RIGORS OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM[35]
[Footnote 35: References: Marbot, Memoirs, ch. 28. Mahan:
Influence of Sea Power. Sloane: Political Science Quarterly,
The Continental System of Napoleon, XIII, pp. 213 _et seq._]
Measures of Ecclesiastical Procedure -- Reforms in the Church --
Napoleon as Suzerain of the Pope -- Methods of Defying the
Continental System -- Measures to Enforce it -- Rearrangement of
German Lands -- Napoleon as a Smuggler -- "Simulated Papers" --
Evasions of the Imperial Restrictions -- Visit to the Netherlands
-- Napoleon and his Brother Louis -- The Latter Defiant --
Louis's Negotiations with England -- Fouche's Interference -- His
Counterplot.
[Sidenote: 1810]
The consolidation of Napoleonic power appeared to be progressing
rapidly. In February a decree of the senate had declared the Papal
States to be divided into two French departments, under the names of
Rome and Trasimenus. The Eternal City was to give her name, as second
city of the Empire, to the imperial heir. The Pope, endowed with a
royal revenue of four millions, was to have a palace in each of
several different places, and reside, according to his choice, in any
one, or in all in turn. He was to swear that he would never contravene
the judgments of the Gallican Church, and his successors were each to
be similarly bound on their accession to office. Daunou wrote a book,
which was published at the Emperor's expense, maintaining the two
theses of Machiavelli: first, that the court of Rome had always used
its spiritual power to increase its temporal estate; secondly, that
its efforts had always been directed against the temporal power
strongest at the moment in Italy. Unconquerable as was the resistance
of Pius VII on the whole, he had nevertheless surrendered temporarily
at the beginning of what might be called the second quarrel of
investitures, by inducting into their offices the bishops nominated by
Napoleon. After he had been thrown into captivity, however, he flatly
refused to continue, and the Emperor cut the knot by installing in the
bishoprics, as they fell vacant, men of his own choice, under the
style of "vicars of the chapters."
This was but the initial step to an entire destruction of the
administrative scheme devised and perfected by the Roman hierarchy.
The college of cardinals had first been brought to Paris, and its
members then banished in pairs to the great provincial towns; the
ecclesiastical courts, with all their archives, were likewise
transplanted from Rome to the French capital; the thirty episcopates
of the two new French departments were reduced to four; the army of
foreign prelates which had been supported by the papal system was
dispersed into the various lands from which its members had come. The
number of Roman parishes, too, was reduced, and all the convents were
secularized. Such of the discharged priests as were ready to swear
allegiance to the Emperor and the Gallican Church received a small
pension; the rest--and they appear to have been in a majority--saw
their personal as well as ecclesiastical goods confiscated and were
themselves exiled.
These or similar measures being applied likewise to Piedmont, Liguria,
Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, the sums of money raised from
confiscated estates became enormous. A large proportion of these funds
flowed of course into the imperial coffers, and to this fact, as well
as to the restored public confidence, was largely due the rise in
prices on the stock exchange which occurred on the consummation of the
Austrian marriage. These sweeping changes were of great service to
true religion and to the lands in which they were made, breaking as
they did the chains of an ecclesiastical oppression under which the
populace had been reduced to poverty, ignorance, and apathy.
Unfortunately the new rule, while more economical than the old, was
not less arbitrary--military despotism being as little fitted for the
development of a people as the rule of a corporation. Men looked
aghast as the papacy and papal influence crumbled together, while the
seat of real ecclesiastical power was removed from the banks of the
Tiber to those of the Seine. Time seemed to be taking its revenge.
Seven centuries earlier Lothair had been the vassal of Innocent II;
Napoleon was now the suzerain of Pius VII. So contemptible had the
Pope become, even in the eyes of devout Catholics, that de Maistre
called the inflexible but supine Pontiff a punchinello of no
importance.
