Personal Mention of Generals Sheridan, Wright, and Ricketts, and
Mrs. Ricketts--Also Generals Crook and Hayes--Battle of Opequon,
Under Sheridan, September, 1864, and Incidents
I had so far recovered from the wound received in the Wilderness
as to enable me to reach Baltimore, August 25th, on the way to the
army, though my arm was yet in splints and a sling. In response
to a telegram, the War Department directed me to report to General
Sheridan. I reached Harper's Ferry the next day. When I reported
to Sheridan, he looked at me fiercely, and observed: "I want
fighting men, not cripples. What can I do with you?" I asked
him to order me to General Wright for assignment to my old brigade.
He seemed to hesitate. I informed him of my familiarity with the
Shenandoah Valley, and told him I thought I was able for duty. He
gave the desired order reluctantly.
Sheridan did not impress me favorably then. He seemed restless,
nervous, and petulant. I now think I somewhat misjudged him. He
was thirty-three years of age,( 1) in full vigor of manly strength.
He had, both in infantry and cavalry commands, won renown as a
soldier, though his highest fame was yet to be achieved. He was
short of stature, especially broad across the shoulders, with legs
rather short even for his height. His head was quite large, nose
prominent, eyes full; he had a strong face, and was of a cheerful,
social disposition, rather than retiring and taciturn. Irish
characteristics predominated in him, and when not on duty he was
disposed to be rollicking and free and easy. He was not hard to
approach by his inferiors, but he was not always discriminating in
the language he used to them. He did not seem to be a deliberate
thinker or reasoner, and often gave the impression that his decisions
or opinions were off-hand and not the result of reflection. In
the quiet of camp he seemed to be less able to combine or plan
great movements than in emergencies in the field. In a battle he
often showed the excitement of his impetuous nature, but he never
lost his head or showed any disposition save to push the enemy.
These are some opinions formed after seeing him in several great
battles, and knowing him personally through all the later years of
his life. It remains to say that he was an honest man, and devotedly
loyal to his friends. His fame as a soldier of a high class will
endure.
Generals Wright and Ricketts each received me warmly, and, as
always, showed me the utmost kindness.
Horatio G. Wright was a skilled and educated soldier, of the engineer
class. He, like the great Thomas, was of a most lovable disposition
and temperament. He had held many important commands during the
war; had failed in none, and yet uncomplainingly suffered himself
to be assigned from the command of a department to that of a division
of troops. He was unfortunate once, as we shall see, and the glory
of his chief shone so brightly as to dim the subordinate's well
earned fame. But I must not anticipate. Wright was especially
fitted to command infantry--a corps or more in battle. His
intercourse with his officers was kindly and assuring under all
circumstances. His characteristics as a soldier were of the
unassuming, sturdy, solid kind--never pyrotechnic. He was modest,
and not specially ambitious. In brief, he was a great soldier.
James B. Ricketts was also a highly educated soldier, and when I
met him in the Valley he had been in many battles. He was a man
of great modesty, of quiet demeanor, and of the most generous
impulses. He never spoke unkindly of any person, and was always
just to superiors and inferiors. He was wounded at Bull Run (1861),
and captured and confined for many months in prison at Richmond.
His heroic wife, Fanny Ricketts, on learning of his being wounded,
joined him on the battle-field, and shared his six months' captivity
to nurse him.( 2) The special mention of Wright and Ricketts and
his wife must be pardoned by the reader, as they were of my best
friends, not only during, but since the war. Mrs. Ricketts was
often in camp with her husband, and though a most refined lady,
was, by disposition, education, and spirit quite capable of commanding
an army corps. She possessed great executive ability.
Two other officers whose acquaintance I formed in the Valley in
1864, and who were in after life my friends, I venture to mention
also.
George Crook was an ideal soldier. He was born near Dayton, Ohio,
September 8, 1828, and was a West Point graduate. He was of medium
stature, possessed of a gentle but heroic spirit, and justly won
renown in the War of the Rebellion, and subsequently in Indian
wars. He died suddenly in Chicago, March 21, 1890. His body is
buried at Arlington in the midst of his fallen war-comrades. He
left no children. His fame as a patriot and soldier belongs to
history.
