief health
officer of Manila, and as all sorts of people were compelled to consult
him on sanitary matters, visits to his office aroused no suspicion. He
spoke Spanish, and this was imperatively necessary. Our spies simply
would not communicate results through interpreters. The facts revealed
by the Insurgent records show how right they were in refusing to do so.
Major Bourns eventually returned to the United States. His work was
taken over by an army officer, with the result that two of our best
men died very suddenly in that gentleman's back yard. As I spoke
Spanish, and as all sorts of people came to see the commission,
I was the logical candidate for this job, which I thereupon inherited.
Each morning, if there was news, I myself laboriously thumped out
my notes on the typewriter, making an original and one copy. The
copy I took at once to General Lawton. The original I took, later,
to General Otis.
General Lawton was firmly convinced that most army officers were
unfitted by their training to perform civil functions. He organized
municipal governments with all possible promptness in the towns
occupied by his troops, and in this work he requested my assistance,
which I was of course glad to give. Sr. Felipe Calderon drafted a
simple provisional scheme of municipal government which I submitted
for criticism to that most distinguished and able of Filipinos,
Sr. Cayetano Arellano. [453] When the final changes in it had been
made, I accompanied General Lawton on a trip to try putting it into
effect. We held elections and established municipal governments in a
number of the towns just south of Manila, and in some of those along
the Pasig River.
General Otis watched our operations and their results narrowly, and
was sufficiently well pleased with the latter to order General Kobbé
to follow a similar course in various towns on or near the railroad
north of Manila. Kobbé did not profess to know much about municipal
government, and asked me to go with him and help until he got the
hang of the thing, which I did.
Thus it happened that the first Philippine Commission had a sort of
left-handed interest in the first municipal governments established
in the islands under American rule.
In his endeavour to show that the Commission interfered with military
operations, Blount has ascribed certain statements to Major Starr. He
says: " ... at San Isidro on or about November 8, Major Starr said:
'We took this town last spring,' stating how much our loss had been in
so doing, 'but partly as a result of the Schurman commission parleying
with the Insurgents, General Otis had us fall back. We have just had
to take it again.'" [454]
If Major Starr ever made such a statement he was sadly
misinformed. General Lawton was the best friend I ever had in the
United States Army. I saw him almost daily when he was in Manila,
and he showed me the whole telegraphic correspondence which passed
between him and General Otis on the subject of the withdrawal from
San Isidro and Nueva Ecija, which was certainly one of the most
ill advised moves that any military commander was ever compelled to
make. General Lawton's unremitting attacks had absolutely demoralized
the Insurgent force, and my information is that when he finally
turned back, Aguinaldo and several members of his cabinet were
waiting, ten miles away, to surrender to him when he next advanced,
believing that they could never escape from him. I have not the
telegraphic correspondence before me, but I remember its salient
features. Otis ordered Lawton to withdraw, and Lawton, convinced of
the inadvisability of the measure, objected. Otis replied that, with
the rainy season coming on, he could neither provision him nor furnish
him ammunition. Lawton answered that he had provisions enough to last
three weeks and ammunition enough to finish the war, whereupon Otis
peremptorily ordered him to withdraw. The Philippine Commission had
no more to do with this matter than they had to do with the similar
order against advancing which Otis sent Lawton on the day the latter
won the Zapote River fight, when the Insurgents were running all over
the Province of Cavite. Lawton wanted to push forward and clean the
whole place up. The reply to his request to be allowed to do so ran,
if memory serves me well, as follows:--
"Do nothing. You have accomplished all that was expected
of you."
Later on, Lawton and his devoted officers and men had to duplicate the
fierce campaign which had resulted in the taking of San Isidro. This
made possible the movement that Lawton had had in mind in the
first instance, which was made with the result that organized armed
resistance to the authority of the United States promptly ceased in
northern Luzón.
While on this subject I wish to record the fact that shortly after
his return from the San Isidro campaign General Lawton asked me to
accompany him on a visit to General Otis and act as a witness. I
did so. In my presence Lawton said to Otis that if the latter would
give him two regiments, would allow him to arm, equip and provision
them to suit himself, and would turn him loose, he would stake his
reputation as a soldier, and his position in the United States Army,
on the claim that within sixty days he would end the insurrection
and would deliver to General Otis one Emilio Aguinaldo, dead or
alive. The general laughed at his offer. General Lawton asked me
some day to make these facts public. As life is an uncertain thing,
I deem it proper to do so now. Personally I am convinced that if his
offer had been accepted he would have kept his promise.
On September 15, 1899, Colonel Denby and I sailed for the United
States, having been recalled to Washington. Shortly after our arrival
there the commission issued a brief preliminary report. The winter
was spent in the preparation of our final report, which constituted
a full and authoritative treatise on the islands, the people and
their resources. Father José Algué, the distinguished head of the
Philippine Weather Bureau, was called to Washington to help us,
and gave us invaluable assistance.
Our preliminary report, dated November 2, 1899, and the first volume
of our final report, published on January 31, 1900, contained our
observations and recommendations relative to political matters.
Mr. Schurman has been credited with saying in an address made on
January 11, 1902: "Any decent kind of government of Filipinos by
Filipinos is better than the best possible government of Filipinos
by Americans." [455]
On November 2, 1900, he signed the following statement: [456]--
"Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the
commission believe that the government of the Philippines
would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it
did not necessitate, the intervention of other powers and the
eventual division of the islands among them. Only through
American occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free,
self-governing, and united Philippine commonwealth at all
conceivable. And the indispensable need from the Filipino
point of view of maintaining American sovereignty over the
archipelago is recognized by all intelligent Filipinos and even
by those insurgents who desire an American protectorate. The
latter, it is true, would take the revenues and leave us the
responsibilities. Nevertheless, they recognize the indubitable
fact that the Filipinos cannot stand alone. Thus the welfare
of the Filipinos coincides with the dictates of national
honour in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago. We
cannot from any point of view escape the responsibilities of
government which our sovereignty entails; and the commission
is strongly persuaded that the performance of our national
duty will prove the greatest blessing to the peoples of the
Philippine Islands."
More than fourteen years' experience in governmental work in the
Philippines has profoundly impressed me with the fundamental soundness
of these conclusions of the first Philippine Commission. Every
statement then made still holds true.