It had been clear since Trafalgar that though France might dominate
earth, air, and fire in Europe, she could not gain the mastery of the
sea and its islands, at least, by the ordinary means. The Emperor's
infatuation with the plausible scheme of destroying England's commerce
by paper blockades and by embargoes on British goods had not been
diminished either by his inconclusive struggle in Spain or by his
victory over Austria. It was in vain that he had changed his naval
policy from one of fleet-fighting to one of commerce-destroying; that
he had seized and was continuing to seize neutral vessels laden with
British wares; that he had expanded his political system by conquest
until he was nominally master of the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and
Baltic harbors. Since 1805 English trade with the Continent, so far
from diminishing, had steadily increased in the hands of
contrabandists and neutral carriers, until it had now reached annual
dimensions of twenty-five millions sterling. In spite of the Tilsit
alliance, even French soldiers occasionally wore English-made shoes
and clothing. English ships carried naval stores out of Russian
harbors, and colonial wares found their way from the wharves of Riga
to the markets of Mainz. But the chief offenders in defying Napoleon's
chimerical policy were the Dutch and Hanseatic cities. The resistance
elsewhere in the Continent was passive compared with the energetic
smuggling and the clandestine evasion of decrees which went on under
the eyes of the officials in places like Amsterdam and Hamburg.
These facts had not been concealed from the Emperor of the French at
any time, and he now made ready to enforce the threats which he had
uttered in the agony of the late wars. It had come to a life-or-death
struggle between the policies laid down respectively in the imperial
decrees and in the British orders in council. Neither measure was in
the strictest sense military, but it is easy to see that the two were
irreconcilable in their intent, while the success of either one meant
the ruin of the land which upheld the other. It was for the sake,
apparently, of waging this decisive though unwarlike contest that
Napoleon renounced leading his victorious legions into Spain for the
expulsion of English troops from the peninsula. What he himself called
the "Spanish ulcer" might weaken the French system, and one hundred
thousand good troops, together with the imperial guard, were to be
sent to heal it by overwhelming the great English general who had been
made Duke of Wellington, and by seizing Lisbon. But the English
commerce with the peninsula was slender in comparison with what she
carried on with the Baltic and with Holland through the connivance of
governments which were nominally her foes. The Continental System,
therefore, must first be repaired, and it was to convert a nominal
acquiescence into a real one that Davout was despatched to hold the
fortresses from Dantzic westward, while Oudinot was to coerce Holland.
With such purposes in view, the lands taken from Austria were
apportioned among Bavaria, Italy, Wuertemberg, and Baden. Each of these
vassal states was made to pay handsomely for its new acquisitions. The
principality of Ratisbon was given to Dalberg, the prince-primate, and
he in turn delivered that of Frankfort to Prince Eugene. The King of
Westphalia received Hanover and Magdeburg, promising in return about
ten millions a year of tribute, and engaging to support the eighteen
thousand French troops who occupied his new lands. The gradual
evacuation of South Germany began, and before long the entire
coast-land between the Elbe and the Weser was held by soldiers who had
fought at Essling and Wagram. Hamburg, Bremen, and the other Hanseatic
towns, East Friesland, Oldenburg, a portion of Westphalia, the canton
of Valais, and the grand duchy of Berg were destined very soon to be
incorporated with France in order to round out the imperial domain. It
might be possible for southern Europe to substitute flax and
Neapolitan cotton for American cotton, chicory for coffee, grape syrup
or beet sugar for colonial sugar, and woad for indigo, but the North
could not. Like Louis, though in a less degree, Murat and Jerome,
sympathizing with their peoples, had sinned against the Continental
System, and were soon to do penance for their sins by the loss of
important territories. But for the present the ostensible compliance
of the northern dependencies was accepted.
It is a curious and amusing fact that the great smuggler and real
delinquent was Napoleon himself. Even he felt the exigencies of France
to be so fierce that, by a system of licenses, certain privileged
traders were permitted to secure the supplies of dye-stuffs and
fish-oil essential to French industries by exporting to England both
wine and wheat in exchange. The licensed monopolists paid handsomely
for their privilege, not only in the sums which they publicly turned
over, but in those which lined the pockets of unscrupulous ministers
like Fouche, who winked at great irregularities not contemplated by
the immunities secured from Napoleon.
An evasion of the British orders in council analogous to that of the
French decrees was extensively practised, and licenses to neutral
traders were also issued by the English government. But it practised
more discretion, and the regulation of the extensive commerce which
resulted was not attended by those court and private scandals so rife
in France. The worst feature of the English procedure was its adoption
of the so-called "neutralization" system. Dutch, French, and Spanish
trading vessels had long been provided by their owners with forged
papers certifying a neutral origin, generally Prussian. To these both
captains and crews swore without compunction when searched by British
cruisers. This system England made her own, issuing not merely to
real, but also to sham neutrals, licenses which insured them against
search when laden with wares for or from English ports. The firms
which engaged in the trade--and after the removal of the
non-intercourse restrictions many of them were American--compounded
morality with legality, considering themselves perfectly reputable,
even though they continued to furnish "simulated papers"--that is,
prepared forgeries--to their ships as part of the regular outfit.
