"Order promptly all troops necessary to support the sheriffs in
protecting moving trains on Baltimore and Ohio railroad. Go to
Pittsburgh and keep supervision of all troops ordered out. Will be
due at Ogden to-morrow at six o'clock. In the meantime, _en route_,
let me know the situation."
I again sent a dispatch from Laramie City, same day, five-twenty,
P.M.:
"Spare nothing to protect all persons in their rights under the
Constitution and laws of the State, in accordance with the policy
heretofore adopted. Am on the train to Ogden."
I received a dispatch from General Latta--I do not remember whether
before sending this last or after--to this effect:
"PITTSBURGH, PA., _July 20,1877_.
"No difficulty on Baltimore and Ohio railroad in Pennsylvania.
Strike extended to Pennsylvania railroad. Trains stopped at
Pittsburgh by rioters, numbering two or three thousand.
"General Pearson has six hundred men under arms guarding property.
General Brinton will be here to-day, with twelve or fifteen hundred
men. Movement will be made immediately on his arrival to open road,
and we expect to do so without bloodshed.
"I will be at Union hotel, Pittsburgh, until order is restored.
Keep me advised of your movements. If your presence is needed, I
will promptly wire you."
I received numerous dispatches after that from General Latta, Mr.
Scott, and others, and at Ogden I sent the following dispatch to
General Latta, Saturday evening, the 21st of July:
"Dispatch received. Unless I hear from you to change my mind, I
will take the first train to Pittsburgh. There must be no illegal
interference with any person willing to work, and to this end act
promptly, that it may be done without bloodshed."
I then went to Salt Lake City with my family, the next train east not
being due at Ogden until ten o'clock Sunday morning. When I arrived at
Salt Lake City, I had another dispatch from Mr. Quay. This I received
at nine o'clock Saturday evening:
"A collision has occurred here between the strikers and the troops.
Number of persons have been killed and wounded. Intense excitement
prevails in city, and there are indications of further bloodshed,
and that the trouble will be wide-spread and protracted. I suggest
that you return, allowing your party to go forward."
I then secured a special train, leaving there at twelve o'clock, and
got to Pittsburgh on Tuesday afternoon.
Q. Before you go any further, I would like to ask a question or two: In
your instructions to General Latta, before leaving the State, was it
your intention to delegate to General Latta your power as
commander-in-chief to call out the militia in case of an emergency?
A. Not my power, but simply discretion, under the general order, to act
in accordance with our custom in case there was any trouble in my
absence, and to issue orders by my authority, just the same as if I
were in the State.
Q. Signing your name?
A. No; his own, by order of the commander-in-chief, or what is the same
thing, as Adjutant General. I may say that I talked with the Attorney
General before I left the State, and he thought there was no reason why
I should not go.
Q. He was to follow strictly the regulations that had been adopted
heretofore?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Under the act of 1864, what have been the regulations--I do not
quite understand you on that point--about calling out troops?
A. We have not fallen back upon the act of 1864, because the sheriffs
have always called. In fact, the sheriffs are generally very prompt to
call for troops. They often wanted our assistance when we thought it
was not necessary, and in every instance when troops have been ordered
out during my administration, they have been ordered, as they were in
this case, upon the call of the civil authorities to aid them. We have
always kept the troops, so far as we could, subordinate to the civil
authorities. In this instance, and some other instances, perhaps the
civil authorities were not quite as active as they ought to have been,
and they, to a certain extent, disappeared, and then, of course, we
came under the act of 1864. But in the first instance we have never
exercised our authority under that act.
Q. You would consider that under that act you have authority to call
out the militia upon notice, or your own knowledge, that there is any
serious riot or outbreak in the State?
A. Yes. If there is a riot in any section of the State, and the civil
authorities are unable or unwilling to suppress it, I think it would be
my duty, as Executive, to order out the National Guard, and to take
charge of the situation to protect life and property. I would not
hesitate to do it, whenever I became satisfied of that fact.
Q. In your judgment, would that be in conflict--would such an action be
in conflict, in any way--with the Constitution, which says that the
military shall always be in subordination to the civil authorities?
A. Well, I do not pretend to give any legal opinion upon that point;
but, so far as the past has been concerned, we would have been glad and
willing to let the civil authorities take entire control, and it is
only when they were willing and anxious that we took part, and there
never has been a conflict.
Q. That has always been the rule adopted by you, as commander-in-chief?
A. Yes, sir. I am not quite sure that that question may not arise. I
can see very easily how it might arise in the near future, in any
locality where the civil authorities might be in sympathy with the
lawless elements, but we hope that it may not.
