THE NAVY IN THE CIVIL WAR
AUTHORITIES.--The general history of this time has been exhaustively
told by Mr. Gardiner in his history of the Civil War. Mr. Granville
Penn has collected the Parliamentary orders, pamphlets, and
proclamations relating to naval affairs in his Life of Sir William
Penn. The Royalist side is told by Clarendon, and in the papers
printed by Mr. Warburton in his _Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers_.
In so far as his control over the navy was concerned, the reign of
Charles I. came to an end with the appointment of the Earl of Warwick
as vice-admiral by the authority of the Parliament in defiance of his
wishes. From that time forward the fleet became a docile instrument
in the hands of his enemies, and so remained throughout the whole of
the first Civil War. The king did indeed dismiss Northumberland from
his post as Lord High Admiral, and the order was obeyed. It may very
well be that the Parliament was not sorry to be rid of an officer
whose powers were so great. Even in the midst of armed rebellion the
Englishmen of the seventeenth century were great sticklers for the
letter of the law, and the Lord High Admiral, the legality of whose
appointment could not be questioned, might have caused the Houses at
Westminster considerable trouble if he had thought fit to act against
them, or even only to abstain from acting energetically on their
behalf. With the minor officers there was not the same probability of
trouble. The king did order them to render no obedience to Parliament,
and a few acted on his command. Others, however, had no scruple in
accepting the doctrine that the order of the king meant his order as
expressed by Parliament--a convenient sophistry by which many men at
that period contrived to reconcile the reality of rebellion with the
profession of loyalty.
Among those who actively assisted Parliament to obtain possession of
the fleet was William Batten, the Surveyor of the Navy. He is described
by Clarendon as an "obscure fellow," who obtained his post by dint of
a bribe. This account of him has been somewhat heatedly contradicted
by modern writers. But it agrees very well with the rather off-hand
account of his appointment given by Northumberland. If Batten belonged
to the Somersetshire family of that name, he was a man of strong
Puritan connections. However that may be, he had passed his life as
a merchant skipper, trading on his own account, or as master in the
navy, till he became Surveyor in 1638, when the Commission of 1628 was
dissolved and Northumberland was appointed Lord High Admiral. There is
a pretty general agreement of authorities that he paid for his post,
which at that time does not necessarily mean that there was anything
corrupt about his nomination. His assistance had a good deal to do with
Warwick's success in bringing the fleet to obedience in July 1642.
Parliament had taken measures to arm a considerable naval force in
the very first days of March, on the plea that the Lords and Commons
had "received advertisement of extraordinary preparations made by the
neighbouring princes both by land and sea; the intentions whereof have
been so represented as to raise an apprehension in both Houses that the
public honour, peace, and safety of His Majesty and his kingdom cannot
be secured unless a timely course be taken for the putting of this
kingdom into a condition of defence at sea as well as land." Orders
were issued that "all and every the ships belonging to His Majesty's
navy which are fit for service, and not already abroad, nor designed
for this summer's fleet, be with all speed rigged and put in such a
readiness as that they may soon be ready for sea." At the same time
Northumberland was requested "to make known to all masters and owners
of such ships as now are in or about any the harbours of this kingdom,
and may be of use to the public defence thereof, that it will be an
acceptable service to the King and Parliament if they likewise will
cause their ships to be rigged, and so far put in readiness, as they
may at a short warning set forth to sea upon any emergent occasion,
which will be a means of great security to His Majesty and his
dominions."
The king had left London, and was either at Royston or at Newmarket
when he heard of this order for the "speedy rigging of the navy."
Northumberland was suffering from an accident which befell him more
than once at a critical moment. He was ill, and could not take the
command in person. It was now that the king endeavoured to secure the
appointment of Sir John Pennington as Northumberland's deputy in actual
command. But Parliament, in pursuit of its policy of laying hands on
the militia, insisted on seeing a list of the officers in command. It
was presented on the 10th of March. Parliament confirmed most of the
names, but expressly voted "that the Lord Admiral shall be desired by
this House that the commander-in-chief of this summer's fleet under
his lordship may be the Earl of Warwick." At the same time Sir Harry
Vane was instructed to "carry unto the Lord Admiral the list of those
commanders that are not allowed of by this House, and desire his
lordship to supply others in the place of those, and to send the names
of them to the House with all convenient speed."
The anger of the king was unavailing, except to deprive Northumberland
of his official rank. The ships in the Downs submitted themselves with
little or no opposition to Warwick's orders. It is possible that if Sir
John Pennington had been a man of more energy, he might have caused
the Parliament considerable trouble. But his virtues were those of
a docile, trustworthy servant. When called upon to act for himself,
he could do nothing effectual. When the king forbade his servants to
submit to the orders of the officers appointed by Parliament, Warwick
boldly put his authority to the test by calling upon the ships
in the Downs to accept his commission. A few only of the captains
hesitated, and of these no more than two made any serious appearance of
resistance. Even they were ill supported by their men, for the unarmed
boats' crews of other ships were allowed to board and take possession
of their vessels. The sympathies of the navy were plainly with the
Parliament. It has been said recently that the navy was mainly neutral
between the king and his enemies in this great struggle. I do not
clearly understand what meaning is attached to the word neutral when
it is used to describe the actions of men who give the most effective
armed help to one party in a Civil War. From 1642 until a part of the
fleet revolted in 1648, the navy never failed to do the king all the
harm in its power. It attacked the garrisons held for him, and helped
to defend the coast towns which his troops were besieging. It captured
ships sailing on his service, and it fired on his wife. It is difficult
to conceive what less neutral line of conduct it could possibly have
followed. A more simple explanation of the action of the navy is, I
think, that which has been given above. It supported the Parliament
because it was Puritan, and this it was partly by choice, and partly of
necessity. The seafaring population came from the more Puritan parts
of England. The same causes which made the other inhabitants Puritan
acted on the sailor. Then, until Prince Rupert took Bristol, every
considerable seaport was in the hands of the Puritans, and a sailor
who would not serve the Parliament would have found some difficulty in
following his trade at all. Writers who have been very anxious to make
out that the navy played an important independent part have been at
some pains to show that it held some weighty constitutional doctrines,
and in particular that it combined a disinterested love of liberty with
an enlightened loyalty to the king's person. It is, however, possible
to feel admiration and respect for the seamen of the seventeenth
century without going so far as to credit them with what there is no
reason to believe they possessed. Like many other Englishmen at that
period the sailors may have thought it possible to coerce the king, to
take the command of the militia out of his hands, to beat his soldiers,
to kill his friends, to make him a prisoner, and, at the end of all
this, to establish his authority. In other words, they entered upon a
revolution without seeing more clearly than the average Presbyterian
member of Parliament what its inevitable consequences must be. They had
been brought up to have an awful reverence for the "Lord's anointed,"
and were glad to have a good legal-looking excuse before laying
unhallowed hands upon him. Therefore, with the most loyal intentions in
the world, they applied themselves with much courage and zeal to the
work of bringing His Majesty to the mercy of the root-and-branch men.
The administration of the navy was put into the hands of a
Parliamentary Committee of both Houses, under which it worked with
more energy than had ever been shown during the reign of the king.
The Houses could pay, if not with unfailing regularity, at least
much better than the king; moreover, Parliament, with its power of
naming committees of its own body, was able to exercise an amount of
supervision which had not been possible for the Crown. The work which
the navy had to do was partly on the coasts of England and partly
on those of Ireland, but it was everywhere the same. In both cases
the object was to prevent help coming from abroad to the enemies of
Parliament. This was to be done partly by capturing ships coming in
with stores, and partly by getting, or keeping, possession of the coast
towns. It was a kind of duty which required rather vigilant cruising
than much actual fighting. Although mention of the action of the fleet
is common, the number of achievements performed by it of which memory
remains is small. The majority of them are of the nature of the relief
given to the town of Lyme when besieged by Prince Maurice. The ships
brought reinforcements of men and stores when the need for them was
great. In this way, and on all parts of the coast, they helped the
cause of the Parliament. One of the feats the navy did, it is true,
made no inconsiderable noise in the world, and has been the subject
of much heated rhetoric. The Queen Henrietta Maria, who had left
England just when the Civil War was beginning, had been busy abroad
purchasing military stores for her husband. The Parliament learned
early in 1643 that these military provisions were about to be sent
over to Bridlington on the coast of Yorkshire, where the army of the
Marquis of Newcastle would be ready to receive them. Whether it was
also known that the queen was coming with the stores is not certain. If
it had been, the principal effect of the knowledge would have been to
induce Parliament to strengthen Batten, who was cruising in the North
Sea. The capture of the queen would have been an immense advantage, and
her death by a cannon ball a satisfaction. The Parliamentary officer
had with him a small squadron of four ships. He missed the queen.
The weather was stormy, and Henrietta Maria had to go through the
unpleasant ordeal of nine days' tossing about in the North Sea. At last
she reached Bridlington, and was able to land. Here a new danger, and a
worse, assailed her. Batten discovered that the transports had reached
harbour, and were landing their stores. He immediately took measures to
prevent these from reaching the king. Bringing his ships close in, he
opened fire on the transport and the houses on the quay, and continued
to discharge cross-bar and other shot for some hours. The Royalists
raised a great outcry over this "obscure fellow's" barbarous want of
respect for Her Majesty's royal person. It is certain that she was
in considerable peril. Batten's shot crashed into the house in which
she was sleeping, and the queen with her ladies had to take refuge in
a ditch, where they lay under the shelter of the bank for some time.
It was reported, to the no small glee of the Parliament's partisans
in London, that the queen had fled out of the house "barelegged"
and almost undressed, so sudden had been her flight. However that
may be, the daughter of Henry IV. had gone through the perils of
storm and battle with cheerful courage. She comforted her terrified
ladies-in-waiting on board the transport by telling them that queens of
England were never drowned. As she fled from the house at Bridlington,
she remembered that her favourite lap-dog had been left behind, and,
in spite of the terrors of her attendants, she went back to bring it
out. The Cavalier writers were more indignant for the queen than she
was for herself. Both then and since they have denounced Batten in no
measured terms for the unheard-of brutality and want of chivalry in his
behaviour. Yet it is very hard to see what the Parliamentary commander
could well have done except what he did do. The king's officers could
not have expected to be allowed to march into London only because they
put the queen at their head, and yet that would have been almost as
rational as to ask that they should be allowed to transport and land
munitions of war unmolested because a great Royalist lady travelled in
company with them.
These years of the first Civil War, though they would be tedious to
tell in detail, are of great importance in the history of the navy.
They formed the first period in which a considerable naval force was
continuously maintained. Even during the reign of Queen Elizabeth the
larger fleets had been armed only for particular expeditions, while
during the reign of James there had been but one large armament, and,
though the considerable displays of naval force had been comparatively
numerous during the first fifteen years of Charles I., still they were
intermittent. But the Parliament kept continually on foot what would
in former times have been called a Royal Fleet. In 1642 there were 18
men-of-war and 24 hired merchant ships in commission. In 1643 this
force was raised to 28 warships, 23 merchant ships, and 8 colliers for
service on the coast of England, besides 8 men-of-war and 13 hired
merchant ships for service on the coast of Ireland. This makes a total
of 80 vessels; and when we consider the average tonnage and weight of
broadside, it represents a much greater force than was ever under the
command of the officers of the great queen. The mere habit of continual
cruising together in fleets must have had an instructive effect, of
which the English Navy was to reap the benefit in the approaching
struggle with Holland. Regular men-of-war crews must have been
gradually formed, and the Parliament secured the services of a trained
body of officers.
Before the value of this practice was to be put to the test, the
nation, and the navy with it, were destined to pass through the
sharpest convulsion in the whole course of our history. The first
Civil War came to an end, having practically settled nothing except
that the Parliament had proved itself strong enough to beat down the
king's partisans. King Charles did not, however, consider himself
completely defeated. Indeed he was incapable of understanding that
utter overthrow was possible for the king who held his place by Divine
Right. Wicked rebels might prove too strong for him for a time, but it
was his firm conviction that in the long-run no party could do without
him. Thus, even before he was delivered by the Scots into the hands of
his Parliament, he began the desperate game of playing off one party
of his conquerors against the other. The Presbyterians remained of the
opinion, as when they had begun the war, that they could beat the king
utterly, and yet leave him not only king, but prepared to co-operate
with them. One of the purposes for which they expected his aid was the
suppression of the Independents, who were fully as offensive to the
Presbyterians as the Presbyterians were to the Church of England. But
the Independents were the commanding element in the New Model Army,
which represented the whole armed force of the Parliament, since its
other troops had been disbanded on the conclusion of the war. The
Independents were thoroughly resolved that, after fighting to be free
from the Church of England, they would not submit to dictation by the
Presbyterians. The king began trying to set them by the ears; and out
of these rivalries and intrigues, with the help of a Presbyterian army
from Scotland, there arose the second Civil War.
In this struggle the navy was more visibly affected by the divisions
of the nation. Its leaders had begun to discover that it was not so
simple a business as they had thought, to beat the king and yet leave
him uninjured. Moreover, professional rivalry affected them to no
small extent. The sea officers were offended when they saw the whole
effective power of the nation in the hands of the New Model Army. Their
loyalty to the king was vigorously revived when they found that not
only the Crown, but they themselves, were at the orders of a committee
of successful soldiers. So, during 1647 and 1648, the navy was agitated
by dissensions. In the spring of 1648 the party which was now, by the
help of the soldiers, supreme in Parliament began to be very uneasy
about the spirit of the fleet. There was a great deal of dangerous
talk as to the necessity for a personal treaty with the king; while
ship's companies took to imitating the "agitators" who had organised
the _pronunciamiento_ of the soldiers at Triploe Heath and elsewhere.
They also had their ideas as to the settlement of the nation. In view
of this untrustworthiness of their naval force, Parliament decided to
put the command of the fleet into other hands. Batten was removed from
his place as second in command to Warwick, and Penn, who had served
throughout the war on the coast of Ireland, and had finally been
in actual command of the station, was put under arrest. A military
officer, Colonel Rainsborough, was sent to take command of the squadron
in the Downs and the river. This measure provoked a partial revolt in
May 1648. The officers and men of the ships which were to have been
under the command of Rainsborough refused to obey his orders, and put
him on shore. This action was justified by a declaration of principles
on the part of "the commanders and officers of the ship =Constant
Reformation= with the rest of the fleet." These politicians stated
their view of the best way for providing a settlement for the nation.
They were in agreement with the Kentish petitioners, and their demands
were grouped under four heads.
"_First_,--That the King's Majesty, with all expedition, be admitted
in safety and honour to treat with both Houses of Parliament.
"_Secondly_,--That the army now under the command of the Lord Fairfax
be forthwith disbanded, their arrears being paid them.
"_Thirdly_,--That the known laws of the kingdom may be established and
continued, whereby we ought to be governed and judged.
"_Fourthly_,--That the privileges of Parliament and liberty of the
subject be preserved."
In the following month this declaration was amended by the complaints
that the Parliament had taken to issuing commissions without the name
of the king; that several landsmen had been made sea-commanders, and
that "the insufferable pride, ignorance, and insolency of Colonel
Rainsborough, the late Vice-Admiral, alienated the hearts of the
seamen." The political side of these pronouncements need not detain us
long. If these were the aims of the seamen, they were trying, as the
Presbyterian party in Parliament also were, to bring things back to the
point at which they had been before 1638, with this difference, that
the king was to show himself converted to their way of thinking by ten
years of failure, defeat, and bitter indignity. Like the Presbyterians,
they forgot to secure the co-operation of the king. The complaint that
Parliament had taken to issuing commissions without the royal name
shows that the sailors, or at least those who spoke for them, were
immensely surprised at the result of their own efforts. When they made
it a grievance that several landsmen had been made sea-commanders, they
were inventing an entirely new grievance. Landsmen always had been
sea-commanders, and were to be so again in the coming years.