Such immoralities, inequalities, and absurdities were the necessary
consequence of a fight for the means of subsistence between two
combatants one of which had no hands and the other no feet. So
extensive was the traffic, however, that although England had found it
necessary, in consequence of the Spanish rebellion, to restrict her
paper blockade to the coasts of Holland, France, and northern Italy,
she nevertheless doubled her importations of naval stores during the
season of 1808, while the prices of wool, silk, and colonial wares
gave temporary promise of a revival of manufactures. As long as
Napoleon's energy was elsewhere engaged, the ubiquity of English
war-ships on the high seas rendered the use of "simulated papers"
inordinately profitable; and even after he began to give his undivided
attention to policing the harbors and guarding the coast-line, it
continued to be fairly so. It must further be remembered that in the
treaty which Russia made with Sweden on September seventeenth, 1809,
the latter country promised not only to cede Finland, but also to shut
out from her harbors all British ships except such as brought salt and
colonial wares. In January, 1810, Napoleon had made an agreement with
the same power that he would hand back Pomerania, but in return Sweden
was to import nothing but salt.
The Austrian marriage having now been consummated and Austria having
been added to his system, Napoleon was ready in June to open his novel
campaign and begin the commercial warfare which eventually furnished
one of the most important elements in his overthrow, the other two
being the national uprisings and the treachery of his friends, so
called. But the zenith had not even yet been reached by his star. It
was with undimmed sagacity and undiminished power that, accompanied by
his bride, he set out about the end of April from Compiegne, to visit
the Dutch frontier, his object being to observe how far Holland's
well-nigh open contempt for his cherished scheme would now justify the
destruction of her autonomy and the utter overthrow of her government.
The nominal purpose of the journey was to please the young Empress,
and to gratify the peoples of Belgium and Brabant by a sight of her
charms. This aim was observed in all the arrangements, but in
well-nigh every town visited the sun's first rays saw the Emperor on
horseback inspecting troops, ships, fortifications, and arsenals; and
when its last beams faded away the unwearied man was still holding
interviews with the local authorities, in which every detail of
administration was revised and strengthened. To all appearance the end
of the journey was as prosperous as its inception. Favors were
distributed with lavish hand, the people displayed a wild enthusiasm
when the affable but distant Empress showed herself, and nothing
occurred to mar the outward state in which the Emperor returned to
Paris. But the condition of his mind cannot be depicted, such was his
rage and humiliation in regard to a revelation of treachery made
inadvertently and innocently by Louis on the eve of their separation.
To explain what had occurred a short retrospect is necessary.
From earliest childhood certain qualities of Louis had endeared him to
Napoleon. The school of poverty, in which the younger brother had been
the pupil of the elder, was likewise a school of fraternal affection.
Throughout the Italian and Egyptian campaigns they stood in intimate
relations as general and aide-de-camp, and one of the earliest cares
of the First Consul was to bestow the beautiful Hortense de
Beauharnais on his favorite brother. In 1804 Louis was made general,
then councilor of state, and finally in 1806 he was elevated to the
throne of Holland. His child until its untimely death was cherished by
Napoleon as a son destined to inherit imperial greatness. But, like
the other royal Bonapartes, the King of Holland regarded his high
estate not as a gift from the Emperor, but as a right. He ruled the
land assigned him, if not in his own interest, at least not in that of
the Empire, and from the outset filled his letters with bitter
complaints of all that entered into his lot, not excepting his wife.
Napoleon admonished and threatened, but to no avail. The interests of
his own royalty and of the Dutch were nearer to Louis than those of
the Empire.
