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[Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected,
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Unusual subscripts have been marked with ^, e.g.: V^te for Vicomte.]
[Illustration: From the collection of W. C. Crane. Engraved by T.
Levasseur.
THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.
Drawn by F. Gerard.]
THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
BY
WILLIAM MILLIGAN SLOANE
PH.D., L.H.D., LL.D.
_Professor of History in Columbia University_
Revised and Enlarged
With Portraits
VOLUME III
[Illustration: Editor's arm.]
NEW YORK
THE CENTURY CO.
1916
Copyright, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1910
BY
THE CENTURY CO.
_Published, October, 1910_
CONTENTS
CHAPTER Page
I. War with Russia: Pultusk................................ 1
II. Check to the Grand Army: Eylau......................... 12
III. An Indecisive Victory: Friedland....................... 24
IV. Napoleon and Alexander at Tilsit....................... 39
V. The Treaty of Tilsit................................... 54
VI. The Path of Napoleonic Empire.......................... 66
VII. The New Feudalism...................................... 80
VIII. The Empires of Land and Ocean.......................... 97
IX. French Empire and European Nationality................ 115
X. The Awakening of Spain................................ 137
XI. The First Revolt of Nations........................... 153
XII. Napoleon and Alexander at Erfurt...................... 171
XIII. The Failure of the Spanish Campaign................... 182
XIV. The Transformation of Austria......................... 192
XV. The Fifth War with Austria--Eckmuehl................... 202
XVI. Aspern, Essling, and Wagram........................... 218
XVII. The Peace of Schoenbrunn............................... 233
XVIII. Napoleon's Fatal Decision............................. 244
XIX. The Austrian Marriage................................. 251
XX. Rigors of the Continental System...................... 262
XXI. The Continental System Completed...................... 274
XXII. The Course of the Peninsular War...................... 282
XXIII. Birth of the King of Rome............................. 293
XXIV. Tension Between Emperor and Czar...................... 303
XXV. The Array of Nations.................................. 313
XXVI. The Congress of Kings................................. 325
XXVII. The Invasion of Russia--Borodino...................... 335
XXVIII. The Evacuation of Moscow.............................. 346
XXIX. The Retreat from Russia............................... 357
XXX. The Horrors of the Beresina........................... 368
XXXI. The Prodigal's Return................................. 378
XXXII. The Revolt of the Nations............................. 388
XXXIII. The First Campaign in Saxony.......................... 401
XXXIV. The Nations in Grand Array............................ 413
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
The Emperor Napoleon................................. _Frontispiece_
Map of the Battle of Eylau....................................... 14
Map of the Battle of Heilsberg................................... 28
Map of the Battle of Friedland................................... 36
Napoleon--by Ingres.............................................. 50
Queen Hortense................................................... 98
Napoleon in his Study........................................... 146
Map of the Spanish Campaign..................................... 184
Joseph Bonaparte................................................ 196
Map of the Battle of Eckmuehl.................................... 212
Two Maps of the Battles of Aspern and Essling................... 221
Map of the Battle of Wagram..................................... 228
Eugene Beauharnais.............................................. 246
Napoleon Bonaparte in 1809...................................... 296
Map of the Russian Campaign, 1812............................... 340
LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
CHAPTER I
WAR WITH RUSSIA: PULTUSK[1]
[Footnote 1: References as before.]
Poland and the Poles -- The Seat of War -- Change in the
Character of Napoleon's Army -- The Battle of Pultusk --
Discontent in the Grand Army -- Homesickness of the French --
Napoleon's Generals -- His Measures of Reorganization -- Weakness
of the Russians -- The Ability of Bennigsen -- Failure of the
Russian Manoeuvers -- Napoleon in Warsaw.
