CHAPTER VI

THE PATH OF NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE[13]

[Footnote 13: References: Jauffret: Memoires historiques sur

les affaires ecclesiastiques de France pendant les premieres

annees du XIXe siecle. Thorsoe: Den danske Statspolitiske

Historie 1800-1864. Lemoine: Napoleon et les Juifs. Lemann:

Napoleon et les Israelites; La preponderance juive.]

Napoleon and the Neutral Powers -- The Protectorate of Portugal

and the End of Etruria -- Annexation of the Papal Legations --

Seizure of the Danish Fleet by Great Britain -- The Degradation

of Spain -- Godoy's Impolicy -- The Spanish Court and the Heir

Apparent -- Effects of the Russian Alliance in Paris --

Napoleon's Commentary on the Treaty -- His Administrative Wisdom

-- Public Works in France -- The Jews in France -- The Sanhedrim

-- Napoleon's Successful Reforms -- War Indemnities and Finance

-- Annoyances of the Continental System.

But in order to fulfil the purposes and realize the possibilities

which were indicated in the treaties of Tilsit, no time was to be

lost. The fate of Sweden and the Hanse towns having been virtually

settled, there remained three small maritime states in Europe which

still maintained a nominal neutrality--Denmark, Portugal, and Etruria.

One and all, they must choose between England and France. To each a

summons was to be addressed, and Napoleon wrote the preliminary

directions at Dresden. Between the lines of his despatches it was

clear that the precious naval armaments of all three powers--ships,

arsenals, stores, and men--must be put at the disposal of France. "A

thing must needs be done before the announcement of your plan," was

one of Napoleon's own principles, and it was his intention so to

proceed in this case. At Dresden, also, was promulgated the new

constitution of Warsaw. Modeled on that of France, it was far from

liberal; but it abolished serfdom, made all citizens equal before the

law, and introduced the civil code.

In 1804 Portugal had purchased her neutrality for the duration of the

war with the sum of sixteen million francs. She was now ordered to

close her ports to the British, to seize all their goods and ships,

and finally to declare war against Great Britain. Junot, formerly

imperial ambassador at Lisbon, was despatched with twenty-seven

thousand men, designated as a "corps of observation," to be ready on

the frontier to enforce the command. In reply, England seized the

Portuguese fleet, and kept it in security until the close of the war.

During the late campaigns in Poland and Prussia, King Louis of Etruria

had died, and his helpless widow, the Spanish infanta, Maria Louisa,

acting as regent for her young son, had admitted the English to the

harbor of Leghorn. Prince Eugene was now ordered to take another

"corps of observation" of six thousand men, and drive them out. He did

so promptly. Duroc at once suggested to the Spanish minister that

Napoleon would like some proposition for the indemnification of Maria

Louisa for the loss of Etruria--say one portion of Portugal for her,

and the rest for Godoy, the Prince of the Peace.

This "deformity" removed from the Italian peninsula, it revealed a

still greater one--the fact that the Papal States disturbed the

connection between the two kingdoms of Italy and Naples. Pius VII,

returning disillusioned and embittered after the coronation ceremony,

and finding that his temporal weapons had failed him, had taken a

stand with his spiritual armor. It has already been recalled that he

began to refuse everything Napoleon desired,--the coronation as

Western emperor, the extension of the Concordat to Venice, the

confirmation of bishops appointed in France and Italy by the temporal

power, the annulment of Jerome's marriage, the recognition of Joseph's

royalty,--except in return for a guarantee of his own independence and

neutrality; in short, he feebly abjured the French alliance and all

its works. There now came a demand from Napoleon that henceforth there

should be as many French cardinals as Roman, that the agents of

hostile powers should be banished from the Papal States, and that the

papal ports should be closed to England. The Emperor was weary, too,

of the petty squabbles in connection with the Church, of the threats

to excommunicate him and declare his throne vacant. Did they mean to

put him in a convent and whip him like Louis the Pious? If not, let

the full powers of an ambassador be sent to the cardinal legate at

Paris; in any case, let there be an end to menaces. At the same time

Eugene showed to Pius a personal letter from his stepfather, which,

though marked confidential, was intended to be thus shown. It

contained the threat that the Emperor contemplated calling a council

of the Gallican, Italian, German, and Polish churches to liberate

those peoples from the domination of Roman priests. The Pontiff was

terrified, and hastened to yield the most pressing demands made in the

message which he had himself received, among them the nomination of a

negotiator. But he childishly refused the letter of the Emperor's

demand, and commissioned, not the French cardinal legate at Paris, but

an Italian cardinal. Napoleon notified the See that he would treat

only with Bayanne, the French cardinal at Paris, and that longer

dallying would compel him to annex Ancona, Urbino, and Macerata to

the kingdom of Italy. Pius yielded at once, nominating Bayanne,

agreeing to enter the federation with France, and promising to crown

Napoleon; but the annexation took place quite as expeditiously as the

surrender--was, in fact, complete before it!

Of the three minor sea powers, Denmark, commanding as she did the

gateway of the Baltic, was far the most important. Bernadotte was

already on her borders with an army. She was notified by him that she

must declare war against England immediately, or lose all her

continental possessions. Her government promised to obey, but

procrastinated. It has been claimed that English spies at Tilsit had

caught scraps of the bargain contained in the secret articles, and

that the Portland cabinet, in which Canning was secretary for foreign

affairs and Castlereagh for war and the colonies, had divined the

rest. It is now known that Canning believed there were no secret

articles, but was convinced that the two emperors had reached a secret

understanding hostile to England.[14] During the summer the ministry

received what they called the most positive information--what was its

extent and how it was obtained have never been made known--that the

French intended to invade Holstein and force Denmark to close the

Sound to British commerce. The danger seemed imminent: the Danish

fleet contained no fewer than twenty ships of the line, eighteen

frigates, nine brigs, and a number of gunboats. Such a reinforcement

of the French navy would put it again on a war footing. The English

ministry, therefore, offered to defend Denmark, guarantee her

colonies, and give her every means of defense, naval, military,

pecuniary, if only she would surrender her fleet to England, to be

restored in the event of peace. The Danish regent was already

committed to France, and did not accept. Accordingly the English army

under Cathcart landed, and laid siege to Copenhagen, while the fleet

bombarded it for three days, until the government agreed to their

stipulations. This shameful deed of high-handed violence must be laid

at Canning's door. It was the first step in the humiliation of a fine

people, to their loss of Norway, and ultimately of Schleswig and

Holstein. Moreover, it was impolitic in the highest degree, making the

Czar a bitter enemy of England for four years. The wretched country,

in distraction, threw itself into the arms of Bernadotte. Christian

VII had long been an imbecile, and his son, Frederick VI, though

energetic and well-meaning, turned Denmark into another vassal state

of France by the treaty of Fontainebleau, signed October thirtieth,

1807.

[Footnote 14: See discussion of this question by J. H. Rose,

"A British Agent at Tilsit," in English Historical Review,

Oct., 1901.]

In none of their many sovereignties had the incapacity of the Bourbons

been more completely demonstrated than in Spain. With intermittent

flickerings, the light of that famous land had been steadily growing

dimmer ever since Louis XIV exultingly declared that the Pyrenees had

ceased to exist. Stripped of her colonial supremacy, shattered in

naval power, reduced to pay tribute to France, she looked silently on

while Napoleon trafficked with her lands, mourning that even the

memory of her former glories was fading out in foreign countries. The

proud people themselves had, however, never forgotten their past; with

each successive humiliation their irritation grew more extreme, and

soon after Trafalgar they made an effort to organize under the crown

prince against the scandalous regime of Godoy. Both parties sought

French support, and the quarrel was fomented from Paris until the

whole country was torn by the most serious dissensions.

When, in the previous year, Prussia declared war, and the French

legions were about to face those trained in the school of Frederick

the Great, a vigorous attempt was made by the Russian envoy in Madrid

to win the support of Spain for the coalition. England, too, at the

same moment, threatened to make the South American colonies

independent if she did not consent. Godoy was persuaded that Napoleon

had at last found his match, if not his master, and on October

fourteenth issued a manifesto couched for the most part in ambiguous

terms, but clearly announcing war as an immediate necessity. By a

strange coincidence, its date was that of the day on which was fought

the battle of Jena, and after hearing the news of that event the

Prince of the Peace hastened to make his submission in the name of the

King. Napoleon turned pale as he read the news of the contemplated

defection, which reached him at Berlin; he never forgave the

treachery, although for the time he feigned ignorance of its

existence. The renewal of Charles IV's submission gave him the

opportunity to demand that the Spanish fleet should proceed to Toulon,

that the King should send fifteen thousand men to oppose a possible

English landing at the mouth of the Elbe, and at the same time

undertake the sustenance of twenty-five thousand Prussian prisoners of

war, while thenceforward he must rigidly enforce the embargo on

English trade in all Spanish ports and markets.

These demands the weak and contemptible government could not resist.

Godoy and the Queen resumed their scandalous living, while the King

joined in a conspiracy to cut off his son Ferdinand from the

succession. The young prince had the people's sympathy; but although

he had sought Napoleon's favor, and wished to marry the Empress

Josephine's niece, there was no response, and he remained impotent

before an administration apparently supported by France. He was, in

the sequel, arrested on a charge of conspiring against his father's

life. Before the summer of 1807 closed, everything was ripe for

Napoleon's contemplated intervention to "regenerate" Spain.

Such was the harvest of Tilsit in the field of foreign relations--a

harvest which to the last the Emperor claimed that Talleyrand had

sown. As to its effect in France, Metternich, then Austrian ambassador

in Paris, declared that men sat in the cafes coldly discussing an

entire reconstruction of Europe--two empires, and seventeen new

kingdoms with new sovereigns either from or in the interest of the

imperial houses! "Rhapsodies," he said, "which proved that all Europe

might crumble without exciting a single emotion of sorrow,

astonishment, or satisfaction in a people degraded beneath all others,

beneath all imagination, and which, worn out, demoralized to the point

where every trace of even national feeling is wiped out, by nineteen

years of revolution and crimes, now looks on with cold-blooded

indifference at what is passing beyond its own frontiers. Wise men

think that the treaties, being as advantageous to Russia as to France,

necessarily contain a germ which in developing will prove dangerous to

the latter." In reality there was not now a state in Europe toward

which the French empire did not stand in strained relations, not a

nationality besides the French which did not feel its self-respect

wounded, and resent the abasement.

This, however, was not the panorama which the Emperor unfolded in

Paris. He reached St. Cloud quietly on the evening of July

twenty-seventh. The people of Paris learned the news incidentally, and

burst into spontaneous rejoicings, illuminating the city, and sending

addresses in which the terms of adulation were exhausted. Napoleon was

no longer an actor in merely human history: he was a man of the

heroic age; he was beyond admiration; nothing but love could rise to

his lofty place. On August sixteenth the Emperor opened the

legislature in person. "Since your last session," he said, "new wars,

new triumphs, new treaties, have changed the face of Europe." If the

house of Brandenburg still reigned, he continued, it was due to the

sincere friendship he felt for the Czar. A French prince would rule on

the Elbe, and would know how to conciliate his subjects, while ever

mindful of his most sacred duties. Saxony had recovered her

independence, the peoples of Dantzic and the duchy of Warsaw their

country and their rights. All nations rejoiced to see the direful

influence of England destroyed. France was united to the Confederation

of the Rhine by its laws, by the federative system to the countries of

Holland, Switzerland, and Italy; her new relations with Russia were

cemented by reciprocal esteem. In all this, he affirmed, his pole-star

had been the happiness of his people, dearer to him than his own

glory. He would like maritime peace, and for its sake would overlook

the exasperations caused by a people tossed and torn by party strife.

Whatever happened, he would be worthy of his people, as they had shown

themselves to be worthy of him. Their behavior in his absence had only

increased his esteem for their character. He had thought of several

measures to simplify and perfect their institutions.

This picture of martial and political renown, painted by a master who

had on one campaign changed the meaning of his title from its

primitive sense of military ruler to its later and grander one of

chief among and over princes, thus realizing the revival of the

Western Empire, could not but please the fancy and arouse the

enthusiasm of a generous, imaginative, forgiving people. The

impression was heightened by their Emperor's activity in keeping faith

as to their own prosperity. As after Austerlitz, his first care was

now finance. The new commercial code was promulgated, and it proved

scarcely less satisfactory to the merchants than the civil code had

been to the people at large. The Bank of France was immediately

compelled to lower its rate of discount, and a council was held to

consider how Italy and the Rhine Confederation could be made tributary

to French industry and commerce. Recourse was also had to those

measures of internal development by the execution of great public

works which had been begun after Austerlitz, but were suspended before

Jena.

Before the last campaign the Emperor and Empress had been accustomed

to visit various portions of France. During every halt the Emperor

would mount his horse, and, attended occasionally by one or more of

the local officials, but usually only by Rustan or an adjutant, would

gallop hither and thither, gathering information, examining

conditions, and making suggestions. Immediately afterward he would

throw off a sketch of needed improvements: public buildings,

almshouses, roads, canals, aqueducts, town streets, mountain

roads--anything, in short, which would arouse local enthusiasm and

benefit the country at large. Many--most, perhaps--of these schemes

remained inchoate; but many of the grandest were executed, and

Napoleon has left his impress as indelibly upon France itself as upon

its society. The routes of the Simplon and Mont Cenis, the great

canals which bind together the river systems, the restoration of the

cathedral at St. Denis, the quays of the Seine in Paris, the great

Triumphal Arch, the Vendome Column, the Street of Peace, the Street of

Rivoli, the bridges of Austerlitz, Jena, and the Arts--these are some

of the magnificent enterprises due to his initiative. Such works were

pushed throughout the summer of 1807 by employing large numbers of

laborers and artisans, while local workshops were opened in every

department to furnish employment to all who could not otherwise find

it. The political economist may lift his eyebrows and shrug his

shoulders in contemplating such shifts; but they were imperial shifts,

and created a high degree of comfort at the time, while they satisfied

in permanency that passion for beauty in utility which does not

sufficiently enter as an element into economic science.

Closely connected with this policy was a measure of Napoleon's already

referred to, but little known. In some respects it was more successful

than any other; it certainly is most characteristic of the man. The

evil aimed at was cured at the time, and the permanent question is

less acute in modern France than in any other European country. For

years past there had been chronic distress among the agricultural

classes in some of the most fertile districts of France, notably in

the northeast. This was attributed to the presence of Jews in large

numbers. The stringent laws of the old regime had crowded that

unfortunate people out of all occupations but two--peddling and

money-lending. In both of these they became experts, and when

emancipated by the Revolution they used their liberty, not to widen

their activities, but to intensify the evils of the monopoly which

they had secured. Since 1791 large numbers of Polish and German Jews

had established themselves on the right bank of the Rhine; and

reaching hands across that stream to their kinsfolk on the left bank,

they combined to strip the French peasantry by the familiar arts of

barter and usury, which need not be described here, until in a few

years they were creditors to the extent of twenty-three million

francs, and had become extensive landed proprietors. They were never

seen to labor with their hands, and having no family name, they evaded

the conscription laws with impunity, while the courts of justice

became their humble servants in enforcing the collection of scandalous

debts or in the foreclosure of inflated mortgages.

In 1806 a temporary decree had suspended all legal executions in

certain districts, and many Jews of the better class made ready to bow

before the coming tempest and come to the assistance of the

government. Napoleon, aware that the Old Testament law was civil and

political as well as religious, shrewdly asked advice from these and

other men of the more enlightened sort. It was agreed to call a

council. The Emperor summoned his prefects to name its members, and

appointed a committee to represent the government at its sessions.

Decisions taken by this assembly were to be submitted to a general

Sanhedrim of all Europe. The assembly of French Israelites met in

Paris during the latter part of 1806, and after due deliberation gave

satisfactory answers to a carefully prepared set of questions

propounded by the government commission. In 1807 the economic

situation had nevertheless become graver. The Sanhedrim met early in

February. Its members vied in flattery with the Roman priesthood,

setting the imperial eagle above the ark of the covenant, and blending

the letters N and J with those of the Jehovah in a monogram for the

adornment of their meeting-place. On March fourth they issued a decree

which is still the basis of religious instruction among Jewish youth.

