A. Yes; well armed, that is all right; but they were not.
Q. Were there no arms there. Were there not some stacks of muskets?
A. They had nothing but their sabers, that is all. I saw them all. They
had nothing but their pocket knives. Some of them had no knives,
because they went away so quick, they didn't know where they were
going, and they thought they were going a few miles outside of
Philadelphia.
Q. Do you know whether there was any effort made to take any provisions
or ammunition to the troops in the round-house on Saturday night?
A. Not as I know of.
By Mr. Engelbert:
Q. These Black Hussars are generally intended as cavalry, are they not?
A. Yes; they are all mounted.
Q. The general cry was against the Philadelphia soldiers. That
intimidated these men, did it?
A. I heard them hollering in the street for to kill them--in Liberty
street.
Q. That is a good way to intimidate a person, isn't it?
A. Oh! yes; I was right with them. I suppose they would if they could.
A man says to me, what I got business to do with the Philadelphia
troops, keeping conversation with them. I told him that is my business.
Q. What business you had with them?
A. Yes. I said that is my business.
Q. They didn't pretend to interfere with you--did they?
A. I suppose they would, if they could. I don't know, I wasn't afraid.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Was it known to the crowd that these Black Hussars were quartered in
your house? Did the crowd know that the Black Hussars were in your
house?
A. No; not that Sunday. They found it out on Monday, though. The people
came in the house keeping very nice, quiet conversation with them. I
never heard a wrong word on Wednesday. The house was crowded, and they
were sitting around with them, drinking beer. It was all right; very
nice, quiet conversation.
Q. The Black Hussars did?
A. Our Pittsburgh friends treated them very kind.
* * * * *
Robert B. Carnahan, being duly _sworn_, was examined as follows:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside, Mr. Carnahan?
A. I reside in Pittsburgh, Nineteenth ward. We call it the east end
here.
Q. Practicing attorney?
A. Practicing attorney.
Q. Solicitor for the sheriff, I believe?
A. Yes; I am at this time, and have been for two years past.
Q. Just state what you know of the movements of the sheriff during the
riots of July last?
A. At the time of the first disturbance, which occurred on Thursday
evening, it was preceding the Saturday on which----
Q. That was the 19th--Thursday evening, the 19th?
A. Yes; the 19th. I knew nothing whatever of anything the sheriff had
done, or had been called on to do. I was informed the next morning that
during the night of Thursday the sheriff had been called on by the
solicitor of one of the railroads--Mr. Scott--by some of the railroad
officials, during the night, and that he had been at Twenty-eighth
street during that night, but I knew nothing of it personally. My
residence is five miles--nearly six miles--from here, though in the
city of Pittsburgh, and I was not sent for that night. The next day I
became acquainted with what had been done, but I think I did not see
the sheriff at all. He was out at Torrens station during a considerable
portion of the day, with the railroad officers, and I don't remember to
have seen him that day. I think he had been up pretty much all the
night before, and was out, away from his office, the greater part of
Friday, and I don't think I saw him at all on Friday. On Saturday
morning I saw the sheriff, and had a full conference with him in his
office. The sheriff submitted to me what he had done. Gave me an
account of his meeting the rioters on Thursday night, and of his being
out at Torrens station on Friday, where I think he was a considerable
part of the day--at one place or the other--at least, I did not find
him during business hours; and of his notification of the Governor that
he was not able to deal, in his opinion, with the rioters or mob that
had obstructed the running of the trains. Of course, I made inquiry as
to the magnitude of the gatherings, to learn something about their
threatening, hostile character. In fact, had known myself, personally,
coming in on the road, that the trains were detained. I said to him
that I entirely approved, as a matter of law, of what he had done in
notifying the Governor to send on troops. The view I had of the act of
1864, I think it is, was that the Governor, on reliable information
from any quarter where there was insurrection that the legal
authorities were not able to deal with, might call out the troops, and
I approved of that; but on Saturday morning the attorneys of the
Pennsylvania railroad went into the court of common pleas No. 2, and
obtained warrants for the arrest of a number of persons--my
recollection is, fifteen in number--who were charged as leaders of this
riotous movement. I think the warrants were addressed to a constable of
the name of Richardson, and the solicitors of the road made a demand on
the sheriff that morning for a _posse comitatus_ to attend the
arresting officers, and support him in the discharge of that duty. This
took place sometime in the morning, at or after eleven o'clock in the
morning--it was after eleven o'clock, I think--and I advised the
sheriff to assemble a _posse comitatus_--as large a number of men
as he could obtain--that three or four hundred would not be too large,
and it was understood, at that time, that troops would arrive that
evening. They would arrive here at twelve o'clock, or about twelve
o'clock, perhaps earlier than twelve, on a train that arrived here
between eleven and twelve o'clock, and it was understood the
arrangement was, that the civil authorities were to make these arrests,
the constable supported by the sheriff and his _posse comitatus_,
and that the military were to be on the ground. There was, indeed, very
little time for obtaining a _posse comitatus_ at that time, but
the sheriff sent out his deputies, some fifteen or sixteen of them,
with instructions to bring in a _posse comitatus_. There was not
time to write out summonses and serve them in any way, but I said to
him that it would be a sufficient demand upon a person to attend if
given verbally, that it was better to have a written notice, if there
was time, which there was not then--less than an hour to do it all in.