[Sidenote: 1806-07]
The key to Napoleon's dealings with Poland is to be found in his
strategy; his political policy never passed beyond the first tentative
stages, for he never conquered either Russia or Poland. The struggle
upon which he was next to enter was a contest, not for Russian
abasement but for Russian friendship in the interest of his
far-reaching continental system. Poland was simply one of his weapons
against the Czar. Austria was steadily arming; Francis received the
quieting assurance that his share in the partition was to be
undisturbed. In the general and proper sorrow which has been felt for
the extinction of Polish nationality by three vulture neighbors, the
terrible indictment of general worthlessness which was justly brought
against her organization and administration is at most times and by
most people utterly forgotten. A people has exactly the nationality,
government, and administration which expresses its quality and secures
its deserts. The Poles were either dull and sluggish boors or haughty
and elegant, pleasure-loving nobles. Napoleon and his officers
delighted in the life of Warsaw, but he never appears to have
respected the Poles either as a whole or in their wrangling cliques;
no doubt he occasionally faced the possibility of a redeemed Poland,
but in general the suggestion of such a consummation served his
purpose and he went no further. That he had no sentiment about Polish
nationality is self-evident.
After Jena the Czar displayed great activity. In spite of being
compelled to detach eighty thousand men for service against Turkey, he
had got together a second numerous army; Lestocq, with a corps of
fifteen thousand Prussians, had joined him, and he was clearly
determined to renew the war. For a time the French had no certain
information as to whether he would cross the Prussian frontier or not,
and Napoleon at first expected the city of Posen to be the center of
operations. Before long, however, it became evident that the Russians
were drawing together on Pultusk. Displaying an astounding assurance
as to the stability of his power in France, and without regarding the
possible effect upon conditions at home of a second war, at an
enormous distance, Napoleon determined to meet them. With the same
celerity and caution as of old, the various French divisions were led
first across the Vistula, and then over the plains, until in the end
of December they were concentrated before the enemy. During the three
weeks consumed in these operations much besides was done to strengthen
the position of the French and to assure their communications. The
Russians were dislodged from Warsaw, and Thorn was besieged; the
Vistula, Bug, Wkra, Narew, and other rivers were bridged; and a
commissary department was organized. The seat of war was different
indeed from any of those to which Napoleon had hitherto been
accustomed. It was neither as densely settled nor as well tilled as
Italy and Germany, the population was far lower in the scale of
civilization, and therefore fiercer. The inhabitants could easily
strip their villages of the little forage and the few goods they
possessed, and at that season the fields were bare. The roads were of
the worst description; the rivers were deep and broad, often with
swampy banks and treacherous bottoms. In these circumstances it was
almost impossible to secure reliable information, for scouts and spies
were alike at fault.
These new conditions of warfare were further complicated by a change
in the character of Napoleon's army. After Austerlitz many men of
German speech were to be found among the rank and file, and after Jena
the character of the soldiery grew more and more cosmopolitan. On the
first appearance of the imperial eagles of France in Poland, Jerome
was at the head of a whole corps of Wuertembergers and Bavarians; many
Poles, Italians, Swiss, and Dutch were in others of the French corps;
and among the foreigners there were even Prussians from beyond the
Elbe. Some confusion was caused by this, and it was not diminished by
the fact that the French themselves had scarcely recovered from the
orgies in which they had been indulging for the last six weeks.
Moreover, the determination of the Emperor to "conquer the sea by
land" had emphasized in his mind the necessity of an overwhelming
superiority of numbers, and in November he demanded from the French
senate the eighty thousand conscripts who, according to law, could not
be drawn until September, 1807. This was the beginning of the fatal
practice destined in the end to enervate France and demoralize the
army. There was already little patriotism among the men, except what
served as a pretext for plunder; the homogeneity of purpose,
principle, nationality, and age was soon to disappear.