Rutherford B. Hayes, a brigade commander in the opening of Sheridan's
Valley campaign, was born at Delaware, Ohio, October 4, 1822. He
was not educated for a soldier. He was a man of medium height,
strong body, sandy hair, sanguine temperament, and was always self-
possessed, and gentle in his intercourse with others. He was a
most efficient officer and had the power to inspire his men to
heroic deeds. He was twice wounded, and retired at the end of the
war distinguished as a volunteer soldier. Subsequently he served
a term in Congress, three terms as Governor of Ohio, and was
President of the United States 1877 to 1881.
I assumed command of my old brigade on the 26th of August, near
Halltown. Its ranks had been much depleted, yet it numbered about
2000 effective men, including recruits. It was then composed of
the 6th Maryland, 110th, 122d, and 126th Ohio, 67th and 138th
Pennsylvania, and 9th New York Heavy Artillery serving as infantry.
I found still with it, in command of regiments, Colonels John W.
Horn and Wm. H. Ball, Lieutenant-Colonels Otho H. Binkley and Aaron
W. Ebright, who had each passed safely through the recent bloody
campaigns.
Sheridan's cavalry made daily reconnoissances, and frequently
engaged the enemy in advance of Charlestown. A cavalry reconnoissance
was made on the 29th which brought on an attack, near Smithfield,
by Fitz Lee's cavalry supported by infantry. The report came that
our cavalry under General Wesley Merritt were being driven back,
and Ricketts was ordered to go to its relief. As I was familiar
with the roads and country, he sent me forward with my brigade and
some attached troops. We met our cavalry about two miles from
Smithfield retiring in a somewhat broken condition. I deployed my
command on its left and pushed the enemy back to a ridge about a
mile north of that place. Here he made a stand, displaying
considerable force. I decided to attack at once. While preparing
for an advance, I discovered what appeared to be a considerable
body of cavalry forming for a charge on my left flank. My line
was single, and I was without support in that direction. At this
juncture a small number of mounted officers and men appeared on a
knoll to my rear. I supposed them to be a body of cavalry sent
forward to participate in the engagement. I rode to advise the
officer in command of the threatened danger. I found there Sheridan
and his staff and escort; also Merritt and some of his staff.
Sheridan had ridden to the front to see the situation. He seemed
surprised to see me, and asked sharply, "What are _you_ doing here?"
There was no time then for parley, as my command had already begun
to advance. I told him of the danger, and pointed out to him the
enemy's cavalry on our left, and asked for a force to meet it. He
responded that he had no force on hand. I suggested that the
cavalry with him, if immediately thrown well out to the left in a
threatening position, would answer the purpose. He replied: "----
----, that is my escort." I rejoined that it was needed badly,
and might save disaster. With a somewhat amused expression on his
face he ordered it to move as I indicated.( 3)
About the time of this incident a puff of smoke from a rifle, fired
on the heights held by the enemy about a mile distant, was seen.
Almost instantly a familiar _thud_ was heard, and all looked around
to see who of the assembled officers had been hit. Major (Surgeon)
W. H. Rulison (9th New York Cavalry), serving as Medical Director
of the Cavalry, was killed by the shot.( 4)
The enemy was driven from the ridge and we were soon in possession
of Smithfield.( 5) Merritt's cavalry took post at the bridge, and
the infantry were withdrawn to camp near Charlestown.
Sheridan threw his whole army forward on September 3d, the infantry
stretching from Clifton farm on the right to Berryville on the
left. On this day there was short but fierce fighting between
Averell and McCausland's cavalry at Bunker Hill, in which the latter
was defeated with loss in prisoners, wagons, and supplies, and also
between Crook's command and Kershaw's division. The latter seems
to have run, at nightfall, unexpectedly, into Crook, near Berryville,
and was severely punished. Kershaw was of Longstreet's corps and
was then under orders to return to Lee's army at Petersburg. No
other event of greater importance than a reconnoissance occurred
until the 19th.
Sheridan's army was then composed of the Sixth Corps, under Wright
--three divisions, commanded, respectively, by Generals David A.