It is hard to say how far the discontent of the seamen had anything to
do with the revolt, if that can be called a revolt which was, in fact,
a refusal to obey revolutionary authority. It was probably mainly the
work of a few officers, and the men were carried away by the example
of their commanders and by the contagious example of the Royalists
in the county of Kent. The officers did in some cases belong to the
Presbyterian Parliamentary party, which was now becoming Royalist under
the stimulus of rivalry with the Independents.
In any case this revolt against the predominant party in Parliament
extended such a very little way in the fleet, and proved so thoroughly
impotent, that we can hardly suppose the bulk of the seamen to have
been seriously discontented. The defection of the navy was stopped
by the use of a very moderate degree of ingenuity on the part of the
dominant faction. They sent the Earl of Warwick, whose sympathies
were known to be with the Parliamentary Presbyterians, back to take
command in place of Rainsborough. The City was very Presbyterian, and
it presented a petition on behalf of Batten, to which no attention
was paid. Warwick was successful in keeping the bulk of the fleet
steady, but the insurgent ships helped the Kent Royalists to obtain
possession of the castles of Deal, Walmer, and Sandown. No active
measures were taken against them by the Lord Admiral Warwick. He was
too busy in new-modelling the fleet. The process of new-modelling
consisted in removing all officers and men whose loyalty was doubtful,
and in replacing them by others whose principles were trustworthy, or
who belonged to that useful class of fighting men who may be trusted
to return an equivalent of service for their pay and allowances. The
mutiny of the fleet was, in fact, shattered by Fairfax, who in the
early days of June swept through the county of Kent, dashing the
Royalist forces to pieces, and driving the remnants over the river into
Essex. As the Royalist seamen were deprived of all hope of obtaining
fresh stores by the defeat of their friends on shore, and as the ships
under Warwick remained steady, there was nothing for it but to stand
across the North Sea to Holland and there put themselves under the
command of the Prince of Wales. The Prince was at that time in France,
whither he had fled from the Channel Islands. Encouraged by the news
that the ships were beginning to declare for his party, he hurried to
Helvoetsluys and there took the command on the 9th of June.
As far as the king was still master to decide who was to command either
ships or soldiers, authority over his navy belonged to the young Duke
of York, who, in theory, was Lord High Admiral. But the duke was a mere
boy of fifteen, and not on good terms with his brother. By the decision
of the Prince of Wales and his Council, the command of the squadron was
given to Lord Willoughby of Parham. Under this new admiral, who, as the
authors of the late protestation must have observed with disgust, was a
"landsman," the Royalist squadron sailed from the Dutch harbour on the
17th of July, and, carrying with it the Prince of Wales, stood over
to Yarmouth. It appeared before the town on the 22nd of July, with the
intention of favouring a Royalist rising, which might have disturbed
Fairfax, who was now engaged in the siege of Colchester. But though
the Royalists had a party in the town, the friends of the Parliament
were strong enough to hold their ground. Finding that it was hopeless
to endeavour to raise the county of Norfolk, and being, moreover, in
dire want of money, the Royalist squadron sailed for the Thames. It
found Warwick still engaged in new-modelling his fleet, and, although
the sailors are said to have been eager to engage, made no attack upon
him. Warwick reported that his men also were full of zeal and eager to
fight, but no conflict took place. The Prince of Wales summoned the
Parliamentary Admiral to take down the Royal Standard, which he flew as
Lord High Admiral; and Warwick refused to make this submission, on the
ground that he held his place by lawful authority, namely, by the will
of the king as expressed through the Parliament. While these flourishes
of summons and retort were passing between the two fleets, the prince's
ships were busily engaged in capturing merchant vessels. One of these
was estimated to be worth £20,000, and the prince demanded a ransom
of that amount for her. The City, now longing for a reconciliation
with the king, would have been well enough disposed to receive the
prince. But Parliament was inexorable. The Independents had befooled
the Presbyterians, always easy to deceive, by apparent concessions,
and, in the meantime, the victory of Fairfax in Kent and the success
of Cromwell against the Royalists in Wales were re-establishing their
supremacy. They declared that the prince and all who were acting with
him were guilty of high treason.