Q. And is that a reason why you have adhered to the rules that you have
just mentioned?
Q. I do not know that it was because of any supposed conflict, but I
adhered to that because I thought it was the common-sense way of doing
it. That is about all.
Q. Then the first telegram, I understood you to say, received from
General Latta was in the forenoon of Friday, the 20th?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you know on that day that General Latta had already ordered out
the militia?
A. Not except through him.
Q. Does that telegram state that?
A. Yes. He says, "Ordered Pearson to take charge, and put one regiment
on duty."
Q. Do you know what time General Latta gave that order to General
Pearson to take charge?
A. No; I do not.
Q. I would like you now to state when the news first reached you of any
disturbance at Scranton, and through what channel, and your action in
relation to the outbreak at Scranton.
A. I do not know that I knew anything definitely about the trouble
there until the 25th. As I was passing through Harrisburg to
Philadelphia, on the 25th, I received a dispatch from the Brotherhood
of Firemen and Brakemen, and there was also one, I think, from the
officers of the road, which I do not see here just now. The question
that arose there was that the railroad company were unable to run their
trains, because the firemen and brakemen had struck, and mob would not
let them, and then the Brotherhood of Firemen and Brakeman agreed that
they might run the mails through, and the company did not want to do
that unless they could take a passenger train. I telegraphed back to
the superintendent of the railroad, "Would advise you to let mails run
through." My object in that was not to precipitate any further
disturbance until I had everything in hand. There was, I think, no
running of trains for a week or ten days after that. They were making
an effort to run trains about the 31st of July, but on the 1st of
August there was a disturbance in Scranton, and the mayor called upon
me for troops. The miners came out on a strike about the 25th. In
consequence of this general confusion in Luzerne county, no trains
moved. I had anticipated a movement to Luzerne county for the purpose
of starting trains, and had made my arrangements, but this riot at
Scranton precipitated the movement, and I got there on August 2d. The
riot occurred on the 1st, and I got the first news about two o'clock,
and my advance troops got to Scranton early next morning.
Q. What day did you say you received the call from the mayor for
troops?
A. On the 1st of August. The dispatch was:
"Mob have partly taken possession of the town. I was assaulted, and
sent to my committee for assistance. Mob attempted to follow me up,
when three or more were killed. Come to my assistance.
"R. H. MCKUNE,
_Mayor_."
Very soon afterward, I received another dispatch: "How soon can I
expect troops?" Then I received half a dozen dispatches from private
parties. I sent a dispatch to McKune: "Keep quiet. Will be with you in
the morning."
Q. Had you any communication with the mayor prior to the 1st day of
August?
A. Yes; there were several dispatches in which he was confident that he
could manage the situation. For instance, here is one on the 29th of
July: "Pumps will start to-morrow. Send no troops until you hear
further from me. Am in hopes of a peaceful settlement." Here is a
dispatch from the mayor on the 25th of July, which I overlooked before:
"Strikers have taken the coaches off of the mail train, and will not
allow them to proceed. I am unable to assist the company in getting the
train started." That is on the 25th of July. There is another dispatch
here which influenced me to some extent, dated July 25:
"There is not flour or provisions enough in this (Wyoming) district
to last one week. We are informed that at Scranton the situation is
no better. Unless some means are adopted to open up western
communication by rail, there will be serious trouble here. The
situation is very grave, and demands urgent attention.
"Very respectfully,
"CONYNGHAMS & PAINE."
That is dated Wilkes-Barre, July 25, 1877.
Q. Then, I understand, prior to August 1, the mayor of Scranton did not
desire troops to be sent?
A. No; the first dispatch did not call for troops, but he was evidently
looking to me for assistance. But in a few days after that, on the
29th, he thinks he is able to control it.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Up to that time he was confident that the civil authorities could
control it?
A. Yes. There was no conflict, because the railroad companies could not
move their trains, and did not attempt it. They could not move them,
and the civil authorities were unable to assist the railroad companies,
and therefore did not attempt it, and everything was quiet. Eventually
they were looking to me to help them, but I did not propose to go there
until I got through with Pittsburgh. Besides, I thought if we got
everything started at Pittsburgh, the moral effect of that might settle
the question in the whole State, and there would be no necessity to go
anywhere else.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Did you have any other dispatches from him except the one you have
read, dated the 29th, in which he expressed himself as being able to
control it.
A. No; I think not. I find none in the appendix to the message, and I
have none in this package, I know. While I was at Pittsburgh, Mr. Farr,
my private secretary, was here in charge, and he kept me in constant
communication with the region--with the Luzerne region--and there is
one dispatch from him here; it is rather lengthy, but it gives the
situation on the 31st of July, the day before the riot occurred.
