VI.

Those who can receive that lesson, that is to say, those in whom it

can expand and ramify to the fulness and complexity which is its very

essence. For it happens frequently enough that we learn only a portion

of this truth, which by this means is distorted into error. We accept

the æsthetic instinct as a great force of Nature; but, instead of

acknowledging it as our master, as one of the great lords of life, of

whom Emerson spoke, we try to make it our servant. We attempt to get

congruity between the details of our everyday existence, and refuse to

seek for congruity between ourselves and the life which is greater

than ours.

A friend of mine, who had many better ways of spending her money, was

unable one day to resist the temptation of buying a beautiful old

majolica inkstand, which, not without a slight qualm of conscience,

she put into a very delightful old room of her house. The room had an

inkstand already, but it was of glass, and modern. "This one is in

harmony with the rest of the room," she said, and felt fully justified

in her extravagance. It is this form, or rather this degree, of

æstheticism, which so often prevents our realising the higher æsthetic

harmonies. In obedience to a perception of what is congruous on a

small scale we often do oddly incongruous things: spend money we ought

to save, give time and thought to trifles while neglecting to come to

conclusions about matters of importance; endure, or even cultivate,

persons with whom we have less than no sympathy; nay, sometimes, from

a keen sense of incongruity, tune down our thoughts and feelings to

the flatness of our surroundings. The phenomenon of what may thus

result from a certain æsthetic sensitiveness is discouraging, and I

confess that it used to discourage and humiliate me. But the

philosophy which the prophetess of Mautineia taught Socrates settles

the matter, and solves, satisfactorily what in my mind I always think

of as the question of the majolica inkstand.

Diotima, you will remember, did not allow her disciple to remain

engrossed in the contemplation of one kind of beauty, but particularly

insisted that he should use various fair forms as steps by which to

ascend to the knowledge of ever higher beauties. And this I should

translate into more practical language by saying that, in questions

like that of the majolica inkstand, we require not a lesser

sensitiveness to congruity, but a greater; that we must look not

merely at the smaller, but at the larger items of our life, asking

ourselves, "Is this harmonious? or is it, seen in some wider

connection, even like that clumsy glass inkstand in the oak panelled

and brocade hung room?" If we ask ourselves this, and endeavour to

answer it faithfully--with that truthfulness which is itself an item

of _consistency_--we may find that, strange as it may seem, the glass

inkstand, ugly as it is in itself, and out of harmony with the

furniture, is yet more congruous, and that we actually prefer it to

the one of majolica.

And it is in connection with this that I think that many persons who

are really æsthetic, and many more who imagine themselves to be so,

should foster a wholesome suspicion of the theory which makes it a

duty to accumulate certain kinds of possessions, to seek exclusively

certain kinds of impressions, on the score of putting beauty and

dignity into our lives.

Put beauty, dignity, harmony, serenity into our lives. It sounds very

fine. But _can_ we? I doubt it. We may put beautiful objects,

dignified manners, harmonious colours and shapes, but can we put

dignity, harmony, or beauty? Can we put them into an individual life;

can anything be put into an individual life save furniture and

garments, intellectual as well as material? For an individual life,

taken separately, is a narrow, weak thing at the very best; and

everything we can put into it, everything we lay hold of for the sake

of putting in, must needs be small also, merely the chips or dust of

great things; or if it have life, must be squeezed, cut down, made so

small before it can fit into that little receptacle of our egoism,

that it will speedily be a dead, dry thing: thoughts once thought,

feelings once felt, now neither thought nor felt, merely lying there

inert, as a dead fact, in our sterile self. Do we not see this on all

sides, examples of life into which all the dignified things have been

crammed and all the beautiful ones, and which despite the statues,

pictures, poems, and symphonies within its narrow compass, is yet so

far from dignified or beautiful?

But we need not trouble about dignity and beauty coming to our life so

long as we veritably and thoroughly _live_; that is to say, so long as

we try not to put anything into our life, but to put our life into the

life universal. The true, expanding, multiplying life of the spirit

will bring us in contact, we need not fear, with beauty and dignity

enough, for there is plenty such in creation, in things around us, and

in other people's souls; nay, if we but live to our utmost power the

life of all things and all men, seeing, feeling, understanding for the

mere joy thereof, even our individual life will be invested with

dignity and beauty in our own eyes.

But furniture will not do it, nor dress, nor exquisite household

appointments; nor any of the things, books, pictures, houses, parks,

of which we can call ourselves owners. I say _call_ ourselves: for can

we be sure we really possess them? And thus, if we think only of our

life, and the decking thereof, it is only furniture, garments, and

household appointments we can deal with; for beauty and dignity cannot

be confined in so narrow a compass.

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