The prince remained in the river till the first days of September.
He was reinforced by Batten, who escaped from observation in London,
and contrived to carry over the =Constant Warwick=, one of the best
appointed ships in the Parliament's service. But here his successes
ended. The rest of the fleet continued loyal, or at least consistent
in disloyalty, and the stores began to run out. The Royalist ships
remained, it would seem, on the north side of the Thames near Leigh,
and Warwick remained at Chatham. While they were here, a number of
vessels came round from Portsmouth to reinforce the Parliamentary
squadron. It was made a subject of bitter complaint against Batten,
whom the prince had knighted, and to whom he gave a large share of his
confidence, that he allowed them to pass undisturbed. The Royalist
who had denounced Batten for firing on the queen at Bridlington must
have found this favour, shown by her son to such "a villain," somewhat
hard to digest. Under the pressure of want of stores, the prince was
disposed to return at once to Holland; but his fleet was eager for
battle, and so, at least, a pretence of engaging Warwick was made.
Upon the last day of August, when the two fleets were within striking
distance, they were separated by a sudden gale. When the wind fell, the
prince's fleet was within one barrel of pork of actual starvation; and
the game being now clearly up, the most fire-eating of his followers
saw that there was nothing for it but to stand over to Holland. The
Royalists, therefore, retreated and anchored at Goree on the 3rd of
September. The Royalist movement in the fleet had completely failed.
It did nothing to avert the disasters of their party at Colchester and
Preston, and only served to diminish the naval forces of the Parliament
by a little, and for a short time. Indeed the immediate result was to
make the navy far more anti-Royalist than it had been before. The navy
joined in that Remonstrance of the soldiers, which was the preliminary
to the trial of the king.
While that great tragedy was in preparation, Warwick was pursuing his
successes against the Royalists. On the 19th of September he was off
Helvoetsluys, and had established what was, in fact, a blockade of the
prince's ships. Correspondence and negotiations passed between the two
forces. There would probably have been blows also, if a squadron of
Dutch ships, under command of Tromp, had not dropped anchor between
them. Each appealed to the other's men, but Warwick only was successful
in withdrawing support from his opponent. The prince's squadron was
indeed shortly in a deplorable condition. He was in utter want of
money, and the loyalty of his followers was by no means equal to
standing the strain of starvation. His men had tasted the pleasures of
mutiny, and were much enamoured of them. They treated Lord Willoughby
of Parham, and Batten, as they had treated Rainsborough. A large party
of them refused to serve under Prince Rupert, on the ground that he was
a foreigner, and insisted that they would obey nobody except their own
Lord High Admiral, the Duke of York. In fact, all the dissensions at
that time existing among the Royalists were repeated in the squadron at
Helvoetsluys. The genuine Royalists looked upon the recently converted
Presbyterians as rebels, only a very little less unpardonable than
the Independents. The Presbyterians were by no means prepared to
concede all the demands of the Royalists. The perplexities of this
section of the prince's followers may be judged from the tone of the
rather pitiable apology published by Batten. He confessed that he had
been quite misled in supporting the Parliament, and this avowal of
imbecility was not made more respectable by his unconscious betrayal of
the discreditable fact that his eyes had not been opened till he had
thought himself in danger of losing his pay and allowances.
While the leaders were wrangling with one another and were being put
ashore by mutinous followers, a large proportion of the prince's
sailors became tired of their tardy Royalism, when they found that it
meant exile from home and choice of service with the Dutch, or a life
of semi-piratical adventure with Prince Rupert. Several of the revolted
ships were brought over by their crews to Warwick, and numbers of the
sailors of the others followed the example. Among the officers not a
few made their peace with the triumphant Parliament, and among them was
Batten, who, after joining the Royalists because the Parliament was
not sufficiently loyal, went back to what remained of it after Pride's
Purge, when it was manifestly ready to cut off the king's head. He
was not again employed until the Restoration, but the new masters of
England were not rigorous towards his fellow-insurgents.