At last the Emperor hinted that the air of Holland did not agree with
its monarch, indicating that circumstances required it to be
incorporated with France. In March, 1808, he offered the crown of
Spain as a substitute. A little later the suggestion was made that
Louis might have the Hanseatic towns in exchange for Brabant and
Zealand. Both propositions were scouted. When we remember who the
potentates were, by whom such offers were made and refused, we seem
forced to dismiss all notions of patriotism, uprightness, and loyalty
as the motives of either, and must attribute Louis's course to
petulance. Napoleon was highly incensed. On the failure of the
Walcheren expedition, both Brabant and Zealand were occupied by French
troops, and Louis was summoned to Paris. His first desperate thought
was one of resistance, but on reflection he obeyed. On his arrival he
learned that his fate was imminent. Napoleon announced to the
legislature that a change in the relations with Holland was
imperative. The minister of the interior explained that, as being the
alluvium of three French rivers--namely, the Rhine, the Meuse, and the
Scheldt--that land was by nature a portion of France, one of the great
imperial arteries. Louis sought to fly, but was detained. He at once
despatched the Count de Bylandt with orders to close the Dutch
frontier fortresses and defend the capital against the French troops.
This was done, but Louis's defiance was short. After signing a treaty
which bound him, among other things, to open his fortresses, seize all
"neutralized," and even all neutral, vessels in his harbors, including
those of the United States,--a document which thus left him only a
nominal throne,--he was permitted early in April, 1810, to return to
Amsterdam.
Napoleon's subsequent course was dictated by what might appear to be a
sudden change of view, but was in reality a revival of his perennial
hopes for peace with England. Having in mind the annexation of
Holland, it occurred to him that by desisting from that measure he
might wrench from Great Britain the lasting peace which she had thus
far refused. Accordingly he ordered his brother to open a negotiation
with London and represent his kingdom as in danger of annihilation
unless the British government would consent to a cessation of
hostilities and an enduring treaty of peace. This was done, and though
Labouchere, Louis's agent, had so little to offer that his
propositions were farcical, yet there was at least the show of a
diplomatic negotiation. At this juncture the superserviceable
Mephistopheles of the Empire, Fouche, intervened. By an agent of his
own he approached the cabinet of St. James with an offer of peace on
the basis of restoring the Spanish Bourbons and compensating Louis
XVIII by a kingdom to be carved from the territories of the United
States!
The agent of Fouche reached London somewhat ahead of the one sent by
Louis. He was firmly sent to the right-about. Labouchere was then told
that before entering further on the question, a proposition for peace
must be formulated and presented, not by the King of Holland, but by
the Emperor. The failure of the Walcheren expedition had exasperated
England, Canning had fallen, and Lord Wellesley, his successor,
represented a powerful sentiment for the continuation of the war.
Napoleon replied, therefore, by a note suggesting not a definite
peace, but a step toward it. If England would withdraw the orders in
council of 1807, he would evacuate Holland and the Hanseatic towns.
His note closed with a characteristic threat. If England should delay,
having already lost her trade with Naples, Spain, Portugal, and the
port of Triest, she would now lose that with Holland, the Hanseatic
towns, and Sicily.
Nothing dismayed by his first rebuff, the audacious Fouche again
intervened. This time he selected Ouvrard, a friend of Labouchere's
and of his own, a man well known as a stormy petrel of intrigue, to
operate insidiously through the accredited envoy, who innocently
supposed his friend to be representing Napoleon's own views. There was
consequently but little sense of restraint in the renewed negotiation.
Virtually the entire continental situation was considered as open, and
Fouche's pet scheme of an American kingdom for Louis XVIII was further
amplified by the suggestion of an Anglo-French expedition to establish
it. Labouchere having returned to Holland, much of the negotiation had
been carried on by letter, and Napoleon, getting wind during his
Belgian visit of Ouvrard's presence at the Dutch court, suspected
trickery and called for the correspondence. Its very existence enraged
him; that such matters should have been put in writing was
compromising to his entire policy. Ouvrard afterward declared that he
personally informed the Emperor of what was going on, but he could
never prove it; the only possible basis which can be found for his
statement consists in the seizure and confiscation about this time of
some hundred and thirty American vessels lying in continental
harbors; but, base as that deed was, it proves nothing and was due to
another cause. It is not easy to determine whether this deed was a
well-considered measure of French diplomacy, intended to arouse the
pugnacity of the United States, or a temporary shift to fill empty
coffers. In either case it was not intended to have a direct bearing
on irregular diplomatic negotiations between England and Holland. The
circumstances were a direct result of the Berlin Decree.