In the preliminary operations this deterioration was not apparent. The
troops marched doggedly through the mud, worked hard when called upon,
and although their rations, which were supplied by rascally
contractors, were very bad and altogether different from those to
which they had become accustomed in the years just preceding, the men
ate them without murmuring. But when, on December twenty-sixth, they
joined battle, the old push and nerve seemed lacking. The preparations
had been made on the plan of concentration, but at the last moment
Lannes was detached with his division to cut off the enemy's line of
retreat over the Narew. Napoleon, as at Jena, believed the main army
of his opponent to be where it was not, and he was incautious in thus
dividing and weakening his forces. Accordingly the battle had an
irregular and indecisive character. Lannes came unexpectedly upon the
mass of the Russian army, two columns forming the center and right,
and engaged them from ten in the morning until two in the afternoon.
At that hour a reserve arrived under Gudin, and attacked the Russian
right. But Bennigsen, the commander of that column, had ready a fresh
reserve, and with its aid the newcomers were repulsed. Lannes, who had
simultaneously made a final onset, was also beaten off by the superior
force of his enemy. On the same day, Murat, Davout, and Augereau
reached the neighboring village of Golymin, expecting to find the
Russian center there; on the left wing, at Neidenburg, Ney stood face
to face with Lestocq and his Prussians. There was nothing but
skirmishing at either place, for the French emperor could not drag his
artillery through the mud swiftly enough to make it tell at the right
time, and both Prussians and Russians drew slowly off. Soult was to
have repeated the turning manoeuver as carried out before Jena, but
the marching was so difficult, owing to a thaw, that he could not
accomplish anything like the necessary distance.
The morning after this indecisive battle the entire Russian army was
far away. For strategic reasons and for lack of provisions it had
withdrawn to Ostrolenka. There was no pursuit. The natural question,
Why? is still unanswered. Some declare that the French troops were too
weary and bad-tempered; others, that Napoleon, in view of the
quagmires to which the roads were now reduced, dared not abandon his
base of supplies, as he was accustomed to do in summer weather and in
fruitful lands. There is still a third answer, that nothing was to be
gained; for of what use were the few miles of bare, flat land which
the army, putting forth its utmost exertions, might have been able to
traverse? All these reasons have validity. There was discontent among
the soldiers, for there was no booty; not even a soldier's common
comforts could be found. For the first time men of the line shouted
insults after the Emperor, and with impunity; even the faithful guard
indulged in double-meaning quips, but they, on the other hand, were at
the proper time soundly berated. "The short campaign of fifteen days,"
wrote one of them, "made us ten years older." There was also danger in
advancing beyond reach of the commissary department,--deficient and
contemptible as it was in the hands of unscrupulous speculators,--and
there was indeed little to be gained by such a pursuit as was
possible, except prestige, which at that moment and at that distance
from France was not a valuable commodity.
This element of distance from home was weighty. In far-off Egypt and
Syria, French soldiers had fought bravely; an ideal will carry even
the commonest Frenchman far, and they then believed themselves to be
fighting for a principle. But since the armies of France had begun to
fight for booty and glory, they must have both. Of the former there
was little or none at all in the lands they now occupied; the latter
could be enjoyed only in the jubilations of their kinsfolk; and
although no account of any battle was more beclouded than that of
Pultusk which the Emperor sent to Paris, the approbation of the
fatherland could not reach Poland until long afterward, and in tones
that were low and almost inaudible. It is an old French saying that
next to the kingdom of heaven France is the most beautiful land, and
every Frenchman believes it. The Emperor himself said that his French
soldiers were unfitted for distant expeditions by their yearnings for
home. In his mind, therefore, the one essential thing to restore the
spirits of his men was rest. This opinion was strengthened when he
endeavored to visit the posts. Although his carriage stuck in the mud
and a saddle-horse could scarcely make its way, yet he got far enough
to see that his men were suffering and destitute.
This preliminary campaigning, allowing for all obstacles so far
enumerated, was so generally inefficient and futile, that there
remains a conviction of further causes not lying on the surface. That
which is most to be suspected is the hastening corruption in the
character and morals, not of the soldiery,--that has been noted,--but
of the generals. One diarist of the time saw four marshals at Anspach.