The dispatch was read as follows:
"With exception of Luzerne county, matters in eastern Pennsylvania
have returned to normal condition. Philadelphia is orderly. In
Reading all danger is over, and civil authorities are rapidly
arresting rioters. About fifty are now in jail. The citizens
support General Reeder's action, and believe the firing of his
troops prevented great destruction of property. Two of leaders of
rioters were killed. The P. & R.R. is running trains, and the
bridge will be ready for trains in two weeks. At Harrisburg all
signs of disorders have disappeared. Forty arrests have been made,
and the authorities are rapidly ferreting others. There is no doubt
of their conviction of majority of prisoners, both in Reading and
Harrisburg. Captain Linden assures me there are no fears of an
outbreak in Schuylkill, unless irruptions of striking miners from
Luzerne force the men in Schuylkill to quit work. General
Sigfried's advices from Pottsville are to same effect. In Luzerne
affairs are threatening. The Lehigh Valley R.R. has not resumed,
and trains are stopped on other roads by miners. Engineers driven
from pumps, and mines are flooding. In Wilkes-Barre there is said
to be a scarcity of provisions, owing to interrupted
transportation, and fears are felt of disturbance on that account.
A concentration of troops in Luzerne, to give control of property,
open traffic, and protect workmen, would remove the last vestige of
lawlessness in eastern Pennsylvania. There are two hundred regulars
in Reading. Available troops can be taken from Harrisburg or
Reading without danger. If to-night's advices indicate the
necessity, I will go to Scranton and Wilkesbarre to-morrow, if I
can get there."
Witness: There is another one here, 11.30, P.M., that I suppose was the
same date.
The dispatch was read, as follows:
"In answer to my dispatch of yesterday, Sheriff Kirkendall, of
Luzerne, telegraphs as follows: 'All travel and communication by
railroad stopped. Rumors that Lehigh Valley road resumes to-day.
There has been no riots so far, nor destruction of property, except
incident to stopping mines. Work in all mines stopped; men on
strike.' I report no immediate apprehension of danger. There are
some five hundred troops--National Guard--encamped
here--Wilkes-Barre.... telegraphs from Kingston, July 31, that
Kingston, Plymouth, and Nanticoke have been entirely in the hands
of mob since last night. If anything is being done to master it, I
don't know it. Last night, 30th, they mobbed a passenger train at
Plymouth. Have been ready all day to do so again, if one moved.
This afternoon, 31st, at Nanticoke, the mob stopped all the pumps
at the mines. The citizens are powerless to act; those in authority
don't.
"C. N. FARR, jr.,
_Private Sec'y._"
Q. Had you any communication with the sheriff of Luzerne county direct?
A. His dispatch is incorporated in these: "In answer to my dispatch of
yesterday, Sheriff Kirkendall, of Luzerne, telegraphs as follows: 'All
travel and communication by railroad stopped. Rumors that Lehigh Valley
road resumes to-day. There has been no riot so far, nor destruction of
property, except incident to stopping mines. Work in mines all stopped;
men on strike.'" And there may have been other dispatches received from
him which I have not got--which I did not print.
Q. Had you any dispatches from the sheriff of Luzerne county, in which
he expressed himself as being able to control the situation of affairs
without troops?
A. No; I think there were no such dispatches.
Q. Did he make any call for troops?
A. He made no call. The mayor of Scranton made a call, and so did the
mayor of Wilkes-Barre. I cannot find the dispatch from the mayor of
Wilkes-Barre, but I am satisfied there was one.
Q. Do you know what time the call was made by the mayor of
Wilkes-Barre?
A. It came on the same afternoon that Mayor McKune called for troops. I
do not know just what time the miners came out of the mines. I do not
think they came out until after railroad communication was stopped. I
think the strike was inaugurated after that.
Q. Did you publish the proclamation in your message?
A. Yes; there are two proclamations there.
Q. I wish you would state when the first proclamation was issued?
A. The first proclamation was issued on the 20th of July. The
proclamation was gotten up at the office, and I was notified that it
was issued as soon as it was done.
Q. By the Secretary of the Commonwealth?
A. By the Adjutant General. It was signed by the Secretary of the
Commonwealth. The proclamation was prepared on a blank, which was left
signed for general purposes. Then, when I returned to Pittsburgh I
issued another proclamation, which was dated the 25th of July.
The proclamation was as follows:
_Pennsylvania, ss_: