ASPERN, ESSLING, AND WAGRAM[31]
[Footnote 31: See Marbot: Memoirs. Smekal: Die Schlacht bei
Aspern und Essling. Strobl: Aspern und Wagram. Cadet de
Gassicourt: Voyage en Autriche. Schmoelzer: Hofer und seine
Kampfgenossen.]
The Marchfeld -- Tactics of the Two Armies -- The Battle in
Aspern and Essling -- The Indecisive Result -- Napoleon's Retreat
-- Character of the Battle -- Discontent in the French Army --
The Spirit of Austria -- Preparations to Renew the Conflict --
The French Army on the Lobau -- Napoleon's New Tactics -- The
First Day of Wagram -- Napoleon's Use of Artillery -- The Second
Day of Wagram -- The Victory Dearly Bought -- A French Panic --
Napoleon's Dilemma.
Charles, having apparently determined to let his enemy cross
unmolested, and to fight the decisive battle on his own ground, had
advanced meantime to still another line of hamlets--Strebersdorf,
Gerasdorf, Deutsch-Wagram. On the morning of the twenty-first
Napoleon's army was partly across the main stream, some of his troops
being yet on the Lobau, some entirely over on the left bank, but a
large portion still on the right bank. His cavalry was again sent to
clear the Marchfeld of the Austrian light horse, who were coursing
from one vantage-point to another; and he himself, in order to survey
the country, advanced to the first slight rise beyond the low meadows
which border the river. Near where he stood was the comfortable hamlet
of Aspern, composed like the others round about of one-story stone
houses and high stone barns, some of which are of great size, with
walls many feet thick. The farmsteads and churchyards are inclosed
with ordinary masonry walls. At a short distance to the eastward lay
Essling, which, like Aspern, had a few hundred inhabitants, and
farther still, but easily visible, the somewhat larger village of
Enzersdorf. The plain, though not rolling, is yet not perfectly flat,
and small watercourses traverse it at frequent intervals, their
direction marked by the trees growing on their banks. The most
important of these, the Russbach, was some miles north of where he
stood. Turning to Massena, after scanning the ground, he said: "I
shall refuse on the left, and advancing on the right, turn in the
Austrian front to the left." That is, he would leave his own left on
the river, turn the Austrian left, and rolling up their line, inclose
them with their rear to the Danube. His success would be their
annihilation, for they had no means of crossing in retreat.
To men of less daring this would have seemed a mad plan. A careful
general would, without hesitation, have seized and strongly garrisoned
Aspern, Essling, and Enzersdorf, in order that his own line of retreat
might be secure, and sufficient room be assured in which to deploy.
Pelet, in his memoirs, declares that the Emperor's orders were "to
cross the river and march against the enemy." Be this as it may, there
were as yet only three infantry divisions on the left bank of the
Danube, and Aspern was but weakly garrisoned. Charles was determined
to maintain if possible his superiority of numbers. The river was
somewhat swollen and he sent floats laden with stones down the main
channel to crash through Napoleon's bridges. The attempt met with only
slight success, though it weakened the most important bridge. Meantime
the Austrians were advancing in five columns, one by Breitenlee
against Aspern, one by Aderklaa against Essling, one direct on
Enzersdorf to their left; the two others were cavalry, and bore in
the general direction of Breitenlee toward Aspern. They appeared in
full sight about one o'clock, the column destined to attack Napoleon
being nearest. Napoleon's over-confidence disappeared at once, and
while the Austrians deployed for the attack, and occupied Aspern, he
sent in Molitor's division to seize and hold that hamlet, Massena
being in command. The divisions of Legrand and Boudet were in the
rear, on the right and left respectively. Bessieres, with the cavalry
of Lasalle and Espagne, stood between Aspern and Essling; the division
of Carra Saint-Cyr arrived later and was held in reserve. Lannes and
Boudet, with a small force, were ordered to hold Essling. Enzersdorf
was abandoned, and quickly occupied by the Austrian left.
The fighting at Aspern was awful. The French pushed in, were driven
out, then turned and seized the place again. Once more, and still once
more, the same alternation of success and defeat was repeated, the
thickest of the fight being at the churchyard in the western end of
the village. At Essling the fore-post about which the battle raged was
a great barn with mighty walls and vaulted cellars. Meanwhile the
Emperor was calling in his troops as fast as possible from behind, but
at three in the afternoon his main bridge over the chief arm of the
Danube gave way before masses of rubbish brought down from the
hill-country by a freshet, which was hourly increasing in volume. The
Austrians were from first to last superior in numbers on the
battle-field; their enfilading batteries were able to sweep the French
lines for several hours, and the carnage was dreadful. At last
Bessieres succeeded in dislodging them from Essling, and by great
exertion that place was held until dusk, when the Austrians drew off
to bivouac. But at Aspern the numbers engaged were greater, Legrand
being sent in toward nightfall. The Archduke intended to take and hold
the village if possible, and the fighting continued there until
midnight. Weakened and inferior in numbers though the French were,
they understood better than their foes the defense of such a place,
and when firing ceased they still held half of the long main street.