These deputies went out, some fourteen or fifteen of them, but they
severally came in and reported at an interval of an hour, or an hour
and a half--it was nearly one o'clock--and the result was, I think, but
two men were obtained. I remember of one man being brought into the
office who was very much alarmed. The sheriff asked him if he was
willing to go. He said he was not willing to go; he was afraid to go.
The sheriff reproached him with cowardice, and said he did not want
that kind of a fellow to attend him. I think not more than two men were
obtained. Sometime between twelve and one--I think nearer one than
twelve--the sheriff, with his own deputies, went up to the Union depot.
I think all his deputies, with the exception of one or two, perhaps,
who were not then in the city. Every deputy he had in the city attended
him, including his two sons and his brother, and they went up to the
Union depot, and I think the constable was with him. I am not entirely
sure about that. I attended them myself up as far as the Union depot. I
know we went there, and some of the military had arrived there from
Philadelphia at that time, but I think not all of them. I know nothing
more as to what occurred on that afternoon, for I was not at
Twenty-eighth street when the firing took place, and my personal
knowledge ends with this, that the sheriff himself personally went. I
cannot relate about anything that took place on Saturday night, or
after that time, for I was not in that part of the city, but was at
home.
Q. Do you know when it was that she sheriff made the call on the
Governor for troops to support him?
A. I only know from what he told me himself, and what I have heard
others say, and what I have seen printed--it must have been on Thursday
night, the 19th.
Q. In your opinion, had the sheriff then exhausted his powers and
resources to cope with the mob?
A. I, of course, cannot judge that; that is a question of fact. I can
only judge of it from what other people have told me. I can judge from
what I personally have seen of this mob myself, coming in on the train
every day, for these trains had been delayed for two or three days. The
freight trains were accumulating, and had been detained for some days
before that or some time before that--at least one day--one whole day,
if not another. I should judge from the crowds I saw assembled about
the trains myself, and from descriptions of them by others, that it was
not possible for the sheriff with any _posse comitatus_ that he
could obtain to deal with them, and I will tell you on what I found my
opinion. This was a combination, I may say, of what we call here in
Pittsburgh, the striking element. I don't think any man will say that
he found a preponderance of the railroad men in their assemblages about
Twenty-eighth street, or the Union depot, or other places on the road.
Everybody out of work who belonged to what we call the striking
population, were directed by sympathy or opinion towards these people.
It was not a body of railroad men alone, and I don't think that the
larger part of them were railroad men--the iron workers, the people who
work in rolling mills, and the people who work in the various branches
of industry, were all in sympathy with them, so far as I observed, and
so far as my knowledge, derived from others, extends, and it was a sort
of massing of the striking element here. The strike of the Pennsylvania
railroad men being simply the occasion that brought them together.
Q. Let me ask you another question: In your judgment, had the sheriff
at that time, under the act of 1864, laid the grounds for calling on
the Governor for aid?
A. I don't remember--I have not the act of 1864 before me, and I don't
remember whether it defines any ground. My recollection is, that the
act itself does not define more than in general terms, at least, the
ground upon which the executive aid maybe invoked. I was satisfied of
this, and I think Senator Scott was. I know from his conversations with
me that it was such a gathering, with such a purpose, and with such a
determination that, at least, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company did not
expect to deal with them without military forces to aid them, and I
think that that was the prevalent impression. One of the sheriffs
deputies told me that, though he had served in the army three years, he
never had encountered any danger that alarmed him like the danger he
expected to encounter here. He was a man willing to do his duty. It was
a mob that inspired some terror, even at that time. Before any blood
was shed, there was a general apprehension of trouble. I have seen many
strikes here of coal diggers, of men engaged in iron mills and glass
houses, and the various departments of industry. In fact, we have been
a good deal accustomed to them, but there had never before been very
much actual, positive mischief coming from them, and I never before saw
a mob the people were afraid of, before that one in this city. However,
I must say I saw but little of it until Saturday, and then the soldiers
had been called out under the command of General Pearson, and some
Philadelphia soldiers had arrived. On Saturday, the feeling was angry,
it was threatening and severe.
Q. What preparations is it necessary for the sheriff to make, or what
are his duties under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania before
calling on the Governor for aid?
A. Well, gentlemen, I think the law on that subject has been very much
changed by the act of 1864. That is here. I would like to refer you to
it. I think very radical changes were made in the law relative to
calling out the militia, by the act of 1864, that has been much
adverted to lately. I think it establishes a very different system.
Q. From that heretofore in practice?
A. I think so. I think it is altogether different. As I understand that
law, it is not necessary at all that the sheriff should notify the
Governor. It might be done by the mayor, or alderman, or even by any
citizen. The Governor himself judges of the sufficiency.
Q. As you understand the law, is it necessary for the sheriff to make
an effort to obtain a _posse comitatus_ before calling on the Governor?
A. I certainly would think the sheriff, the principal peace officer of
the county, ought to make some effort to get a _posse comitatus_
to control that riot; but there are cases where the riot has taken such
proportions, as I think this one had--I do not regard it as local at
all, for it extended from the Mississippi to the Atlantic--there are
such cases where no _posse comitatus_ could deal with them at all.
Q. At the time the sheriff made the call on the Governor, was it not
principally local?
A. As to that I cannot speak from personal knowledge. What has been
told to me was, in substance, this: That when the sheriff first met the
gathering at Twenty-eighth street, there was a large collection of
people, numbering, I don't know how many, but one or two thousand
people, and this was in the middle of the night--towards eleven o'clock
at night. They were gathered there. They insulted the sheriff, threw
all sorts of reproaches upon him, blasphemy and obscenity of the very
worst character were employed--this I don't know personally, but it has
been told to me--and threats were made. Now, it is a question upon
which you can judge as well as I, whether, when a crowd can be brought
together at that hour of the night--a crowd greatly in excess of all
the railroad men in this part of the country--whether any collection of
citizens you might obtain, would be able to successfully disperse them,
and it is a question very hard to determine.
Q. Would it, in your judgment, be the duty of the sheriff to make an
effort to obtain a posse before calling on the Governor?
A. Unless the effort was plainly fruitless, I would not understand the
law to require him to do a thing that is plainly unnecessary. If an
armed force would come into the county which the sheriff evidently
could not deal with citizens, especially without arms, I would not
think it necessary to expose himself to any sacrifice of life. If the
disturbance were local, I think he ought to make a serious effort to
disperse it, before calling on the Governor. The law, as I understand
it, and the only law in force on this subject, is the act of 1864,
which was passed during the war--during the time of the rebellion, and
when there were disturbances in different parts of this State. I
understand it authorizes the Governor to call out the militia, on any
information that satisfies his mind, whether it is of an official
character or not. It is in these terms:
"When an invasion of, or insurrection in, the State is made
or threatened, or a tumult, riot, or mob shall exist, the
commander-in-chief shall call upon the militia to repel or suppress the
same, and may order our divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, or
companies, or may order to be detached parts or companies thereof, or
any number of men to be drafted therefrom, and may cause officers to be
detailed, sufficient with those attached to the troops to organize the
forces."
That was not the law until 1864. At one period in Pennsylvania, when
the military were called out, they were to be under the command of the
sheriffs. That was changed by the act of 1857--I am not entirely sure
about that--it was about that time, and in case of an insurrection,
application was to be made to a judge, and so forth. But it will be
observed that that law seems to supply all existing legislation on the
subject, and applies to cases of insurrection, invasion, mobs, tumults,
and riots, and also authorized the Governor when these exist, to call
them out, though it don't prescribe on what terms or conditions he
shall call them out. I take it that if you, Mr. Chairman, or any
gentleman in whom the Governor had confidence, were to communicate with
him information that a mob or tumult existed, and it was necessary to
call out forces to deal with them, he would be perfectly authorized in
calling out the militia, whether his information is of official
character or not.
