CHAPTER XVI

THE REGENCY

After Pedro's expulsion the country was left in a very insecure

situation. In Rio the Portuguese were as numerous as the native

Brazilians. A great part of the population was under arms and radicalism

and revolution were in the air; but, for the moment, fear of the

Portuguese and of Pedro's restoration enabled cool-headed, conservative

leaders to maintain peace. The members of Congress in the city selected

a provisional regency. The ministry, whose dismissal had been the

occasion of the outbreak against Pedro, returned to power and, so far as

Rio was concerned, government proceeded without interruption. Within a

few weeks Congress met in regular session, and a permanent regency was

elected. Bahia had revolted and expelled the pro-Portuguese military

commander even before Pedro's deposition by Rio. When the news of the

events of the 7th of April reached Pernambuco and Para the troops

promptly renounced their commanders.

In Congress grave differences of opinion appeared. The Brazilian party

quickly divided into two factions--the conservatives, who were faithful

to the dynasty and wanted the fewest possible changes, and the radicals.

The former had stepped into control ahead of the latter, but they had

not the real force of the country behind them. There was a growing

demand for a larger measure of self-government by the provinces and for

sweeping democratic reforms.

The regency had no real prestige, the military soon became jealous and

dissatisfied, and the party in favour of the Emperor's restoration began

to assume a formidably menacing attitude. In July Rio seemed on the

point of plunging into a bloody and desperate civil war. The Regency

called upon Padre Feijo, the great patriot priest and leader of

democratic opinion, and gave him absolute power as minister of justice.

His firm measures soon suppressed the disorders in Rio, and the national

guard which he organised among the better classes of the people held the

revolting regiments in check. In the provinces, however, the local

authorities often ignored the commands of the governors appointed by the

regency; ambitious local leaders plotted to turn the situation to their

personal advantage; and the soldiers and disorderly elements were

inflammable material ready to their hands.

In nearly every province civil wars broke out. The typical process was

for a military officer, a national-guard colonel, or any other person

who had acquired local prestige, to issue a pronunciamento and announce

the establishment of a liberal government whose scope was only limited

by the imagination and knowledge of constitutional law possessed by the

writer of the pronunciamento. If the municipal authorities resisted they

were expelled, and creatures of the head of the insurrection put in

their places. This overturning of legally existing authority would

usually be resented by some neighbouring official or some rival of the

petty dictator, and a confused conflict would ensue in which the rank

and file of neither side would have a very clear conception of what they

were fighting about, although the words of "liberty" and "local rights,"

"constitutionalism" and "union," were overworked in speeches and

proclamations. It is not worth while to give the detailed story of these

monotonous and tedious uprisings, massacres, encounters, and

usurpations, though the operations often rose to the dignity of

campaigns and pitched battles. Hardly a province escaped. In Pernambuco

in 1831 the soldiery sacked the city and the people avenged themselves

by killing three hundred and banishing the rest. Next year another

military revolt broke out in the same city, which soon became an

insurrection whose nominal purpose was to restore the Emperor, and which

lasted four years. Two hundred persons were killed in Para in 1831

during a single night of street fighting. A bitter little civil war in

Maranhao lasted all through the winter of 1831-32, and was only put down

by a general sent from Rio. In Ceara the partisans of the Emperor kept

the province in a state of anarchy for several months. In Minas Geraes

the friends of Pedro obtained possession of the capital, and the

patriots had to fight hard to get the better of them. Though most of

these insurrections were suppressed by the people of the state

concerned, disrespect for the central government was increasing, and a

blind and jealous hatred of the Portuguese and everything foreign grew

continuously.

During the four stormy years which succeeded Pedro's expulsion, Congress

discussed violently the terms of the constitutional revision which all

saw to be inevitable. Though the radical elements predominated, the

conservatives and the senate succeeded in bringing about a compromise. A

single regent was substituted for the triple system; he was to be

elected by universal though indirect suffrage; and, most important of

all, each province was given its own assembly with power to levy taxes

and conduct most of the affairs of local government. The conservatives

managed to preserve the life senate and the nomination of the provincial

governors by the central government.

The party in favour of Pedro's restoration had been gaining ground. The

Andradas, always in the most extreme opposition when out of power, went

over to it, and the conservatives were gravitating in the same direction

when Pedro's own death in 1834 put an end to the movement. He died at a

happy moment for his fame,--covered with the laurels he had just won by

driving out his usurping and absolutist brother, Miguel, and by using

that opportunity to endow Portugal with a constitution. By a curious

irony of fate, this reckless soldier and descendant of a hundred

absolute kings was the instrument through which constitutional

government was given to both branches of the Portuguese race.