He sketches Bernadotte as "a very tall dark man with fiery eyes under
thick brows." Humble as was his origin, his ambitions were lofty and
he was beginning to make ventures on his own account, not for the
master who had made him. There was also Mortier, fairly tall, "with a
stupid sentinel look"; considering his career, he was probably
putting up his mask. There too were "Lefebvre, an old Alsatian
camp-boy, with his wife, former washerwoman in the regiment; and
Davout, a little smooth-pated, unpretending man, who was never tired
of waltzing." Mme. Lefebvre was aware of how costly were such
drawing-room triumphs as she imaged in her ambitious soul, and where
the supplies of booty could be found; Davout and Lannes and Ney were
still faithful and efficient; Augereau in action was utterly
uncertain, in morals pompous and wrong-headed; Murat knew where and
how the great prizes were to be found, and was as dashing and
venturesome as he was selfish and worldly-wise. The Russian generals
were plodding disciples of routine. Bennigsen was an able Hanoverian
mercenary, despising alike his Livonian colleague, Buxhoewden, and his
chief, the servile Russian marshal, Kamenski. The Prussian general
Lestocq was capable but inexperienced. The chief and his subordinate
were far from harmonious.
The measures adopted to secure a period of comfort and repose for the
army were, unlike those taken for the campaign, apparently adequate.
The Emperor proceeded at once to station the various corps along the
Vistula, with provision and munition depots behind them. The
commissary department was thoroughly overhauled and much improved. The
line ran from Warsaw northwestward through Poland into Prussia, to the
river's mouth near Dantzic. Bernadotte had eighteen thousand men; Ney,
sixteen thousand; Soult, twenty-eight thousand; Augereau, eleven
thousand; Davout, twenty thousand; Lannes, eighteen thousand; Murat,
fourteen thousand; and the guard numbered fifteen thousand--a total of
about a hundred and forty thousand men. As conscripts and troops from
various garrisons came in, a new corps of twenty-three thousand men
was formed, and placed under the command of Lefebvre. At the same
time, from his headquarters at Warsaw, the Emperor proceeded with the
organization of a government for Poland, and with the training of her
national guard. The two Russian columns had withdrawn to Szuczyn,
where they united under the command of Bennigsen, and the Prussians
were at Angerburg under Lestocq. This left open the way to Koenigsberg,
and early in January, 1807, Ney, overpowered by the temptation to
relieve the miseries of his men, and to make a stroke on his own
account by seizing the capital of East Prussia, set out from
Neidenburg without orders, leaving Bernadotte's position at Elbing
much exposed. Lestocq, however, managed to block Ney's path until the
Russians under Bennigsen arrived and compelled the French general to
return with his men to their quarters. Napoleon administered a severe
reprimand; and well he might, for the advantage thus offered to the
Russians had tempted Bennigsen to move, and the Russian army, once
afoot, seemed determined to remain so. In this way were destroyed
Napoleon's excellent calculations for the season of absolutely
essential repose.
The action of Pultusk had made clear two serious defects in the
efficiency of Russia's force. During the battle, Kamenski, the
general-in-chief, a martinet and disciple of routine, had twice given
the order for retreat, and it was Bennigsen's disobedience which made
the conflict so indecisive that Russia claimed it as a victory. If a
victory, it was a barren one, because a weak and venal administration
of the commissary department had deprived the soldiers of sustenance
at the critical moment. Kamenski, who was seventy-six years old, was
retired on the ground of his health, and Bennigsen succeeded him, but
the bad commissary administration was not remedied. The Russian army
was strong in regular infantry, but weak in well-disciplined cavalry,
although the latter defect was largely supplied by the Cossacks, a
peculiar body of riders from the Volga and the Don, who paid the
rental of their lands to the crown by four years' military service at
their own charges. Then, as now, they fought with barbaric ferocity;
they attacked in open formation, each man for himself, and gave no
quarter until the Czar offered a ducat for every live Frenchman. They
were known to ride a hundred miles in twenty-four hours, and their
services in pursuing an enemy were invaluable.