Q. Did you communicate your views, as you have given them to us, to
Sheriff Fife?
A. Yes; I said I approved of what he had done. He had sent these
telegrams on Thursday night, and as I stated to you, I didn't see him
until afternoon.
Q. You approved of what he had done?
A. I approved of what he had done, and I think that view was the view
of Mr. Scott, the solicitor of the railroad, and I think of everybody
that were cognizant of the fact. At a later period, during the week
succeeding the destruction of the property, the various railroads
here--the Fort Wayne and Chicago, the Pittsburgh and Cleveland, and the
Allegheny Valley, the Baltimore and Ohio, and the Charleston and
Virginia road sent written demands to the sheriff, setting forth that a
tumultuous body of men were holding their property, and threatening to
destroy it, and calling upon him to protect the property. The sheriff
made a demand for aid upon General Brown, who was in command of the
Sixth division, having succeeded General Pearson, who had been
relieved, to enable him to protect this property. I cannot give you the
views the military had of their duty here----
Q. We will take the evidence of the military men?
A. There is a communication, and a copy of the communication, written
by myself, and sent to General Brown, in fact, it is the original
letter, which I have here, to General Brown, making a demand, and I
have a copy of his reply. The sheriff, at the same time, or before that
time, had constituted General James S. Negley his deputy, for the
purpose of preserving the public peace and dispersing the rioters.
General Negley was recruiting a body of men to act in preserving the
peace. It was said he had several hundred men, and the sheriff, after
consultation, clothed him with all the civil character which the
sheriff himself had in dealing with these disturbances.
Q. What time was that done?
A. That was done somewhere about the 25th of July. It is about the date
of this letter. [Indicating.] This letter will, perhaps, explain about
what the sheriff's views of duty were, if you will permit me to read
it.
Q. I don't see hardly how that would be necessary, because he called
upon the Governor as commander-in-chief to send troops?
A. But the Governor was not here with his troops.
Q. Well, he ordered his troops out?
A. There were no troops here at that time, except the Sixth regiment.
General Brinton had been here on Saturday, but he had left with his
troops. There were no troops here, except the Sixth division, commanded
then by General Brown, and composed of the Fourteenth, Eighteenth, and
Nineteenth regiments.
Q. Is this of a character to give directions to General Brown or asking
him for aid?
A. Asking him for aid.
Q. I think it would be proper to have it read.
The witness then read the following communication:
SHERIFF'S OFFICE, PITTSBURGH, _July 26, 1877_.
_To GENERAL JOSEPH BROWN, in command of the Sixth Division National
Guard of Pennsylvania_:
SIR: I have the honor to enclose to you copies of the
following communications, addressed to me under date of the 25th
and 26th days of July, inst., by Messrs. Hampton and Dalzell,
solicitors for the Pennsylvania company, operating the Pittsburgh,
Fort Wayne and Chicago railway, and the Cleveland and Pittsburgh
railroad; also by the same parties, solicitors of the Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Company; also by the same parties,
solicitors of the Pittsburgh, Virginia and Charleston Railroad
Company, and by Welty McCullough, solicitor of the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Company and the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad
Company, representing, in substance, that the property of the
respective railway companies is in immediate and constant danger of
destruction at the hands of a body of rioters and disaffected
workmen, which may at any time become a mob, and which said
companies believe has an intention of destroying said property.
I beg leave to inform you that since the present disturbances began
I have made efforts to summon a _posse comitatus_ to suppress
the unlawful and riotous proceedings of the persons referred to in
the enclosed communications, but have been hereto unsuccessful in
procuring the services of any considerable number of men willing to
come to my aid as a _posse comitatus_. My consequent inability
to disperse the unlawful assemblages referred to (or some of them)
has been communicated to the Governor, who has ordered out the
military power of the State for that purpose. I cannot protect the
property referred to without your aid. Can you give it? I am well
persuaded that no mere civil force that I can raise can protect
this property. If you can give me the aid of your military force
please inform in writing immediately.
Yours respectfully,
R. H. FIFE,
_Sheriff_.
Signed by the sheriff. It was dated the 26th, and the answer of General
Brown came two days afterwards, July 28th, and is as follows:
[Official Business.]