The statesman who had proved himself most nearly master of the situation

during these stormy years was Padre Feijo. He represented the average

Brazilian--the disinterested and honest public. He had energy and

intrepidity; his eloquence was peculiar and commanding; his advocacy of

his beliefs was uncompromising; he had been a leader in sustaining

liberal ideas; and he had proven his practical courage and capacity in

putting down the counter-revolution in Rio. He naturally became a

candidate for sole regent after the passage of the _Acto Addicional_, or

amendment to the constitution. It seemed appropriate that to him should

be entrusted the putting into force of the law which was expected to

change Brazil into a federation of democracies united under a

constitutional monarchy. Elected after a close contest, he took office

in the latter part of 1835, sincerely anxious to rule well and sustained

by a popular love and confidence such as few Brazilian statesmen have

enjoyed. However, from the beginning he was unable to count on the

support of a majority of the Chamber. He was not the man to manage by

adroit manipulation and skilful distribution of patronage, but his own

work and that of Vasconcellos had borne fruit, and the popular branch of

the legislature had become the dominating political force in the

Brazilian system. The tide was now setting toward conservatism; the

heroic impulses that had brought about the revolution of 1831 had lost

their force; the nation's temper was cooled; the politicians had

forgotten their fine enthusiasm and were busily engaged in personal

intrigues.

Feijo inherited from the former regency the two most formidable

revolutions which so far had broken out--that of Vinagre and Malcher in

Para, and the great rebellion in Rio Grande do Sul. He was hardly fitted

to deal with such a complicated situation as that of Brazil in 1836. He

himself said: "I am a man to break, never to bend." Though he gave the

officeholders of Brazil an object-lesson in unblemished integrity, his

actions were often harsh and arbitrary. When on the floor of the Chamber

he had been the chief exponent of democracy, but as chief executive he

rode roughshod over his inferiors, refused to be guided by others, even

in matters where no principle was involved, and proved that he had the

true Latin tendency to centralise administration.

Vasconcellos soon outgeneralled Feijo. A dread of innovation was

spreading among the landholding classes. The merchants and Portuguese of

the cities naturally gravitated away from the radical regent. The

opposition majority in the Chamber, compactly organised by

Vasconcellos's skilful management, was encouraged, feeling that it was

backed by the mercantile and office-holding classes, and by the persons

of highest intelligence and best social position. It clung together with

a cohesion unusual in South America, and was the foundation upon which

the historical parties were built whose names are constantly

encountered in Brazilian political history for the next fifty years.

For two years Feijo struggled against the adverse conditions. For the

Para revolution he found a clever and faithful general in Andrea, and

managed to keep him well supplied with money and troops, so that a

vigorous pursuit of the guerrilla chiefs resulted in their capture and

the pacification of the province. But in Rio Grande the people were too

strong and too independent to be reduced by troops sent from without,

and Congress hampered him by refusing votes of credit. The revolution

which had broken out there three months before he assumed the regency

had been occasioned by anti-Portuguese feeling and the unpopularity of

the governor. The latter was obliged to flee from Porto Alegre with

hardly a semblance of resistance. At first Feijo wisely limited his

interference to the nomination of a new governor. It was not safe to

irritate the half-feudal chiefs, backed by their bands of gauchos

trained in constant raids over the Uruguayan border and who were too

accustomed to seeing revolutions on the Spanish side to hesitate much

about undertaking one on their own account. But the new governor was

ambitious and tried to take advantage of the jealousies among the gaucho

leaders to make himself supreme. He got some of the ablest of them on

his side, but the others were stimulated into more determined fighting.

The rebels kept the field in formidable numbers, and among their able

partisan chiefs was Giuseppe Garibaldi, who here took part in his first

war for freedom. At first evil fortune followed the patriots, and they

were badly defeated in the battle of Fanfa, where their greatest leader,

Bento Goncalves, was captured and carried to Rio. His lieutenants

rallied again and declared Rio Grande an independent republic.

Feijo despatched a new governor, whose oppressive measures soon brought

about a wholesale desertion by the Rio Grandenses, who had hitherto

supported the union side. By the middle of 1837 Rio Grande seemed

hopelessly lost to Brazil, and the government only held the coast towns.

His bad management of affairs in Rio Grande was the immediate occasion

of Feijo's resignation (September, 1837). The victorious conservative

majority immediately stepped into power. Bernardo de Vasconcellos reaped

at length a personal reward for his years of labour and intrigue, and

became the ruling force in the Chamber, and Prime Minister, though a

wealthy senator, Araujo Lima by name, had been elected regent. But

Vasconcellos was merely the first among equals and held his power only

so long as he could command the support of the conservative majority. A

sort of oligarchy grew up which directed the work of reaction without

much more regard for outside opinion than Pedro himself had shown.