They forbade polygamy, and admitted the principle of civil marriage

without anathema; they ordered all Israelites to treat those who

believe that God is the Creator of heaven and earth as fellow-citizens

and brothers; to obey the civil and military laws, including that of

conscription, and to train their children to industry and handiwork;

they also invited them to enter the learned professions, and to attach

themselves to the country by the purchase of public obligations. Usury

was absolutely forbidden, the Israelite being enjoined as a religious

precept to make no distinction in money transactions between Hebrew

and Christian. The minutest details of the whole transaction were

foreseen and regulated by Napoleon, and may be studied in his

correspondence with his ministers.

A year later, after careful and mature deliberation, there appeared an

imperial decree, not only organizing the Jewish Church and regulating

its relations with the state, but defining the civil and political

status of Hebrews. They were pronounced to be citizens like other men;

but they could not exact higher interest than five per cent., while if

they should demand over ten they should be punished for usury. Every

Jew in the northeastern department must have a license to do business,

and a notarial authorization for pawnbrokerage. Any Jew not domiciled

at the moment in Alsace might not thereafter acquire domicile in that

department, and could do so in others only by becoming a landowner and

tilling the soil. Every Jew should be liable to military service, and,

unlike his Christian fellow-citizens might not provide a substitute;

moreover, he must adopt and use a family name. This stringent law was

rigidly enforced, except in Bordeaux, the Gironde, and the Landes,

where no offense had been given. Its effect was steady and sure.

Before long, first one and then another Israelite was exempted from

its rigors, until finally, in 1812, the department or the man still

subject to its provisions was the exception and not the rule. From

that day to this there has scarcely been in France what is known

elsewhere as the Jewish question. Hebrews are found in every line of

human activity; they have the same civil, political, and religious

standing as men of other blood and confessions; they are illustrious

in finance, in politics, in science, and in the arts. They are,

moreover, passionate patriots, and to the casual observer scarcely

distinguishable in mien and appearance from other citizens. The

temporary contravention of the civil code, both as to spirit and

letter, by the notorious decree above referred to has been so

beneficent that it has for the most part escaped any criticism or even

remark.[15]

[Footnote 15: See Lemoine: Napoleon et les Juifs.]

While in ways like these the clutch of the usurer was relaxed and the

general well-being promoted, measures were taken to crown the work by

a stable system of finance. It will be recalled that two years before

the Emperor had saved the public credit by the direct expenditure of

the Austrian war indemnity. It was his fixed principle that France

should not pay for his wars, except with her children. He knew too

well the thrift of the whole nation and the greed of the lower classes

to jeopardize their good will either by the emission of paper money or

by the increase of tax rates. The panic of 1805 had been precipitated

by the virtual failure of a bankers' syndicate which made advances to

the government on its taxes and on the annual Spanish contribution as

well. In 1807 the war indemnity exacted from Prussia, Poland, and

Westphalia was used for a double purpose, the creation of two funds:

one to furnish an immediate supply of cash on the outbreak of war, the

other to replace the bankers' syndicate by making advances on the

taxes whenever required. There was therefore no increase in the rate

of taxation, work was abundant, and under the forcing process the

wheels were moving in almost every department of trade and industry.

The price of the imperial bonds on the Bourse rose to ninety-nine, a

price never afterward reached in Napoleon's day.

There was one sharp pinch. Coffee and sugar were no longer luxuries,

but necessities; and through the continental embargo colonial wares

had become, and were likely to remain, very dear and very scarce. Such

substitutes as ingenuity could devise were gradually accepted for the

former; to provide the latter the beet-root industry was fostered by

every means. The Emperor kept a sample of sugar made from beets on his

chimney-piece as an ornament, and occasionally sent gifts of the

precious commodity to his fellow-sovereigns. The story is told that an

official who had been banished from favor recovered his standing

entirely by planting a whole estate with beets. Such traits were

considered evidence of plain, homely common sense by the people, who

enjoyed the sensation that their Emperor shared their feelings and

participated in their daily shifts.

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