Russell, George W. Getty, and James B. Ricketts, and an artillery
brigade of six batteries; the Nineteenth Corps under Emory--two
divisions and four batteries; Eighth Corps (Army of West Virginia)
under Crook--two divisions, and an artillery brigade of three
batteries. Besides the troops mentioned, there were three divisions
of cavalry and eight light or horse artillery batteries, commanded
by General Alfred A. T. Torbert. The cavalry divisions were
commanded, respectively, by Generals Wesley Merritt, Wm. W. Averell,
and James H. Wilson.( 6) Although there were in Sheridan's command
about 50,000 men present for duty, they were so scattered, guarding
railroads and various positions, that he was not able to take into
battle more then 25,000 men of all arms.( 7) Early had in the
Valley District Ewell's corps, Breckinridge's command, and at least
one division of Longstreet's corps, Fitz Lee's and McCausland's
cavalry divisions and other cavalry organizations, and it is probable
that he was not able to bring into battle more then 25,000 effective
men. These estimates will hold good through the months of September
and October, though some additions and changes took place in each
army. Grant met Sheridan at Charlestown the 16th, to arrange a
plan for the latter to attack Early. Sheridan drew from his pocket
a plat showing the location of the opposing armies, roads, streams,
etc., and detailed to Grant a plan of battle of his own, saying he
could whip Early. Grant approved the plan, and did not even exhibit
one of his own, previously prepared. This meeting was on Friday.
Sheridan was to move the next Monday.( 8)
Sheridan gives much credit to Miss Rebecca M. Wright of Winchester
for sending him information by a messenger that Kershaw's division
and Cutshaw's artillery, under General Anderson, had started to
rejoin General Lee.( 9)
The enemy was in camp about five miles north of Winchester at
Stephenson's Depot, his cavalry extending eastward to the crossing
of the Opequon by the Berryville pike. Our camps were, in general,
about six miles to the northward of Opequon Creek. Sheridan's plan
submitted to Grant was to avoid Early's army, pass to the east of
Winchester, and strike the Valley pike at Newtown, seven miles
south of Winchester, and there, being in Early's rear, force him
to give battle.(10) Early moved two divisions to Martinsburg on
the 18th, which caused Sheridan suddenly to change his plan and
determine to attack the remaining divisions at Stephenson's Depot.
Early, however, did not tarry at Martinsburg, but learning there
of Grant's visit to Sheridan, and fearing some aggressive movement,
returned the same night, leaving Gordon's division at Bunker's Hill
with orders to start at daylight the next morning for the Depot.
Gordon reached the Depot about the time the battle opened.(11)
Sheridan's final plan for the expected battle was set forth in
orders issued on the 18th. It was for Wilson's cavalry and Wright's
corps to force a crossing of Opequon Creek on the Berryville pike.
Emory was to report to Wright and follow him. As soon as the open
country, south of the Opequon, was reached, Wright was to put both
corps in line of battle fronting Stephenson's Depot. Crook's
command was to move to the same crossing of the Opequon and be held
there as a reserve. Merritt and Averell's cavalry divisions under
Torbert were to move to the right in the direction of Bunker
Hill.(12)
The army moved at 2 A.M. of the 19th as ordered. Wilson's cavalry
succeeded in crossing the creek and driving the enemy's cavalry
through a deep defile some two miles towards Winchester. Wright
followed, Getty's division leading, Ricketts and Russell following.
When the defile was passed, Getty went into position on the left
of the pike, Ricketts on the right, both in two lines, and Russell's
division was held in reserve. My brigade was the right of the
corps as formed for battle. The only battery up was put in position
on the right. The Nineteenth Corps was ordered to form on the
right of the Sixth and to connect with it. Up to this time no
severe fighting had taken place. Early was forced to move the main
part of his army to his right to cover the Berryville and Winchester
pike. Upon our side much delay occurred in getting up the artillery
and the Nineteenth Corps, during which time we were exposed to an
incessant fire from the enemy's guns. The Nineteenth did not make
a close connection on the right of the Sixth. Not until 11.40 A.M.
was the order given for a general attack. Ricketts' division was
to keep its left on the pike. As soon as the advance commenced
the Sixth Corps was exposed to a heavy artillery fire from the
enemy's batteries, but it went forward gallantly for about one
mile, driving or capturing all before it. General Ricketts, in
his report of September 27th, described what took place:
"The Nineteenth Corps did not move and keep connection with my
right, and the turnpike upon which the division was dressing bore
to the left, causing a wide interval between the Sixth and Nineteenth
Corps. As the lines advanced the interval became greater. The
enemy, discovering this fact, hurled a large body of men towards
the interval and threatened to take my right in flank. Colonel
Keifer at once caused the 138th and 67th Pennsylvania and 110th
Ohio to break their connection with the right of the remainder of
his brigade and move towards the advancing columns of the enemy.