However, Brazil had finally entered upon a stage of government which in

form was parliamentary and in substance was partly so. It was rather the

parliamentarism of Walpole than of Gladstone; the members owed their

seats to the administration; they were a sort of self-nominating and

self-renewing body; and departmental and judicial administration

continued in much the same old way.

The great task before the conservative regency was to undo most of the

work which had been wrought by the federalist and democratic movement of

the early 30's. The amendments to the constitution, known as the _Acto

Addicional_, had apparently established the autonomy of the provinces in

their local affairs. If these amendments had been put into effect,

Brazil would have become a federated state like Switzerland or the

United States. The conservatives were alarmed at the length to which the

provincial assemblies were already going in managing their own affairs,

and succeeded in turning the country back on the road toward

centralisation and unification. A law was passed which interpreted the

_Acto Addicional_ so as nearly to destroy provincial autonomy. The

provincial assemblies were forbidden to interfere with the magistracy;

their resolutions could be vetoed by the governors or the national

Congress; their power of controlling the administration of justice was

taken away. They became little more than advisory bodies completely

under the dominance of governors appointed from Rio, and who rarely were

citizens of the states they ruled. At first there was little opposition,

and the regency easily suppressed a separatist movement in Bahia which

proposed to establish a republic until the boy emperor should come of

age.

[Illustration: DONNA JANUARIA.

[From a steel engraving.]]

The reorganised regency was, however, weak. The attitude of the nation

was merely tolerant and expectant. The war in Rio Grande, continued and

the attacks of the Liberals in the Chamber increased in force and

effectiveness. Ministers began to change and shift; the conviction grew

that the conservative oligarchy would not long rule the country.

Liberals and conservatives alike inclined to the idea that the best

thing was to return to a ruler selected from the legitimate royal

family. According to the constitution the boy emperor would not become

of age until he reached eighteen, in 1843. If the constitution were

strictly followed the country would have to be governed for years by a

hybrid executive--a regent who was neither a ruler by popular choice nor

yet a monarch by blood and succession. Many advocated declaring the

Emperor's eldest sister, Januaria, regent, though the young lady

protested tearfully against being turned into such a thing as she

imagined a regent to be. More insisted that the Emperor, in spite of his

tender years, immediately assume the functions of supreme ruler.

The politicians in opposition, with the two surviving Andradas at their

head, took advantage of this feeling. Bills were introduced in Congress

authorising the Emperor to take the reins at once. The regent's

ministers did not dare directly oppose these measures; they only tried

to compromise as long as possible. But difficulties and dissatisfaction

increased; a formidable revolution broke out in Maranhao; the Rio

Grandenses invaded Santa Catharina. It was evident that the regency

could not continue to hold the clashing provinces together. While the

intellectual conviction had never been stronger that union between the

provinces was an advantage, circumstances were increasing

dissatisfaction and insubordination in every part of the empire.

[Illustration: DOM PEDRO II.

[From a steel engraving.]]

The contest in Congress over the Emperor's majority assumed an acute

phase as soon as the session of 1840 began. The ministry in desperation

sought to prevent immediate action by calling Vasconcellos back to power

and proroguing the session. The announcement of this step was followed

by an outburst that left no recourse but a submission of the matter in

dispute to the boy emperor himself. The opposition deputies went out in

a body to see him, and begged him to consent to assume his imperial

functions at once. Though entirely unauthorised by the constitution, no

one made serious objection to such a revolutionary way of proceeding.

The young Pedro accepted with dignity and confidence; the city and

country went wild with delight, and on the 23rd of July, 1840, Congress

assembled in a sort of extraordinary constituent assembly and without a

dissenting voice proclaimed him of age.

Although the ten years of the regency were the stormiest in Brazilian

history, they were in many respects the most fruitful. The nation was

serving an apprenticeship in governing itself; its public men were being

trained; the value of self-restraint and of peace were being learned.

The freedom of the press and of parliament was definitely established.

The production of literature began; professional schools were put on a

footing not unworthy of any civilised country; learned societies were

organised; the study of the resources of the country was continued;

social intercourse developed; communication between the provinces

increased; the study of foreign languages became general among the

polite classes.

Industrially, too, the period was one of germination of those seeds from

which subsequently grew the prosperity of the country. Though foreign

commerce increased little during the civil wars, the cultivation of

coffee assumed large proportions, and while sugar and cotton, food crops

and tobacco, suffered much from foreign competition and civil

disturbances, nevertheless they held up pretty well. The confusion of

the times and the weakness of the central government prevented any great

improvement in the public finances, but neither taxes nor debt were

piled up as they had been under Pedro I. Though the efficiency and

honesty of the administration left much to be desired, the small

resources of which the central government disposed brought about an era

of comparative economy in the departments.

The South American Republics, Part 1 of 2 · 第 16 / 21 章