The one remarkable and unique feature of the Russian army in every
branch of the service has ever been its personal devotion to the Czar.
This feeling is a compound of religious fervor, patriotism, and
dynastic loyalty; these elements, welded inseparably, form a sentiment
of tremendous strength, which is a fair substitute for enlightened
patriotism. The case is different with the Tatar hordes from Central
Asia, who fight only for plunder, and in a crisis are often utterly
unreliable. At this time both Cossacks and Tatars were in the field,
the former in considerable numbers. The appointment of Bennigsen as
commander-in-chief, and the results of Pultusk, awakened great
enthusiasm among his hungry soldiers, who were now clamorous for a
decisive battle. He had ninety thousand men,--at least on paper,--and
was not disposed to leave the French in peace to recruit their numbers
and physical strength in comfortable winter quarters. Unlike the
Prussian officers, he had learned the lessons of recent campaigns, and
had the strength of his character been equal to the cleverness of his
strategy, he would have been a fair match for Napoleon. Moreover, the
King of Prussia, shut up in Koenigsberg with a few thousand men, was in
a most precarious situation, both Ney and Bernadotte being within
striking distance. Finally, the garrison of the fortress at Graudenz
was dependent on the precarious supplies which they received as
Lestocq found an opportunity to send them.
Very soon, therefore, the Cossacks were sent out to scour the country.
In their repeated skirmishes with the French light cavalry they showed
such daring and address that their foes became timid and cautious. In
this way the movements of Bennigsen's army were successfully
concealed, and he hoped by a swift march to overtake and destroy Ney's
isolated division; if successful he would secure access to Dantzic and
a connection with Graudenz, Kolberg, and other fortresses, which would
give him a position strong enough to jeopardize that of Napoleon at
Warsaw. Accordingly, with about sixty-five thousand men he began a
rapid and circuitous march northwesterly and around behind the
impenetrable belt of dark forests, past Lake Spirding to Heilsberg,
where he found Ney in full retreat on January twenty-second. But he
had overestimated the strength of his Russians; they were too
exhausted to strike quickly. Frost had set in, snow had fallen, and
both Ney and Bernadotte made their escape to Gilgenburg, the latter
after defeating the Russian advance-guard in a skirmish at Mohrungen.
Bennigsen was compelled to retire in order to recruit the strength of
his men.
The Emperor of the French was still at Warsaw. The Polish capital was
gay and frivolous. New hopes had awakened the spirit of folly in the
aristocracy, and the "liberator," now at the very height of his
physical power, was often conspicuous in the revels. In the intervals
of his serious labors Napoleon gave way to a life of sensuality, and
the women were prodigal of their charms. One of them was the
well-known Countess Walewska, a beautiful woman, who while yet a
child had been forced into wedlock with an aged nobleman. She was now
made to feel that the future of her country depended upon her
captivating Napoleon, for he had singled her out as the most beautiful
of all the crowd which pressed around him on his entry. Indignant when
the proposition was first made, she finally listened to the prejudiced
morality of her friends, and gave an unwilling consent. It is thought
that her child was the first born to Napoleon, and that this fact,
combined with his disgust for Josephine's incessant and inconsistent
outpourings of jealous complaint as to his conduct, had much to do
with his attitude concerning the political advantages of the divorce.
Such was the young Polish noblewoman's eventual devotion to the father
of her boy, that throughout his subsequent life in Europe she ran
every risk to be near her idol, and actually followed him to Elba.
Their son, the Count Walewski, was a devoted Frenchman, and a man of
quality, filling, with dignity, important offices in the service of
his country.