These three regiments most gallantly met the overwhelming masses
of the enemy and held them in check. As soon as the Nineteenth
Corps engaged the enemy the force in my front commenced slowly
retiring. The three regiments named were pushed forward until they
came upon two batteries (eight guns), silencing them and compelling
the enemy to abandon them. The three regiments had arrived within
less than two hundred yards of the two batteries when the Nineteenth
Corps, after a most gallant resistance, gave way. These guns would
have been taken by our troops had our flanks been properly protected.
The enemy at once came upon my right flank in large force; successful
resistance was no longer possible; the order was given for our men
to fall back on our second line, but the enemy advancing at the
time in force threw us temporarily in confusion."
The repulse of the Nineteenth, and consequently of my three regiments,
left Breckinridge's corps full on our right flank, threatening
disaster to the army. Wright promptly put in Russell's division,
until then in reserve, and the progress of the enemy was arrested.
Here the brave David A. Russell lost his life. My report, written
September 27, 1864, described, in general, a further part taken by
my brigade:
"The broken troops of my brigade were halted and reformed in a
woods behind troops from the reserve, which had come forward to
fill up the interval. As soon as reformed, they were moved forward
again over the same ground they had traversed the first time.
While moving this portion of my brigade forward, I received an
order from Brigadier-General Ricketts, commanding division, to
again unite my brigade near the centre of the corps, and to the
right of the turnpike, near a house. This order was obeyed at
once, and my whole brigade was placed on one line, immediately
confronting the enemy. The four regiments of my brigade, that were
upon the left, kept connection with the First Brigade, Third
Division, and fought desperately, in the main driving the enemy.
They also captured a considerable number of prisoners in their
first advance.
"Heavy firing was kept up along the whole line until about 4 P.M.,
when a general advance took place. The enemy gave way before the
impetuosity of our troops, and were soon completely routed. This
brigade pressed forward with the advance line to, and into, the
streets of Winchester. The rout of the enemy was everywhere
complete. Night came on, and the pursuit was stopped. The troops
of my brigade encamped with the corps on the Strasburg and Front
Royal roads, south of Winchester."
It was Sheridan's design, if Wright's attack had been completely
successful, to push Crook rapidly past Winchester and seize the
Strasburg pike, and thus cut off Early's retreat; but the repulse
of the Nineteenth Corps made it necessary to move Crook to our
right. This caused some delay, during which the Sixth Corps bore
the brunt of the battle. General Hayes, in his report, dated
October 13, 1864, described the part taken by a division of Crook's
command:
"I have to honor to report that at the battle of Opequon, September
19, 1864, the Second Infantry Division, Army of West Virginia, was
commanded by Colonel Isaac H. Duval until late in the afternoon of
that day, when he was disabled by a severe wound, and the command
of the division devolved upon me. Colonel Duval did not quit the
field until the defeat of the enemy was accomplished and the serious
fighting ended. The division took no part in the action during the
forenoon, but remained in reserve at the Opequon bridge, on the
Berryville and Winchester pike. The fighting of other portions of
the army had been severe, but indecisive. There were some indications
as we approached the battle-field soon after noon that the forces
engaged in the forenoon had been overmatched. About 1 P.M. this
division was formed on the extreme right of the infantry line of
our army, the First Brigade, under my command, in advance, and the
Second Brigade, Colonel D. D. Johnson commanding, about sixty yards
in the rear, forming a supporting line; the right of the Second
Brigade being, however, extended about one hundred yards farther
to the right than the First Brigade. The division was swung around
some distance to the right, so as to strike the rebel line on the
left flank. The rebel left was protected by field-works and a
battery on the south side of Red Bud Creek. This creek was easily
crossed in some places, but in others was a deep, miry pool from
twenty to thirty yards wide and almost impassable. The creek was
not visible from any part of our line when we began to move forward,
and no one probably knew of it until its banks were reached. The
division moved forward at the same time with the First Division,
Colonel Thoburn, on our left, in good order and without much
opposition until they unexpectedly came upon Red Bud Creek. This
creek and the rough ground and tangled thicket on its banks was in
easy range of grape, canister, and musketry from the rebel line.