[Illustration: Battle of Aspern or Essling. 21st of May 1809.]
[Illustration: Battle of Aspern or Essling. 22nd of May 1809.]
By midnight the French bridge was again repaired, and Davout, in
response to Napoleon's urgent orders, began to bring up
reinforcements, especially artillery, holding them on the south shore
of the main stream in readiness for crossing. At two in the morning
the Austrians made still another effort to drive out the enemy from
Aspern; soon afterward they again attacked Essling. Massena called in
Carra Saint-Cyr to Aspern; within an hour both attacks had been
repulsed, and the latter hamlet was entirely cleared of the enemy.
While the desperate struggle again went on, the Emperor once more
surveyed the field; and when at seven in the morning Davout sent word
that a portion of the reinforcements was already on the Lobau,
Napoleon determined to break through the enemy's center, and for that
purpose threw forward the troops already on the ground. But once more
the weakened and patched structure over the Danube gave way, and the
arrival of reinforcements was stopped; the available French force was
immediately drawn back, and stationed to hold the line from Aspern to
Essling. The enemy was encouraged and pressed on to the attack with
renewed vigor; in the former village the scenes of the previous day
were repeated, first one and then the other contestant holding it for
a time. In the center, where the Austrians almost broke through the
line, Napoleon quickly brought together his recently arrived artillery
and Bessieres's cavalry; after terrific struggles they succeeded in
holding the Austrians in check. On the right Essling, after being
captured and recaptured several times by each side, was taken and long
held by the enemy's left; it was then retaken at about three in the
afternoon, by a portion of the French reserve, Napoleon's "young
guard." Thereupon, from the sheer exhaustion of both sides, the
conflict ceased, nothing being heard but desultory discharges of
artillery. The French were in possession of both Aspern and Essling.
At seven the Emperor called a council of war; the generals advised
recrossing the Danube and a retreat into Vienna. "You must mean to
Strasburg," said their chief; "for if Charles should follow, he might
drive me thither, and if he should march to cut me off at Linz, I must
march thither, too, to meet him. In either case, I must abandon the
capital, my only source of supplies." There was no reply, and it was
determined to withdraw into the Lobau, and hold it until a stronger
bridge could be constructed and Davout bring over his entire force.
After two days of terrific defensive fighting,--so terrific that the
Austrians were several times on the point of retreat,--Napoleon was
obliged to abandon the field.
The night of May twenty-second was the beginning of such bitterness
for the French emperor as he had not yet tasted. His enemy's forces
numbered about seventy thousand, his own perhaps forty-five thousand;
but this was entirely his own fault, due largely to overweening
confidence in himself and a weak contempt for foes who, after a long
and severe novitiate, now fought like veteran Frenchmen, and were led
by one who had learned the lessons of Napoleon's own strategy. Five
times Essling had been lost and won; how often Aspern had been
captured and retaken could only be estimated. Both hamlets were now
abandoned by the French. The last Austrian charge against the center
had been made and repelled with fiery valor, but in it Lannes was
mortally wounded. The grand total, therefore, of the two days was a
loss of gallant troops by the thousand, and of this marshal,
Napoleon's greatest division general, the friend of his youth, and the
only surviving one that was both fearless and honest. Worse even than
this, the "unconquerable," though not conquered, had been checked, and
that, too, not in a corner, as in Spain or at Eylau, but in the sight
of all Europe, on a field chosen by himself.
As the war-sick Emperor passed the litter on which lay his old
comrade, he threw himself on the living but maimed and half-conscious
form in an agony of tenderness; and that night, as he sat at table
before an untasted meal, briny tears rolled over cheeks which did not
often know the sensation. But the bulletin which he dictated ran, "The
enemy withdrew to their position, and we remained masters of the
field." This latter clause was exactly as true of the French at Aspern
as it had been of the Russians at Eylau--the affair was a technical
victory, a moral defeat. The Austrians celebrated the battle as their
victory, the honors of which they accorded to the last cavalry charge
under Prince John Liechtenstein; and in the peaceful churchyard at
Aspern lies the effigy of a majestic lion stricken to the heart, as a
reminder to patriotic Austrians of those two days' victorious
fighting, which literally drenched the spot with blood. "We could not
use the victory," wrote Charles's chief of staff on the twenty-fourth;
"for the enemy's strong position made pursuit impossible." This he
well knew, because the night before the Austrians had tried with
signal failure to dislodge the French army from the Lobau.
The respective feelings of the two forces are mirrored in two facts.
On the twenty-third Napoleon again visited Lannes, who was now fully
conscious and aware that he was doomed. He was as fearless as ever and
with the stern candor of an old republican poured out to the Emperor
all that he felt. The army, he said, was weary of bloodshed, the
nation of its sense of exhaustion; for both were alike aware that they
suffered and bled no longer for a principle, but for the boundless
ambition of one man. The veteran marshal refused all sympathy or
consolation, and turned his face to the wall. Both Marbot and Pelet
declare that this story of Cadet de Gassicourt is an invention; if so,
it is a clever one, for we know from other sources that the language
ascribed to Lannes expressed the sentiments of the soldiery. As there
was little chance for booty in such rapid marching and constant
fighting, the youth and the poor were disheartened. The great fortunes
won by the officers were of little use while peace was denied for
their enjoyment; the millions of Massena did not save him from the
exposures and hardships of the battle-field, and he confessed that he
loved luxury and immoral self-indulgence. Such voices had created an
undercurrent of discontent.
The feeling of Charles and his soldiers was not greatly different.
There was nothing possible as the result of their victory but to take
up a more comfortable position on the same Marchfeld which had
witnessed their losses. Before them were the bodies of ten thousand
dead and four times that number had been wounded: losses which were
about equally divided between their brethren and their foes. The
Archduke urged that now was the time for diplomacy. The battle of
Aspern had softened Napoleon, he said, and Austria might secure an
advantageous peace. But Francis had not changed his nature; he would
await the final decision. His brother Ferdinand would soon arrive from
Poland, and John was already in Hungary. To Frederick William III he
had offered Warsaw if Prussia would only come to his assistance. But
the King of Prussia was stubborn. Fearing lest Austria should secure
German leadership, and expecting in the end to gain more from Russia,
he refused, in spite of the earnest advice of all his ministers, to
assist his rival. It was only when he was assured that Alexander
intended to remain neutral that he consented to a secret armament, but
then it was too late. The insurrection in Westphalia, to assist which
Schill, in disobedience of orders, had led his battalion of hussars
from Berlin, was easily suppressed. This fact, with Napoleon's signal
success in Bavaria, seemed to justify Frederick William, and the
failure of Francis to secure any advantage after Aspern confirmed the
opinion. Such, however, was the temper of the Prussian people that,
under moral compulsion, their King finally proposed formal terms of
alliance. Austria's real spirit appeared in her vague answer. She
first asked England for more assistance, but failing to secure it,
turned ungraciously and with indefinite proposals to Prussia. Her
envoy of course found no response. Thus it was that Charles and
Napoleon lay for weeks watching each other like gladiators, each ready
to take advantage of any false step made by the other, and both
steadily gathering strength to renew the struggle in the same arena.
Napoleon seemed to make his preparations with a determination to risk
all in the next encounter. His line of communication with the west was
abandoned altogether; the Tyrol, too, was virtually evacuated, and
Lefebvre, with the Bavarians, relieved Vandamme and Bernadotte at
Linz, so that both the latter might at once advance within striking
distance. Eugene had reached Bruck in Styria, and was therefore at
hand; Marmont with ten thousand men was called from Illyria. Being
thus safe toward the south, the Emperor sent two divisions to watch
the Austrians at Presburg. Before June tenth he had compacted in and
about Vienna an army of two hundred and forty thousand men. On the
thirteenth the Archduke John, having turned and advanced toward Raab,
was attacked, defeated, and driven back into Hungary by Eugene, who
had learned, if not generalship, at least obedience, and having
carefully obeyed his stepfather's injunctions, had thus won an
important victory.
Meantime all was activity on the Lobau. A new and solid bridge was
built across the main stream. To forestall another such accident as
had occurred before, this structure was not only protected by piles,
but guarded by rowboats which were armed with field-pieces and manned
by artillerymen. The enemy had withdrawn behind the Russbach in a line
from Deutsch-Wagram to Markgrafneusiedl, leaving only a corps to
fortify the old line from Aspern to Essling. In consequence the
Emperor entirely changed his plan. The island of Lobau was first
strongly fortified, and then, not one, but numerous bridges were
constructed to the mainland on the left bank under cover of the guns.
Lower down similar measures were taken. In this way the French troops
could effect their passage very rapidly and much farther eastward than
before, avoid the Aspern-Essling line, and reaching Enzersdorf under
protection of their own forts, turn the enemy's left almost in the act
of crossing, and so roll up the left wing of his line, which was
strongly posted on high ground behind the Russbach, from
Markgrafneusiedl through Parbasdorf toward Wagram, where it was
connected with the center. These arrangements were all completed by
July first, on which date the Emperor left Schoenbrunn for the Lobau.
During the fighting at Aspern he had observed the field from the
swinging rungs of a rope-ladder fastened to one of the tall trees on
the island. This time he brought with him a long step-ladder, one of
those used in the palace gardens to trim high shrubs. The Archduke
John was now in Presburg; the Archduke Charles had raised his numbers
to a hundred and thirty thousand men. On and near the Lobau were a
hundred and eighty thousand French soldiers; twenty-two thousand more
were behind.
It was the fifth before all the preliminary moves were successfully
taken. The passage had been safely accomplished during the previous
night exactly as had been planned, a feint against Aspern having
thrown the Austrians on a false scent. In the morning, therefore, the
two lines were arrayed opposite, but somewhat obliquely, to each
other, the French right overlapping the Austrian left beyond
Enzersdorf as far as Wittau, so as either to prevent the approach of
Archduke John or to outflank the Austrian left according to
circumstances. The French center was thus in front of the Austrian
left, and Massena, with the French left resting on the Danube, was to
attack the Austrian center at the village of Gerasdorf, while
Bernadotte and Eugene were to throw themselves on Charles's left,
which stretched behind the Russbach from Wagram to Markgrafneusiedl.
Napoleon waited for some hours while scouts reconnoitered toward
Presburg. Being assured about five that John had not left that city
nor given any signs of moving, he prepared his columns, and about
seven in the evening ordered the onset.
Massena made a vigorous effort to hold the enemy's center and right,
while Napoleon launched his own center and right against the positions
held by his opponent's left. For some hours there was vigorous
fighting, but Charles saw the Emperor's manoeuver, and swiftly
throwing his reserve from behind Gerasdorf into his left, gained time
to call up reinforcements from his right at the Bisamberg. Bernadotte
moved slowly, and did not render his force effective at the crucial
moment. Napoleon was much incensed by his apparent sluggishness. An
attack made at seven against Wagram by Oudinot failed. This hamlet was
the key of the Austrian position, forming as it did the angle of their
line, and the fighting there was desperate. By nine o'clock the French
were thrown back all along, and compelled to resume the positions they
had held in the morning. At eleven a last attempt was made by Eugene
and Bernadotte on Wagram, but like the other it was bloody and
useless. At the council-fire that evening the leaders of the French
left and center were ordered to move farther to the right, and to
concentrate next morning on the positions behind the Russbach. About
dawn the change was made, and before sunrise all was ready, the
Emperor having passed a sleepless night on his tiger-skin behind the
bivouac fire in front of his tent.
[Illustration: Battle of Wagram. Positions July 5th 1809.]
But Charles did not wait to be attacked. With new courage and added
confidence he ordered his right, under Klenau, to follow down the
Danube against the enemy's weakened left, which might thus be turned,
while with the break of day his center advanced against Massena. For a
time the Austrians carried all before them, and Massena retreated step
by step until it appeared as if the tables would be turned and
Napoleon overwhelmed by his own tactics. Both Aspern and Essling were
taken, and then, turning north, the united Austrian center and right
entirely surrounded the French left and attacked it on the flank. They
thought themselves victorious, when unexpectedly the heavy artillery
on the Lobau opened fire upon them, and they began to waver. At this
crisis the great artillerist brought into action the strong
batteries of his own arm which he had so carefully prepared. Lauriston
was chosen to carry out the decisive movement, and his splendid
conduct not merely secured the victory, but made it overwhelming.
According to the most conservative estimate, there were under his
command one hundred field-pieces,--sixty from the guard,--and these
were supported by cavalry and cuirassiers; some estimate the number of
guns at four hundred, but this is manifestly a wild exaggeration. As
the artillery rolled up and unlimbered, volleys of shot, shell, and
grape began to follow in swift succession, and in a short time the
enemy's pursuit was not only stayed, but with the approach of
Macdonald's infantry to form a new flank it was turned into retreat.
The Austrians made one gallant stand, but were finally forced back to
the foot of the Bisamberg.
Meantime Davout had attacked the left. While he fought he was steadily
reinforced, until at one time, about midday, over a third of the army
was concentrated under his command. The Austrians opposed to them
could not, even with their vantage of high ground, withstand the ever
stronger pressure, and slowly rolled back northward in a curve. Eugene
captured Wagram, and then turned in that direction to unite with
Macdonald, whose division had joined that of Wrede, and had been
steadily pushing back the enemy's line toward the same point. They
were supported by Davout and Oudinot. The Austrians on the right were
then once more dislodged and compelled to withdraw on the highway to
Bruenn. It was about two in the afternoon. Davout had been ordered to
wait for a signal to make the decisive advance. It was given, and as
Oudinot rushed up the heights at Parbasdorf, his comrade appeared from
Markgrafneusiedl, driving the enemy before him. A breach in the
opposing line was made at once, and the whole Austrian wing, being
thus disorganized, hurried back to reform if possible beyond Wagram,
cross the Russbach, and join the main army. They were successful. The
French right halted just beyond the village which gave its name to the
battle. Lasalle, a brilliant light-horse general, was killed in the
last charge, and both armies bivouacked for the night. Next morning
Charles withdrew toward Znaim, Massena, Davout, and Marmont following
with the van of Napoleon's army. Several skirmishes took place between
portions of the Austrian rear and various corps of the French van, in
which the latter were decidedly checked. Marmont was obliged to assume
the defensive under the walls of Znaim. The Austrian losses at the
battle of Wagram were computed at twenty-four thousand, including
seven hundred and fifty-three officers. Those of the French were
certainly not less, if we include seven thousand who were taken
prisoners. They lost, moreover, twelve standards and eleven guns.
In the early hours of July sixth, Charles had despatched an adjutant
to Presburg with orders to the Archduke John to march at once and
attack the enemy's rear. The story at first accepted was that the
messenger found the bridges over the river March destroyed, and
arrived six hours too late for his errand to be successful. There
were, however, many at the time who attributed criminal negligence to
John, among them his own brother, the commander-in-chief. For a time,
by means of court intrigue and persistent misrepresentation, the blame
was put, not on John, but on Charles, but eventually the former was
found guilty and banished to Styria. Had the latter's plan succeeded,
Napoleon would have had a different task--a task so difficult that the
issue of the battle might well have been doubtful, if not disastrous.
As it was, the victory was dearly bought, and the Austrians were not
demoralized.
On the other hand, in the very hour of victory the French, who had
halted to take breath, were thrown into a panic by the appearance of a
few Austrian pickets from the Archduke John's army, then coming up,
and thousands of the victorious soldiers fled in wild demoralization
toward the Danube. John, whose appearance but a short time earlier
would have turned his brother's defeat into victory, drew back his
thirteen thousand men in good order to guard Hungary. As Napoleon
himself had been in a dangerous condition of over-confidence before
Aspern, so now his soldiery were clearly in the same plight.
Self-conceit had made them unreliable. Bernadotte's corps had
displayed something very much like cowardice and mutiny at the last.
The army still fought in the main like the perfect machine it was, but
the individual men had lost their stern virtue. They believed that
victory, plunder, and self-indulgence were the fair compensations of
their toils. Ungirt and freed from the restraints of discipline, they
gave signs that the petulance, timidity, and unruliness which had been
manifested in Poland and Prussia were not diminished.
Their Emperor, if his vision had been unclouded, would have
understood that endurance, suffering, and privation would make such
men an untrustworthy dependence in the hour of need. How changed he
was himself is clear from the fact that Bonaparte would never have
rested until his foe was disorganized and overpowered, while Napoleon
saw himself forced to treat with an opponent who, though beaten, was
still undaunted and active. If the victor had been fighting for life,
his position would have been morally strong; fighting as a
world-conqueror, it was illogical; fighting as equal with equal to
repel aggression, it was comprehensible. This last was the attitude
into which he was forced by the campaign of Aspern, Essling, Wagram.
Francis, whose power he had meant to crush, upon whom a few short
weeks before he had heaped insult and abuse, had turned out a most
dangerous foe. Technically conquered, it would not be well for his
opponent to try conclusions with him again in the still uncertain
position of the Napoleonic power. Rather reap the field secured, the
daunted conqueror reasoned, than risk devastation by grasping for
more. This, and no other, is the explanation of that remarkable
somersault in Napoleon's diplomacy which followed in the next few
weeks.