X.

But, letting alone the possibility of art acting as a poison for the

soul, there remains an important question. As I said, although art is

one of the most wholesome of our soul's activities, there are yet

kinds of art, or (since it is a subjective question of profit or

damage to ourselves) rather kinds of artistic effect, which, for some

evident reason, or through some obscure analogy or hidden point of

contact awaken those movements of the fancy, those states of the

emotions which disintegrate rather than renew the soul, and accustom

us rather to the yielding and proneness which we shun, than to the

resistance and elasticity which we seek throughout life to increase.

I was listening, last night, to some very wonderful singing of modern

German songs; and the emotion that still remains faintly within me

alongside of the traces of those languishing phrases and passionate

intonations, the remembrance of the sense of--how shall I call

it?--violation of the privacy of the human soul which haunted me

throughout that performance, has brought home to me, for the hundredth

time, that the Greek legislators were not so fantastic in considering

music a questionable art, which they thought twice before admitting

into their ideal commonwealths. For music can do more by our emotions

than the other arts, and it can, therefore, separate itself from them

and their holy ways; it can, in a measure, actually undo the good they

do to our soul.

But, you may object, poetry does the very same; it also expresses,

strengthens, brings home our human, momentary, individual emotions,

instead of uniting with the arts of visible form, with the harmonious

things of nature, to create for us another kind of emotion, the

emotion of the eternal, unindividual, universal life, in whose

contemplation our souls are healed and made whole after the

disintegration inflicted by what is personal and fleeting.

It is true that much poetry expresses merely such personal and momentary

emotion; but it does so through a mechanism differing from that of music,

and possessing a saving grace which the emotion-compelling mechanism

of music does not. For by the very nature of the spoken or written

word, by the word's strictly intellectual concomitants, poetry, even

while rousing emotion, brings into play what is most different to

emotion, emotion's sifter and chastener, the great force which reduces

all things to abstraction, to the eternal and typical: reason. You

cannot express in words, even the most purely instinctive,

half-conscious feeling, without placing that dumb and blind emotion in

the lucid, balanced relations which thought has given to words;

indeed, words rarely, if ever, reproduce emotion as it is, but

instead, emotion as it is instinctively conceived, in its setting of

cause and effect. Hence there is in all poetry a certain reasonable

element which, even in the heyday of passion, makes us superior to

passion by explaining its why and wherefore; and even when the poet

succeeds in putting us in the place of him who feels, we enter only

into one-half of his personality, the half which contemplates while

the other suffers: we _know_ the feeling, rather than _feel_ it.

Now, it is different with music. Its relations to our nerves are such

that it can reproduce emotion, or, at all events, emotional moods,

directly and without any intellectual manipulation. We weep, but know

not why. Its specifically artistic emotion, the power it shares with

all other arts of raising our state of consciousness to something more

complete, more vast, and more permanent--the specific musical emotion

of music can become subservient to the mere awakening of our latent

emotional possibilities, to the stimulating of emotions often

undesirable in themselves, and always unable, at the moment, to find

their legitimate channel, whence enervation and perhaps degradation of

the soul. There are kinds of music which add the immense charm, the

subduing, victorious quality of art, to the power of mere emotion as

such; and in these cases we are pushed, by the delightfulness of

beauty and wonder, by the fascination of what is finer than ourselves,

into deeper consciousness of our innermost, primæval, chaotic self:

the stuff in which soul has not yet dawned. We are made to enjoy what

we should otherwise dread; and the dignity of beauty, and beauty's

frankness and fearlessness, are lent to things such as we regard,

under other circumstances, as too intimate, too fleeting, too obscure,

too unconscious, to be treated, in ourselves and our neighbours,

otherwise than with decorous reserve.

It is astonishing, when one realises it, that the charm of music, the

good renown it has gained in its more healthful and more decorous

days, can make us sit out what we do sit out under its influence:

violations of our innermost secrets, revelations of the hidden

possibilities of our own nature and the nature of others; stripping

away of all the soul's veils; nay, so to speak, melting away of the

soul's outward forms, melting away of the soul's active structure, its

bone and muscle, till there is revealed only the shapeless primæval

nudity of confused instincts, the soul's vague viscera.

When music does this, it reverts, I think, towards being the nuisance

which, before it had acquired the possibilities of form and beauty it

now tends to despise, it was felt to be by ancient philosophers and

law-givers. At any rate, it sells its artistic birthright. It

renounces its possibility of constituting, with the other great arts,

a sort of supplementary contemplated nature; an element wherein to

buoy up and steady those fluctuations which we express in speech; a

vast emotional serenity, an abstract universe in which our small and

fleeting emotions can be transmuted, and wherein they can lose

themselves in peacefulness and strength.

Laurus Nobilis: Chapters on Art and Life · 第 63 / 131 题