A very destructive fire was opened upon us, in the midst of which
our men rushed into and over the creek. Owing to the difficulty
in crossing, the rear and front lines and different regiments of
the same line mingled together and reached the rebel side of the
creek with lines and organizations broken; but all seemed inspired
by the right spirit, and charged the rebel works pell-mell in the
most determined manner. In this charge our loss was heavy, but
our success was rapid and complete. The rebel left in our front
was turned and broken, and one or more pieces of artillery captured.
No attempt was made after this to form lines or regiments. Officers
and men went forward, pushing the rebels from one position to
another until the defeated enemy were routed and driven through
Winchester."
About 5 P.M. Sheridan galloped along the front line of the Sixth
Corps with hat and sword in hand and assured the men, in more
expressive than elegant language, of victory in the final attack,
and he, about the same time, ordered Wilson with his cavalry to
push out from the left and gain the Valley pike south of Winchester.
Torbert, with Merritt and Averell's cavalry, was ordered to sweep
down along the Martinsburg pike on Crook's right to strike Early's
left. The enemy had been pushed back upon the open plains northeast
of Winchester and was trying hard to hold his left against the foot-
hills of Apple-Pie Ridge, and to cover the Martinsburg pike.
Most of the enemy's cavalry and much of his artillery were on his
left. Getty (Sixth Corps), who from the first held the left of
our infantry, steadily advanced, holding whatever ground he gained.
The Nineteenth did not participate largely in the battle after its
repulse. The cavalry bore a conspicuous part in the battle. The
last stand was made by Early one mile from Winchester. About 5
P.M. Wright and Crook's corps, though then in single line, impetuously
dashed forward, while Merritt and Averell's cavalry divisions under
Torbert, somewhat closely massed, overthrew the Confederate cavalry
and swept mercilessly along the Martinsburg pike and the foot of
the precipitous ridge. The enemy's artillery was ridden over or
forced to fly from the field. Torbert reached the left flank of
the Confederate infantry at the moment it was hard pressed by the
advancing troops of Wright and Crook. Our cavalry, in deep column,
with sabres drawn, charged over the Confederate left, and the battle
was won. This charge was the most stirring and picturesque of the
war. The sun was setting, but could be seen through the church
spires of the city. Its rays glistening upon the drawn sabres of
the thousands of mounted warriors made a picture in real war, rarely
witnessed. In this charge, besides the division leaders mentioned,
were Generals Custer and Devin, and Colonels Lowell, Schoonmaker,
and Capehart, leading brigades, all specially distinguished as
cavalry soldiers. The fighting continued into and through the
streets of Winchester. The pursuit was arrested by the coming of
night and the weariness of the soldiers, many of whom had been
without food or rest for about eighteen hours. The significance
of the victory was great, but it was particularly gratifying to
the old soldiers in my command who had fought at Winchester under
Milroy. The night battle at Stephenson's Depot, fifteen months
before--June, 1863--was within the limits of the field of Opequon.
Ewell's corps had driven Milroy from Winchester, but now, in turn,
under another commander, it was flying as precipitately from our
forces. The war-doomed city of Winchester was never again to see
a Confederate Army. Wilson's cavalry division did good service on
the Union left, often fiercely attacking the Confederate right
flank. Late in the day he pushed past Winchester on the east, and
encountered and dispersed Bradley Johnson's cavalry. Wilson,
however, was too weak to cut off Early's retreat, but he continued
in pursuit until 10 P.M.
This was my first considerable battle after being severely wounded,
and candor compels me to say that I do not think being wounded one
or more times has a tendency to promote bravery or to steady nerves
for future battles. The common experience, however, is that when
a soldier is once engaged in the conflict, his nerves, if before
affected, become steady, and danger is forgotten.
My horse was shot while leading the three regiments on the right
of the corps; later I was severely bruised on the left hip by a
portion of an exploded shell, and a second horse was struck by a
fragment of one which burst beneath him while I was trying to
capture a battery posted on a hill at the south end of the main
street of Winchester.
I quote again from my report:
"My brigade lost, in the battle of Opequon, some valiant and superior
officers. Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Ebright, commanding the 126th
Ohio, was killed instantly early in the action. He was uniformly
brave and skilful. He had fought in the many battles of the Sixth
Corps during the past summer's campaign. Captain Thomas J. Hyatt
and Lieutenant Rufus Ricksecker, 126th Ohio, and Lieutenant Wm. H.
Burns, 6th Maryland, also fell in this action. Each was conspicuous
for gallantry on this and other fields upon which he had fought.
Colonel John W. Horn, 6th Maryland, whom none excelled for
distinguished bravery, was severely if not mortally wounded.(13)
Colonel William H. Ball, 122d Ohio, received a wound from a shell,
but did not quit the field. He maintained his usual reputation
for cool courage and excellent judgment and skill. Captain John
S. Stucky, 138th Pennsylvania, lost a leg. Major Chas. M. Cornyn,
122d Ohio; Captain Feight and Walter, 138th Pennsylvania; Captain
Williams, Lieutenants Patterson, Wells, and Crooks, 126th Ohio;
Captains Hawkins and Rouzer and Lieutenant Smith, 6th Maryland;
Lieutenants Fish and Calvin, 9th New York Heavy Artillery; Captains
Van Eaton and Trimble and Lieutenants Deeter and Simes, 110th Ohio,
are among the many officers more or less severely wounded.
(Lieutenant Deeter, 110th Ohio, has since died.)
"Captain J. P. Dudrow, 122d Ohio, and Lieutenant R. W. Wiley, 110th
Ohio, were each slightly wounded while acting as A. D. C.'s upon
my staff."
Colonel Ebright had a premonition of his death. A few moments
before 12 M. he sought me, and coolly told me he would be killed
before the battle ended. He insisted upon telling me that he wanted
his remains and effects sent to this home in Lancaster, Ohio, and
I was asked to write his wife as to some property in the West which
he feared she did not know about. He was impatient when I tried
to remove the thought of imminent death from his mind. A few
moments later the time for another advance came, and the interview
with Colonel Ebright closed. In less than ten minutes, while he
was riding near me he fell dead from his horse, pierced in the
breast by a rifle ball. His apprehension of death was not prompted
by fear. He had been through the slaughters of the Wilderness and
Cold Harbor; had fought his regiment in the _dead angle_ of
Spotsylvania, and led it at Monocacy. It is needless to say I
complied with his request.
Incidents like this were not uncommon.
The battle was a bloody one.
The Union killed and wounded were:(14)
Killed. Wounded. Aggregate.
Officers. Officers.
| Men. | Men.
Sixth Army Corps (Wright) 18 193 111 1331 1653
Nineteenth Army Corps (Emory) 22 292 104 1450 1868
Army of W. Va. 6 98 34 649 787
Cavalry 7 61 29 275 372
---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Totals 53 644 278 3705 4680
The casualties in my brigade were 4 officers and 46 men killed, 24
officers and 261 men wounded; aggregate, 335.(15) This was little
less than the total loss in the three cavalry divisions.
There is no complete list of the Confederate losses so far as I
can discover. Early reported his killed and wounded in this battle
at 2141, and missing 1818, total, 3959.(16) Doubtless many of the
missing were killed or wounded. General R. E. Rodes was killed in
a charge with his division.(16) General Godwin and Colonel Patton
were also killed; Generals Fitzhugh Lee and York were severely
wounded.
This battle was inspiriting to the country. Lincoln, Stanton, and
Grant each wired congratulations and thanks.(17)
Sheridan was now appointed a Brigadier-General in the regular army
and assigned to the permanent command of the Middle Military
District.
The Valley was soon to further reek with blood, and the torch of
war was soon to consume it.
( 1) Sheridan was born March 6, 1831, and died August 5, 1888.
( 2) Mrs. Ricketts drove from Washington to Bull Run in her own
carriage and besought Gen. J. E. Johnston to parole her husband,
and allow her to take him to his home in Washington. This was
refused, and her carriage was confiscated. In after years, when
the Johnstons were in Washington, he holding high political positions,
she refused to recognize them.
( 3) Members of his staff reported Sheridan as saying that the
request for his personal body-guard was impudent, but could not be
refused.
( 4) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., 145.
( 5) _Ibid_., 45.
( 6) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., pp. 107-112.
( 7) _Ibid_., p. 61.
( 8) Grant's _Memoirs_, vol. ii., p. 328.
( 9) Sheridan's _Memoirs_, vol. ii., pp. 4-7.
(10) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 46.
(11) _Ibid_., p. 555.
(12) _Ibid_., Part II., pp. 102-3.
(13) Colonel Horn survived the war, and died near Mitchellville,
Md., October 4, 1897.
(14) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., 118.
(15) _Ibid_., p. 113.
(16) _Ibid_., p. 555.
(17) _Ibid_., pp. 61-2.